


THE CAMBRIDGE
HEGEL TRANSLATIONS

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
*Encyclopedia of the Philosophical
Sciences in Basic Outline*

Part 1: Logic



CAMBRIDGE

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GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL

Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline

Part I: Science of Logic

The purpose of the Cambridge Hegel Translations is to offer translations of the best modern German editions of Hegel's work in a uniform format suitable for Hegel scholars, together with philosophical introductions and full editorial apparatus.

Hegel's *Encyclopedia* Logic constitutes the foundation of the system of philosophy presented in his *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. Together with his *Science of Logic*, it contains the most explicit formulation of his enduringly influential dialectical method and of the categorial system underlying his thought. It offers a more compact presentation of his dialectical method than is found elsewhere, and also incorporates changes that he would have made to the second edition of the *Science of Logic*, if he had lived to do so. This volume presents it in a new translation with a helpful introduction, an extended analytical index, and notes. It will be a valuable reference work for scholars and students of Hegel and German idealism, as well as for those who are interested in the post-Hegelian aspects of contemporary philosophy.

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GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH
HEGEL

*Encyclopedia of the Philosophical
Sciences in Basic Outline*

Part I: Science of Logic

TRANSLATED AND EDITED BY

KLAUS BRINKMANN AND DANIEL O. DAHLSTROM

Boston University



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Introduction

Hegel's Encyclopedia *Logic*

Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel (1770–1831) is one of the great figures of German Idealism along with Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775–1854). Hegel's most famous publication is undoubtedly the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which appeared in 1807 just after he had left his teaching position at the University of Jena. In 1800 his friend Schelling, with whom he had been a student at Tübingen, had invited Hegel to join him in Jena, where they taught side by side until 1803, when Schelling left for southern Germany. When French troops under Napoleon entered Jena in October 1806, Hegel's situation became too precarious for him to stay. The university was closed, Hegel's position there was relatively insecure, and his salary (which Goethe had been able to procure for him) was too small to make ends meet. As much as Hegel desired to continue in an academic setting, he was forced to spend the next decade of his life outside the university, first in a temporary job as editor of the *Bamberger Zeitung*, a newspaper that appeared in Bamberg, Bavaria, and then as professor and headmaster of the *Gymnasium* in Nuremberg, Bavaria.

The Nuremberg years (1808–16) are the gestation period of Hegel's mature philosophy.¹ During this time, he wrote and published the *Science of Logic* (appearing in two volumes comprising three books, in 1812–13 and 1816) and began to work out the contours of his comprehensive philosophical system. Like his contemporaries, Hegel was convinced that any philosophy had to take the form of a system, i.e. it had to be a comprehensive, complete body of knowledge organized around a central principle, such that all propositions were rigorously derived in a progressive line of argument and all parts methodically connected to each other. In 1807 he intended the *Phenomenology of Spirit* to be 'the first part of the system',² to be followed by a second part comprising a logic (i.e. a general ontology)

¹ See Nicolin (1977).

² See SL 29.

and a philosophy of nature and of spirit. While this second part of the system was never published in its originally intended form, the first volume of the *Science of Logic* came out as the first instalment of the system's second part, but because it had grown to such dimensions Hegel decided to publish it separately, without the philosophies of nature and of spirit.

Apparently, Hegel then changed his mind and abandoned the idea of working out the remaining parts of the system as initially planned.³ Instead, he decided to develop an abbreviated version of the entire system under the title of an *encyclopedia*. This encyclopedic version was to reflect the basic structure of the system itself, but it was meant to provide only the key concepts and major parts in outline without going into too much detail. So what Hegel had in mind was a compendium of the fully worked-out system itself: a *summa philosophiae*, so to speak. While the key concepts and parts of the system would be contained in it, the text would represent a slimmed-down version, organized in successively numbered sections. In the Nuremberg text, Hegel defines its purpose as follows: A 'philosophical encyclopedia is the science of the necessary connection, as determined by the concept, and of the philosophical genesis of the fundamental concepts and principles of the sciences'.⁴

It seems that Hegel's decision to compose an outline of his system was primarily motivated by his obligations as principal of the Nuremberg *Gymnasium*: his responsibilities included teaching philosophy in lower, middle, and upper level courses. The guidelines he received from the Bavarian ministry of education for the upper-level course prescribed that he teach 'the topics of speculative thought' that had been taught separately at the lower and middle level, and that he do so in the comprehensive form of 'a philosophical encyclopedia'.⁵ Thanks to manuscripts discovered in 1975, scholars have been able to determine that Hegel taught the entire *Encyclopedia* (consisting of a logic, a philosophy of nature, and a philosophy of spirit) for the first time in the school years 1811–12 and 1812–13.⁶

In August 1816 Hegel accepted the offer of an appointment as professor of philosophy at the University of Heidelberg, where he stayed for four semesters before accepting an even more prestigious position at the University of Berlin in 1818. Already during his first semester at Heidelberg he lectured on the *Encyclopedia* and repeated this course twice during the Heidelberg years (typically, Hegel would hold his lecture courses six hours

³ He also decided that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* would no longer serve as the first part of the system. Instead, its first part would now be the *Logic*.

⁴ WW (Glockner) III, 169 (our translation).

⁵ Jaeschke (2003, 219). ⁶ Bonsiepen/Grotsch (2000, 620).

per week, Monday to Saturday). Based on the drafts written in Nuremberg, Hegel prepared a book manuscript entitled *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline* for publication. The book was supposed to serve as a compendium for his lectures, i.e. a resource for his students and a basic text to be expanded on during the oral presentation. This so-called Heidelberg *Encyclopedia* was printed and available to the public in the summer of 1817.

Practically from the start, Hegel began to emend and elaborate on the printed text in handwritten notes. To this end, he ordered a specially made personal copy of the *Encyclopedia* with blank pages inserted between the printed ones.⁷ The second edition of the *Encyclopedia*, which appeared in 1827, grew out of these revisions. As early as 1822, Hegel had expressed the need for a second edition, and in 1825 the first edition had in fact gone out of print. The second edition of the *Encyclopedia* contains significant revisions and adds a hundred sections to the 477 of the Heidelberg version. The revisions chiefly concern the Introduction to the work, the Preliminary Conception of the Logic, the arrangement of the categories at the beginning of the Doctrine of Essence, and various elaborations in the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit. By comparison, the third edition of the *Encyclopedia*, which followed in 1830 and on which our translation of the Logic is based, contains few further revisions.⁸ In particular, beginning with the second edition Hegel now prefaced the main body of the text with a new explanation of the method, purpose and the overall structure of philosophy (the 'Introduction' comprising §§ 1–18 in this translation of the 1830 *Encyclopedia*), a new introduction to the Logic (the 'Preliminary Conception' comprising §§ 19–78), and an explanation of the dialectic with an overview of the structure of the Logic (the 'More Precise Conception and Division of the Logic' comprising §§ 79–83).⁹

Since the 1830 edition of the *Encyclopedia* incorporates Hegel's own successive revisions, it is natural for students and scholars of Hegel's philosophy to rely on this edition today. However, today's editions of the 1830 *Encyclopedia* are in one respect significantly different from the one published

⁷ This copy survives, and the handwritten notes in the section on the Philosophy of Spirit have been reproduced in facsimile and transcribed in vol. XIII of the edition of Hegel's collected works published under the aegis of the Northrhine-Westphalian Academy of the Sciences (i.e. the volume here referred to as Bonsiepen/Grotsch (2000)).

⁸ Thus, the number of the sections (577) remained the same in the second and third editions. For a synopsis of the changes between the first and second edition see Kainz (1996, 39–40). For a list of the changes from the second to the third edition see the editorial report in Bonsiepen/Lucas (1992).

⁹ We know from Hegel's correspondence that he struggled with the length of this introductory text, trying several times to shorten earlier drafts of it (see Bonsiepen/Lucas, 1989, 463).

by Hegel, for they usually contain additional material deriving not only from Hegel himself but also from notes taken by his students during his lectures. This material was added to the first posthumous edition of Hegel's collected works published by Hegel's students in 1832 and the following years. The editors used material from notes taken during different lecture cycles, unified it in language and style, and added it to the relevant sections of the *Encyclopedia*. For the most part, this material, flagged as 'Zusatz' (Addition) to the section and printed in smaller type than the original Hegelian text (which contains the main body of the section and very often an indented Remark), expands on the point made in the main section by elaborating on the argument and offering illustrations or examples. It adds flesh to the bare bones of the original text, as it were, and thus reflects Hegel's oral presentation of the printed material in the classroom. While the text of these Additions cannot be said to be a verbatim reproduction of Hegel's lectures, it certainly constitutes a faithful and reliable echo of them. In their mostly non-technical language, the Additions are also immensely helpful in elucidating the main text.

The *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline* is the only form in which Hegel ever published his entire mature philosophical system. It is therefore an indispensable text for those who want to study Hegel's conception of philosophy as a whole. Whereas some parts of it, such as the *Encyclopedia Logic* (also called the Lesser Logic) and the Philosophy of Objective Spirit, also exist in expanded published versions, namely, the *Science of Logic* and the 1821 *Philosophy of Right*, or in the form of lecture cycles, other parts, like the Philosophy of Nature, have up till now never been accessible in any other form than the *Encyclopedia* version.¹⁰

Hegel organizes the material of the philosophical sciences into three large blocks, each with a tripartite subdivision: Logic (subdivided into Being, Essence, and Concept), Nature (subdivided into Mechanics, Physics, and Organics), and Spirit (subdivided into Subjective, Objective, and Absolute Spirit), each of the subdivisions being further divided in tripartite fashion. He thereby means to capture all fundamental aspects of reality and to indicate the basic concepts and principles of each. Thus, for instance,

¹⁰ Some of the lecture cycles such as the Lectures on the Philosophy of History, the Aesthetics, the Philosophy of Religion and the History of Philosophy have been accessible in print since the time of the first posthumous edition of Hegel's works in 1832–45. However, they constitute edited and consolidated versions of materials taken from different courses over a period of several years, and hence a uniform text that makes it impossible to discern the development of Hegel's views over the years. The edition of the Northrhine-Westphalian Academy of the Sciences (still in progress: see <http://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/philosophy/Hegelarc/homepage.htm>) will make available the individual lectures from the individual semesters separately.

Mechanics discusses space, time, matter, motion, gravity; Organics treats of geology and meteorology, inorganic and organic nature (plant and animal life); Subjective Spirit deals with the nature and functions of the human soul and its relation to the body (under the title of Anthropology), consciousness as it relates to and begins to categorize and discern regularities in the world of objects, self-consciousness in its relationship to other self-consciousnesses, and the inner workings of the mind such as memory, imagination, the formation of language, and volition (under the title Psychology); Objective Spirit represents an outline of Hegel's philosophy of right and his moral and political philosophy, while the Philosophy of Absolute Spirit contains Hegel's philosophy of the arts, religion, and philosophy itself (with an account of the syllogistic structure of the entire tripartite system).¹¹

The important consideration for Hegel, however, is the unity of the system as a whole and its logically rigorous internal structure. Each concept or category of reality (also called 'thought-determination' by Hegel) must be methodically derived from its predecessor and together they must form a single, comprehensive, closed system such that his philosophy can claim to be an exhaustive account of the ideal structures underlying all reality. The fact that the account is exhaustive, that the grounding structures of reality are conceptual, and that the system is closed makes Hegel's philosophy a statement of absolute idealism. It is in part the ambitiousness of this programme and the fact that Hegel did in fact execute it (in the form of the *Encyclopedia* and in his lectures) that has earned him his reputation as one of the greatest philosophical minds ever (the other part being the unique style of his philosophizing and the stupendous insights growing out of it).

How, then, does Hegel ensure the inner cohesion of the system? First, he determines the core or ground of reality to be in fact thinking or reason¹² (or, in its most highly developed form, spirit), so that reality can be said to be organized in terms of intelligible structures that are conceptual or conceptualizable. The problem that the world in its material reality is *not* itself thought is solved by referring to anything that is not thought or reason as *otherness*. However, what is other than thought is conceptualizable, since this otherness can be determined by thinking. Whatever is

¹¹ The lecture cycles on aesthetics, religion and philosophy mentioned in the previous footnote offer first a systematic and then a historical account of their subject matter with a wealth of historical detail.

¹² He likes to appeal to Aristotle's belief that the world is governed by *nous* or reason: see, for instance, *Encyclopedia* § 24 Addition 1.

an object of thought (and in this sense opposed to, excluded from, or a *negation* of thought) is other than thought, but its otherness has a name and a conceptual content that can be specified. This, however, is only the first step. Merely to generate concepts or thought-determinations for what is other than thought would not allow thought to claim that it is itself the real ground of this otherness. In fact, in our ordinary understanding this is precisely how we look at the world – as describable and intelligible, even conceptualizable and predictable (for instance, through the laws of physics), but as something other than thought, not as the otherness of thought itself. Hegel's perhaps most notorious move here is to *integrate* this otherness (i.e. anything that is an object of thought) into thought itself by *negating* its otherness. Since the otherness was already determined as something negative, its second negation now amounts to a negation of the negation, i.e. an affirmation in the sense of integration into thought. This is Hegel's famous negation of negation, the most important aspect of his dialectic.¹³ What happens is that the conceptualized otherness is made part of a system of thought-determinations¹⁴ and is then shown to be only a *partial* determination of the system as a whole. Thus, new aspects of otherness need to be identified that have not yet been integrated into the complete conceptual account, until all otherness is exhausted. It is important to keep in mind, however, that conceptualized and integrated otherness is a determination of reality itself; hence Hegel is able to say that the concepts or categories represent 'objective thoughts' (*Encyclopedia* § 24), or that they contain 'the object in its own self'.¹⁵ The concept of the object is equivalent to the object itself to the extent that the object is intelligible, conceptualizable, or 'rational'. In this sense, thought thinks itself in thinking about the thought-determinations of the real. Philosophy is the knowledge that the world of nature and spirit is structured in accordance with reason, and its highest aim is the recognition of this accord (see *Encyclopedia* § 6). In this recognition philosophy fulfils its highest aspiration according to Hegel, namely the reconciliation of reason with the reality we live in (*ibid.*). Philosophical thought is self-recognition in the other, hence, Hegel's designation of philosophy as speculative thought (see *Encyclopedia* § 82).¹⁶

¹³ Hegel explains the dialectic, or, more precisely, the structure of the process of thought as such, in *Encyclopedia* §§ 79–82 (see below). The dialectical aspect constitutes the second phase of this process (see *Encyclopedia* § 81), but it is customary to have the entire process in mind when speaking of Hegel's dialectic.

¹⁴ Hegel speaks of a 'system of concepts' (*System der Begriffe*) in his *Science of Logic*: see SL 54 (Miller translates 'system of Notions').

¹⁵ SL 49. ¹⁶ Speculative from Lat. 'speculum': mirror.

Hegel ensures the overall unity of the system by presenting its three parts as three forms of a single reality called 'the idea' (see *Encyclopedia* § 18). The idea is the ensemble of all the ideal structures that constitute reality. At the same time, it is the thinking that contemplates this ensemble and recognizes itself in it. The idea is reality as subjectivity, i.e. as a self-referential, self-organizing, self-determining system that is capable of self-reflection to the extent that it is thought or reason. The Logic is the idea 'in the abstract element of *thinking*' (*Encyclopedia* § 19), while Nature is the idea in its self-externality and Spirit the idea as it realizes itself in the human spirit, its institutions and its achievements (e.g., political community, in the arts, religion, and philosophical thought). In truth, therefore, we do not have three parts of the system but instead three aspects of one and the same totality.

However, the Logic is not only the logical core of the idea; it also occupies a special place within the system in that it serves as the structural foundation of its other parts. At its core is the concept (see *Encyclopedia* §§ 163–5),¹⁷ a complex ideal structure that is the blueprint, so to speak, for all self-referential, self-organizing and self-determining forms of reality. In traditional terms, its basic form is that of a definition by genus and specific difference (see *Encyclopedia* § 164 Remark). The thought behind this is that concrete reality always has the form of a particularized universality instantiated in individuals.

But why does Hegel give the name of 'logic' to the first part of the system? Here it should be pointed out that Hegel's idea of logic does not derive from the modern concept of formal logic but from the ancient Greek word for reason, word or language, *logos*. The *logos* means the ideal structure that makes sensible reality intelligible, just as the meaning of a word makes the mere sound of a word intelligible. More precisely, *logos* stands for the conceptual structure that captures the essentialities of things (see *Encyclopedia* § 24). Hegel's logic should therefore be understood as a theory of the fundamental concepts of reality – concepts that in the philosophical tradition since Aristotle are referred to as 'categories'. Consequently, Hegel either identifies his logic with traditional metaphysics (ibid.), or he says that his Logic *replaces* the metaphysics of the past (see *Science of Logic* 63). His Logic can therefore also be called an ontology.¹⁸ The categorial structures developed in the Logic, and in particular those of the Doctrine

¹⁷ Hegel's *Begriff*, sometimes also translated as Concept or Notion.

¹⁸ During the Nuremberg years, Hegel's own designation for the first two parts of the Logic was that of an 'ontological logic' and an 'objective logic', whereas the third part entitled Doctrine of the Concept was called 'subjective logic': see Bonsiepen/Grotsch (2000, 62f.).

of the Concept, form the conceptual basis for the Philosophies of Nature and of Spirit.

The objectives Hegel tried to achieve with his philosophy and with the Logic in particular are too complex to summarize in the space of a short introduction. Two goals may be identified here, however. First, as the opening sections of the *Encyclopedia* Logic explain, Hegel believes that the primary business of philosophy is the translation of representations (*Vorstellungen*) into thoughts (see *Encyclopedia* § 3 Remark, § 5), or the reflection on the deeper meaning of our experience by means of thinking things over (see *Encyclopedia* § 6, § 3 Remark). What in ordinary experience and in the empirical sciences is understood in more or less depth and detail and often in isolation must be contemplated in its true meaning and in its inner coherence so as to understand its place within the whole of human knowledge. Philosophy is the attempt to comprehend things holistically, i.e. in their interconnectedness and their relative contribution to the self-organizing whole. But philosophy is not only the attempt to comprehend the fundamental nature of the object-world. The translation of the contents of our experience must ultimately lead to a contemplation of the underlying principle of experience, namely to a contemplation of thinking itself,¹⁹ spirit's 'loftiest inwardness' and 'unalloyed selfhood' (see *Encyclopedia* § 11), so that it may know itself, achieve complete self-transparency, and thus fulfil what Aristotle called the desire to understand that is characteristic of the human spirit. Philosophy is actual knowledge of the truth, not merely love of wisdom (see *Encyclopedia* § 25).

But second, thinking is unable to recognize its own unalloyed self entirely in the object-world. The tradition of metaphysics had been to understand reality in terms of an objectivity existing over against the thinking subject. In other words, traditional metaphysics was an ontology focused on substances as with Aristotle and Descartes, or on the one substance as the sum total of reality that is both God and nature, as with Spinoza. Although substance could be endowed with thought or reason like Aristotle's *nous* or Spinoza's God, the thinking that contemplated this substance contemplated an object: something other than itself that is not a self for itself and therefore still separated from the contemplating subject. It was only with Kant's Copernican turn that philosophical thought came to understand that subjectivity itself is at the basis of the object-world as well. Hence, Hegel believed that, by drawing out the consequences of the Kantian

¹⁹ Hence Hegel specifies: 'philosophy does nothing but transform representations into thoughts, – and indeed, beyond that, the mere thought into the concept' (*Encyclopedia* § 20 Remark).

revolution (as he understood it) he was also bringing to completion the quest that had motivated philosophy throughout its history, namely, achieving full understanding of the world by achieving full understanding of thinking itself – since the world is, at its core, subjectivity itself. For this reason, substance had to be shown to be subject, too, and substance ontology had to be seen ultimately to be subject ontology.²⁰ For Hegel, this insight revealed the very meaning of the history of philosophy.

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²⁰ This is why Hegel entitles the third part of the *Logic*, the *Doctrine of the Concept*, 'subjective logic' and the concept as such the 'subjective concept' (E § 163), not because the concept is subjective but because the concept exhibits the logic of subjectivity.

Translators' note

The aim of this translation is to present Hegel's *Encyclopedia* Logic faithfully in readable and lucid contemporary English prose. The task is daunting, given the technical and dated senses of his terminology, the idiosyncrasies of his style, and – above all – the sheer complexity and power of his thinking. A translation must be sensitive to the fact that Hegel's terminology is now almost two centuries old, stemming from a period when German philosophers – even in the wake of Kant and Herder, Mendelssohn and Wolff – were still looking for the words to express themselves. While Hegel marks a high point in this development, it is also a distant memory today. Moreover, translators of Hegel's Logic must never lose sight of the fact that, while Hegel eschews neologisms for the most part, he nonetheless moulds terms to suit the distinctive technical aims of a philosophical science and, indeed, in the text at hand, the aims of a science of logic that underpins all other philosophical sciences. In addition, like any writer, he has a style all his own that, even in its quirkiness, must be respected and reflected as much as possible in translation. Finally and most importantly, the task of translating Hegel's texts must heed their philosophical import, capturing and conveying to their readers the force of the philosophical arguments that they contain.

Our translation of Hegel's *Encyclopedia* Logic has been motivated by the general principles just outlined. We have tried to strike a balance between the need to be faithful to Hegel's prose in its historical context and the desire to convey the force of his thinking as clearly as possible. These general principles guided our endeavour but, as general principles, they left us with several prudential decisions about the translations of specific words and phrases. The results of our decisions about specific terms can be garnered from the Glossary. However, it may prove helpful to review our reasons for translating some traditionally troublesome terms in the ways that we did.

First, however, a word about the editions on which the translation is based. We based the translation on the text of the 1830 edition of Hegel's *Encyclopedia* as it appears in the reissue by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, published as vol. VIII of *Werke in zwanzig Bänden* (Stuttgart: Suhrkamp, 1970). The Moldenhauer–Michel text is based on the Complete Edition of Hegel's works by his students (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1832–45). This text also contains the Additions (*Zusätze*) of the 1840 edition of Hegel's *Encyclopedia*, which appeared as vol. VI of the Complete Edition. We found that the differences between the latter and the following Akademie edition were largely limited to spelling or orthography: *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* (1830), unter Mitarbeit von Udo Rameil, herausgegeben von Wolfgang Bonsiepen und Hans-Christian Lucas, in: *Gesammelte Werke*, hrsg. von der Rheinisch-Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Band XX (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1992).

We have followed ordinary English usage and left most terms uncanceled, leaving it to the reader to determine from the context whether or not Hegel is using terms such as 'concept' and 'idea', for example, in the technical senses he gives them in the *Logic*. On the other hand, in cases where it is helpful to know which term Hegel uses in the original, we often insert the German term in italics and brackets.

Finding a suitable English equivalent for *aufheben* is perhaps the most formidable challenge for translators of Hegel's texts. We translate the term with 'sublate', 'sublating' or 'sublation'. The alternative 'supersede' would have had the advantage of conveying much of the technical term's central significance as a process of cancellation, preservation, and elevation at once. However, as Hegel's *aufheben* and *Aufhebung* are themselves non-ordinary terms of art like 'sublate', and since the translation of the *Science of Logic* appearing in this series of Hegel translations chose 'sublate' and 'sublation', we thought it best to opt for 'sublate' and 'sublation' as well.

Because *Moment* is Hegel's technical term for integral but distinguishable parts of a concept or definition, we have decided to translate it as 'moment', despite the obviously different normal sense of the English term.

Hegel characterizes *Dasein* as 'determinate being' (*bestimmtes Sein*), but uses *Dasein* as the name of this category. We have translated *Dasein* as 'existence', since that is the closest English equivalent. Since Hegel also uses *Existenz* as a technical term in the *Logic of Essence*, we chose 'concrete existence' for the latter to mark the difference between *Dasein* and *Existenz*.

Similarly, we translate *Wesen* straightforwardly as 'essence' except for those cases where, in the English context, it clearly refers to a being such as 'the supreme being' (*das höchste Wesen*).

Since Hegel employs *Inhalt* far more often than he employs the cognate, but in his use more emphatic, term *Gehalt*, we have reserved 'content' for *Inhalt* and translated *Gehalt* as 'basic content' – unless otherwise indicated, as, for example, in the Foreword and in § 48. In order to differentiate *Sache* from *Ding* ('thing') and *Materie* ('matter'), we have systematically translated *Sache* as 'basic matter'.

The term *wissen* – as the adjectives (e.g. 'immediate' or 'absolute') chosen by Hegel to modify it suggest – can signify the entire gamut of knowing, from the most elemental knowledge to knowledge that is absolute. At one point (§ 81, Addition 2) Hegel uses *wissen* to designate knowing in general, while attributing *erkennen* to philosophy (see, however, his reference to *philosophisches Wissen* in § 88). Along these lines, *erkennen* signifies at times the mediation of a process of *wissen*, the specification of a more immediate *wissen* (see § 46: 'Now to know [*erkennen*] means nothing other than knowing [*wissen*] an object in terms of its determinate content'), although it is also used as a synonym for or in apposition to *wissen* (see § 225: 'The former is the drive of knowledge [*Wissen*] to truth, knowing [*Erkennen*] as such'). Given the frequent lack of differentiation of the two terms and Hegel's far more frequent use of *erkennen* than *wissen*, we have elected to translate both as 'knowing' or 'knowledge'. However, readers can assume that any occurrence of 'immediate knowing' translates *das unmittelbare Wissen* or *unmittelbares Wissen*. In any other case where *wissen* is in play, we indicate as much by citing the relevant German term.

In two other instances where a single English term is the best translation for two German words, we have employed a similar strategy. Thus, we translate both *Unterschied* and *Differenz* as 'difference' but flag the less frequent uses of *Differenz* (and its cognates: *different*, *indifferent* and the like).

We follow a modified version of this strategy with respect to *Gegenstand* and *Objekt*. Both may be rendered as 'object', but *Gegenstand* refers typically to any object of consideration or, more technically, to an object of consciousness or experience; *Objekt*, on the other hand, refers to the logical concept of object and is the title of the second chapter of the third division of the *Logic*. Before § 193, the final section before that chapter, Hegel employs *Gegenstand* far more frequently than *Objekt*, while afterwards he employs *Objekt* far more frequently than *Gegenstand*. So, prior to § 193, all unflagged instances of 'object' refer to *Gegenstand* and we flag all instances

of 'object' as a translation of *Objekt*. After § 193, all unflagged instances of 'object' refer to *Objekt* and we flag all instances of 'object' as a translation of *Gegenstand*. Throughout the entire text, an unflagged 'objectivity' is a translation of *Objektivität*.

Hegel often employs the term *scheinen* in its ordinary sense as an equivalent to 'seem' and we have translated it accordingly. However, he also employs it in a technical way that draws upon two *distinguishable* senses of the term, namely, that of 'shining' and '(projecting or presenting a) semblance'. In contexts where this technical employment is clearly intended (in particular, in the Logic of Essence, starting with § 112 and the Logic of the Concept at §§ 240 *et seq.*), we have employed one of the two translations, depending upon the emphasis more directly germane to the passage in question.

Another vexing word-play in Hegel's text is the phrase *sich mit etwas zusammenschließen*, here translated as 'joins itself together with something' or, simply, 'joins together with something' (where 'something' is often replaced by a specific term). This translation, while reflecting a common usage of the German expression, does not convey any link with another use of *schließen*, namely, 'infer' or 'syllogistically infer', precisely in the sense of bringing an inference or syllogism to a 'close'. Thus, whereas *schließen* can mean 'inferring' or 'closing', *zusammenschließen* means 'uniting' (in the sense of 'closing ranks'). Unable to find a suitable English expression that preserved the German word-play – 'close' and 'infer (i.e. close an argument)' and 'join together (i.e. close ranks)' – we chose to stay with the straightforward translation and simply acknowledge its inadequateness. *Traduttore, traditore!*

Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences
in Basic Outline

Part I: Science of Logic

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Preface to the first edition

The need to provide my listeners with a guide to my philosophical lectures first prompted me to let this overview of the entire scope of the philosophy come to light earlier than I would have otherwise thought appropriate.

The nature of an outline not only excludes a more exhaustive elaboration of the ideas in terms of their *content*, but also restricts in particular the elaboration of their systematic derivation, a derivation that must contain what is otherwise understood as a *proof* and that is indispensable for a scientific philosophy. The title was supposed to indicate the scope of the whole as well as the intention to reserve the details for the oral presentation.

In the case of an outline where the aim is to present an already pre-supposed and familiar content in a deliberately succinct manner, more consideration is given simply to the *external purposefulness* of the ordering and arrangement. The present exposition is not in this position. Instead it sets up a new reworking of philosophy according to a method that will some day be recognized, I hope, as the only true method, identical with the content. For this reason, I would have considered it more advantageous for the exposition, as far as the public is concerned, if circumstances would have allowed me to have a more elaborate work about the other parts of the philosophy precede it, a work of the same sort as I provided the public in regard to the first part of the whole, the Logic. Moreover, although it was necessary in the present exposition to limit the side of the content that lies closer to *representation* and empirical familiarity, I believe that, in regard to the transitions (which can be nothing other than a mediation effected by means of the *concept*), I have made this much evident: that the methodical character of the progression is sufficiently distinct from the merely *external order* that the other sciences look for, as well as from a *mannerism* that has become customary in treating philosophical objects. This mannerism *presupposes a schema* and in the process sets up parallels among the materials just as externally as – and even more arbitrarily than – the first way does [i.e. the way of the other sciences]. Through the most peculiar

misunderstanding, this mannerist method claims to have done justice to the necessity of the concept with contingent and arbitrary connections.

We have seen the same arbitrariness also seize control of philosophy's content, setting out on the adventures of thought and imposing itself for a while on sincere and honest striving, but otherwise taken, too, to be a foolishness that had risen to the point of madness. Yet instead of being imposing or mad, its basic content more readily and more often displayed quite familiar trivialities, just as the form displayed the sheer mannerism of a deliberate, methodical, and easily procured witticism involving baroque connections and a forced eccentricity, just as generally, behind the visage of seriousness, it displayed deception towards itself and the public. By contrast, on the other side, we have seen the sort of shallowness that stamps its *lack of thoughts* as a scepticism that regards itself as clever, and a critical position that is modest about reason's prospects, a shallowness whose arrogance and vanity mount in tandem with the emptiness of its ideas. – For some time these two directions of the spirit have simulated German earnestness, wearied its deeper philosophical need and brought about an indifference to the science of philosophy – indeed, even a scorn for the latter – with the result that now a self-styled humbleness even thinks itself entitled to enter the discussion and pass judgment on the profoundest dimension of philosophy and to deny it the rational knowledge whose form used to be conceived in terms of *proofs*.

The first of the phenomena touched on can be regarded, in part, as the youthful pleasure of the new epoch that has blossomed both in the realm of science and in the political realm. If this pleasure greeted the dawn of the rejuvenated spirit giddily and went straight for the enjoyment of the idea without deeper work, revelling for a time in the hopes and prospects that the idea presented, then this pleasure reconciles us all the more easily with its excesses, because a strong core underlies this pleasure and the fog of superficiality that it poured out around that core dissipates necessarily on its own. The other phenomenon is, however, more adverse [to the idea] since it reveals fatigue and feebleness and strives to cover them up with an arrogance that finds fault with the philosophical spirits of every century, mistaking them all, and, most of all itself, in the process.

Yet it is all the more gratifying to perceive and to mention in conclusion how the philosophical interest and the earnest love of *higher knowledge* have maintained themselves, impartially and without conceit, against both of these orientations. If this interest now and then thrusts itself more into the form of an *immediate knowing* and *feeling*, it attests, on the other hand, to the inner drive of a rational insight that goes further and alone

gives human beings their dignity, and attests to it, above all, by the fact that that standpoint comes about for it [that interest] only as the *result* of philosophical knowledge [*Wissen*], so that what it seems to despise is at least recognized as a *condition* by it.

To this interest in *knowing the truth* I dedicate this attempt to provide an introduction or contribution to satisfying this interest; may such a purpose procure it a favourable reception.

Heidelberg, May 1817

Preface to the second edition

In this new edition, the reader (if he is motivated to look for such things) will find several parts reworked and developed into more precise determinations. I was concerned in this edition with moderating and lessening the formal character of the presentation by, among other things, using more expansive, exoteric remarks to bring the abstract concepts closer to ordinary understanding and a more concrete representation of them. Yet the condensed brevity made necessary by an outline, in matters that are abstruse anyway, leaves this second edition in the same role as the first, to serve as a text for the lectures [*Vorlesebuch*] in need of the requisite elucidation by the oral presentation. To be sure, the title of an *encyclopedia* ought to leave room for a less rigorous scientific method and for assembling items based upon external considerations. However, the nature of the matter entails that the logical connection had to remain the foundation.

There are, it would seem, more than enough promptings and incentives on hand that seem to make it compulsory for me to explain the position of my philosophizing towards what lies beyond it, namely, the bustling concerns of contemporary culture, some of which are full of spirit, some devoid of it. This is the sort of thing that can only happen in an exoteric manner, as in a preface. For, although these concerns link themselves to philosophy, they do not engage with it scientifically and thus bar themselves from philosophy altogether, conducting their palaver outside of philosophy and remaining external to it. It is unpleasant and even awkward to enter ground so alien to science, for this sort of explaining and discussing does not advance the very understanding that can alone be the concern of genuine knowledge. Yet it may be useful, even necessary, to discuss some of these phenomena.

In general, in my philosophical endeavours, what I have worked towards and continue to work towards is the scientific knowledge of the truth. It is the most difficult path but the only path that can be of interest and value for the spirit, once the latter has entered upon the path of thought

and, once it is on that path, has not fallen prey to vanity but instead has preserved the will and the courage for the truth. That spirit soon finds that the method alone can tame thought, bring it to the basic matter at hand, and keep it there. Inasmuch as the spirit initially strove to venture beyond this absolute content and placed itself above it, such a procedure proves to be nothing other than the restoration of that content – but a restoration in the most distinctive, freest element of the spirit.

It is not yet very long ago that the innocent and, by all appearances, fortunate condition obtained when philosophy proceeded hand in hand with the sciences and with culture, when enlightenment of the understanding was moderate and satisfied at once with the need for insight [*Einsicht*] and with religion, when a natural law was likewise in accord with the state and politics, and empirical physics bore the name of ‘natural philosophy’. The peace, however, was rather superficial and, in particular, that insight stood in internal contradiction to religion just as that natural law stood in fact in contradiction to the state. The split then ensued, the contradiction developed itself. In philosophy, however, the spirit celebrated its reconciliation with itself, so that this science is in contradiction only with that contradiction itself and the effort to whitewash it. It is a pernicious prejudice that philosophy finds itself in opposition to knowledge gained from sensory experience, to the rational actuality of what is right as well as to an innocent religion and piety. These figures are recognized, indeed even justified, by philosophy. Far from opposing them, the thoughtful mind enters deeply into their content, and learns and strengthens itself in their midst as in the midst of the great discernments of nature, history, and art. For this solid content, insofar as it is thought, is the speculative idea itself. The collision with philosophy enters only insofar as this ground takes leave of its own distinctive character and its content is supposed to be grasped in categories and made dependent upon them, without leading the categories to the concept and completing them in the idea.

The understanding of the universal, scientific culture finds itself with an important negative result, namely, that no mediation with the truth is possible on the path of the finite concept. This result tends to have a consequence that is the very opposite of what lies immediately in it. That conviction has nullified [*aufgehoben*] the interest in the investigation of the categories and superseded, too, attentiveness and caution in the application of them, instead of working to eliminate finite connections from knowing. The use of categories has only become all the more unabashed, devoid of consciousness, and uncritical, as in a state of despair. The notion that the insufficiency of finite categories for truth entails the

impossibility of objective knowledge is based upon a misunderstanding, from which the legitimacy of addressing and rejecting [matters] on the basis of feeling and subjective opinion is inferred. Replacing proofs are assurances and narratives of facts found in the consciousness that is held to be all the purer, the more uncritical it is. On so barren a category as *immediacy* – and without investigating it further – the highest needs of the spirit are to be based and to be decided by means of it. Particularly where religious objects are treated, one can find that philosophizing has been explicitly put aside, as if by this means one had banned every evil and attained assurance against error and deception. The investigation of truth is then staged on the basis of presuppositions drawn from anywhere and through rationalization [*Räsonnement*], i.e. through the use of the usual determinations of thought such as essence and appearance, ground and consequence, cause and effect, and so forth, and through the usual ways of inferring according to these and the other finite connections. ‘Free of the evil one though they are, the evils remain’,¹ and the evil is nine times worse than before because trust is placed in it without any suspicion and critique, as if that evil held at bay, namely, philosophy, were something other than the investigation of the truth – conscious of the nature and the value of the relationships in thinking that link and determine all content.

Philosophy itself, meanwhile, experiences its worst fate at the hands of those same individuals when they make it their business to meddle in philosophy, construing it and judging it [on their own terms]. The *fact* [*Faktum*] of physical or spiritual, in particular also religious vitality, is distorted by a reflection incapable of grasping it. Yet, as far as it is concerned, this way of construing the fact has the sense of initially elevating it to the level of something known [*Gewußte*] and the difficulty lies in this transition from the basic matter to knowledge, a transition that is the work of deliberating on the matter. In the science itself, this difficulty is no longer on hand. For the fact of philosophy is knowledge that has already been prepared and, with this, the process of construing the matter would be a thinking over [*Nachdenken*] only in the sense of thinking *that follows after the fact* [*nachfolgendes Denken*]. It is only [the act of] evaluating that would demand a thinking over in the usual meaning of the term. But that uncritical understanding demonstrates itself to be equally unfaithful in the naked construal of the idea that has been articulated in a determinate

¹ Moldenhauer–Michel: *Faust*, first part, The witches’ kitchen, V. 2509: ‘Den Bösen sind sie los, die Bösen sind geblieben’ (‘They got rid of the Evil One, the evil ones remain’).

manner; it has so little suspicion or doubt of the fixed presuppositions contained within it that it is even incapable of repeating the bare fact of the philosophical idea. Miraculously, this understanding combines the following double-barrelled approach [*das Gedoppelte*] within itself. It is evident to this understanding that in the idea there is a complete departure from and even explicit contradiction of its use of categories – and at the same time no suspicion dawns on it that another way of thinking than its own is present and employed and that its thinking would have to behave differently here than usual. In this manner it happens that the idea of speculative philosophy is fixed upon immediately in terms of its abstract definition, on the supposition that a definition would of itself necessarily appear clear and settled and that it would have its regulating mechanism and criterion in presupposed representations alone, at least without knowing [*in der Unwissenheit*] that the sense of the definition like its necessary proof lies solely in its development and in the way the definition proceeds from the latter as a result. More precisely, since the idea in general is the *concrete, spiritual* unity but the understanding consists in construing conceptual determinations only in *abstraction* and thus in their one-sidedness and finitude, that unity is made into an abstract identity, devoid of spirit, an identity in which difference is not on hand but instead *everything is one*; even good and evil, among other things, are one and the same. Hence, the name ‘*system of identity*’, ‘*philosophy of identity*’ has already come to be a received name for speculative philosophy. If someone were to make his profession of faith as follows: ‘I believe in God the Father, the Creator of heaven and earth’, it would be surprising if someone else were to conclude from this first part that the person professing his faith believed in God, the creator of heaven, and *therefore* considered the earth to be uncreated and matter to be eternal. The fact is correct that in his profession of faith that person has declared that he believes in God, the creator of heaven, and yet the fact, as others have construed it, is completely false; so much so that this example must be regarded as incredible and trivial. And yet this violent bifurcation takes place in the way the philosophical idea is construed, such that, in order to make it impossible to misunderstand how the identity (which is, we are assured, the principle of speculative philosophy) is constituted, the explicit instruction and respective refutation ensue to the effect that, for instance, the subject is *different* [*verschieden*] from the object [*Objekt*], likewise the finite from the infinite, and so forth, as if the concrete, spiritual unity were in itself devoid of any determinateness and did not *in itself contain* the difference, as if someone did not know [*nicht wüßte*] that subject and object [*Objekt*] or the infinite and the finite were different from one another, or as

if philosophy, immersing itself in book-learning [*Schulweisheit*], needed to be reminded that, outside school, there is wisdom for which that difference is something familiar.

More specifically, in relation to this difference that is not supposed to be familiar to it, philosophy is decried for the fact that in it, because of this, even the distinction between good and evil falls away. As a result, some would happily exercise a certain fairness and magnanimity by acknowledging 'that philosophers, in their presentations, do not always develop the disastrous consequences that are *bound up* with what they assert (though perhaps they also do not do so because these consequences are not inherent in their presentations after all)'.² Philosophy must spurn this mercifulness

² The words of Mr Tholuck in the *Collection of Blossoms from Western Mysticism* (*Blütensammlung aus der morgenländischen Mystik*) (Berlin, 1825), p. 13. Even Tholuck, for all his profound sensibility, allows himself to be misled into following the popular manner of construing philosophy. The understanding, he says, can make inferences only in the following two ways: either there is a primal ground [*Urgrund*] conditioning everything, so that even the ultimate ground of my self [*meines Selbst*] lies in it and my being and free acting are only an illusion, or I am actually a being [*ein Wesen*] differentiated from the primal ground, and my acting is not conditioned and produced by the primal ground, and consequently the primal ground is not the absolute being, conditioning everything; hence, there is no infinite God but instead a multitude of gods, and so forth. All philosophers who think more deeply and more incisively are supposed to accept the first proposition (I would not know exactly why the first one-sidedness should be deeper and more incisive than the second); the consequences, however, which, as mentioned above, they do not always develop, are 'that even the ethical standard of the human being is not an absolutely true standard; instead good and evil are *actually* (emphasis by the author himself) alike and only diverse in terms of the appearance [*Schein*].' It would always be better for someone not to speak of philosophy at all as long as, for all the depths of one's feeling, one is still so much caught up in the one-sidedness of understanding that one knows only the *either-or* of, on one side, a primal ground, in which the individual being and its freedom [*is*] only an illusion and, on the other, the absolute self-sufficiency of individuals, and one has no experience of the *neither-nor* of these two sorts of one-sidedness of what Mr Tholuck calls the 'dangerous dilemma'. On page 14 he speaks, to be sure, of such spirits – and these are, he claims, the genuine philosophers – who assume the second proposition (though one would think that this is exactly what is meant by the first proposition above) and cancel [*aufheben*] the opposition between *unconditioned* and conditioned being, doing so by virtue of the *indifferent primal being* in which all the respective oppositions pervade one another. But did Mr Tholuck not notice, in speaking this way, that the indifferent primal being in which the opposition is supposed to be suffused is entirely the same as that unconditioned being, the one-sidedness of which was supposed to be cancelled [*aufgehoben*]? Did he not see that in the same breath, as he cancels [*das Aufheben*] that one-sided thought [*Einseitiges*], he is thus cancelling [*des Aufhebens*] it in favour of something that has precisely this same one-sidedness and that, as a result, what he says allows that one-sidedness to persist instead of cancelling it. If one wants to say what *spirits* do, then one has to be able to comprehend the fact of the matter and do so with spirit. Otherwise, the fact has become falsified in one's own hands. – Allow me to note, moreover, somewhat tediously, that what is said here and subsequently about Mr Tholuck's notion of philosophy cannot and should not be said, so to speak, *individually* about him. One reads the same thing in hundreds of books, in the prefaces of theologians especially, among others. I have cited Mr Tholuck's presentation, in part because it happens to be closest at hand, in part because the profound feeling (that seems to place his writings on a side completely different from the theology of the understanding) stands closest to something profound. For the basic determination of that profundity, the *reconciliation* – which is not the unconditioned primal being and

that some would extend to it, for it needs that mercifulness for its moral justification just as little as it can lack insight into the actual consequences of its principles and fail to make explicit their implications. I want to shed light briefly on that alleged implication, according to which the difference between good and evil is supposedly made into a mere semblance of a difference. I want to do so more to give an example of the hollowness of such a manner of construing philosophy than to justify it. For this purpose, let us simply take up Spinozism, the philosophy in which God is determined only as *substance* and not as subject and spirit. This distinction concerns the *determination* of the unity; this alone is what matters and yet those who tend to call the philosophy a system of identity, know [*wissen*] nothing of this *determination*, although it is a fact. They are even willing to say that, for this philosophy, *everything is one and the same*, even good and evil are *alike* – all of which are the worst sorts of unity. In speculative philosophy, there can be no talk of these sorts of unity; only a thinking that is still barbaric can make use of them with respect to ideas. As far as the claim is concerned that in that philosophy the difference between good and evil is not *in itself* or *genuinely* valid, it must be asked ‘what does “genuinely” mean here?’ If it means the nature of God, it will not seriously be demanded that evil be placed in that nature. That substantial unity is the good itself; evil is only division; in that unity, then, there is anything but the sameness of good and evil; to the contrary, the latter is excluded. Accordingly, the distinction of good and evil is just as little in God as such. For this distinction is only in what is divided into two, in which there is evil itself. Furthermore, in Spinozism one also finds the distinction: that *the human being is different from God*. Theoretically, the system may not be satisfying from this side. For human beings and the finite in general,

something abstract of this sort – is the basic content itself that the speculative idea is and expresses in thinking – a basic content that that profound sensibility should be least prone to fail to appreciate in the idea.

But even there it happens as it does everywhere else in Mr Tholuck’s writings that he allows himself to indulge in the usual palaver about *pantheism*, about which I have spoken at length in one of the final Remarks [§ 573] of the *Encyclopedia*. I note here merely the peculiar clumsiness and about-face [*Verkehrung*] into which Mr Tholuck falls. For while, on the one side of his alleged philosophical dilemma, he places the primal ground, and afterwards (pp. 33, 38) characterizes this as pantheistic, he characterizes the other side as that of the Socinians, Pelagianists, and the so-called Popular Philosophers in such a way that on that side there is ‘no infinite God but instead a *large number* of gods, namely, the number of *all* the beings that are different from the so-called primal ground and have their own *being* and acting, alongside that so-called primal ground’. On this side there is thus in fact not merely a large number of gods, but instead *all things* (everything finite counts here as having its own *being*) *are gods*. By this means, Mr Tholuck in fact explicitly has his *omnitheism* [*Allesgötterei*], his *pantheism* on this side, not on the first side, whose God he explicitly makes the *one* primal ground, such that, on that side, there is only *monotheism*.

even though reduced later to a mode, *find themselves* and are considered only *alongside* the substance. Here it is, then, in human beings, that the distinction exists, existing essentially as the distinction of good and evil as well, and it is here alone that the distinction *genuinely* is, for only here is the determination peculiar to it present. If, with respect to Spinozism, one is looking only at the substance, then, to be sure, there is no distinction of good and evil in it, but because evil, like the finite and the *world* generally (see the Remark § 50 on pp. 98–9), *does not exist at all* from this standpoint. If, however, one has one's eyes on the standpoint from which, even in this system, human beings and the relation of human beings to the substance surface and where evil alone can have its place in contrast to the good, then one must have examined the parts of the *Ethics* [of Spinoza] which treat of it (of emotions, human servitude and human freedom), in order to be able to speak of the moral implications of the system. One will undoubtedly be convinced as much of the exalted purity of this moral dimension, the principle of which is the sheer love of God, as of the fact that this purity of the moral dimension is a consequence of the system. Lessing said in his day that people treat Spinoza the way they treat a dead dog; one cannot say that in more recent times Spinozism, and speculative philosophy in general, are treated any better, particularly if one sees that those who report on and judge these matters do not even take the trouble to grasp the facts correctly and cite and portray them correctly. This would be the minimum of fairness and philosophy should in any case be able to demand as much.

The history of philosophy is the history of the discovery of the *thoughts* about the absolute that is their object. Thus, for example, one can say that Socrates discovered the determination of the *purpose* that was developed and determined by Plato and, in particular, by Aristotle. Brucker's history of philosophy³ is so uncritical, not only with respect to the external aspect of the historical material but with respect to the report of what was thought, that one finds twenty, thirty, and more sentences quoted as the philosophical sayings of ancient Greek philosophers, not a single one of which belongs to them. They are inferences that Brucker draws based on the bad metaphysics of his time and imputes to those philosophers as their claims. Inferences are of two sorts: some are merely elaborations of a principle in further detail, others trace the principle back to deeper principles. The historical dimension consists precisely in detailing which individuals are responsible for such a further deepening of thought and for unveiling

³ Moldenhauer–Michel: Johann Jakob Brucker, *Historia critica philosophiae* (Leipzig, 1742–4).

this deepening. But that procedure [of Brucker] is inappropriate not merely because those philosophers did not themselves draw the implications that supposedly lie in their principles and thus merely failed to articulate those implications explicitly. It is even more inappropriate because in the course of inferring in this way it is immediately imputed to them that they let stand and make use of finite relations of thought, relations that are directly counter to the sense of philosophers of a speculative spirit and merely pollute and falsify the philosophical idea instead. In the case of ancient philosophers of whom only a few sentences have been conveyed to us, such falsification might be excused as allegedly a matter of making the correct inference. But that excuse falls by the wayside for a philosophy that has put its idea into determinate thoughts and has explicitly investigated and determined the value of the categories, if, in spite of this, the idea is construed in a distorted way and only *one* moment (e.g., identity) is picked out of the presentation and put forward as the totality, and if the categories are introduced quite unreflectively in the manner nearest at hand in their one-sidedness and untruthfulness, just as they pervade everyday consciousness. An educated knowledge of the relations of thoughts is the first condition of construing a philosophical fact correctly. But, thanks to the principle of immediate knowing, the rawness of thoughts is not only explicitly authorized but made into a law. Knowledge of thoughts, and with it the education of subjective thinking, is as little a form of immediate knowing as is any sort of science or art and skill.

Religion is the manner of consciousness in which the truth exists for all human beings, for human beings with any education. Scientific knowledge of the truth, however, is a particular sort of consciousness of it, the labour of which not everyone, indeed only a few, undertake. *The content is the same*, but just as Homer says that some things have two names, one in the language of the gods, the other in the language of the earthlings [*übertägige Menschen*], so there are two languages for that content, one the language of feeling, representation, and thinking nesting in finite categories and one-sided abstractions of the understanding, the other, the language of the concrete concept. If one also wants to discuss and evaluate philosophy from the vantage point of religion, more is required than merely having the habit of the language of earthlings. The foundation [*Fundament*] of scientific knowledge is the inner basic content, the indwelling idea and its vitality vibrant in spirit, just as religion is no less a mind that has been worked through, a spirit awake to mindfulness, a well-developed basic content. In most recent times religion has more and more contracted the cultivated extensiveness of its content and retreated into the intensity of

piety or feeling, and indeed often a feeling that manifests a very meagre and barren content. As long as it has a Credo, a doctrine, a systematic theology, it has something that philosophy can treat and in which philosophy as such can come to some understanding with religion. This [process of coming to some understanding] is, again, not to be taken in terms of the impoverished understanding that merely dissects things, the sort of understanding that has captivated modern religiosity and in accordance with which both philosophy and religion are represented in such a way that the one excludes the other, or that they are generally separable to such an extent that they can then only be joined together from the outside. It is far more the case, again based on what has been said up to this point, that religion can probably exist without philosophy but philosophy cannot exist without religion, instead encompassing religion within itself. The genuine religion, the religion of the spirit, must have such a Credo, a content; the spirit is essentially consciousness, with a content that has been rendered objective [*gegenständlich*]. As a feeling, it is the non-objective content itself (merely *qualia*-like [*qualiert*], to use an expression from Jakob Böhme) and only the lowest level of consciousness, indeed, in that form of the soul that we have in common with animals. Only *thinking* makes the soul (with which animals are also endowed) a spirit, and philosophy is only a consciousness of that content, the spirit and its truth, in the shape and manner of its essential character that distinguishes it [the spirit] from the animal and makes it capable of religion. The intense [*kontrakte*] religiosity concentrating itself in the heart must make its gnashing and contrition [*Zermürbung*] the essential factor of its rebirth. At the same time, however, it would have to remember that it is dealing with the heart of a spirit, that the spirit is ordained with the power of the heart, and that this power can only exist insofar as spirit is itself reborn. This rebirth of the spirit from natural ignorance as well as from natural error takes place through instruction and the belief in the *objective truth*, the content, achieved by the testimony of the spirit. This rebirth of the spirit is, among other things, also immediately a rebirth of the heart from the vanity of the one-sided understanding, a rebirth on which it insists and through which it claims to know [*wissen*] things such as that the finite is different from the infinite, that philosophy must be either polytheism or, in discriminating spirits, pantheism, and so forth – the rebirth from such pitiful views on the basis of which pious humility rides high against philosophy as much as against theological knowledge. If religiosity persists in this intensity that is devoid of spirit because it lacks any expansion, then it knows [*weiß*], of course, only of the contrast of its narrow-minded and narrowing form with the

spiritual expansiveness of religious as well as philosophical doctrine.⁴ But the spirit that thinks does not restrict itself merely to being satisfied with the purer, innocent religiosity. By contrast, the former standpoint [the one that lacks such expansiveness] is in itself the result of reflection and rationalization [*Räsonnement*]. With the help of a superficial understanding, it has fashioned for itself this polite [*vornehme*] liberation from practically every doctrine and, by zealously employing the thinking (with which it is infected) against philosophy, it maintains itself forcibly on the thin peak of an abstract condition of feeling, devoid of content. I cannot refrain from citing excerpts from Franz von Baader's exhortation [*Paränesis*] over such a patterning of piety, from *Fermenta Cognitionis*, Volume 5 (1823), Preface, p. ix:

⁴ To come back once more to Mr Tholuck who can be regarded as the enthusiastic representative of the pietistic orientation, the lack of such a *doctrine* is quite marked in his work *The Doctrine of Sin*, second edition (Hamburg, 1825), which has just come to my attention. What caught my eye was his treatment of the doctrine of the trinity in his work *The Speculative Doctrine of the Trinity of the Late Orient* (Berlin, 1826), for whose assiduously assembled historical notes I am sincerely grateful. He calls this doctrine a *scholastic* doctrine. But in any case it is much older than what one calls 'scholastic'. He considers it solely from the external side as supposedly a merely historical emergence, proceeding from speculation on biblical passages and under the influence of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy (p. 41). But in the writing about sin, he treats this dogma quite cavalierly, one might say, by declaring it to be only capable of being a *framework* [*Fachwerk*] within which the doctrines of faith (but which?) might be classified (p. 220); indeed, one must also employ the expression *fata morgana* to refer to this dogma (p. 219), for so it appears to those standing on the shore (in the sands of the spirit?). But the doctrine of trinity is 'under no circumstances a foundation on which *the faith can be grounded*' (hence, Mr Tholuck speaks of it as a three-legged stool; see p. 221). Has not this doctrine, as the most holy of doctrines, from time immemorial – or at least for how long? – been the chief content of the faith itself as its *Credo* and has this *Credo* not been the foundation of subjective faith? Without this doctrine, how can the doctrine of reconciliation (that Mr Tholuck in the work cited tries with so much energy to make his readers feel) have more than a moral or, if one will, heathen sense? How can it have a Christian sense? In this text one also finds nothing of other, more particular dogmas; Mr Tholuck always leads his readers, for example, only up to Christ's life and death but neither to his resurrection and elevation to the right hand of the Father nor to the outpouring of the Holy Spirit. A major determination in the doctrine of reconciliation is the *punishment of sins*; for Mr Tholuck (pp. 119ff.) this is the burdensome self-consciousness and the unblessed condition bound up with it, the condition of everyone who lives *outside* God, the sole source of the blessedness as well as holiness. As a result, sin, consciousness of guilt, and the unblessed condition cannot be *thought* without one another (here then thinking, too, comes into play, just as on p. 120 the determinations are also shown to flow from God's *nature*). This determination of the punishment of sins is what some have called the *natural* punishment of sins and (like the indifference towards the doctrine of trinity) it is the result and the teaching of reason and the Enlightenment, otherwise so severely decried by Mr Tholuck. – Some time ago, in the upper house of the English Parliament, a bill fell through that concerned the *Unitarian* sect. On this occasion an English newspaper, after reporting the large number of Unitarians in Europe and America, added: 'For the most part, on the European continent, Protestantism and Unitarianism are presently synonymous.' Theologians may decide for themselves whether Mr Tholuck's systematic (or dogmatic?) theology differs from the usual theory of the Enlightenment on more than one or at most two points and whether, on closer inspection, it even differs on these points.

‘As long,’ he says, ‘as a respect grounded on free investigation and thereby on genuine conviction has not been procured for religion and its doctrines, from the side of science . . . you pious and impious souls alike, with all your commandments and prohibitions, with all your palaver and action, will have no remedy for this bad situation [*Übel*] and, as long as this is the case, religion that is not respected will also not be loved. For one can only love heartily and sincerely what one sees sincerely respected and what one knows, beyond a doubt, to be worthy of respect, just as religion can only be served by this sort of *amor generosus* [generous love] . . . In other words, if you want the practice of religion to thrive once again, then take care that we attain once more a rational theory of it. Do not entirely leave the field to your opponents (the atheists) with the *irrational* and *blasphemous* claim that such a theory of religion is something impossible, something utterly unthinkable, and that religion is merely an affair of the heart in regard to which one justifiably can, indeed must, lose one’s head.’⁵

As for the scantiness of the content, it can also be noted that one can talk of this only as the way religion appears in its external circumstances at a particular time. Such a time would be lamentable, when there is such a need simply to bring forth the mere belief in God (what was so pressing to the noble *Jacobi*) and, beyond that, simply to awaken a concentrated Christian feeling. At the same time, the higher principles that make themselves known in that feeling cannot be overlooked (see the Introduction to the Logic, the Remark to § 64). But before the science lies the rich content produced by centuries and millennia of the activity of knowing for itself. Moreover, it lies before science, not as though it were something historical that only *others* possessed and for us is in the past, something we concern ourselves with merely to become acquainted with it and to remember it and to develop acuity in criticizing narratives – in short, something irrelevant to knowledge of the spirit and interest in the truth. Religions, philosophies, and works of art have brought to the light of day the most sublime, the most profound and the innermost dimensions of things and done so in pure and impure, clear and clouded, often rather repugnant form. Mr Franz von Baader deserves our esteem for continuing, not only to recall

⁵ Mr Tholuck several times cites passages from Anselm’s treatise *Cur Deus homo* [Why God is Man] and on p. 127 [‘The Doctrine of Sin’] lauds ‘the profound humility of this great thinker’; why does he not also consider and cite the following passage from the same treatise (cited on p. 167 with reference to § 77 of the *Encyclopaedia*): ‘Negligentiae mihi videtur si . . . non studemus quod credimus, *intelligere*’ [It would seem negligent to me if . . . we did not study what we believe, *to understand*]. – Of course, if the Credo is reduced to only very few articles, little material remains to be known and little can come from such knowledge.

such forms but also, with a profoundly speculative spirit, to honour their content explicitly in a scientific way by expounding and corroborating the philosophical idea as it emerges from them. The profundity of *Jakob Böhme* in particular affords opportunity and forms for this. The title *philosophus teutonicus* [Teutonic philosopher] has been rightly accorded this powerful spirit. On the one hand, he has expanded the content of religion for itself to the universal idea, and in terms of that very content he conceived the highest problems of reason and sought to grasp spirit and nature in their more definite spheres and formations. He did so by taking as the foundation that the spirit of the human being and all things have been created according to the image of God – none other, of course, than the *triune* God – and that their life is only this, after the loss of that original image, to be reintegrated into it. On the other hand, moving in the opposite direction, he has violently employed the forms of natural things (sulphur, saltpetre, and so forth, the tart, the bitter, and so forth) as spiritual forms and forms of thought. The gnosis of Mr Baader, which latches on to the same sorts of formations, is a distinctive way of igniting and advancing philosophical interest. His approach forcefully opposes the tranquil resignation accompanying the empty and barren pronouncements of so-called Enlightenment as much as a piety that wants only to remain in an intensive emotional state. In all his writings Mr Baader demonstrates, along the way, that he is far from taking this gnosis for an exclusive manner of knowing. There is more than one awkward side to it: its metaphysics does not push itself to consider the categories themselves and to develop the content methodically; it suffers from the concept's inadequacy for such wild or ingenious forms and formations; in a similar way, it suffers generally from having the absolute contents as a *presupposition* and then explaining, reasoning, and refuting on the basis of it.⁶

⁶ It is obviously quite pleasant for me to see, in the content of several more recent writings of Mr Baader, as well as in the explicit mentioning of many statements from me, his agreement with the latter. Regarding most or easily all of what he contests, it would not be difficult for me to come to terms with him, to show in other words that it in fact does not diverge from his views. I only want to touch on one reproach that comes up in the *Remarks on Some Anti-religious Philosophical Arguments of our Age* (1824), p. 5, cf. pp. 56ff. He speaks of a philosophical argument which is the product of the 'philosophy of nature' school and sets up a false concept of matter, 'because it maintains of the transient essence of this world, containing ruination in itself, that this essence, having emerged from God and being emergent from him both *immediately* and eternally, as the eternal exit (externalization) of God, *conditions* God's eternal re-entry (as spirit)'. As far as the first part of this representation is concerned, on matter's *emerging* from God, I see no way around the fact that this proposition is contained in the determination that God is the creator of the world (though it bears noting that 'emerging' is in general a category that I do not use since it is only a picturesque image, not a category). As for the other part, namely, that the eternal exit *conditions* God's re-entry,

We have *enough* and even *too many*, one can say, of more rarefied and cloudier configurations of the truth – in religions and mythologies, in Gnostic and mystical philosophies of ancient and modern times. One can enjoy *discovering* the idea in these configurations and derive a certain satisfaction from the fact that the philosophical truth is not something merely solitary but that its activity has at least been present as a stirring ferment within them. But something else happens when the arrogance of someone immature, as was the case of an imitator of Mr Baader, tries to ‘reheat’ such productions of the fermenting process. In his laziness and inability to think scientifically, this imitator easily elevates that gnosis into the exclusive manner of knowing. For it takes less effort to indulge in such fictions and attach assertoric philosophical arguments to them than to take on the development of the concept and to submit one’s thinking as well as one’s mind to its logical necessity. Someone with this arrogance is also likely to attribute to himself the discovery of what he has learned from others, and he believes this all the more easily if he fights them or puts them down or, rather, is annoyed by them because he has drawn his insights from them.

Just as the urge to think announces itself, albeit distortedly, in the phenomena of the present time – phenomena that we have taken into consideration in this Preface – so, too, there exists in and for itself the need (this being the only reason worthy of our science) for the thought that has elevated itself to the heights of the spirit, as well as for its time, for what had been earlier revealed as a mystery – but in its revelation’s more rarefied configurations and even more so in its cloudier ones remains something utterly opaque to formal thought – to be revealed for thinking itself. With the absolute right of the freedom proper to it, this thinking stubbornly insists on reconciling itself with the sound content, but only insofar as this content has been able to give itself the form [*Gestalt*] most worthy of

Mr Baader places *conditioning* in this position, a category that is, in and for itself, inappropriate and one that I use just as little for this relation. I recall what I noted above about uncritically swapping determinations of thought. But to discuss matter’s emergence, be it in an *immediate* or *mediated* way, would lead merely to utterly formal determinations. What Mr Baader himself (pp. 54ff.) declares about the concept of matter does not, as far as I see, depart from my own determinations with respect to it. Similarly, for the absolute task of grasping the creation of the world as a concept, I do not understand what help might lie in Mr Baader’s declaration (p. 58) that matter ‘is not the immediate product of unity, but the product of the *principles* of it (those empowered, the Elohim) *which the unity* summoned for this purpose’. From the grammatical structure, the sense of this claim is not completely clear. Is the sense that matter is the product of the principles or is it that matter has summoned these Elohim to itself and has let itself be produced by them? In either case, those Elohim or rather this entire circle must be put together into a relation to God, a relation that the insertion of Elohim does not illumine.

it: that of the concept and of necessity, which binds everything, content as well as thought, and precisely therein makes it free. If the old is to be renewed (i.e., an old shape since the content itself is eternally young), then perhaps the shape of the idea given it by Plato and, much more profoundly, by Aristotle is infinitely more worth remembering. Moreover, it is so not least because to unveil it [i.e. that shape] by means of appropriating it to the formation of our thought is, without further ado, not only to understand it but also to advance science itself. But understanding such forms of the idea does not lie on the surface as does grasping Gnostic and cabbalistic phantasmagorias, and developing such forms is something that happens much less automatically than pointing to or indicating these echoes of the idea.

It has been rightly said of the true that it is *index sui et falsi* [the sign of itself and the false], but that the true is not known [*gewußt*] on the basis of the false. So, too, the concept is the understanding of itself and of the form lacking a concept, but the latter does not, on the basis of its inner truth, understand the concept. Science understands feeling and faith, but science can only be judged on the basis of the concept on which it rests. Moreover, since science is that concept's self-development, then appraisal [*Beurteilung*] of it on the basis of the concept is not so much passing judgment [*Urteilen*] on it as progressing along with it. That kind of appraising judgment is, necessarily, what I also wish for the present venture, as the only kind that I can respect and heed.

Berlin, May 25, 1827

Foreword to the third edition

In this third edition, various improvements have been made here and there. Particular care has been taken to enhance the clarity and exactness of the exposition. However, in keeping with a course book's purpose of serving as a compendium, the style had to stay condensed, formal and abstract. The book retains its function of receiving the requisite explanations only through the oral presentation.

Since the second edition, several evaluations of my philosophy have appeared that have for the most part shown little aptness for such business. Such careless responses to works that have been thought and worked through for many years with all the seriousness of the object and its scientific requirements are unseemly and unpleasant when one sees the nasty passions of conceit, haughtiness, envy, mockery, and so on, that emerge from those responses; even less is there anything in them that might be instructive. Cicero says in *Tusculanae disputationes* I. II [4]: 'Est philosophia paucis contenta iudicibus, *multitudinem* consulto ipsa fugiens, eique ipsi et *invisa* et *suspecta*; ut, si quis universam velit vituperare, *secundo id populo* facere possit.' [Philosophy is content with but a few judges and flees from the *multitude* deliberately, while they are themselves both *suspect* to and *hated* by the multitude; so that, if someone wanted to chide it as a whole, he could do so *with the support of the people*.] The more limited the insight and thoroughness, the more popular it is to attack philosophy. A petty repulsive passion is palpable in the resonance it encounters in others, and ignorance accompanies it with the same sort of intelligibility. Other objects impress themselves upon the senses or stand before representation in all-embracing intuitions; one feels the need to have at least a slight degree of acquaintance with them in order to be able to converse about them; in addition, sound common sense [*Menschenverstand*] finds it easier to recall them since they are situated in a familiar, firm presence. But the lack of all this [i.e., all these features of other objects] unleashes itself unabashedly against philosophy, or rather against some imaginary empty picture of it that ignorance

fabricates and talks itself into. It has nothing [standing] before it towards which it could orient itself and thus wanders about, entirely among the indeterminate, empty and thus senseless. – Elsewhere, I have undertaken the unpleasant and sterile business of shining the spotlight on some of those phenomena in their utter nakedness, woven as they are out of passions and ignorance.⁷

Recently, it could have seemed as if the province of theology and even religiosity were poised to prompt a more serious study of God, divine things, and reason scientifically within a broader domain.⁸ Alas, the very inception of the movement quashed such hopes. For the inducement was dependent upon *personalities*, and neither the pretensions of accusatory piety nor the attacked pretensions of free reason elevated themselves to the *basic matter*, much less to the consciousness that one would have to enter upon the terrain of philosophy in order to discuss the basic matter. That personal attack on the ground of very particular external aspects of the religion exhibited itself in the monstrous presumptuousness of wanting to reject the Christianity of individuals based on one's own absolute power, sealing them with secular and eternal damnation in the process. *Dante*, empowered by the enthusiasm of divine poetry, took it upon himself to wield the keys of Peter and to condemn by name many of his – albeit already deceased – contemporaries, even popes and emperors, to damnation in hell. The infamous objection has been levelled against a more recent philosophy that in it the human individual posits itself as God. But compared to such a reproach concerning a false inference, it is an actual presumptuousness of a completely different order to pose as the Judge of the World, to censure the Christian character of individuals and thus to issue the innermost condemnation of them. The shibboleth of this absolute power is the *name of the Lord Christ* and the *assurance* that the Lord resides in the hearts of these judges. Christ says (Matt. 7: 20): 'By their fruits you shall recognize them', but the monstrous insolence of condemning and damning others is hardly good fruit. He continues: 'Not all who say unto me, "*Lord, Lord*" shall enter into the Kingdom of Heaven. Many will say unto me on that day: "*Lord, Lord*, have we not prophesied in thy name? Have we not *in thy name* cast out devils? Have we not done many deeds *in thy name*?"

⁷ Moldenhauer–Michel: In *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik* (1829) Hegel announces the review of five works that deal with his philosophy. Only the reviews of two of these works did appear. See vol. XX, 'Two Reviews'.

⁸ Moldenhauer–Michel: A reference to the so-called quarrel of Halle between the *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung* [a newspaper of the Evangelical church] and some representatives of the School of Theology at Halle in 1830.

Then shall I profess to them: “I never *recognized* you, *get away from me, all of you, you evildoers.*” Those who give assurances of being in exclusive possession of Christianity and demand of others this faith in it have not brought matters so far as to exorcise devils. Many of them, like the believers in the Seer of Prevorst,⁹ pride themselves far more on being on good terms with a riff-raff of ghosts and revering them, instead of chasing away and banning these lies of an anti-Christian and servile superstition. They show themselves to be equally inept at conveying wisdom and utterly incapable of performing great deeds of knowledge and science which should be their vocation and duty. Erudition is not yet science. While busying themselves at length with the mass of irrelevant externalities of faith, they remain, by contrast, in regard to the import and content [*Gehalt und Inhalt*] of faith itself, all the more barrenly at a standstill with the name of the Lord Christ and deliberately scorn with invectives the development of the doctrine that is the foundation of the faith of the Christian Church. For the spiritual, let alone the thoughtful and scientific, expansion would interfere with, indeed would prohibit and erase, the self-conceit of the subjective insistence on the obtuse [*geistlose*] assurance – barren of the good and rich only in evil fruits – that they are in possession of Christianity and own it exclusively themselves. – With a consciousness that could not be more definite, this spiritual expansion is distinguished in Scripture from mere faith in such a way that the latter becomes the *truth* only through the former. ‘*Rivers of living waters will flow*’, Christ says (John 7:38), ‘from the body of whoever has *faith* in me.’ These words are then immediately explained and specified in verse 39 that faith in the temporal, sensuous, present personality of Christ as such does not achieve this; that he is not yet the truth as such. In the subsequent verse (39) faith is then further specified [by saying] that Christ said this of the *spirit* whom those who *believed* in him *were to receive*. For the Holy Spirit *was not yet there*, since Jesus was *not yet transfigured*. The not-yet-transfigured shape of Christ, which is the immediate object of faith, is the personality that was then sensuously present in time or, which is the same content, that was afterwards represented as such. In that present moment, Christ himself revealed to his disciples orally his eternal nature and vocation for the reconciliation of God with himself and of human beings with him, the order of salvation and the ethical doctrine. The faith that the disciples had in him encompasses all this. Nevertheless,

⁹ Translators’ note: Reference to somnambulist and clairvoyant Friederike Hauffe, the subject of *The Seer of Prevorst. Disclosures About the Inner Life of Men and the Projection of a Spiritworld into Ours* (1829) by the Swabian poet Justinus Kerner (see Encyclopaedia Britannica Online: www.search.eb.com/eb/article-9045161).

this faith that did not lack in the strongest certainty is declared to be only a beginning, a conditional foundation that is as yet unfinished. Those who believed in this way have not yet *received* the spirit. They must first receive it – receive the spirit [that is] the truth itself that comes later than the faith that leads to every truth. Those others, however, stop short at such certainty – a certainty that is [only] the condition. But certainty, itself merely subjective, bears only the subjective fruit of formal *assurance*, and therein that of conceit, slander and condemnation. In opposition to Scripture, they hold fast only in the certainty against the spirit which is the expansion of knowledge and only then the truth.

This piousness shares that barrenness of basic scientific content, and basic spiritual content in general, with what it directly makes the object of its indictment and condemnation. Through its formal, abstract thinking, the enlightenment of the understanding has emptied religion of all content, just as that piousness had done by reducing faith to the shibboleth of ‘Lord, Lord.’ Neither of them has the better of the other in this respect. And as they contentiously collide, there is no material on hand with respect to which they might come into contact with one another and could arrive at a common ground and possibility of bringing things to an investigation and, further, to knowledge and truth. Enlightened theology for its part has stood fast in its formalism, namely, of appealing to the *freedom* of conscience, *freedom* of thought, *freedom* of teaching, of appealing even to reason and science. Such freedom is, to be sure, the category of the *infinite right* of spirit and the other, *specific condition* of truth in addition to the first condition, i.e. faith. But as for *what* sort of reasonable determinations and laws the true and free conscience *might contain*, *what* sort of *content-free* belief and thought might have and teach, they refrained from touching this material point. They have not moved beyond that formalism of the negative and beyond the freedom of filling out the freedom according to whim and opinion, such that it is altogether irrelevant what the content itself is. They also could not get near to any content, because the Christian community has to be and is still supposed to be united by the bond of a doctrine, a creed, whereas the generalities and abstractions of the stale, lifeless, rationalistic waters of the understanding do not permit what is specific to an intrinsically determined, developed Christian content and doctrine. By contrast, the others, insisting on the name ‘Lord, Lord’, frankly and freely scorn the fulfilment of faith by spirit, basic content and truth.

Thus, to be sure, much dust has been stirred up – dust of conceit, spitefulness, and personality as well as empty generalities – but it is a dust cursed with sterility and unable to contain the basic matter itself, unable

to lead to the basic content and knowledge. – Philosophy could be content to have been left out of play. It finds itself outside the terrain of those presumptions – presumptions of personalities as well as those of abstract generalities – and, were it dragged onto such ground, it could have expected only things unpleasant and fruitless.

As that deep and rich basic content disappeared from the greatest and absolute interest of human nature, and as religiosity, the pious together with the reflective, came to find the highest satisfaction in something without content, philosophy has become a contingent, subjective need. For both kinds of religiosity, those absolute interests have been set up – and, of course, set up by nothing other than a strictly formal mode of reasoning [*Raisonnement*] – in such a way that philosophy is no longer needed to satisfy them. Indeed, philosophy is deemed, and rightly so, a disturbance of that newly created contentment and such narrowed-down satisfaction. As a result, philosophy is entirely left over to the free need of the subject. No constraint of any kind is issued to it; rather, where this need is present, it has to steadfastly resist [others'] suspicions [of it] and admonitions to be cautious. It exists only as an inner necessity that is stronger than the subject, a necessity that tirelessly drives its spirit 'so that it may overcome' and may procure for reason's urges the satisfaction it deserves. Thus, far from being prompted by any sort of authority, including religious authority, engaging in this science is instead declared superfluous and a dangerous or at least dubious luxury, and as a result it stands all the more freely on an interest in the basic matter and the truth alone. If, as Aristotle says, theory is what is most *blessed* and the *best* of the good [*Metaph.* XII 7, 1072b 24], then those who partake of this pleasure know [*wissen*] what they possess in it, namely the satisfaction of the necessity of their spiritual nature. They can refrain from making demands on others regarding it and can leave them to their needs and the satisfactions they find for them. The pressing, yet unsolicited motivation to enter into the business of philosophy was considered above, namely how the motivation becomes noisier the less it is suited to take part in philosophy, so that the more fundamental, profounder participation in philosophy is more alone with itself and quieter towards what lies outside it. Vanity and superficiality are quickly finished with the business and driven to interrupt it in next to no time. But when a basic matter is great in itself and can be satisfied only through the long and arduous work of a complete development, seriousness about such a matter immerses itself for a long time in quiet preoccupation with it.

The swift depletion of the second edition of this encyclopedic guide (which does not make the study of philosophy easy according to the sense

indicated above) has given me the satisfaction of seeing that, in addition to the clamouring of superficiality and vanity, a quieter, more rewarding participation [in philosophy] has taken place, which I hope will now also be accorded this new edition.

Berlin, 19 September 1830

Introduction

§ 1

Philosophy lacks the advantage from which the other sciences benefit, namely the ability to *presuppose* both its *objects* as immediately endorsed by representation of them and an acknowledged *method* of knowing, which would determine its starting-point and progression. It is true that philosophy initially shares its objects with religion. Both have the *truth* for their object, and more precisely the truth in the highest sense, in the sense that *God* and *God alone* is the truth. Moreover, both treat the sphere of finite things, the sphere of *nature* and the *human spirit*, their relation to each other and to God as their truth. Philosophy thus may definitely presuppose a *familiarity* with its objects – indeed it must do so – as well as an interest in them from the outset, if only because chronologically speaking consciousness produces for itself *representations* of objects prior to generating *concepts* of them. What is more, only by passing *through* the process of representing and by turning *towards* it, does *thinking* spirit progress to knowing by way of thinking [*denkendes Erkennen*] and to comprehending [*Begreifen*].

While engaged in thoughtful contemplation, however, it soon becomes apparent that such activity includes the requirement to demonstrate the *necessity* of its content, and to *prove* not only its being but, even more so, the determinations of its objects. The aforementioned familiarity with this content thus turns out to be insufficient, and to make or accept *presuppositions* or *assurances* regarding it appears illegitimate. The difficulty of making a *beginning*, however, arises at once, since a beginning is *something immediate* and as such makes a presupposition, or rather it is itself just that.

§ 2

Generally speaking, philosophy may initially be defined as the *thoughtful examination* [*denkende Betrachtung*] of things. If, however, it is correct

(as it probably is) that it is through thinking that human beings distinguish themselves from the *animals*, then everything human is human as a result of and only as a result of thinking. Now insofar as philosophy represents a peculiar way of thinking, in virtue of which thinking becomes knowing and a knowing that comprehends things [*begreifendes Erkennen*], its thinking will be *different* from the thinking at work in everything human and which, indeed, is responsible for the humanity of all that is human, even though it is identical with the latter such that *in itself* there is only *one* thinking. This distinction is tied up with the fact that the human content of consciousness which is grounded in thought does not at first *appear in the form of thought*, but rather as feeling, intuition, representation, i.e. *forms* that must be distinguished from thought *as form*.

It is an old prejudice, indeed a triviality, that human beings set themselves apart from animals through thinking. While it may seem trivial to remind ourselves of such a longstanding belief, it must definitely seem strange that there should be a need for such a reminder. And yet this can be considered necessary given the prejudice of our time which separates *feeling* and *thinking* to such an extent that they are supposedly opposed or even inimical to one another, that feeling, in particular religious feeling, is contaminated and perverted, even annihilated, by thinking, and that religion and religiosity do not have their roots and proper place essentially in thinking. In this kind of separating it is forgotten that only human beings are capable of religion and that animals no more have religion than they have law and morality.

When the said separation of religion from thought is maintained, one tends to have in mind the kind of thinking that may be called *thinking over* [*Nachdenken*], – *reflective thinking* which has *thoughts per se* for its *content* and brings them as such to consciousness. Negligence in knowing and heeding the distinction specifically formulated by philosophy in regard to thinking is responsible for generating the crudest ideas about philosophy and the recriminations against it. Since religion, law, and the ethical are properties of human beings alone, and, again, are so only because a human being is a thinking being, *thinking* has not been inactive at all in what is religious, right, and ethical – whether it be feeling and faith or representation: its activity and its products are *present* and *contained* therein. However, there is a difference between having such feelings and representations that are *determined* and *permeated* by

thought, and having *thoughts about* them. The thoughts *about* those forms of consciousness produced by *thinking* them *over* constitute the rubric under which reflection, formal reasoning [*Raisonnement*] and the like, and in the end even philosophy, are subsumed.

In this connection, the claim has been made – quite frequently under the influence of an erroneous understanding – that such *thinking over* is the condition or even the only way for us to attain a representation of and belief in the eternal and true. Thus, for instance, the *metaphysical proofs of the existence of God* (which are now somewhat *obsolete*) have been served up as evidence that – or as if – belief and conviction in the existence of God could essentially or even exclusively be caused only by familiarity with those proofs and the conviction produced by them. Assertions such as these would be equivalent to the contention that we would be incapable of eating, before we have acquired familiarity with the chemical, botanical, or zoological properties of our nutrients, and that we would have to wait to digest, until we finished the study of anatomy and physiology. If this were so, the sciences in their fields, just as philosophy in its own, would gain considerably in utility; indeed their utility would be elevated to an absolute and universal indispensability; or rather, instead of being indispensable, none of them would exist.

§ 3

The *content* that fills our consciousness, of whatever kind it may be, makes up the *determinacy* of the feelings, intuitions, images, representations, of the ends, duties etc., and of the thoughts and concepts. Feeling, intuition, image, etc., are in this respect the *forms* of such content, a content which remains *one and the same*, whether it is felt, intuited, represented, willed, and whether it is *merely* felt, or felt and intuited, etc., together with an admixture of thoughts, or whether it is thought entirely *without any such admixture*. In any one of these forms, or as a mixture of several of them, the content is the *object* of consciousness. In this objectification, it so happens that the determinacies of these forms convert themselves into part of the content, such that with each of these forms a specific object seems to arise, and, what is in itself the same, can take on the look of a different content.

Given that the determinacies of feeling, intuition, desire, volition, etc., insofar as we are *conscious* of them, are usually called *representations*, it can be said quite generally that philosophy replaces

representations with *thoughts* and *categories*, but more specifically with *concepts*. Representations may generally be regarded as *metaphors* of thoughts and concepts. By merely having representations, however, we are not yet familiar with the meaning they have for thinking, i.e. we are not familiar with *their* thoughts and concepts. Conversely, it is one thing to have thoughts and concepts, and another to know [*wissen*] which representations, intuitions, feelings correspond to them. – One aspect of what is called *the unintelligibility* of philosophy relates to this. In part, the difficulty consists in a certain inability, which is really merely a *lack of training*, to think abstractly, i.e. to hold on to pure thoughts and to move among them. In our ordinary consciousness, thoughts are clothed in and combined with familiar sensuous and spiritual material, and when we think things over, reflect, or reason about them, we intermingle our feelings, intuitions, and representations with thoughts (in every sentence with a quite sensuous content – as for instance in ‘This leaf *is* green’ –, categories such as *being*, *singularity* are already part of the mix). But it is something else to make the unmixed thoughts themselves our object. – The other aspect of the unintelligibility of philosophy is due to the impatience of wanting to have before oneself in the form of a representation what exists in our consciousness in the form of a thought and a concept. We sometimes hear people say that they do not know [*wissen*] what they are supposed to *think* in connection with a concept they have grasped. When it comes to concepts, nothing further needs to be thought than the very concept itself. What those people mean to express, however, is the yearning for some *familiar, current representation* [of things]; when deprived of its manner of representing, consciousness feels as if it had lost the ground in which it is otherwise so firmly rooted and at home. When it finds itself transposed into the pure region of concepts, it no longer knows [*weiß*] *where* in the world it is. – As a result, those writers, preachers, speakers, etc., are regarded as the most *intelligible* who tell their readers or listeners things which they knew already by heart: things which are familiar to them and *self-evident*.

§ 4

In relation to our ordinary consciousness, philosophy would first have to explain, or even awaken, *the need* for the *manner of knowing*

[*Erkenntnisweise*] *peculiar to it*. In relation to the objects of religion, however, and *truth* generally, it would have to prove its *capacity* to know them by its own lights. In relation to the appearance of a *difference* from the *religious* representations, it would have to *justify* its own diverging determinations.

§ 5

For the purpose of reaching a preliminary agreement about the difference mentioned above and the insight connected with it, namely, that the true *content* of our consciousness is *preserved* in its translation into the form of thought and the concept, and indeed only then placed in its proper light, the reader may be reminded of an *old prejudice*, namely that in order to learn what is true in objects and events, even feelings and intuitions, opinions, representations, etc., *thinking* them *over* is required. At any rate, thinking them over has at least this effect, namely, that of transforming the feelings, representations, etc., into *thoughts*.

Due to the fact that philosophy merely lays claim to *thinking* as constituting the proper *form* of its business, and the fact that each human being by nature possesses the capacity for thinking, abstraction is made from the difference referred to in § 3, and thus there comes to pass the opposite of what was mentioned above concerning the complaint about the *unintelligibility* of philosophy. This science frequently suffers contemptuous treatment even by those who have not taken the trouble to study it but fancy themselves capable of *understanding* without further ado what philosophy is about, and of philosophizing and passing judgments on philosophy, simply on the basis of an ordinary education, and religious feelings in particular. People admit that one must study the other sciences in order to be familiar with them, and that one is entitled to pass judgment on them only by virtue of such familiarity. People admit that in order to manufacture a shoe one must have learnt and practised shoemaking, despite the fact that everyone possesses the requisite model for it in his own feet, as well as the required aptitude for the task in his own hands. Only for philosophizing are such study, learning, and effort supposed not to be a requirement. – This convenient opinion has in recent times received confirmation through the doctrine of immediate knowing [*Wissen*], or knowledge through intuition.

§ 6

On the other hand, it is just as important that philosophy come to understand that its content [*Inhalt*] is none other than the basic content [*Gehalt*] that has originally been produced and reproduces itself in the sphere of the living spirit, a content turned into a *world*, namely the outer and inner world of consciousness, or that its content is *actuality* [*die Wirklichkeit*]. We call the immediate consciousness of this content *experience*. Any sensible consideration of the world discriminates between what in the broad realm of outer and inner existence [*Dasein*] is merely *appearance*, transitory, and insignificant, and what truly merits the name ‘*actuality*’. Since philosophy differs only in form from the other ways of becoming conscious of this content that is one and the same, its agreement with actuality and experience is a necessity. Indeed, this agreement may be regarded as at least an external measure of the truth of a philosophy, just as it is to be viewed as the highest goal of the philosophical science to bring about the reconciliation of the reason that is conscious of itself with the reason that *exists*, or with actuality, through the knowledge of this agreement.

In the Preface to my *Philosophy of Right*, p. XIX, the following statement can be found:

*What is rational, is actual,
And what is actual, is rational.*

These simple sentences have seemed striking to some and have been received with hostility even by those who would not want to be regarded as lacking in philosophy, let alone religion. It will be unnecessary to turn to religion for support for these sentences, since its doctrines of the divine governance of the world express the above propositions only too clearly. With regard to their philosophical meaning, however, we may presuppose that the reader is sufficiently educated to know [*wissen*] not only that God is actual – that he is what is most actual, indeed that he alone is what is truly actual –, but also, insofar as the merely formal difference is concerned, that existence [*Dasein*] in general is partly *appearance* and only partly actuality. In ordinary life, we may accidentally call every idea, error, evil, and the like, *actual*, as well as every concrete existence [*Existenz*], crippled and transitory though it may be. But even for someone possessing an ordinary sensitivity, a contingent concrete existence [*Existenz*] will not be deemed to deserve the emphatic designation of being actual; a contingent concrete existence has no

greater value than something that is *possible* and which may just as well *not exist* as exist. But when I spoke of actuality, it should have been evident in what sense I am using this expression, since I treated actuality in my more extensive Logic, too. There I directly distinguished it not only from what is contingent (which, after all, exists as well), but also and more specifically and precisely from existence [*Dasein*], concrete existence [*Existenz*], and other determinations. – The notion of the *actuality of the rational* seems immediately to come up against two objections: one, that ideas and ideals are nothing more than chimeras and philosophy a system of such phantasms, and the other that, conversely, ideas and ideals are much too exquisite to be actual, or again too impotent to acquire for themselves the status of something actual. But the severance of actuality from the idea is popular particularly with that kind of understanding which takes the dreams of its abstractions for something true, and which insists pretentiously on the ‘*ought*’ which it likes to prescribe especially in the sphere of politics – as if the world had been waiting for this to learn how it *ought* to be, but is not. Were it as it ought to be, what would the precociousness of such ‘ought’ come to? When its ‘ought’ is directed against trivial, superficial and transitory objects, arrangements, situations, and so forth (that is to say, what may perhaps be of relative importance to certain circles for a period of time), then this understanding may indeed be right to find many things that are not in accord with universal and correct standards. Who would not have enough good sense to see much around him that is indeed not as it should be? But this cleverness is in the wrong when it fancies itself to have the interest of the philosophical science at heart with such objects and their ‘ought’. Philosophical science deals solely with the idea which is not so impotent as to demand that it merely ought to be actual without being so and, hence, it deals with an actuality of which those objects, arrangements, situations, etc., are only the superficial exterior.

§ 7

Insofar as the *thinking over* of things in general contains the principle of philosophy (including the sense of a philosophy’s starting-point), and after it has newly blossomed in its *independence* in recent times (i.e. after the Lutheran reformation), the name of *philosophy* has been given to all those

kinds of knowledge [*Wissen*] that occupy themselves with the knowledge of fixed measures and what is *universal* [*das Allgemeine*] in the sea of empirical particulars, and with what is *necessary*, such as the *laws* governing the seemingly chaotic and infinite mass of contingent things. For, contrary to the philosophical beginnings among the Greeks, this renewed thinking has not held on to what is abstract only, but from the very start has thrown itself equally upon the seemingly immense material of the world of appearance. It has thus derived its *content* from its *own* intuition and perception of the outer and inner world, from its immediate rapport with nature and its immediate rapport with the spirit and the human heart.

The principle of *experience* contains the infinitely important determination that human beings must themselves be *involved* when taking up a given content and holding it to be true, more precisely that they must find such content to be united and in unison with *the certainty of themselves*. They must be involved in it, whether through their external senses only or with their deeper spirit and the essential consciousness of their respective self. – This is the same principle that in our time has been called faith, immediate knowledge, the revelation coming from outside and in particular from one's *own* inner being. We designate those sciences that have been called *philosophies* as *empirical* sciences due to their taking their point of departure from experience. But what in essence they aim at and produce are *laws*, *general propositions*, a *theory*, i.e. the *thoughts* of what there is. Thus *Newton's* physics has been called a philosophy of nature, while *Hugo Grotius*, for instance, by cataloguing the historical interactions of peoples among themselves, and by relying on ordinary reasoning, has developed general principles, a theory that could be called a philosophy of international law. – Even today the name of *philosophy* retains this general connotation among the English, and Newton continues to enjoy the fame of being the greatest philosopher. Down to the very pricing tables used by 'instruments-makers', those instruments that are not specifically classified under the columns of the magnetic or electric gadgets, such as the thermometers, barometers, etc., are called *philosophical instruments*; though, frankly, only *thinking* rather than some combination of wood, iron, etc.¹⁰ should properly be called an

¹⁰ The journal edited by Thomson, too, has the title 'Annals of *Philosophy*, or Magazine of *Chemistry, Mineralogy, Mechanics, Natural History, Agriculture, and the Arts*'. From this, everybody may form their own idea of the nature of the materials that are here called *philosophical*. – Among the

instrument of philosophy. In particular, the science of political economics, which has emerged in recent times, is also called philosophy, something we usually call rational state economy, or perhaps *intellectual* state economy.¹¹

§ 8

As satisfactory as this [empirical] knowledge may initially be in its sphere, there is, *in the first place*, yet another domain of *objects* that are not contained therein, namely freedom, spirit, and God. The reason why they cannot be found in that sphere is not that they are supposedly not a part of experience; they are not experienced by way of the senses, it is true, but whatever is present in consciousness is being experienced – this is even a tautological sentence. Rather, they are not found in that sphere, because in terms of their *content* these objects immediately present themselves as infinite.

There is an old saying customarily attributed to *Aristotle* (and falsely, because it allegedly expresses the standpoint of his philosophy), namely that *nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu*; – there is nothing in the understanding that has not been in sensation, in experience. It must be considered a misunderstanding, if speculative philosophy were to refuse to accept this proposition. It would, however, just as much have to assert the opposite, namely that *nihil est in sensu, quod non fuerit in intellectu* and assert it in the quite general sense that *nous*, or, in its deeper determination, *spirit*, is the

advertisements of newly published books I recently found the following in an English newspaper: ‘The Art of Preserving the Hair, on *Philosophical Principles*, neatly printed in post 8., price 7 sh.’ – Chemical or physiological procedures, etc., are what is presumably meant by *philosophical* principles of preserving one’s hair.

¹¹ The expression ‘philosophical principles’ is often used by English statesmen when they refer to general principles of national economics, even in public speeches. During the 1825 session of Parliament (on 2 February) *Brougham*, while delivering the address in reply to the King’s Speech, expressed himself as follows, speaking of ‘the philosophical principles of free trade that are worthy of a statesman – for no doubt they are philosophical – on the acceptance of which His Majesty has congratulated parliament today’. – It was not only this member of the opposition, however, who used such words. At the Annual Dinner of the London General Shipowners’ Society (which took place during the same month), presided over by the Prime Minister, the Earl of Liverpool, with the junior minister Canning and the Paymaster General of the Army, Sir Charles Long at his side, *Canning*, responding to a toast drunk to him, answered thus: ‘There has recently begun a period in which the ministers enjoyed the power to apply the right maxims to the administration of this country based on a *profound philosophy*.’ – In whatever way English philosophy may differ from German philosophy, it is always a pleasure to see the name of philosophy still honoured by English members of His Majesty’s government, even while this name is elsewhere used merely as a nickname and as an insult or to refer to something hateful.

cause of the world, and more specifically (see § 2 above) in the sense that the feelings concerning what is right, ethical, or religious are feelings and, consequently, that they are the experience of a content that has its roots and its seat in thinking alone.

§ 9

Second, however, subjective reason demands further satisfaction *in terms of form*. This form is the *necessity* in general (cf. § 1). Regarding the scientific manner mentioned above [§ 7], the *universal* that it contains (such as the genus, etc.) is on the one hand left indeterminate for itself and is not intrinsically connected to the particular [*das Besondere*]. Instead, both are external and contingent in relation to each other, as are likewise the combined particularities vis-à-vis each other in their reciprocal relationship. On the other hand, the starting-points are throughout *immediacies*, *accidental findings*, *presuppositions*. In neither respect is justice being done to the form of necessity. The process of thinking over that is directed towards satisfying this need is genuinely philosophical thinking, *speculative thinking*. This process of thinking things over is both the *same* as and *different* from the former process of thinking them over and, as such, it possesses in addition to the shared forms of thinking *its own peculiar forms*, of which the *concept* is the general form.

To that extent, the relationship of the speculative to the other sciences is merely this, namely that the former does not simply set aside the empirical content of the latter, but instead acknowledges and uses it; that it likewise acknowledges and utilizes as its own content the universal produced by these sciences, such as their laws, genera, etc.; and furthermore that it introduces into those categories others as well and validates them. In this respect, the difference between them concerns solely the said modification of the categories. Speculative logic contains the former logic and metaphysics, preserves the same forms of thought, the same laws and objects, but at the same time in doing so it develops them further and transforms them with the help of additional categories.

The *concept* in its speculative sense must be distinguished from what is customarily called a 'concept'. It is only with reference to the latter one-sided sense of the term that it has been asserted again and again a thousand times and been made a prejudice that the infinite cannot be grasped by means of concepts.

§ 10

The thinking operative in the philosophical manner of knowing needs to be understood in its necessity. Equally, its capacity to produce knowledge of the absolute objects needs to be justified. Such understanding, however, is itself a case of philosophical knowledge that can accordingly fall *within* philosophy alone. A *preliminary* explication would thus have to be an unphilosophical one and could not be more than a web of presuppositions, assurances, and formal reasoning, a web, that is, of casual assertions against which the opposite could be maintained with equal right.

It is one of the main viewpoints of the *Critical* philosophy that, prior to setting about to acquire knowledge of God, the essence of things, etc., the *faculty of knowing* itself would have to be examined first in order to see whether it is capable of achieving this; that one must first come to know the *instrument*, before one undertakes the work that is to be produced by means of it. For should the instrument be insufficient, all the effort would then have been expended in vain. – This thought has seemed so *plausible* that it has elicited the greatest admiration and acclaim and drawn knowing away from its interest in the *objects* and work on them and drawn it back to itself, i.e. to the formal aspect. If, however, we do not delude ourselves with words, it is easy to see that other tools may very well be examined and evaluated in ways other than undertaking the actual work for which they are determined. But the examination of knowing cannot take place other than *by way of knowing*. With this so-called instrument, examining it means nothing other than acquiring knowledge of it. But to want to know *before* one knows is as incoherent as the Scholastic's wise resolution to learn to *swim*, *before he ventured into the water*.

Reinhold,¹² who recognized the confusion that prevails in beginning in this way, proposed as a remedy that one make a preliminary start with a *hypothetical* and *problematic* kind of philosophizing and continue in this vein – Heaven knows how [*man weiß nicht wie*] – until somehow at some point along the line it would emerge that in this way one had arrived at the *primordial truth*. Looked at more closely, this would come down to the usual procedure, namely analysis of an empirical foundation or a provisional assumption that has been put into a definition.

¹² Moldenhauer–Michel: Karl Leonhard Reinhold, *Beiträge zur leichtern Übersicht des Zustandes der Philosophie beim Anfange des 19. Jahrhunderts*, Hamburg, 1801.

Unmistakably, it is right to declare the usual manner of working with presuppositions and provisional assumptions a hypothetical and problematic procedure. Still, while right, this observation does not alter the character of such a procedure, but instead immediately articulates the insufficiency of it.

§ 11

What philosophy aspires to may be further specified in the following way. In feeling and intuiting, the spirit has sensory things for objects; it has images in imagining, purposes when it wills, and so forth. But, *in opposition*, or merely in *contradistinction to those forms* of its existence and its objects, it also seeks to satisfy its loftiest inwardness, namely *thinking*, and to secure thinking as its object. In this way, spirit comes *to itself* in the deepest sense of the word, for its principle, its unalloyed selfhood, is thinking. But while going about its business it so happens that thinking becomes entangled in contradictions. It loses itself in the fixed non-identity of its thoughts and in the process does not attain itself but instead remains caught up in its opposite. The higher aspiration of thinking goes against this result produced by thinking satisfied with merely understanding [*verständiges Denken*] and is grounded in the fact that thinking does not let go of itself, that even in this conscious loss of being at home with itself [*Beisichsein*], it remains true to itself, ‘*so that it may overcome*’, and in thinking bring about the resolution of its own contradictions.

The realization that the dialectic makes up the very nature of thinking and that as understanding it is bound to land in the negative of itself, i.e. in contradiction, constitutes a cardinal aspect of logic. Despairing over its inability to achieve *by its own lights* the resolution of the contradiction into which it has placed itself, thinking returns to the resolutions and appeasements that have become part of the spirit in its other modes and forms. In the course of this return, however, thinking did not need to fall into the *misology* – a phenomenon Plato had already witnessed – of acting polemically against itself as happens when the so-called *immediate knowing* is declared to be the *exclusive* form in which we may become conscious of the truth.

§ 12

The *origin* of philosophy, emerging from the aspiration mentioned above, takes its *point of departure* from *experience*, i.e. from the immediate

consciousness engaged in formal reasoning [*räsonnierendes Bewußtsein*]. Aroused by this stimulus, thinking essentially reacts by *elevating* itself above the natural, sensory, and formally reasoning consciousness and into its own unmixed element. In this way, it at first takes up a self-distancing, *negative relationship* towards that point of departure. It thus finds satisfaction, for the time being, within itself, i.e. in the idea of the *universal* essence of these appearances, an idea that may be more or less abstract (such as the absolute, God). Conversely, the empirical sciences provide the stimulus to conquer *the form* in which the wealth of their content presents itself as something merely immediate and ad hoc, a multiplicity of items placed *side by side* one another and thus generally *contingent*, and to elevate this content to necessity. This stimulus tears thinking away from that universality and the implicitly [*an sich*] assured satisfaction and impels it to *the development [of the form and content] from out of itself*. Such development consists on the one hand merely in taking up the content and its given determinations and at the same time bestowing upon them, on the other hand, the shape of a content that emerges purely in accordance with the necessity of the subject matter itself, i.e. a shape that emerges freely in the sense of original thinking.

The relationship of *immediacy* and *mediation within consciousness* will have to be discussed explicitly and in detail below. At this point, it suffices to point out that, although both moments *appear* to be distinct, *neither of them* may be absent and they form an *inseparable* combination. – Thus, the knowledge [*Wissen*] of God, like that of anything *supersensory*, essentially contains an *elevation* above sensory feeling or intuiting. It accordingly entails a *negative* stance towards its initial object and therein a *mediation* as well. For mediation means to make a beginning and then to have proceeded to a second item, such that this second item is the way it is only insofar as one has arrived at it by starting with something that is an other over against it. This does not mean, however, that the knowledge [*Wissen*] of God is for all that any less independent vis-à-vis that empirical side; to the contrary, it achieves its independence essentially by means of this negation and elevation. If mediation is made a condition and is emphasized in this one-sided fashion, then one can say (although it does not say much) that philosophy owes its initial origin to experience (the *a posteriori*) – for thinking is indeed essentially the negation of something immediately on hand – just as eating is indebted to food, since without the latter

one would not be able to eat. Note, however, that in this connection eating is represented as ungrateful, for it consumes that to which it owes its being. Taken in this sense, thinking is no less ungrateful.

However, the *immediacy* that belongs properly to thinking and that is reflected into itself and thus mediated in itself (i.e. the *a priori*) is *universality*, its being-at-home-with-itself [*Beisichsein*] in general. In this universality, it finds satisfaction within itself, and in this respect the indifference against *particularization*, and hence against its development, is innate. Religion also possesses this same intensive kind of satisfaction and bliss, whether it be more or less developed or uneducated, whether it has advanced to scientific consciousness or been kept alive in the heart and a naïve sort of faith. When thinking remains at a standstill with the universality of ideas, as is unavoidable in the case of the first philosophies (think of *being* in the Eleatic school, *becoming* in Heraclitus, etc.), then it is rightfully accused of *formalism*. Even in the case of a more developed philosophy it can happen that only abstract propositions or determinations are taken up (such as, for instance, that everything is one in the absolute, that there is an identity of the subjective and the objective), and are merely repeated when we come to the particulars. As far as the first abstract universality of thinking is concerned, it makes very good and sound sense to say that philosophy owes its *development* to experience. On the one hand, the empirical sciences do not stand still with the perception of the details of the appearances; instead, by thinking, they have readied this material for philosophy by discovering its universal determinations, genera, and laws. In this way, they prepare this particularized content so that it can be taken up into philosophy. On the other hand, they thus make it necessary for thinking to proceed to these concrete determinations by itself. The process of taking up this content, in which thinking sublates its mere givenness and the immediacy that still clings to it, is at the same time a process of thinking *developing* out of itself. Insofar as philosophy owes its development to the empirical sciences, it bestows upon their contents the most essential shape of the *freedom* of thought (i.e. the shape of the *a priori*) and, instead of relying on the testimony of their findings and the experienced fact, provides their contents with the *corroboration of being necessary*, such that the fact becomes the depiction and the replication of the original and completely independent activity of thinking.

§ 13

The origin and development of philosophy as a *history of this science* is portrayed in the peculiar shape of an *external history*. This shape bestows upon the developmental stages of the idea the form of *contingent* succession and mere *diversity* of the principles and their elaborations in philosophies of them. The architect of this work of millennia, however, is the one living spirit whose thinking nature it is to become conscious of *what it is*, and, in having thus become an object, to be at the same time already elevated above it and to be in itself a higher stage. In part, the *history of philosophy* presents only one philosophy at different stages of its unfolding throughout the various philosophies that make their appearance. In part, it also shows that the specific *principles* each one of which formed the basis of a given system are merely *branches* of one and the same whole. The latest philosophy, chronologically speaking, is the result of all those that precede it and must therefore contain the principles of all of them. This is why, if it is philosophy at all, it is the most developed, richest and most concrete philosophy.

When dealing with what seem to be so many *diverse* philosophies one must distinguish the *universal* and the *particular* according to their proper determinations. If the universal is taken in its formal aspect and set *alongside* the particular, then it, too, becomes something particular. Such a procedure would strike us automatically as inappropriate and inept in the case of objects of everyday life, such as when someone were to ask for fruit and then rejected cherries, pears, and grapes simply because they are cherries, pears, and grapes, but *not* fruit. When it comes to philosophy, however, we allow ourselves to justify its rejection on the grounds that philosophies are so diverse and that each one of them is only *one* philosophy, not *the* philosophy; as if cherries were not fruit as well. It also happens that a philosophy whose principle is the universal is placed alongside one whose principle is particular, or even alongside doctrines that assert that there is no philosophy at all, in the sense that both are *merely different* aspects of philosophy, just as if light and darkness were to be called two *different* kinds of light.

§ 14

The same development of thinking that is portrayed in the history of philosophy is also portrayed in philosophy itself, only freed from its historical

externality, *purely in the element of thinking*. Free and genuine thought is *concrete* in itself, and as such it is an *idea*, and in its full universality *the* idea, or *the absolute*. The science of the latter is essentially a *system*, since the true insofar as it is *concrete* exists only through unfolding itself in itself, collecting and holding itself together in a unity, i.e. as a *totality*. Only by discerning and determining its distinctions can it be the necessity of them and the freedom of the whole.

A philosophizing *without a system* can be nothing scientific. Apart from the fact that such philosophizing expresses by itself more of a subjective outlook, it is also random in terms of its content. A particular content is justified solely as a moment of the whole. When separated from it, it represents an unjustified presupposition or a subjective certainty. Many philosophical writings limit themselves to expressing in this way merely *attitudes* [*Gesinnungen*] or *opinions*. – By a *system* one wrongly understands a philosophy built on a narrowly circumscribed *principle* distinct from other such principles; contrary to this, however, it is a principle of any genuine philosophy that it contain all particular principles within itself.

§ 15

Each of the parts of philosophy is a philosophical whole, a circle coming to closure within itself, but in each of its parts the philosophical idea exists in a particular determinacy or element. The individual circle, simply because it is in itself a totality, also breaks through the boundary of its element and founds a further sphere. The whole thus presents itself as a circle of circles each of which is a necessary moment, so that the system of its distinctive elements makes up the idea in its entirety, which appears equally in each one of them.

§ 16

As an *encyclopedia*, this science will not be presented in a detailed development of its particular divisions [*Besonderung*]. It has to be limited instead to the starting-points and the fundamental concepts of the particular sciences.

How much of the particular parts is required to constitute a particular science is indeterminate insofar as a part is not merely a singular moment, but must itself represent a totality in order to be

something true. Thus, the whole of philosophy constitutes truly *one* science, but it may also be viewed as a whole made up of several particular sciences. – A philosophical encyclopedia distinguishes itself from other, ordinary encyclopedias in that the latter are meant to be an *aggregate* of sciences that have been included in an ad hoc and empirical fashion. Some of these merely bear the name of a science but are in reality a mere collection of data. Because sciences of this kind have been taken up extraneously, the unity into which they are brought together in such an aggregate is itself likewise *extraneous*, i.e. – *an arrangement*. For this reason, such an arrangement must remain a provisional *attempt* and will always display unsuitable sides, especially since its materials are themselves of a contingent nature. – So in addition to the fact that a philosophical encyclopedia excludes (1) mere *aggregates* of data (as philology, for instance, seems at first glance to be), it likewise and *a fortiori* excludes (2) those based on mere caprice (such as, for instance, heraldry); sciences of the latter sort are positive *through and through*. (3) Other sciences are called *positive* as well. They, however, have a rational basis and starting-point. This part of them belongs to philosophy, whereas their *positive side* remains peculiar to them. The positive element of the sciences comes in several forms. First, what is in itself a rational starting-point passes over into something contingent due to the fact that they have to trace the universal back down to *empirical singularity* and *actuality*. In this field of the changeable and the accidental it is not the *concept* but only reasons [*Gründe*] that can be appealed to. Jurisprudence, for instance, or the system of direct and indirect taxation, require definitive, exact decisions which lie outside the *determinateness in-and-for-itself of the concept*. They therefore admit of a wide margin of discretion that may lead to one result for one reason and a different result for another, but is not capable of a final certain determination. Similarly, when pursued down to its individual details, the idea of *nature* fades away into contingencies. Thus the *history of nature*, *geography*, *medicine*, etc., end up with determinations of concrete existence and with species and genera that are determined by external coincidence and playfulness rather than by reason. *History* belongs here as well, insofar as its essence is the idea, while its appearance unfolds in contingency and in a field of arbitrariness. Second, sciences such as these are also *positive*, insofar as they do not acknowledge that their determinations are *finite*. Nor do they point

up where these determinations, together with their entire sphere, make the transition into a higher sphere. Instead, they assume those determinations to be *unqualifiedly valid*. Connected with this finitude of the *form* (the earlier point concerned the finitude of the *material*) is the finitude of the *epistemological ground*, which draws partly on formal reasoning, partly on feeling, belief, the authority of others, in general the authority of inner or outer intuition. Philosophies that want to base themselves on anthropology, facts of consciousness, inner intuition or outer experience belong in this group as well. To add one more thing, it may also be the case that only the *form of the scientific presentation* is empirical, but a meaningful intuition has ordered what is otherwise mere appearance in a way that it accords with the inner sequence of the concept. It is characteristic of such an empirical presentation that, due to the opposition and manifoldness of the juxtaposed phenomena, the extraneous and contingent circumstances of their conditions sublate themselves, so that the universal then comes before the mind. – In this way, a sensible [*sinnige*] experimental physics, or history, etc., will present the rational science of nature and of human affairs in an external image that mirrors the concept.

§ 17

As far as the *beginning* that philosophy has to make is concerned, in general it seems to start like the other sciences with a subjective presupposition, namely a particular object, such as space, number, etc., except that here *thinking* would have to be made the object of thinking. And yet, it is thinking's free act of placing itself at that standpoint where it is for itself and thus *generates* and *provides its own object for itself*. Furthermore, this standpoint, which thus appears to be an *immediate* one, must transform itself into a *result* within the science itself, and indeed into its final result in which the science recaptures its beginning and returns to itself. In this way, philosophy shows itself to be a sphere that circles back into itself and has no beginning in the sense that other sciences do. Hence, its beginning has a relationship merely to the subject who resolves to philosophize, but not to the science as such. Or, which comes to the same thing, the concept of the science and hence its first concept – which because it is the first contains the separation whereby thinking is the object for a seemingly external, philosophizing subject – must be grasped by the science itself. This is even its sole purpose, activity, and goal, namely to attain the

concept of its concept, returning to itself and attaining satisfaction in the process.

§ 18

Just as it is not possible to give someone a preliminary, general representation of philosophy, since only the science *as a whole* presents the idea, so also its *division into parts* can be comprehended only on the basis of this, the idea. Like the idea, the division that must be derived from it is something anticipated. The idea, however, proves to be the thinking that is utterly identical with itself. At the same time, it is the activity of opposing itself to itself in order to be for itself and solely by itself in this other. So the science falls into three parts:

- I. Logic, i.e. the science of the idea in and for itself,
- II. Philosophy of nature as the science of the idea in its otherness,
- III. Philosophy of spirit as the idea returning back to itself from its otherness.

In § 15 above, mention was made of the fact that the differences between the particular philosophical sciences are merely determinations of the idea itself and that it is the latter alone that presents itself in these several elements. What is recognized in nature is not something other than the idea. It is just that in nature the idea is in the form of *externalization*, just as in spirit the very same idea exists *as being-for-itself* and *as coming to be in and for itself*. A determination such as this in which the idea appears is at the same time a *fluid* moment. Thus, the individual science is just as much this: to know its content as a *positively existing* [*seiend*] object, as well as knowing therein immediately of its transition to a higher sphere. The *representation* of the *division into parts* is thus incorrect insofar as it sets the particular parts or sciences alongside one another, as if they were merely static components with substantive distinctions, similar to *species*.

PART I

Science of Logic
Preliminary conception

§ 19

Logic is the science of *the pure idea*, i.e. the idea in the abstract element of *thinking*.

The same proviso that holds generally for the concepts prefacing the philosophy – namely, that they are determinations drawn *from* and *subsequent to* the survey of the whole – also holds for this as well as other determinations contained in this preliminary conception.

It can indeed be said that logic *is* the science of *thinking*, of its *determinations and laws*. However, thinking as such constitutes only *the universal determinateness* or the *element* in which the idea exists qua logical. The idea is thinking not insofar as the latter is formal, but insofar as it is the self-developing totality of its distinctive determinations and laws, which it gives itself and does not already *have* and find within itself.

Logic is the *most difficult* science in that it has to do not with intuitions – and not even with abstract sensory representations as in geometry – but with pure abstractions. It requires a certain strength and versatility to retreat into pure thought, to hold on to it steadfastly and to move about in it. On the other hand, logic could be considered the *easiest* science, because its content is nothing but one's own thinking and its familiar determinations, and these are at once the *simplest* and the *elementary* sort of determinations. They are also what is *most familiar*, namely being, nothing, etc., determinateness, magnitude, etc., being-in-itself, being-for-itself, one, many, etc. This familiarity with them, however, makes the study of logic even harder. On the one hand, it is readily held to be not worth the effort to occupy oneself with such familiar things and, on the other, the point is to become familiar with them in a way that

is entirely different from, indeed even opposed to, the way one is already.

The *usefulness* of logic concerns the relationship to the subject, namely, the extent to which the subject [thereby] provides himself with a certain education for other purposes. His education through studying logic consists in acquiring practice in thinking, since this science is a thinking of thinking, and in getting thoughts into his head [precisely] as thoughts. – However, insofar as the logical dimension [*das Logische*] constitutes the absolute form of the truth and even more than that, the pure truth itself, it is something completely different from anything merely *useful*. But just as the most excellent, the freest and the most self-reliant things are also the most useful, so logic, too, may be understood in this way. Seen in this light, its usefulness must be deemed different from the merely formal exercise of thinking.

Addition 1. The first question is, what is the object of our science? The simplest and most intelligible answer to this question is that the *truth* is its object. Truth is a grand word and an even grander thing. If someone's spirit and mind are still healthy, his heart must leap at once at the thought of this word. But then the 'but' immediately surfaces, namely whether we are capable of knowing the truth. An incommensurability seems to obtain between us as imperfect humans and the truth as it exists in and for itself, and the question arises as to the bridge between the finite and the infinite. God is the truth; how are we to know him? The virtues of humility and modesty seem to conflict with such an undertaking. – However, one also asks whether the truth can be known, merely to find a justification for trudging on in the banality of one's finite ends. Such humility is not worth much. Such language as 'How am I, a poor earthly worm, to know the truth?' is a thing of the past. Its place has been taken by arrogance and smugness, and some have fancied themselves to be immediately in possession of the truth. – Our youth has been persuaded that they possess the truth (in religious and ethical matters) without further ado. In particular, it has been said in this context that all adults are wooden and fossilized and immersed in untruth. The dawn has appeared to the young people, so they say, but the older world is stuck in the muddle and morass of the everyday. In this context, the special sciences have been designated something that must indeed be acquired, but only as a means for the external purposes of life. Here, then, it is not modesty that holds off from knowledge and from the study of the truth, but instead the conviction that one already possesses the truth in and for itself. The older generation does indeed pin its hopes on the young, for it is they who are supposed to keep the world and science advancing. But this hope is conferred upon the young only insofar as they do not remain as they are, but take on the bitter labour of the spirit.

There is yet another brand of modesty about the truth. This is the seeming nobleness [*Vornehmheit*] towards the truth that we see in Pilate facing Jesus. Pilate

asked ‘What is the truth?’ in the sense of someone finished with everything, for whom nothing is of significance anymore – the sense in which Solomon says ‘All is vanity’. – Here, there is nothing left but subjective vanity.

Timidity is a further impediment to knowing the truth. It is easy for the lethargic mind to say that one did not really mean to be serious about philosophizing. One also hears logic lectures, it is true, but this is supposed to leave us as we are. It is believed that if thinking goes beyond the ordinary reach of representations it moves into sinister territory, that one entrusts oneself there to a sea on which one is tossed hither and thither by the waves of thought only to land eventually back again on the sandbank of this temporal finitude that one had left for nothing at all. The results of such views can be seen in the world. People may acquire many skills and grow to be knowledgeable in many ways; one may become an accomplished civil servant and be educated in preparation of whatever one’s particular purposes may be. But it is something quite different to educate one’s mind for what is loftier and to care about that. We may hope that in our times a demand for something better has dawned on our youth and that they will not be content with the straw of superficial knowledge.

Addition 2. Everyone is in agreement that *thinking* is the object of logic. Still, one can have a very low and a very high opinion of thinking. Thus, on the one hand, it is said: this is *just* a thought, meaning by that that the thought is merely subjective, arbitrary and contingent, not the basic matter itself, not what is true and actual. On the other hand, one may also have a very high opinion of thoughts and understand them in such a way that they alone are able to reach the highest truth, the nature of God, and that nothing can be known about God through the senses. It is said that God is spirit and wishes to be worshipped in spirit and in truth. But then we admit that what is felt and what is perceived by the senses is not what is spiritual, and that thinking is instead the innermost part of spirit and that only spirit is able to recognize spirit. Spirit may indeed also assume the form of feeling, as in religion, for instance. But, in general, feeling as such, i.e. the form of feeling, is one thing, while its *content* is quite another. Feeling as such is generally the form of the sensory dimension [*des Sinnlichen*], something we share with the rest of the animals. This form may indeed appropriate a concrete content, and yet this content does not properly belong to this form. The form of feeling is the lowest form for a spiritual content. Only in thinking and as thinking is this content, God himself, in its truth. In this sense, then, thought is not just *mere* thought, but rather the highest and, properly viewed, the only manner in which it is possible to comprehend what is eternal and in and for itself [*das an und für sich Seiende*].

Just as one can have a high and a low opinion of thinking, so also with the science of thought. Anybody can think, it is believed, without the study of logic, much as one can digest food without having studied physiology. And even if one has studied logic, one thinks just as one did before, perhaps more methodically, but otherwise with little difference, or so it seems. If logic had no other business than to familiarize us with the activity of merely formal thinking, then it would indeed produce nothing one would not have otherwise been doing just as well all along. The earlier logic was in fact reduced to this position. Incidentally, even

acquaintance with thinking as a merely subjective activity is honourable and of interest to human beings. By knowing [*wissen*] who they are and what they are doing, human beings distinguish themselves from animals. – On the other hand, however, as the science of thinking, logic occupies an eminent position, insofar as thought alone is capable of experiencing what is highest, namely the true. So when the science of logic contemplates thinking in its activity and production (for thinking is not an activity devoid of content, since it produces thoughts and *the* thought), its content is *a fortiori* the supersensory world, and to occupy oneself with it is to linger in this world. Mathematics deals with the abstractions of number and space, which are, however, still something sensory, albeit something sensory in an abstract sense without existence. Thought takes leave of even this ultimate sensory element and is freely in communion with itself, renouncing internal and external sensoriness, and removing all particular interests and inclinations. Insofar as logic stands on such a ground, we should think of it in a more dignified way than is usually the case.

Addition 3. The need to understand logic in a deeper sense than that of the science of merely formal thinking is prompted by the interest we take in religion, the state, the law and ethical life. In earlier times, people had no misgivings about thinking; they engaged in it spontaneously and with a fresh mind. They thought about God, nature, and the state and were convinced that it is only by means of thought that one is able to know the truth, not by means of the senses or coincidental representations and opinions. But while engaging in thinking in this way it turned out that the highest relationships in life are thereby compromised. Through thinking, the positive state of affairs was deprived of its power. State constitutions became casualties of thought; religion was attacked by thought; firm religious representations, once held to be valid unconditionally on the basis of revelation, were undermined and the old faith was toppled in the minds of many. Thus, for example, the Greek philosophers opposed the old religion and destroyed the representations of it. This is why philosophers were exiled and killed on the grounds that they overthrew religion and the state, which were essentially connected to one another. In this way, thinking made its mark on actuality and had the most awe-inspiring effect. People thus became aware of the power of thinking and started to examine more closely its pretensions. They professed to finding out that it claimed too much and could not achieve what it undertook. Instead of coming to understand the essence of God, nature and spirit and in general the truth, thinking had overthrown the state and religion. Hence, the demand was made that thinking justify its results, and it is the examination of the nature of thinking, and what it is entitled to, that has in large measure constituted the interest of philosophy in more recent times.

§ 20

Taking up thinking as it presents itself most readily, it appears (α) at first in its usual subjective meaning as one of the spirit's activities or faculties

alongside others such as the sensory dimension, intuiting, fantasy etc., desiring, willing and so on. Its *product*, namely the determinacy or form of thought, is the *universal*, the abstract in general. *Thinking* as an *activity* is thus the *active* universal and, more precisely, the universal that acts upon *itself* in so far as its accomplishment, i.e. what it produces, is the universal. Represented as a *subject*, thinking is a *thinking being*, and the simple expression for a concretely existing [*existierenden*] subject that thinks is *I*.

The determinations offered here and in the following sections are not to be taken as assertions and as my *opinions* about thinking. Since, however, in this preliminary exposition no derivation or proof can be given, they may be regarded as *facts* such that in the consciousness of anyone who has and contemplates thoughts it is found empirically to be the case that the character of universality and likewise the subsequent determinations are on hand in them. To be sure, for the observation of the facts of one's consciousness and representations, it is prerequisite that one be already educated in the tasks of paying attention and engaging in abstraction.

Already in such a preliminary exposition as this, the differences among sensory dimension, representation, and thoughts come up. They are crucial for grasping the nature and the types of knowing. It will therefore serve our elucidation well to call attention to these differences already at this point. – The *sensory* is initially explained by reference to its external origin, i.e. the senses or instruments of sensation. However, mention of the instrument does not by itself afford a determination of what is meant by it. The difference between the *sensory* and thought is to be located in the fact that the determination of the former is its *individualness*, and insofar as the individual (taken quite abstractly as an atom) also stands in connection with other things, whatever is sensory is *outside-of-something-else*, the abstract forms of which are, more precisely, those of being *side-by-side* and *after* one another. – Representation has such sensory material [*Stoff*] for its content, but posited in the determination of *being mine*, i.e. the determination that such content is in *me*, and of *universality*, the relation-to-self, *simplicity*. – Yet representation also contains, in addition to that sensory material, material that has originated from self-conscious thought, such as the representations of what is right, ethical, religious, or even of thought itself, and it is not easily noticed how the difference between such

representations and the *thoughts* of such content is to be marked. Here it is the case that the content is a thought and the form of universality is present as well, which is inherent in a content's being in *me* and in being a representation at all. But even in this respect, the distinctiveness of the representation is generally to be located in the fact that in it such content at the same time remains isolated. To be sure, the right, the just, and similar determinations do not occupy the sensory [positions of] being-outside-of-one-another proper to *space*. They may indeed appear to be somehow successive in time, but their content as such is not represented as being encumbered by time, as transient and alterable in it. Still, even such intrinsically spiritual [*an sich geistige*] determinations stand *isolated* on the wide terrain of the inner, abstract universality of representing as such. In this isolation, they are *simple*; right, duty, God. Now either representation remains at a standstill with the determination that 'right is right' and 'God is God' or, if it is more educated, it adds determinations, for instance, that God is the creator of the world, all wise, omnipotent, etc. In this case, several isolated simple determinations are similarly strung together, remaining outside one another, despite the bond assigned to them in the subject possessing them. Representation here meets with the *understanding* which differs from the former only in that it posits relationships of the universal and the particular or of cause and effect, etc. It thus establishes relations of necessity among the isolated determinations of representation, while representation leaves them standing *side-by-side* in its indeterminate space, connected only by the bare *also*. – The distinction between representation and thoughts has a special significance, because it can generally be said that philosophy does nothing but transform representations into thoughts – and, indeed, beyond that, the mere thought into the concept.

Incidentally, when it was said that the determinations of the sensory are those of *individuality and being-outside-of-one-another*, it can also be added that the latter, too, are in turn thoughts and universals themselves. In the logic, it will be shown that thought and the universal are just this, namely to be itself as well as its other, that its reach extends over the other, and that nothing escapes from it. Given that *language* is the product of thought, nothing that is not universal can be expressed in it either. What I only *mean*, is *mine*, belonging to me as this particular individual. If, however, language

expresses only what is universal, then I cannot say what I *mean* only. And the *ineffable*, feeling, sentiment are not what is most exquisite and true, but instead the most insignificant and untrue. When I say 'the *individual*', '*this individual*', '*here*', '*now*', then these are all universalities. *Anything* and *everything* is an individual, a *this*, even when it is sensory, just as much as a *here*, *now*. Similarly, when I say 'I' I *mean* to refer to myself as *this one* individual, excluding everyone else. But what I say (namely, 'I') is precisely each and every one, the I excluding everyone else. – Kant used the awkward expression that the I *accompanies* all my representations as well as sentiments, desires, actions, etc. This I is the universal in and for itself, and the commonality is also a universal, albeit only an outer form of universality. All other humans have it in common with me to be an I, just as it is a common feature of all *my* sensations, representations, etc. to be *mine*. 'I', however, taken abstractly and as such, is the pure relationship to itself in which abstraction is made from representing, sensing, indeed from every state as from every particularity of nature, talent, experience, etc. I is in this respect the concrete existence [*Existenz*] of the entirely *abstract* universality, the abstractly *free*. This is why the I is *thinking* as a *subject*, and because I am at the same time present in all my sensations, representations, and states, etc., thought is present everywhere and permeates all these determinations as a category.

Addition. When we speak of thinking, it appears initially to be a subjective activity, one of several faculties possessed by us, such as memory, representation, volition, and the like. If thinking were a merely subjective activity and as such the object of logic, this science like any other would have its specific object. It could then appear to be arbitrary to make thinking and not also the will, imagination, and so forth the object of a particular science. That thinking should receive this honour may well be due to the fact that we grant it a certain authority and that we regard it as what is truly human, distinguishing humans from animals. – To become familiar with thinking even as a merely subjective activity is not without interest. Its more specific determinations would be the rules and laws with which one becomes acquainted through experience. Thinking viewed in this way as determined by laws makes up what usually otherwise constituted the content of logic. Aristotle is the founder of this science. He possessed the strength to assign to thinking what belongs to it *per se*. Our thinking is very concrete, but with respect to its manifold content we need to sort out what belongs to thinking or the abstract form of the activity. The activity of thinking, acting as a subtle spiritual bond, connects all this content. It is this bond, this form itself, which Aristotle highlighted and defined. To this day, the logic of Aristotle represents

the logical [sphere], which has merely been made more elaborate, primarily by the Scholastics of the Middle Ages. The Scholastics did not add to the material, but merely developed it further. The work of more recent times with respect to logic consists primarily in omitting many of the logical determinations spun out further by Aristotle and the Scholastics, on the one hand, and in superimposing a lot of psychological material [on the other]. The interest in this science lies with becoming acquainted with the procedures of finite thinking, and the science is correct when it corresponds to its presupposed object. To occupy oneself with this kind of formal logic is no doubt useful. It clears the head, as they say. One learns to concentrate, to abstract, whereas ordinary consciousness deals with sensory representations which crisscross and get entangled. In the act of abstraction, however, the mind is concentrated on a *single* point and, by this means, the habit is acquired of preoccupying oneself with the interiority [of things]. One can use the familiarity with the forms of finite thinking as a means towards educating oneself in the empirical sciences that proceed in accordance with those forms. In this sense, logic has indeed been called 'instrumental logic'. To be sure, it is possible to assume a more liberal stance and claim that logic is to be studied for its own sake rather than for its usefulness, since excellent things should not be sought out merely for their usefulness. Now in one sense, this is quite correct, but in another that which is excellent is likewise what is most useful, for it is substantive, something that stands fast for itself and is for that reason the bearer of the particular ends which it furthers and brings to fruition. One must not view the particular ends as primary, since that which is excellent promotes them as well. Thus, for example, religion has its absolute value in itself. At the same time, other ends are borne and upheld by it. Christ says: 'Seek ye first the kingdom of God, and all these things shall be added unto you' [Matt. 6:33]. Particular ends can be achieved only through attaining what is in and for itself [*das Anundfürsichseiende*].

§ 21

(β) When thinking is taken as active in relation to objects, as *thinking over* something, the universal that is the product of such an activity contains the value of the *basic matter* [*Sache*], the *essential*, the *inner*, the *true*.

In § 5 the old belief was mentioned that whatever is truthful in objects, the constitutions [of things], or events is the inner, the essential [dimension], the basic matter on which something hinges, and this is not to be found *immediately* in consciousness; that it is not what appearances first present and what first occurs to one; that instead one must first *think it over* in order to arrive at the true constitution of the object and that this is achieved through thinking things over.

Addition. Even *children* are instructed to think things over. For instance, they are told to connect adjectives with substantives. Here they have to pay attention and differentiate, remember a rule, and adjust the particular case to it. The rule is nothing but a universal, and children are asked to make the particular conform to the universal. – Furthermore, in life we have *ends*. We think over the ways in which we can achieve them. The end here stands for the universal, the ruling principle, and we have means and instruments whose operation we determine in light of our end. – Thinking things over functions in a similar way in the *context of morality*. To think things over here means to recall the right thing to do, one's duty, the universal that serves as the fixed rule in accordance with which we are to orient our particular behaviour in the cases at hand. The universal determination ought to be recognizable and inherent in our behaviour. – We find the same thing in our attitude towards the *phenomena of nature* [*Naturscheinungen*] as well. For instance, we take note of thunder and lightning. This phenomenon is familiar to us and we often perceive it. But human beings are not content with mere familiarity, with the mere sensory phenomenon. Rather, they want to get behind it, they want to know [*wissen*] what it is, they want to comprehend it. Hence, one thinks over and wants to know [*wissen*] the cause as something distinct from the phenomenon as such, the inner in its distinctness from the mere outer. The phenomenon is accordingly made double, broken apart into the inner and the outer, force and expression, cause and effect. Here, the inner, the force, is again the universal, that which abides, not this or that flash of lightning, this or that plant, but instead that which remains the same in all these things. The sensory is something individual, ephemeral; by thinking it over, we become acquainted with what abides in it. Nature shows us an infinite amount of individual shapes and phenomena. We have a need to introduce unity into this manifoldness. Hence we compare and seek to recognize the universal in each case. Individuals are born and pass away; the genus is what abides in them, what recurs in all of them, and what is present only for [those] thinking them over. The laws belong in this context as well, such as, for example, the laws of motion of the celestial bodies. We see those bodies here today and there tomorrow. This lack of order is something inappropriate for the spirit, something it does not trust, for it believes in order, in a simple, constant, and universal determination. Guided by this belief, spirit has applied its process of thinking things over to the phenomena and has come to know their laws, has laid down the motions of the celestial bodies in a universal manner, so that every change of location can be determined and recognized on the basis of this law. – It is the same with those powers that rule human action in its infinite manifoldness. Here, too, human beings possess that belief in a prevailing universal. – From all these examples, it is to be gathered that the process of thinking things over is always seeking what is fixed, abiding, intrinsically determined, and governing the particular. This universal is not to be grasped with the senses, and it counts as what is essential and true. Thus, for example, duties and rights are the essence of actions and the truth of the latter consists in being in conformity with those *universal* determinations.

By determining what is universal in this way, we find that it forms the opposite of an other, and this other is the merely immediate, external, and individual over against the mediated, inner, and universal. This universal does not exist concretely as a universal outwardly, i.e. the genus as such cannot be perceived, and the laws of motion of the celestial bodies are not inscribed in the sky. Thus, one does not hear the universal and one does not see it; instead, it is only for the spirit. Religion leads us to a universal that encompasses everything else in itself, an absolute through which everything else has been generated, and this absolute is not for the senses but only for the spirit and for thought.

§ 22

(γ) Through the process of thinking something over, its content is *altered* from the way it is in sensation, intuition, or representation initially. Thus, it is only *by means of* [*vermittels*] an alteration that the *true* nature of the *object* emerges in consciousness.

Addition. The result of thinking something over is a product of our thinking. Thus, for instance, *Solon* created out of his head the laws that he gave the Athenians. On the other hand, however, we also regard the universal, the laws, as the opposite of something merely subjective and see in it what is essential, true, and objective in things. In order to learn the true nature of things, mere attentiveness is not enough. Rather, our subjective activity has to be involved, reshaping what is immediately on hand. Now at first blush this seems to be quite misguided and contrary to the end at stake in knowing. Nonetheless, it can be said that it has been the conviction of all times that only by reworking the immediate, a reworking produced by thinking things over, is something substantive attained. By contrast, it is primarily in recent times alone that doubts have been raised and the distinction has been maintained between the products of our thinking and things in and of themselves. It has been said that the in-itself of things is something entirely different from what we make of it. The standpoint in defence of this separation has been advocated particularly by the Critical philosophy against the conviction of the whole previous world for which the agreement of the basic matter and thought counted as something settled. The interest of modern philosophy revolves around this opposition. However, it is the natural belief of human beings that this opposition has no truth. In ordinary life we think things over without the added reflection that this is how truth comes about. In the firm belief in thought's agreement with the basic matter, we think without further ado and this belief is of the highest importance. It is the sickness of our time that has led to the desperation that our knowing is merely subjective and that this subjectivity is the last word. And yet, the truth is what is objective and this ought to be the rule for everyone's convictions, such that an individual's conviction is bad if it does not conform to this rule. According to the modern viewpoint, by contrast, conviction as such, i.e. the mere form of being convinced, is already a good thing – whatever the content, since no standard for its truth is on hand. – When we said earlier that it is an old belief of human beings that it

is the vocation of the spirit to know [*wissen*] the truth, it was implied that the objects, the outer and the inner nature, and in general the object [*Objekt*] as it is in itself, are just the way they are qua thought, and that thinking therefore is the truth of what is objective [*die Wahrheit des Gegenständlichen*]. The business of philosophy consists merely in bringing explicitly to consciousness what has been valid for humanity since antiquity with respect to thinking. Philosophy thus does not establish anything new. What we have brought out here by means of our reflection is everybody's immediate prejudice already.

§ 23

(8) Since in thinking things over their true nature emerges and since this thinking is just as much *my* activity, that true nature is equally the *product of my* spirit insofar as the latter is a thinking subject. It is mine in accordance with my simple universality, i.e. as an I that is entirely *with itself* – it is the product of my *freedom*.

One can often hear the expression '*to think for oneself*', as if something significant is thereby said. In fact, nobody can think for someone else, just as little as they can eat and drink for them. That expression is thus a pleonasm. – *Freedom* is immediately entailed by thinking because thinking is the activity of the universal, a relating of itself to itself that is accordingly abstract, a subjectively non-determinate being-with-itself [*Beisichsein*] that at the same time, as far as its *content* is concerned, is only in the *basic matter* and its determinations. If, therefore, there is talk of humility or modesty or, alternatively, haughtiness in connection with philosophizing, and if humility or modesty consists in ascribing to one's subjectivity nothing *particular* [*nichts Besonderes*] about one's qualities and actions, then philosophizing will at least have to be acquitted of haughtiness. For thinking is true in terms of content only if it is immersed in the *basic matter* at hand and in terms of form only if it is not a *particular* instance of being or doing of the subject, but instead is consciousness conducting itself precisely as an abstract 'I', *liberated from all the particularity* [*Partikularität*] that attaches to qualities and conditions otherwise, and only enacting the universal through which it is identical with all individuals. – When Aristotle calls upon us to think of ourselves as worthy of such behaviour, then the worthiness which consciousness bestows upon itself consists precisely in letting go of its *particular* beliefs and opinions and letting the *basic matter* hold sway in itself.

§ 24

In accordance with these determinations, thoughts may be called *objective* thoughts. Also to be reckoned among them are those forms that are initially examined in ordinary logic and are usually taken to be only forms of *conscious* thought. *Logic* thus coincides with *metaphysics*, i.e. the science of *things* captured in *thoughts* that have counted as expressing *the essentialities of things*.

The relationship of such forms as concept, judgment, and syllogism to others, e.g. causality and so forth, can emerge only within logic itself. However, this much should be clear in a preliminary way, that insofar as thought tries to come up with a *concept* of things, this concept (and with that also its most immediate forms such as judgment and syllogism) cannot be made up of determinations and relationships which are alien and external to those things. Thinking things over, as has been said above, directs us to the *universal* in things, but the universal is itself one of the moments of the concept. The fact that there is rhyme and reason [*Verstand*, *Vernunft*] to the world conveys exactly what is contained in the expression ‘objective thought’. To be sure, the latter expression is awkward because *thought* is habitually used for something belonging to the mind [*Geist*], i.e. to consciousness and what is objective is for the most part attributed to what is not mental.

Addition 1. When it is said that thought as objective thought constitutes the core [*das Innere*] of the world, it may seem as if, by this, consciousness is supposed to be attributed to natural things. We feel a certain resistance to construing the inner activity of things as thinking, since we say that human beings distinguish themselves from all natural things through thinking. We would therefore have to speak of nature as the system of unconscious thoughts, a ‘petrified intelligence’, as Schelling puts it. Instead of using the expression *thoughts*, it would thus be better to speak of *thought-determinations*, in order to avoid any misunderstanding. – In general, from what has been said so far, the logical dimension is to be sought as a system of thought-determinations for which the opposition of the subjective and the objective (in its ordinary sense) falls away. This meaning of thinking and its determinations is expressed more directly by the ancients when they say that *voûs* governs the world – or when we say that reason exists in the world and mean by it that reason is the soul of the world, residing in it, immanent in it as its ownmost, innermost nature, its universal. To take a more particular example, when we talk about some specific animal we say that it is an *animal*. The *animal as such* cannot be shown, only a specific animal can. *The* animal does not exist concretely [*existiert nicht*] but is instead the universal nature of individual animals, and each concretely

existing animal is much more concretely specific, something particularized. But to be an animal, i.e. the genus that is the universal, belongs to the specific animal and constitutes its specific essentiality. Take what it is to be an animal away from a dog, and we would be at a loss to say what it is. In general, things have an abiding inner nature as well as an external existence. They live and die, come to be and pass away. The genus is their essentiality, their universality, and it is not to be construed merely as some common feature.

Just as thinking makes up the substance of external things, so it is also the universal substance of all things spiritual. Thinking is inherent in all human intuiting. Similarly, thinking is the universal in all representations, memories, and generally in every spiritual activity, in all willing, wishing, and so forth. The latter are one and all merely further specifications of thinking. When we construe thinking in this way, it appears in a different context from when we merely say that among and alongside other faculties such as perception, representation, willing, and so on we also possess the faculty of thinking. When we consider thinking as the true universal in everything natural and everything spiritual as well, then it extends over all of this and is the foundation of everything. We can use this conception of thinking in its objective sense (as *nous*) as a starting-point for explaining what thinking means in the subjective sense. To begin with, we say that humans think – and yet at the same time we also say that they perceive, will, etc. Humans think, and to be human is to be something universal. However, they think only insofar as the universal exists *for* them. The animal, too, is *in itself* a universal, but the universal does not exist as such *for* it; it is always only the individual thing that does. The animal sees something individual, e.g. its food, a human being, and so on. All this, however, is merely something individual for it. Similarly, sensation is always involved with individual things alone (*this* pain, *this* pleasant taste, and so forth). Nature does not bring *nous* to consciousness, only humans duplicate themselves in such a way that the universal exists *for* the universal. This is already the case when a human being knows [*weiß*] itself as 'I'. When I say 'I', I mean to refer to myself as this individual, indeed as this determinate person. Actually, however, I do not thereby say anything specific about myself. Everybody else is 'I' as well, and although in denoting myself as 'I' I mean myself, this individual being, I simultaneously utter something completely universal. 'I' is pure being-for-itself in which all that is particular has been negated and sublated [*aufgehoben*]; it is the ultimate, simple, and pure element of consciousness. We can say that 'I' and thought are the same; or more specifically, 'I' is the thinking as someone thinking [*das Denken als Denkendes*]. What I possess in my consciousness is for me. 'I' is this void, the receptacle for anything and everything, that for which everything exists and which stores everything within itself. Every human being is an entire world of representations buried in the night of the 'I'. The 'I' is thus the universal in which abstraction is made from everything particular, but in which at the same time everything lies shrouded. It is therefore not a merely abstract universality, but a universality that contains everything within itself. We use 'I' at first in a purely trivial way, and only through philosophical reflection does it come to be an object of consideration. In the 'I' we possess the entirely pure thought in its

presence. The animal cannot say 'I'; only a human can do so because a human is the thinking. In the 'I' there is inner and outer content of many different kinds, and depending on the make-up of this content, we behave as someone perceiving with the senses, representing, remembering, and so on. In every instance, however, the 'I' is present, or rather, thinking is inherent in all of it. Thus, humans are always thinking, even if they are only perceiving. When they consider something, they always view it as something universal. If they zero in on an individual thing, they pick it out, thereby turning their attention away from something else, and take it as something abstract and universal, even if only as a universal in a formal sense.

Regarding our representations, we have a twofold situation. Either the *content* is a thought, but the *form* is not; or, conversely, the form belongs to thought, but the content does not. For instance, when I say 'anger', 'rose', 'hope', then all these things are familiar to me through sensation and feeling but I express this content in a general way, i.e. in the form of thought. I have left out many particulars and rendered only the content as something universal, but the content remains sensory. Conversely, when I form a representation of God, the content is indeed something purely thought, but the form is still sensory in the way in which I find it immediately present in me. In the case of representations, then, the content is not merely sensory, as when I look at things. Instead, the content is sensory while the form belongs to thought or vice versa. In the former case, the matter is given and the form belongs to thinking; in the latter thinking is the source of the content, but by means of the form the content becomes something given that thereby reaches spirit from the outside.

Addition 2. In logic we deal with pure thought or pure thought-determinations. When we think of a thought in the ordinary sense, we always imagine something that is not just a pure thought, for by it we mean a thought whose content is something empirical. In logic, thoughts are considered in such a way that they have no other content than that which belongs to and is generated by thought itself. In this way, the thoughts are *pure* thoughts. Thus spirit relates purely to itself and is therefore free, for freedom is precisely this: to be at home with oneself in one's other, to be dependent upon oneself, to be the determining factor for oneself. In all my urges I start from something other than myself that is for me something external. Here, then, we speak of dependence. Freedom exists only where there is no other for me that I am not myself. The natural human being who is determined only by his urges is not at home with himself. However self-willed he may be, the *content* of his willing and believing is still not his own and his freedom is merely a *formal* one. When I think, I give up my subjective particularity, immerse myself in the basic matter and let thought follow its own course; and I think badly whenever I add something of my own.

If, in keeping with what has been said up to now, we look at logic as a system of *pure* thought-determinations, then by contrast the other philosophical sciences, the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of spirit, appear as a kind of applied logic, for logic is their animating soul. In this respect, these other sciences are concerned simply with recognizing the logical forms in the formations of nature and of spirit,

formations that are merely a particular manner of expression of the forms of pure thinking. For instance, consider *sylogism* (not, indeed, in the meaning it has in the old, formal logic but in its truth). It is that determination in virtue of which the particular is supposed to be the middle that joins the extremes of the universal and the individual together. This form of syllogistic inference is a universal form of all things. Everything is something particular that joins itself as something universal with the individual. The impotence of nature, however, brings with it an inability to exhibit the logical forms in their purity. The magnet is an example of that sort of impotent exhibition of the syllogism. It joins its poles together in the middle, i.e. in the point of indifference, such that they are immediately one in their distinctness. In physics, too, one becomes familiar with the universal, the essence. The difference is merely that the philosophy of nature makes us aware of the true forms of the concept in natural things. – Logic is thus the all-animating spirit of all the sciences and the thought-determinations of logic are pure spirits. They are what is innermost, and yet at the same time they are the very things we utter all the time and which for that reason seem to be something perfectly familiar. However, what is in this way familiar is usually what is most unfamiliar. Thus, for instance, *being* is a pure determination of thought. And yet, it never occurs to us to make the ‘is’ the object of our consideration. We typically believe that the absolute must lie somewhere far yonder. But it is precisely that which is wholly present and which we as thinking beings always carry with us and make use of, even if without explicit consciousness of the fact. Such thought-determinations are deposited first and foremost in language. Hence the instruction in grammar that children receive is useful for drawing their attention to distinctions in thought without their being conscious of it.

It is commonly said that logic deals with *forms* only and that it must take its *content* from somewhere else. However, the logical thoughts are not some *accessory* over against all this content. Rather, all this other content is merely an *accessory* compared to the logical forms. They are the ground, existing in and for itself, of everything. – A higher level of education is required for directing one’s interest at such pure determinations. The contemplation, in and for itself, of these determinations has, in addition, the sense that we derive these determinations from thinking itself and, on the basis of them, see whether they are true determinations. We do not pick them up in some external fashion and then define them or demonstrate their value and their validity by comparing them to the way in which they happen to surface in our consciousness. That would mean that we start from observation and experience and then say, for instance, that we typically use ‘force’ for this and that. We then call a definition of this kind correct, if it agrees with what we usually find in our ordinary consciousness of its object.

However, in such a way a concept is not being determined as it is in and for itself, but determined in accordance with a presupposition that thus constitutes the criterion, the standard of correctness. And yet, we do not have to use such a standard but instead let these determinations, alive in themselves, count for themselves. The question concerning the truth of the thought-determinations must appear strange to ordinary consciousness for, after all, they seem to obtain

their truth only from being applied to given objects. Consequently, it would make no sense to inquire about their truth independently of such an application. This, however, is exactly the point at issue. To be sure, one must first know [*wissen*] what is to be understood by truth here. Usually we call truth the agreement of an object with our representation of it. Thus we have an object as a presupposition, and our representation is supposed to conform to it. – In the philosophical sense, by contrast, truth means in general the agreement of a content with itself, to put it abstractly. Consequently, this is a meaning of truth entirely different from the one just mentioned. Incidentally, the deeper (i.e. philosophical) meaning of truth can already be found to some extent in the ordinary use of language. Thus, for instance, we speak of a *true* friend and mean by that someone whose way of acting conforms to the concept of friendship. Similarly, we speak of a *true* work of art. Untrue then means as much as bad, something in itself inadequate. In this sense, a bad state is an untrue state, and what is bad and untrue generally consists in the contradiction that obtains between the determination or the concept and the concrete existence of the object. We can form a correct representation of such a bad object but the content of this representation is something intrinsically untrue. We may have in our heads many instances of correctness of this sort that are simultaneously untruths. – God alone is the true agreement of the concept with reality.

But all finite things have an untruth: they possess a concept and a concrete existence that is, however, inadequate to the concept. For this reason, they must perish, and by this means the inadequacy of their concept and their concrete existence is manifested. As an individual thing, the animal possesses its concept in its genus, and the genus frees itself from the individuality by means of death.

Truth considered in the sense here explained, namely as the agreement with itself, constitutes the proper concern of logic. In ordinary consciousness, the question regarding the truth of thought-determinations does not even arise. The business of logic can also be expressed by saying that in it thought-determinations are considered in terms of their ability to capture what is true [*das Wahre*]. The question thus aims at finding out which are the forms of the infinite and which of the finite. In ordinary consciousness, we do not lose sleep over finite thought-determinations and we let them count as valid without further ado. All deception, however, is due to thinking and acting in accordance with finite determinations.

Addition 3. What is true can be known [*erkennen*] in different ways, and the ways of knowing are to be considered merely as forms of doing this. Thus one may indeed come to know what is true through experience, but experience is only one of the forms. In the case of experience, it depends on the sensitivity [*Sinn*] with which one approaches actuality. Someone with a great sensitivity has great experiences and catches sight of what matters in the colourful play of appearances. The idea is on hand and actual, it is not something yonder and far away. For example, a great sensitivity such as that of Goethe, when looking at nature or history, has great experiences of them, perceiving what is due to reason and putting it into words. Again, what is true may also be known through reflection, in which case it is determined by relations between thoughts. However, in these two ways what is

true in and for itself does not yet exist in its proper form. The most perfect form of knowing is that in the pure form of thinking. Here a human being behaves in a thoroughly free manner. That the form of thinking is the absolute form and that the truth appears in it as it is in and for itself, this is the claim of philosophy in general. The proof for this first of all requires showing that those other forms of knowing are finite forms. The high scepticism of antiquity accomplished this with its demonstration that all these forms contain a contradiction within themselves. While this scepticism also approaches the forms of reason, it does so by first imputing to them something finite in order to get hold of them. In the course of the logical development [on the following pages], each and every form of finite thought will come up and, indeed, as they step forward according to the necessity [of that development]. Here (i.e. in the introduction) they would have to be taken up initially in an unscientific manner as something given. In the logical treatment itself not only the negative side of these forms is shown, but their positive side as well.

When one compares the different forms of knowing [*Erkennen*] with one another it can easily look as if the first of them, namely that of immediate knowledge [*Wissen*], were the most adequate, most beautiful, and highest. Everything called innocence in a moral respect falls into this form of thinking as do then religious feeling, naïve trust, love, loyalty, and natural faith. The two other forms, first that of reflective knowing and then also of philosophical knowing, abandon this immediate natural unity. Insofar as they have this in common with one another, their manner of intending to grasp what is true, namely, through thinking, can easily seem to be a matter of human pride intent on knowing by one's own might [*Kraft*] what is true. As a standpoint of universal separation [where humans separate themselves from everything], this standpoint can indeed be regarded as the origin of all evil and malice, as the original sacrilege. It may then well appear as if thought and knowing are to be given up in order to manage to return [to a unity] and arrive at a reconciliation. As far as leaving behind the natural unity is concerned, this wondrous division of the spiritual within itself has been an object of consciousness for peoples from ancient times. In nature, such internal division does not take place and things in nature do nothing evil. An old representation of the origin and the consequences of that division was given to us in the Mosaic myth of the Fall [*Sündenfall*, i.e. the original sin]. The subject matter of this myth forms the basis of an essential piece of religious doctrine, namely the doctrine of the natural sinfulness of human beings and the necessity of a help against it. It seems appropriate to examine the myth of the Fall at the beginning of the Logic, since the latter has to do with knowing, while this myth deals with knowing and its origin and significance, as well. Philosophy must not shy away from religion, and it must not behave as if it had to be content if religion merely tolerates it. On the other hand, likewise the view that myths and religious narratives such as these are old-fashioned is to be rejected. After all, for thousands of years they have been venerated among peoples.

If we now look at the myth of the Fall more closely, we find expressed here the general relation of knowing to spiritual life, as was mentioned earlier. In

its immediacy, spiritual life first appears as innocence and naïve trust. However, it is part of the essence of spirit that this immediate state be sublated, for the spiritual life distinguishes itself from the natural life and, more specifically, from the animal life, by not remaining in the state of being in itself but instead by being *for itself*. Hence, the standpoint of division must equally be sublated, and spirit should return to oneness [*Einigkeit*] by its own means. This oneness is a spiritual oneness, and the principle that leads back to it [*das Prinzip der Zurückführung*] exists in thinking itself. It is thinking that causes the wound and heals it, too. – Now in our myth it is said that Adam and Eve, the first human beings (the human being in general), found themselves in a garden in which there existed a tree of life and a tree of the knowledge [*Erkenntnis*] of good and evil. It is said that God had forbidden them to eat from the fruit of the latter tree. There is no further mention of the tree of life at this point. By this means, it is declared that human beings are not supposed to come to know but instead that they are supposed to remain in a state of innocence. Likewise, in other peoples who possess a deeper consciousness we find the first state of the human being represented as a state of innocence and oneness. This much is correct about such a view: we find everything human in a state of division from the outset but this division cannot indeed be the end of the matter. However, it is incorrect that the immediate, natural unity is the right one. Spirit is not merely something immediate; rather it contains the moment of mediation essentially within itself. Childlike innocence does indeed possess something attractive and touching, but only insofar as it reminds us of what is supposed to be brought about by spirit. That natural oneness that we witness in children is supposed to be the result of the work and education of the spirit. – Christ says: ‘Unless you *become* like children . . .’, etc. [Matt. 18:2–4]. This does not mean, however, that we should remain children. – Now in our Mosaic myth we find, furthermore, that the occasion for stepping out of the unity came to the human being through instigation from the outside (through the serpent). In fact, however, the act of entering into the opposition, i.e. the awakening of consciousness, is intrinsic to human beings themselves; it is a history that repeats itself with every human being. The serpent attributes godliness to knowing [*wissen*] what is good and evil, and it is indeed this knowledge that became part of human beings by virtue of the fact that they broke up the unity of their immediate being and enjoyed the forbidden fruit. The first reflection that occurred to the awakening consciousness was the realization by these human beings that they were naked. This is a very naïve and profound feature. For in this feeling of shame lies the divorce of human beings from their natural, sensory being. The animals who do not progress to this divorce are for that reason shame-less. As a result, the spiritual and ethical source of clothing is to be sought in the human feeling of shame. Mere physical need is secondary in comparison. – There now follows the so-called curse that God has laid upon human beings. What is emphasized here relates first and foremost to the opposition between human beings and nature. Man must work by the sweat of his brow, and woman must give birth in pain. As far as the work is concerned, it is just as much the result of the divorce as it is the divorce’s overcoming. The animal finds immediately

whatever it requires for the satisfaction of its needs. By contrast, humans relate to the means of satisfying their needs as something produced and manufactured by them. Thus even in this external respect, human beings are self-relating. – The myth does not conclude with the expulsion from paradise. It says further: ‘God spoke: “Adam has become like one of us, knowing [*wissen*] good and evil.”’ – Knowing is here designated as something divine, not, as before, as something that should not exist. In this then also lies the refutation of that idle chatter according to which philosophy belongs only to spirit’s finitude. Philosophy is knowing, and only through knowing has the original calling of human beings to be an image of God, been realized. – When it is then said in addition that God has ousted humans from the garden of Eden so that they may not eat from the tree of life, it is thereby declared that according to their natural side human beings are indeed finite and mortal, and yet infinite in knowing.

It is the well-known teaching of the Church that human beings are by nature evil, and this being evil by nature is called original sin [*Erbsünde*]. One must, however, give up the superficial idea that original sin is rooted merely in a contingent act of the first human beings. It is in fact inherent in the concept of spirit that a human being is by nature evil, and we ought not to imagine that it could have been otherwise. Insofar as the human being exists as a natural being and behaves and comports himself [*sich verhält*] that way, this is a relationship [*Verhältnis*] that ought not to obtain. Spirit is meant to be free and to be what it is through itself. Nature is for human beings only a starting-point that they are supposed to transform. The deep ecclesiastical teaching of the original sin stands opposed to the doctrine of the modern enlightenment that human beings are good by nature and thus should remain faithful to the latter. The process of the human being emerging from its natural being is the process of it distinguishing itself as a self-conscious and self-confident [*selbstbewußt*] being and from an external world. Yet, though the standpoint of separation is part of the concept of spirit, it is not the standpoint at which a human being ought to remain. The entire [array of the] finitude of thinking and willing falls under this standpoint of division. Here human beings construct ends for themselves out of themselves and take the material for their action out of themselves. By pushing these ends to their ultimate limit, by knowing [*wissen*] and willing only themselves in their particularity to the exclusion of the universal, human beings are evil, and this evilness is their subjectivity. Prima facie, we have two evils here, but in fact they are both the same. Insofar as human beings are spirit, they are not natural beings. Insofar as they behave like natural beings and follow the ends generated by their desires, they *want* this. Hence the natural evil of a human being is unlike the natural being of animals. Naturalness has the further determination that a human being naturally is an individual as such, for nature lies in the bonds of individuation altogether. Hence, insofar as human beings will their naturalness, they will their respective individuality. To be sure, the law or the universal determination then also arises against this kind of acting from drives and inclinations, acting inherent in natural individuality. This law may be an external power or have the form of divine authority. Human beings are in the servitude of the law as long as they persist in their natural behaviour. It is true that among their

inclinations and feelings, human beings also possess benevolent social inclinations, such as sympathy, love, etc. that reach beyond the egoistic individuality. However, insofar as these inclinations are immediate, their content – while in itself universal – retains the form of subjectivity; here, selfishness and contingency always prevail.

§ 25

The expression ‘objective thoughts’ signifies the *truth*, which is to be the absolute *object*, not merely the *goal* of philosophy. And yet it also shows at once an opposition and, indeed, the very opposition around whose determination and validity the interest of the philosophical standpoint of our time turns, as does the question of *truth* and knowledge of the truth. If a fixed opposition attaches to the thought-determinations, i.e. if they are of a merely *finite* nature, then they are unfit for the *truth* that is absolutely in and for itself, and the truth cannot then enter into thinking. Thinking that produces only *finite* determinations and moves among them is called *understanding* (in the more precise sense of the word). More specifically, the *finitude* of the thought-determinations is to be construed in this double sense: the one, that they are *merely subjective* and are in permanent opposition to the objective; the other, that due to their *limited content* generally they persist in opposition to each other and even more so to the absolute. To provide a more detailed introduction and in order to explicate the importance and the standpoint here given to logic the *positions of thought towards objectivity* will now be studied.

My *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which when it came out, and for the reason now given, had been designated the first part of the system of science, began with the first, simplest appearance of spirit, namely *immediate consciousness*, and developed its dialectic up to the standpoint of the philosophical science, the necessity of which is shown by this progression. For the sake of this end, however, it was not possible to remain content with the formal aspect of mere consciousness, for the standpoint of philosophical knowing [*Wissen*] is in itself the most basic and concrete. Hence, emerging as [the development’s] result, that standpoint also presupposed the concrete shapes of consciousness such as morality, the ethical life, the arts, religion. Consequently, the development of the *basic content* of the objects of the distinctive parts of the philosophical science likewise falls within the development of consciousness, which at first seems to be restricted to a merely formal aspect. This development must so

to speak take place behind consciousness's back insofar as the content (as what is *in itself*) relates to consciousness. Due to this fact, the presentation becomes more intricate, and what belongs to the concrete parts falls to some extent already within the introduction. – The consideration (to be undertaken here) is even more awkward in that it can be conducted only historically and by reasoning in a strictly formal way [*räsonierend*]. It is, however, meant to contribute principally to the insight that the questions one entertains and holds as utterly concrete in the representation of the nature of *knowing*, *faith* and so forth in fact lead back to *simple* thought-determinations that receive their definitive treatment only in the Logic.

A. FIRST POSITION OF THOUGHT TOWARDS OBJECTIVITY

Metaphysics

§ 26

The first position is the *naïve* manner of proceeding which, still oblivious to the opposition of thinking within and against itself, contains the *belief* that through *thinking things over* the *truth comes to be known* and that what the objects [*Objekte*] truly are is brought before consciousness. In this belief, thinking engages the objects directly, reproduces out of itself the content of sensations and intuitions as a content of thought, and finds satisfaction in the like as the truth. All philosophy in its beginnings, all the sciences, even the daily doings and dealings of consciousness, live in this belief.

§ 27

Because it has no consciousness of its opposition, it is *possible* for this kind of thinking to be both genuine *speculative* philosophizing in terms of its content as well as to dwell in *finite* thought-determinations, i.e. the *as yet unresolved* opposition. Here in the introduction the concern can only be to consider this position of thinking with respect to its limitation [*Grenze*] and, hence, to take up the latter sort of *philosophizing* first. – In its most determinate and most recent development this kind of thinking was the *metaphysics of the past*, the way it was constituted prior to the Kantian philosophy. This metaphysics is something *past*, however, only in relation to the history of philosophy; of itself it is always on hand, as the *perspective*

of the understanding alone on the objects of reason. Closer examination of its manner of proceeding and main content is of interest for this more immediate reason as well.

§ 28

This science regarded the thought-determinations as the *fundamental determinations of things*; in virtue of this presupposition, namely that what *is*, by being *thought*, is known *in itself*, it occupied a higher place than the later critical philosophizing.

1. However, those determinations were taken to be valid *per se* in their abstraction and capable of being *predicates of the true*. That metaphysics presupposed in general that knowledge of the absolute could take place by attributing predicates to it, and investigated neither the determinations of the understanding with regard to their proper content and value nor even this form of determining the absolute by means of the attribution of predicates.

Predicates such as these are, for example, *existence*, as in the sentence '*God possesses existence*'; *finitude* or *infinity*, as in the question whether the world is finite or infinite; *simple* or *composite*, as in the sentence '*the soul is simple*'; also '*the thing is one, a whole*', and so on. – There was no investigation as to whether such predicates are something true in and of themselves, nor whether the form of judgment is capable of being the form of truth.

Addition. The presupposition made by the old metaphysics was that of the naïve belief in general that thinking grasps the *in-itself* of things, that things are what they truly are only insofar as they are thought. Nature and the minds of human beings are a Proteus constantly transforming itself, and it is a very natural consideration that things as they present themselves immediately are not what they are in themselves. – The standpoint of the old metaphysics mentioned here is the opposite of what resulted from the Critical philosophy. It might well be said that according to this result human beings have to rely on chaff and husks alone.

But if we look more closely at that old metaphysics as far as its way of proceeding is concerned, it should be noted that it did not go beyond thinking in terms of merely *understanding*. It took up the abstract thought-determinations in their immediacy and allowed them to count as predicates of the true. When talking about thinking one must distinguish *finite* thinking, thinking in terms of merely *understanding*, from thinking that is *infinite* and *rational*. The thought-determinations as they present themselves in an immediate and isolated way are *finite* determinations. The true, however, is what is in itself infinite, and it cannot be expressed or brought to consciousness by means of the finite. The expression *infinite thought* may appear to be eccentric, if one holds on to the notion of recent

times according to which thinking is always limited. In itself, however, thinking is in fact essentially infinite. To put it formally, that which comes to an end, that which [merely] *is*, is called finite, and it ceases where it is connected to its other and is thus limited by the latter. The finite therefore consists in its relation to its other which is its negation, and presents itself as its boundary. Thinking, however, is with itself, relates to itself, and has itself for its object. In having a thought as my object, I am with myself. I, the thinking, is accordingly infinite because in thinking it relates itself to an object that it is itself. An object is, generally speaking, an other, something negative opposite myself. When thinking thinks itself, it has an object that is also not an object, i.e. something sublated, ideal. Thinking as such, in its purity, thus has no barrier within itself. Thinking is finite only when it stops short at limited determinations that count as something ultimate for it. By contrast, infinite or speculative thinking is likewise determined, and yet as determining and limiting, it in turn sublates this deficiency. Infinity is not to be interpreted as an abstract yonder-and-ever-yonder as happens in the ordinary way of representing things, but in the simple fashion indicated above.

The thinking of the old metaphysics was a *finite* thinking, for it moved among thought-determinations whose boundaries counted for it as something fixed that was not negated in turn. Thus, for instance, it was asked 'Does God possess *existence*?', where *existence* was taken to be something purely *positive*, something ultimate and magnificent. We will see later, however, that *existence* is in no way something merely positive, but instead a determination that is too lowly for the idea and not worthy of God. – Furthermore, the question was raised about the finitude or infinity of the world. Here infinity is rigidly set over against finitude, although it is easy to see that when both are opposed to each other the infinity, which is supposed to be the whole, appears as *one side* only and is bounded by the finite. A bounded infinity, however, is itself something merely finite. – In the same way it was asked whether the soul is simple or composite. Hence simplicity counted as an ultimate determination as well, capable of grasping the true. To be simple, however, is a determination just as poor, abstract, and one-sided as that of existence, a determination that we will later see to be itself untrue, to be incapable of grasping the true.

The old metaphysics was thus interested in knowing whether predicates of the kind mentioned could be attributed to objects. However, these predicates are limited determinations of the understanding that express only a barrier and not what is true. – In this context it also needs to be specifically noted how its way of proceeding consisted in *attributing* predicates to the object to be known, such as God, for instance. This, however, represents an external reflection about the object since the determinations (the predicates) are ready-made [*fertig*] in my representation and attributed to the object in an external manner only. By contrast, true knowledge of an object must be of *the sort* that the object determines itself out of itself and does not receive its predicates from outside. Proceeding, then, in the manner of predication, the mind has the feeling of inexhaustibility by means of such predicates. Assuming this standpoint, the Orientals quite correctly call God a multinominal being [or] a being with infinitely many names. The mind is satisfied with none of those finite determinations, and thus the Oriental manner

of knowing consists in a restless search for such predicates. Now regarding finite things it is indeed the case that these must be determined by means of finite predicates, and here the understanding and its activity are in their proper place. The understanding, being itself finite, also knows only the nature of the finite. If, for example, I call an action a *theft*, it is thereby determined with respect to its essential content, and it is sufficient for the judge to recognize this. In the same way, finite things relate to each other as *cause* and *effect*, as *force* and *expression*, and when they are grasped in accordance with these determinations, they are known in terms of their finitude. Objects of reason, however, cannot be determined by means of such finite predicates, and the aspiration to do so was the defect of the old metaphysics.

§ 29

Predicates such as these represent in and of themselves a *limited* content and show themselves to be inadequate to the *fullness of the representation* (of God, nature, spirit, and so forth) and in no way exhaustive. Moreover, by virtue of being predicates of *one* subject, they are bound up with one another and yet they are diverse on account of their content. As a result, they are taken up *in opposition to one another from the outside* [*gegeneinander von außen*].

The Orientals sought to overcome the first defect, in the determination of God, for instance, by means of the many *names* they attributed to him. At the same time, however, there were supposed to be *infinitely* many of those names.

§ 30

2. Its *objects* were totalities, to be sure, which in and of themselves belong to reason, to the thinking of the in-itself *concrete* universal – *soul, world, God*. Metaphysics, however, took them up from [the sphere of] *representation*, laid them down as *ready-made, given subjects* for the application of the determinations of the understanding to them, and possessed in this representation alone the *criterion* of whether the predicates were adequate and sufficient or not.

§ 31

The representations of soul, world, God seem at first to offer thinking a *firm hold*. However, in addition to the fact that the character of particular subjectivity is blended in with them and that, on account of this, they can have very different meanings, they first need to receive their firm

determination through thinking. This is expressed by every sentence insofar as in it what the subject is, i.e. the initial representation, is supposed to be indicated first by the *predicate* (i.e. in philosophy by means of the thought-determination).

In the sentence 'God is eternal etc.' we start with the representation of God, but what he *is*, is not yet *known* [*gewußt*]. The predicate first declares what he *is*. In the sphere of the logical, where the content is determined exclusively within the form of thought, it would therefore not only be redundant to make these determinations into predicates of sentences whose *subject* would be God or, more vaguely, the absolute; it would also have the disadvantage of taking us back to a standard other than the nature of thought itself. – The form of the sentence, or, more precisely, of the judgment is in any case unsuitable to express that which is concrete and speculative – and the true is concrete. A judgment is one-sided on account of its form and to that extent false.

Addition. This kind of metaphysics was not a free and objective thinking, since it did not allow the object [*Objekt*] to determine itself freely out of itself but presupposed it as something ready-made. – As concerns thinking freely, Greek philosophy thought freely, but not scholasticism, since the latter likewise took up its content as something given and, indeed, given by the Church. – We moderns, through our entire way of education, have been initiated into *representations* [of things], which it is exceptionally difficult to overcome because these representations possess the deepest content. Regarding the ancient philosophers we must imagine human beings who stand entirely within sensory perception and have no other presupposition than the heaven above and the earth around them, since mythological representations had been discarded. In this factual environment, thought is free and withdrawn into itself, free from anything material, purely with itself. This kind of being purely with itself is inherent in free thought, sailing off into the free, open space where there is nothing below or above us, and where we stand in solitude alone with ourselves.

§ 32

3. This metaphysics became *dogmatism* because, due to the nature of the finite determinations, it had to assume that of *two opposite assertions* (which is what those sentences were) one had to be *true* while the other was *false*.

Addition. *Dogmatism* has its opposite at first in *scepticism*. The ancient sceptics generally called every philosophy dogmatic to the extent that it set up definite doctrines [*Lehrsätze*]. In this wider sense, genuinely speculative philosophy also counts as dogmatic for scepticism. The dogmatic element in the narrower sense, however, consists in holding onto one-sided determinations of the understanding

to the exclusion of their opposites. This is in general the strict either/or and accordingly it is said, for instance, that the world is *either* finite *or* infinite, but *only one* of the two. By contrast, the true, the speculative is precisely what does not possess such a one-sided determination and is not exhausted by it, but rather unites within itself as a totality those determinations that for dogmatism count as something fixed and true in their separation. – It frequently happens in philosophy that what is one-sided puts itself up alongside the totality, with the claim to be something particular, something fixed opposite it [the totality]. In fact, however, what is one-sided is not something fixed and obtaining for itself but is instead contained as something sublated in the whole. The dogmatism of the metaphysics of the understanding consists in holding on to one-sided thought-determinations in their isolation, whereas the idealism of the speculative philosophy, by contrast, has the principle of totality and shows itself to reach beyond the one-sidedness of the abstract determinations of the understanding. Thus idealism will say: the soul is neither *wholly* finite nor *wholly* infinite; instead it is essentially the one *as well as* the other and thus *neither* the one *nor* the other; that is to say, such determinations in their isolation are invalid, and they are valid only qua sublated. – Even in our ordinary consciousness, this idealism already occurs. Thus we say of sensory things that they are changeable, i.e. both being and not-being accrue to them. – We are more stubborn when it comes to the determinations of the understanding. These, taken as thought-determinations, count as something more rigid and fixed, indeed, something absolutely rigid and fixed [*Festes*]. We regard them as if they were separated from each other by an infinite abyss, so that the determinations standing opposite one another are incapable of ever reaching each other. Reason's battle consists in overcoming what the understanding has rendered rigid [*fixiert*].

§ 33

In its well-ordered form, the *first part* of this metaphysics was constituted by *ontology*, i.e. the doctrine of the *abstract determinations of essence*. Due to their multiplicity and finite validity, a principle was lacking for these determinations. For this reason, they had to be enumerated *empirically* and *contingently* and their more precise *content* can be based only on the *representation*, on the *assurance* that in thinking one associates precisely this particular content with a given word, or perhaps on etymology as well. In all this, it can be a matter merely of the *correctness* of the analysis (agreeing with linguistic usage) and of empirical *completeness*, not the *truth* and the *necessity* of such determinations in and of themselves.

The question whether being, existence or finitude, simplicity, compositeness, and so on are *in and of themselves true concepts* must seem odd to someone who believes that there can be talk only of the truth of a *sentence*, that the only question can be whether a *concept* is being truthfully *attributed* (as it is called) *to a subject* or not, and that

untruth depended on the contradiction that might be found to exist between the subject of the representation and the concept to be predicated of it. But the concept as something concrete (and even every determinacy in general) is essentially in itself a unity of diverse determinations. Hence, if truth were nothing more than the lack of contradiction, the first thing that would have to be considered for every concept is whether it did not of itself contain such an internal contradiction.

§ 34

The *second* part was *rational psychology* or *pneumatology*, which concerns the metaphysical nature of the *soul*, i.e. of spirit taken as a *thing*.

Immortality was located in a sphere where *composition, time, qualitative alteration, quantitative increase or decrease* have their place.

Addition. Psychology was called ‘rational’ by contrast with the empirical examination of the outward expressions of the soul. Rational psychology considered the soul according to its metaphysical nature, as the latter is determined by abstract thinking. It wanted to know the soul’s inner nature, as it is in itself, as it is for thought. – Nowadays there is little talk about the soul in philosophy, and instead first and foremost about spirit. Spirit distinguishes itself from the soul, which is, so to speak, the middle between corporeality and spirit, or the bond between the two. Spirit is immersed in corporeality qua soul, and the soul is the animating principle of the body.

The old metaphysics considered the soul as a thing. ‘Thing’, however, is a very ambiguous expression. By thing we understand first of all an immediate concrete existence [*ein unmittelbar Existierendes*], something of which we form a sensory representation, and the soul has been talked about in this sense. Accordingly, it was asked where the soul has its seat. However, by having a seat the soul is in space and represented in a sensory way. When it is asked whether the soul is simple or complex, then this is likewise a case of construing the soul as a thing. This question was of particular interest in connection with the immortality of the soul, insofar as the latter was considered to be dependent on the simplicity of the soul. And yet, abstract simplicity is in fact a determination that corresponds to the nature of the soul as little as that of complexity does.

As far as the relationship between rational and empirical psychology is concerned, the former takes precedence over the latter, insofar as it sets itself the task of knowing the spirit through thinking and also of proving what is then thought, while empirical psychology takes its point of departure from sense perception and only lists and describes what the latter presents it with. But when one wants to think about spirit one must not be so diffident with regard to its particularities. Spirit is activity in the sense in which already the Scholastics said of God that he is absolute,

pure act [*Aktuosität*]. But for spirit to be active implies that it express itself. Spirit must therefore not be regarded as an *ens* devoid of movement [*prozeßloses ens*], as happened in the old metaphysics which separated the interiority of spirit, devoid of movement, from its externality. Spirit must be viewed essentially in its concrete actuality, in its energy, and in such a way that its expressions are recognized as determined by its interiority.

§ 35

The *third* part, *cosmology*, dealt with the *world*, its contingency, necessity, eternity, limitedness in space and time, the formal laws and their modifications, as well as human freedom and the origin of evil.

The following count, above all, as absolute opposites: contingency and necessity; external and internal necessity; efficient and final causes, or causality in general and purpose; essence or substance and appearance; form and matter; freedom and necessity; happiness and pain; good and evil.

Addition. Cosmology made both nature and spirit in their external complexities, in their appearance or, generally, existence, the epitome of the finite, its object. It did not, however, consider its object as a concrete whole but only in terms of abstract determinations. Thus, for instance, it treated the question of whether contingency or necessity reigns in the world, and the question of whether the world is eternal or created. Next, the establishment of so-called universal cosmological laws – such as, for example, that there are no leaps in nature – formed a main interest of this discipline. Leap here simply means qualitative difference and quantitative change, which appear to be unmediated [*unvermittelt*], whereas the gradual quantitative change presents itself, by contrast, as something mediated.

In relation to spirit as it appears in the world, it was pre-eminently questions concerning human freedom and the origin of evil that were treated in cosmology. And indeed these are questions of the utmost interest. However, in order to answer them in a satisfactory way, it is above all required that one not cling to the abstract determinations of the understanding as something ultimate, in the sense as if each of the determinations in opposition to each other obtained on their own and were to be regarded as something substantial and true in their isolation. This was, however, the standpoint of the old metaphysics in general as well as in the cosmological discussions which for that reason were unable to do justice to their goal of comprehending the appearances of the world. Thus, for instance, the difference between freedom and necessity was drawn into consideration and these determinations were applied to nature and spirit in *such a way* that one considered the former in its effects to be subject to necessity but the latter to be free. This difference is indeed essential and is grounded in the innermost dimension of spirit. Yet, freedom and necessity, as standing abstractly opposed

to each other, pertain to finitude alone and are valid only on its soil. A freedom which did not have any necessity within itself and a mere necessity devoid of freedom – these are abstract and accordingly untrue determinations. Freedom is essentially concrete, determined in itself in an eternal manner, and thus equally necessary. When speaking of necessity one tends at first to understand by it only determinacy from outside, as in finite mechanics, for instance, where a body moves only when it is struck [*gestoßen*] by another body, and in the direction imparted to it by this collision [*Stoß*]. This, however, represents a merely external necessity, not the genuinely inner necessity, for the latter is freedom. – It is the same with the opposition of *good* and *evil*, this opposition of the modern world immersed in itself. When we consider evil as something fixed, [existing] for itself, that is not the good, then this is correct and the opposition is to be acknowledged, insofar as its spuriousness and relativity must not be taken to mean that evil and good are one in the absolute, as has apparently been said recently, and that something becomes evil only by virtue of our perspective. What is wrong with this, however, is that one considers evil as something positive in a fixed sense, whereas evil is the negative that has no subsistence for itself but instead only wants to be for itself, and is in fact merely the absolute semblance of negativity within itself.

§ 36

The *fourth* part, *natural* or *rational theology*, considered the concept of God or his possibility, the proofs of his existence and his properties.

(a) In this kind of consideration guided by the understanding, all depends primarily on which predicates are suitable or unsuitable with respect to *how we represent* God to ourselves. The opposition between reality and negation is taken to be absolute here. Hence in the end there is nothing left for the *concept* (as the understanding takes it) but the empty abstraction of the indeterminate *essence*, i.e. the pure reality or positivity, the dead product of modern Enlightenment. (b) The activity of *proving* propositions as carried out by the finite understanding shows generally the wrongheaded approach in which an objective ground is supposed to be given of God's being which thus presents itself as something *mediated* by an other. This process of constructing proofs, which takes the identity of the understanding as its yardstick, is caught up in the difficulty of making the transition from the *finite* to the *infinite*. As a result, it is either unable to free God from the unremittingly positive finitude of the existing world, such that he had to determine himself as its immediate substance (pantheism), – or God remains an object [*Objekt*] over against the subject and thus something *finite*

(dualism). (c) The *properties* that were after all supposed to be determinate and diverse have actually perished in the abstract concept of the pure reality, the indeterminate essence. And yet, insofar as the finite world continues to be represented as a *true* being and God over against it, there arises the representation of diverse relationships between the two which, when determined as properties, on the one hand must be (as relationships to finite states of affairs) of a finite nature themselves (such as just, benevolent, powerful, wise, etc.), while on the other hand they are supposed at the same time to be infinite. From this standpoint, the said contradiction permits only a nebulous resolution by means of quantitative augmentation or the *sensus eminentiorum*, driving the properties into indeterminacy. In this way, however, the property is in fact annihilated and left with a mere name.

Addition. In this part of the old metaphysics the point was to find out how far reason was able to advance on its own in acquiring knowledge of God. Now, to come to know God by means of reason is certainly the highest task of science. To begin with, religion contains representations of God. These representations, as they are put together in the Creed, are communicated to us from our youth onwards as the doctrines of religion and, insofar as the individual believes in these doctrines and insofar as they are the truth for him, he possesses what he needs as a Christian. Theology, however, is the science of this faith [*Glauben*]. If theology offers merely an external list and compilation of religious doctrines, then it is not yet science. Nor does theology achieve a scientific character through merely historical treatment of its subject matter, as is so popular today (when, for instance, it is related what this or that Church Father had to say). Achieving this scientific character takes place only by advancing to thinking that comprehends the matter [*begreifendes Denken*], which is the business of philosophy. True theology is thus in essence also philosophy of religion, and this it used to be in the Middle Ages as well.

As far as the *rational theology* of the old metaphysics is concerned, it was not a science of *reason* but of the *understanding* dealing with God, and its thinking moved among abstract thought-determinations alone. – Insofar as the *concept* of God was treated here, it was the *representation* of God that formed the yardstick of knowledge. Thinking, however, must move freely within itself, although it should be remarked straightaway that the result of freely thinking coincides with the content of the Christian religion, since the latter is the revelation of reason. Such an accord, however, did not come about in the case of that rational theology. Insofar as it undertook to determine the representation of God by means of thought, the result was only the abstraction [*Abstraktum*] of a positivity or reality in general [serving] as the concept of God, with the exclusion of negativity, and God was correspondingly defined as *the most real being*. Now it can easily be seen,

however, that this most real being, by having negation excluded from it, is exactly the opposite of what it is supposed to be and what the understanding means to have in it. Instead of being the richest and utterly complete being, it is rather the poorest and utterly empty because of the abstract manner in which it is construed. The mind rightfully demands a concrete content. Such a content, however, is present only if it contains determinacy, i.e. negation within itself. If the concept of God is construed only in the sense of an abstract or supremely real being, God becomes for us thereby a mere beyond, and there can be no further question of knowledge of him. For where there is no determinateness, knowledge is also not possible. Pure light equals pure darkness.

The second point of interest in this rational theology concerned the proofs of the existence of God. The chief point here is that the way of constructing proofs as it is undertaken by the understanding concerns the dependency of one determination on another. With this kind of demonstration, one makes a presupposition, something fixed, from which something else follows. So what is being demonstrated here is the dependency of a determination on a presupposition. Now if the existence of God is supposed to be demonstrated in this way, then this means that the being of God is made to depend on other determinations so that the latter constitute the ground of God's being. Here one sees immediately that something out of kilter is bound to result, for God is supposed to be the ground absolutely of everything and therefore not dependent on something else. In connection with this point, it has been said in more recent times that the existence of God cannot be proved, but that it must be known immediately. Reason, however, understands by proof something quite different from what the understanding and common sense do. To be sure, the manner of proving engaged in by reason equally takes something other than God for its point of departure, and yet in its progression it does not leave this other standing as something immediate and as a being. Rather, by exhibiting this other as something mediated and posited, it leads at the same time to the result that God is to be regarded as that which is truly immediate, primordial, and self-subsistent, containing mediation as sublated within himself. – When one says 'Look at nature, it will guide you towards God, you will find an absolute final purpose', this does not mean that God is something mediated, but only that *we* progress from an other to God in *such a way* that God as the consequence is at the same time the absolute ground of the former. Hence, the position is reversed and what appeared as a consequence shows itself equally as a ground, and what presented itself at first as a ground is demoted to a consequence. This is just the path of proofs conducted by reason, too.

Following our discussion so far let us have a look at the procedure of this metaphysics in general. It turns out that it consisted in transforming the objects of reason into abstract, finite determinations of the understanding and in making abstract identity into a principle. This infinitude of the understanding, however, this pure essence, is itself merely something finite since the particularity is excluded from it and limits and negates it. Instead of arriving at a concrete identity, this metaphysics insisted on abstract identity. And yet, its good side lay

in the consciousness that thought alone represents the essentiality of what is [*des Seienden*]. Earlier philosophers and notably the Scholastics provided the material [*Stoff*] for this metaphysics. In speculative philosophy, it is true, the understanding is a moment, but a moment at which we do not stop. Plato is not this kind of metaphysician, and Aristotle even less so, although it is usually believed that the opposite is the case.

B. SECOND POSITION OF THOUGHT TOWARDS OBJECTIVITY

I. Empiricism

§ 37

What first led to *empiricism* was both the need for a *concrete* content, in contrast to the abstract theories of the understanding that is incapable of progressing from its generalities to particularization and determination on its own, and the need for a *firm foothold* against the possibility of *being able to prove everything* on the plane of, and by the method of, finite determinations. Instead of looking for the true within thought itself, empiricism sets out to fetch it from *experience*, the inwardly and outwardly present.

Addition. Empiricism owes its origin to the need, referred to in the preceding section, for a *concrete content* and a *firm foothold*, a need that the metaphysics of the abstract understanding is incapable of satisfying. Insofar as the concreteness of the content is concerned, the point is simply that the objects of consciousness are known [*gewußt*] as determinate objects in and of themselves and as unities of diverse determinations. Now as we have seen, this is by no means the case for the metaphysics of the understanding, in keeping with the principle of the understanding. Thinking that merely conforms to the understanding is limited to the form of the abstract universal and lacks the capacity to proceed to the particularization of this universal. Thus, for instance, the old metaphysics undertook to find out through thinking what might be the essence or the basic determination of the soul, and it was then said that the soul is *simple*. The simplicity thus attributed to the soul has the meaning of an abstract simplicity that excludes difference. The latter was regarded as compositeness, i.e. as the basic determination of the body and, furthermore, of matter in general. Abstract simplicity is, however, a rather poor determination, through which the wealth of the soul and that of spirit cannot be comprehended at all. Because abstract metaphysical thought thus proved to be deficient, the need was felt to take refuge in empirical psychology. The same is true of rational physics. When, for instance, it was said that space is infinite, that nature makes no leaps, etc., then this is quite unsatisfactory in relation to the fullness and life of nature.

§ 38

Metaphysics authenticates its definitions, both its presuppositions and its more determinate content, by appealing to the testimony of representations, i.e. the content that derives initially from experience. *Empiricism* shares this source, on the one hand, with metaphysics. On the other hand, a single perception is different from experience, and empiricism raises the content belonging to perception, feeling, and intuition to the *form of universal representations, sentences, and laws*, etc. This happens, however, only in the sense that these universal determinations (e.g. force) are to possess no other meaning and validity for themselves than that taken from perception, and that no connection is supposed to be legitimate unless it has been exhibited in the appearances. As far as the *subjective* side is concerned, empirical knowing possesses its firm foothold in the fact that in perception consciousness finds its *own immediate presence and certainty*.

There lies in empiricism this great principle that what is true must exist in actuality and be there for perception. This principle is opposed to the *ought*, with which reflection inflates itself and looks down on actuality and the present in the name of a *beyond*, which is supposed to have its seat and existence in subjective understanding alone. Like empiricism, philosophy, too (§ 7), knows only what *is*; it does not know [*weiß*] what only *ought* to be and thus *is not there*. – As far as the subjective side is concerned, the important principle of *freedom*, which is part of empiricism, must be recognized as well. This principle means that what a human being is supposed to let stand in his knowing [*Wissen*], he has to see *himself*, knowing [*wissen*] *himself* to be *present* in the process. However, insofar as empiricism, carried out consistently, limits its content to the finite, it refuses to acknowledge the supersensible in general, or at least the knowledge and determinacy of the latter, and allows thinking only abstraction and formal universality and identity. – The fundamental delusion in scientific empiricism is always that it uses the metaphysical categories of matter, force (not to mention those of the one, the many, universality, and infinity, etc.), and proceeds to make *inferences* guided by such categories, all the while presupposing and applying the forms of syllogistic inference, ignorant that in so doing it itself contains and pursues metaphysics and that it uses those categories and their relationships in a completely uncritical and unconscious fashion.

Addition. From empiricism went forth the call: ‘Stop rambling around in empty abstractions, look at your hands, grasp human beings and nature *here*, enjoy the now!’ And it cannot be denied that this call contains an essentially legitimate point. The empty other-worldly reality [*Jenseits*], the cobweb and nebulous shapes of the abstract understanding, were to be exchanged for the *here* and now, for this world [*Diesseits*]. In this way then, the firm foothold, namely the infinite determinability missing in the old metaphysics, was achieved. The understanding picks out only finite determinations; these are inherently [*an sich*] unsupported and wobbly, and the building erected upon them collapses. To find an infinite determination had been the drive of reason generally; however, the time had not yet come to look for it in thinking itself. As a result, this drive took up the *here* and now, the *this*, which possesses the infinite form in itself, if not in its true concrete existence. What is external [*das Äußerliche*] is *in itself* the true, for the true is actual and must exist concretely [*muss existieren*]. Thus, the infinite determinateness that reason seeks is in the world, albeit in sensory, individual form [*Gestalt*], not in its truth. – More specifically, *perception* is the form in which matters are supposed to be comprehended [*begriffen*], and this is the deficiency of empiricism. Perception as such is always of something individual and transitory; knowing, however, does not end with this but in the perceived individual seeks the universal, that which abides, and this is the progression from mere perception to experience. – In order to have experiences, empiricism principally utilizes the form of *analysis*. In perception, one possesses something concrete in multiple ways whose determinations one is supposed to take apart like peeling away the layers of an onion. This process of splitting them up [*Zergliederung*] is therefore intended to dissolve the determinations that have grown together, breaking them up [*zerlegen*] without adding anything but the subjective activity of breaking them up. Analysis is, however, the progression from the immediacy of perception to thought, insofar as the determinations, which the object analysed contains amalgamated within itself, receive the form of universality by being separated. Because empiricism analyses objects, it is in error if it believes that it leaves them as they are, since it in fact transforms the concrete into something abstract. By this process, it happens at the same time that life is taken from the living, for only the concrete, or one, is alive. Nonetheless, this severing [*Scheidung*] must occur in order to comprehend, and spirit is itself the severing in itself. This, however, is only *one* side, and the chief point consists in the unification of what has been severed. Insofar as analysis remains committed to the standpoint of separation, the word of the poet applies to it:

Encheiresin naturae, says Chemistry now,
Mocking itself without knowing how.
Then they have the parts and they’ve lost the whole,
For the link that’s missing was the living soul.¹³

¹³ Translators’ note: Goethe, *Faust*, Part One, tr. David Luke (Oxford, 1987).

Analysis takes its point of departure from what is concrete, and with this kind of material it has an enormous advantage over the abstract thinking of the old metaphysics. It establishes the differences, and this is of great importance. These differences, however, are in turn merely abstract determinations, that is, *thoughts*. Now, insofar as these thoughts count as what things are in themselves, we are back with the presupposition of the old metaphysics, namely that the truth of things is to be found in thought.

Let us now compare further the standpoint of empiricism with that of the old metaphysics with regard to content. As we saw earlier, the latter had those universal objects of reason such as God, the soul, and the world in general for its content. This content had been taken up from representation, and the business of philosophy consisted in guiding it back into the form of thoughts. Similarly with scholastic philosophy; for it, the dogmas of the Christian Church constituted the presupposed content, and the task consisted in further determination and systematization of that content by means of thought. – The presupposed content of empiricism is of an entirely different sort. It is the sensory content of nature and of finite spirit. Here, then, one sees oneself faced with finite material, and in the old metaphysics with infinite material. This infinite content was then made finite by the finite form of the understanding. In empiricism, we have the same finitude of the form, and the content is finite as well. The method, meanwhile, is the same for both modes of philosophizing, insofar as both start from presuppositions that are regarded as something fixed. For empiricism in general, the external is the true, and even when the existence of something supersensible is admitted, knowledge of it is not supposed to be able to occur. Instead, one is supposed to cling exclusively to what belongs to perception. In the execution of this principle, it has yielded what was later designated *materialism*. For this kind of materialism, matter as such counts as the truly objective. However, matter itself is already an abstraction [*Abstraktum*], something that cannot be perceived as such. One can, therefore, say that there is no matter, since however it exists concretely it is always something determinate, concrete. Nevertheless, the abstraction called matter is supposed to be the foundation of everything sensory, i.e. the sensory as such, the absolute individuation in itself, and thus what are outside one another [*das Außereinanderseiende*]. Now, insofar as this sensory component is and remains a given for empiricism, it is a doctrine of unfreedom, for freedom consists precisely in my having no absolutely other over against me, but depending instead only on a content that I am myself. Furthermore, for this standpoint reason and unreason are merely subjective; that is to say, we have to accept the given as it is, and we have no right to ask whether and in what respect it is rational in and of itself.

§ 39

In reflection on this principle, it was immediately and correctly observed that in what is called *experience* (which is to be distinguished from mere individual perceptions of individual facts), there are *two elements*: the

infinitely *manifold material*, [each aspect of which is] individuated for itself, and the *form*, the determinations of *universality* and *necessity*. Empirical observation does indeed show many, indeed countless, perceptions that are alike. Still, *universality* is something entirely different from a large amount [or set: *Menge*]. Similarly, empirical observation indeed affords us perceptions of changes *following upon one another*, or of objects *lying side-by-side*, but no connection involving necessity. Now insofar as perception is to remain the foundation of what is to count as the truth, universality and necessity appear to be something *unwarranted*, a subjective coincidence, a mere habit, and its content might just as well be as it is or otherwise.

An important consequence of this is that in this empirical manner the legal and ethical determinations and laws as well as the content of religion appear as something contingent [*Zufälliges*] and their objectivity and inner truth are given up.

Incidentally, *Humean* scepticism, from which the preceding reflection chiefly proceeds, must be clearly distinguished from Greek scepticism. Humean scepticism makes the *truth* of the empirical, of feeling and intuition its foundation, and from there contests the universal determinations and laws on the grounds that they lack justification through sensory perception. Ancient scepticism was so far removed from making feeling or intuition the principle of truth that to the contrary it turned first and foremost against the sensory. (On modern scepticism as compared to the ancient, see Schelling's and Hegel's *Kritisches Journal der Philosophie*, 1802, vol. I, no. 2.)

II. Critical philosophy

§ 40

Critical philosophy shares with empiricism the supposition that experience is the *sole* basis of knowledge, except that it lets that knowledge count, not for truths, but only for knowledge of appearances.

The initial point of departure is the difference between the elements that result from the analysis of experience: the *sensory material* and its *universal relations*. Insofar as this is combined with the reflection cited in the preceding section (that only the *individual* and only *what occurs* is contained in perception), the *fact is insisted upon* at the same time that *universality* and *necessity* are to be found in what is called experience as

equally essential determinations. Now, since this element does not issue from the empirical as such, it belongs to the spontaneity of *thinking* or is *a priori*. – The thought-determinations or *concepts of the understanding* constitute the *objectivity* of experiential knowledge. They generally contain *relationships*, hence they are instrumental in the formation of *synthetic judgments a priori* (i.e. original relationships between opposed elements).

The fact that the determinations of universality and necessity are found in knowing, is not disputed by Humean scepticism. It is also nothing but a presupposed fact in the Kantian philosophy. In the usual language of the sciences one can say that it has merely put forward a different *explanation* of that fact.

§ 41

First, the *Critical* philosophy subjects to scrutiny the value of the *concepts of the understanding* as they are employed in metaphysics (and, incidentally, in the other sciences and in ordinary representation as well). This critique, however, does not address the *content* and the specific relationship that these thought-determinations have vis-à-vis each other. Instead, it examines them with a view to the opposition of *subjectivity* and *objectivity* in general. This opposition, as it is taken here, refers (see the preceding section) to the difference between the elements *internal to* experience. *Objectivity* here means the element of *universality* and *necessity*, i.e. the element of the thought-determinations themselves – the so-called *a priori*. But the Critical philosophy expands the opposition in such a way that experience *in its entirety*, i.e. both those elements together, belongs to *subjectivity* and nothing remains opposite it but the *thing-in-itself*.

The specific *forms of the a priori*, i.e. of thinking, taken as merely subjective activity despite its objectivity, result as follows – a systematization that, by the way, rests on merely psychological-historical foundations.

Addition 1. No doubt a very important step was taken by subjecting the determinations of the old metaphysics to scrutiny. Naïve thinking moved innocently among those determinations, which produced themselves straightaway and of their own accord. No thought was given to the question to what extent these determinations have value and validity for themselves. It has already been remarked earlier that free thinking is one that has no presuppositions. The thinking of the old metaphysics was not free, because it allowed its determinations to count without further ado as something pre-existing, as an *a priori* which reflection did not itself examine. By contrast, the Critical philosophy made it its task to investigate to what extent the forms of thinking were capable of being of assistance in knowing

the truth at all. More specifically, the faculty of knowledge was now supposed to be investigated prior to knowing. In this there is contained the correct thought that the forms of thought themselves must indeed be made the object of knowing. However, the misunderstanding of wanting already to know prior to knowing or of wanting not to set foot in the water before one has learned to swim, very quickly creeps into the process. To be sure, the forms of thought should not be employed unexamined, but examining them is already itself a process of knowing. Consequently, the activity of the forms of thought and their critique must be joined in knowing. The forms of thought must be considered in and of themselves [*an und für sich*]. They are themselves the object as well as the activity of the object. They themselves examine themselves and they must determine for themselves their limits and point up their deficiency in themselves. This is the activity of thinking that will soon be specifically considered under the name of *dialectic*, about which a preliminary remark must here suffice, namely that it is to be regarded not as something brought to bear on thought-determinations from outside of them, but instead as immanent in them.

The primary concern of the Kantian philosophy is thus that thinking is supposed to investigate itself, the extent to which it is capable of knowing. Nowadays, the Kantian philosophy has been left behind, and everybody wants to be at a point further on. To be further along, however, has a double meaning: both to be further ahead and to be further behind. Looked at in clear light, many of our philosophical endeavours are nothing but the method of the old metaphysics, an uncritical thinking along in a way everyone is capable of.

Addition 2. Kant's examination of the thought-determinations suffers essentially from the defect that they are not being considered in and for themselves but only from the viewpoint of whether they are *subjective* or *objective*. What is understood by *objectivity* is, following the linguistic usage of ordinary life, what is on hand outside of us and reaches us from the outside by means of perception. Now Kant denied that thought-determinations (such as cause and effect) possess objectivity in the sense mentioned here, i.e. that they are given in perception, and instead regarded them as belonging to our thinking itself or to the spontaneity of thinking, and as subjective in *this* sense. This notwithstanding, Kant calls what is thought, and more specifically the universal and the necessary, the objective, and what is only sensed the subjective. The linguistic usage referred to just now thus seems to have been stood on its head, and Kant has for this reason been accused of linguistic confusion. But this is a great injustice. Looked at more closely, things are as follows. To the ordinary consciousness, what stands opposite it, what is perceivable by way of the senses – such as this animal, that star, etc. – seems to exist for itself, to be something independent. By contrast, thoughts count as something lacking independence and as being dependent on something else. In fact, however, what is perceivable by way of the senses is what is genuinely dependent and secondary, and thoughts are by contrast what is truly independent and primary. It was in this sense that Kant called what belongs to thought (i.e. the universal and the necessary) the *objective* element, and in this he was entirely right. On the other hand, what is perceivable by way of the senses is indeed *subjective*

insofar as it does not have its support within itself and is as fleeting and transitory as thought is enduring and inwardly stable. Indeed, nowadays we find that the determination of the distinction mentioned here and advocated by Kant, namely, between the objective and the subjective, is part of the linguistic usage of the more educated consciousness. Thus, for instance, one demands that the judgment about a work of art be objective and not subjective, and by this is meant that the judgment should not proceed from contingent individual sentiments and emotions of the moment, but instead should take into consideration the universal points of view as they are grounded in the essence of art. By the same token, one may distinguish between taking an objective and a subjective interest in some scientific activity.

To continue, however, even the Kantian objectivity of thinking itself is in turn only subjective insofar as thoughts, despite being universal and necessary determinations, are, according to Kant, *merely our* thoughts and distinguished from what the thing is *in itself* by an insurmountable gulf. By contrast, the true objectivity of thinking consists in this: that thoughts are not merely our thoughts but at the same time the *in itself* of things and of the object-world [*des Gegenständlichen*] in general. – *Objective* and *subjective* are comfortable expressions that are employed effortlessly, but whose use nonetheless easily generates confusion. According to the discussion so far, objectivity has a threefold meaning. *In the first place*, it has the meaning of what is on hand externally, as distinct from what is *purely* subjective, i.e. what is meant or dreamed up. *Second*, it has the meaning established by Kant, i.e. the universal and the necessary, in contrast to what, as inherent to sensation, is contingent, particular, and subjective. And *third*, it has the meaning last mentioned above, of what is thought to be in itself, what is there, in contrast to what is merely thought by us and therefore still different from the matter itself or in itself.

§ 42

(a) *The theoretical faculty*, knowledge as such. – This philosophy identifies the *original identity* of the *I* in thinking (i.e. the transcendental unity of self-consciousness) as the specific *ground* of the concepts of the understanding. The representations that are given by means of feeling and intuition constitute a *manifold* in terms of their *content*, but equally by virtue of their form, i.e. by virtue of the status of being outside one another as is characteristic of sensoriness, with its two forms of space and time, which as forms (the universal) of intuition, are themselves a priori. The *I* relates the manifold of sensing and intuiting to itself [the *I*] and unifies it [the manifold] within itself [the *I*] as *one* consciousness (pure apperception) and, as a result, this manifold is brought to an identity, into an original combination. The determinate ways of relating in the aforesaid manner are the pure concepts of the understanding, the *categories*.

It is well known that the Kantian philosophy made it very easy for itself in *locating* the categories. The *I*, the unity of self-consciousness, is quite abstract and entirely indeterminate. How is one then to arrive at the *determinations* of the *I*, the categories? Fortunately, the *various forms of judgment* are already listed empirically in ordinary logic. Now to judge is to *think* a determinate object. The various forms of judgment that had already been enumerated thus provide the various *determinations of thought*. – It remains the *Fichtean* philosophy's profound contribution [*tiefe Verdienst*] to have reminded us that the *thought-determinations* must be exhibited in their *necessity* and that it is essential that they be *derived*. – This philosophy should at least have had the effect on the method of doing logic that the thought-determinations in general or the usual logical subject matter, the *kinds* of concepts, judgments, and syllogisms, would no longer simply be taken up from observation and thus gathered up merely empirically, but that they be derived from thinking itself. If thinking is to be capable of proving anything, if logic must demand that *proofs* be given, and if it wants to teach how to give proofs, then it should be capable above all of proving the content most proper to it and seeing its necessity.

Addition 1. It is Kant's contention, then, that the thought determinations have their source in the *I*, and that therefore the *I* provides the determinations of universality and necessity. – When we look at what is now lying before us, it is a manifold in general. The categories are then simple forms [*Einfachheiten*] to which this manifold refers. By contrast, the sensory dimension [*das Sinnliche*] comprises what are outside one another, asunder, external to themselves; this is its proper fundamental determination. Thus, for example, the 'now' has being only in relation to a before and an after. Likewise, red is present only insofar as it stands in contrast to a yellow and a blue. This other, however, is exterior to the item sensed, and the latter exists only insofar as it is not the other, and only insofar as the other exists. The exact reverse of the sensory dimensions (items existing outside one another and external to themselves) holds for thinking or the *I*. The latter is what is originally identical, one with itself and existing simply with itself [*schlechthin bei sich Seiende*]. When I say 'I', this represents the abstract relation to oneself, and whatever is placed in this unity is being infected by it and transformed into it. Thus, the *I* is, so to speak, the melting pot and the fire by which the indifferent manifoldness is consumed and reduced to unity. This, then, is what Kant calls *pure apperception* to distinguish it from ordinary apperception, which takes up the manifold as such into itself, whereas pure apperception, in contrast to this, is to be regarded as the activity of making things mine. – With this, the nature of all consciousness has, to be sure, been correctly articulated. Human beings' striving is directed generally at knowing the world, appropriating and submitting

it to their will, and towards this end the reality of the world must, so to speak, be crushed, that is, idealized. At the same time, however, it needs to be noted that it is not the subjective activity of self-consciousness that introduces absolute unity into the manifoldness. This identity is, rather, the absolute, the true itself. It is, so to speak, the benevolence of the absolute to release the individualities to their self-enjoyment, and this absolute drives them back into the absolute unity.

Addition 2. Expressions such as *transcendental unity of self-consciousness* look very difficult, as if something monstrous were hiding behind them, but the matter is really simpler than that. What Kant understands by *transcendental* is the result of how it differs from the *transcendent*. For the *transcendent* is in general what surpasses the determinateness of the understanding. In this sense, it first arises in mathematics. Thus, in geometry it is said that one must imagine the circumference of a circle as consisting of infinitely many infinitely small straight lines. So here determinations that for the understanding are completely different from one another (such as the straight and the curved) are explicitly posited as being identical. Now the self-consciousness that is identical with and infinite in itself (as distinct from the ordinary consciousness determined by finite material) is also such a transcendent entity. Kant, meanwhile, designates that unity of self-consciousness merely as *transcendental*, and by this he means that it is only subjective and does not also belong to objects as they are in themselves.

Addition 3. That the *categories* should be regarded only as belonging to *us*, i.e. as subjective, must seem rather bizarre to the natural consciousness, and there is indeed something skewed about it. This much is, however, correct, namely that the categories are not contained in the immediate sensation. Consider, for instance, a piece of sugar. It is hard, white, sweet, and so on. But now we say that all these properties are united in *one* object, and this *unity* does not exist in the sensation. Things are the same when we regard two events as standing in a relationship of cause and effect to one another. What is perceived here are the two individual events that follow after one another in time. The fact, however, that one is the cause and the other the effect (the causal nexus between the two) is not perceived but instead is present only for our thinking. Now although the categories (such as, for example, unity, cause, and effect, and so forth) do belong to thinking as such, it does not follow at all from this that they should for that reason be *ours* alone, and not also determinations of the objects themselves. This, however, is supposed to be the case according to Kant's outlook. His philosophy is a *subjective idealism*, insofar as the *I* (the cognitive subject) supplies the *form* as well as the *matter* of knowing, the one qua *thinking*, the other qua *sensing*. – We in fact do not need to care much about the content of this subjective idealism. To be sure, one might somehow suppose that reality has been withdrawn from the objects by virtue of the fact that their unity is transferred to the subject. Meanwhile, neither the objects nor we gain anything from the fact that *being* accrues to them. Everything depends on the content, namely, whether *it* is something *true*. That things merely *are* does not by itself help them. Time takes care of *what is*, and soon it will likewise not be. – One could also say that according to subjective idealism human beings

can imagine that a lot rests on *them*. And yet, if his world is a mass of sensory intuitions, he has no reason to be proud of such a world. Nothing at all, therefore, depends on that difference between subjectivity and objectivity. Instead, it is the content on which everything depends, and this is equally subjective and objective. A crime is also objective in the sense of a mere concrete existence [*Existenz*], but it constitutes a concrete existence that is null and void in itself, a fact also that then comes to exist [*zum Dasein kommt*] as such in punishment.

§ 43

On the one hand, it is through the categories that mere perception is elevated to the level of objectivity, to the level of *experience*; but, on the other hand, these concepts, taken as unities of subjective consciousness only, are conditioned by the given material. With respect to themselves [*für sich*], the categories are empty, having application and use only in experience, the other element of which, the determinations of feeling and intuition, are likewise something merely subjective.

Addition. To assert of the categories that, with respect to themselves, they are empty is unjustified insofar as they possess in any case content through the fact that they are *determinate*. To be sure, the content of the categories is indeed not perceivable through the senses, it is not spatio-temporal. And yet, this is to be regarded as an advantage rather than a defect of them. Recognition of this fact is also found even in ordinary consciousness and, indeed, in *such* a way that one says more about a book, say, or a speech being rich in content to the extent that more thoughts, general results, and so on, are to be found in it. Just as, conversely, one does not let a book or, more specifically, a novel count as being rich in content simply because it heaps up a great amount of individual occurrences, situations, and the like. Ordinary consciousness thus explicitly recognizes that *more* belongs to the *content* than the sensory material, and this *more* consists in the thoughts and here primarily in the *categories*. – In this connection, it should also be noted that the assertion concerning the emptiness of the categories with respect to themselves has indeed a correct meaning, insofar as we must not stop short at them and their totality (i.e. the logical Idea), but must progress to the real domains of nature and spirit. This progression, however, must not be construed as though content alien to the logical idea were to come to it from the outside, but instead that it is the logical idea's own activity of further determining and unfolding itself as nature and spirit.

§ 44

The categories are therefore incapable of being determinations of the absolute, something that is not given in a perception, and, for that reason, the

understanding or knowledge by means of the categories is unable to know *things in themselves*.

The *thing-in-itself* (and under *thing*, spirit, God are also included) expresses the object insofar as one *abstracts* from everything that it is for consciousness, i.e. from all determinations of sensation [*Gefühlsbestimmungen*] as well as from all determinate thoughts of it. It is easy to see what remains, namely the *complete abstractum*, something entirely *empty*, determined only as a *beyond*; the *negative* of representation, feeling, determinate thinking, and so on. Equally simple, however, is the reflection that this *caput mortuum* is itself merely *the product* of thought, more specifically, [the product] of thought that has progressed to pure abstraction, [the product] of the empty I that makes this empty *identity* of itself into an *object* for itself. The *negative* determination that this abstract identity receives as *object* is similarly listed among the Kantian categories and is something just as familiar as that empty identity. – One can only wonder, then, why one sees it repeated so often that one does not know [*wissen*] what the *thing-in-itself* is, when there is nothing easier to know than this.

§ 45

Now it is *reason*, the faculty of the *unconditioned*, that grasps the conditioned character of these acquaintances with things, gathered from experience [*Erfahrungskenntnisse*]. What is here called object of reason, namely the *unconditioned* or the *infinite*, is nothing but the self-same, or it is the above-mentioned (§ 42) *original identity* of the *I* in *thinking*. *Reason* means this *abstract I*, or the thinking that makes this pure identity into an object or purpose for itself [i.e. for the thinking]. See the Remark in the preceding section. The acquaintances with things, gathered from experience, do not measure up to this identity utterly *devoid of determinateness*, since they are in any case findings of a *determinate* content. Insofar as such an unconditioned object is taken to be the absolute and the true object of reason (as the *idea*), acquaintances with things gathered from experience are as a result declared to be the untrue, to be *appearances*.

Addition. It is first with Kant that the difference between the understanding and reason has been emphasized in a definite way and set down in such manner that the former has the finite and the conditioned as an object and the latter the infinite and the unconditioned. It must be acknowledged as a very important

result of the Kantian philosophy that it established the finitude of the merely experience-based knowledge of the understanding and designated its content as *appearance*. Still, we should not stop short at this negative result and reduce the unconditioned nature of reason to the merely abstract identity with itself that excludes difference. Insofar as reason is regarded in this way merely as stepping out beyond the finite and conditioned character of the understanding, by this means it is in fact itself downgraded to something finite and conditioned, for the true infinite is not merely on the far side of the finite, but instead contains the finite as sublated within it. The same holds equally for the *idea*, which Kant, it is true, rehabilitated, insofar as he vindicated it for reason by distinguishing it from the abstract determinations of the understanding, not to mention mere sensory representations – things that in ordinary life would also be called an idea. And yet, with respect to it [the idea] he stopped short at the negative and what merely *ought to be*. – Furthermore, construing the objects of our immediate consciousness (i.e. those forming the content of experiential knowledge) as mere *appearances* must in any case be regarded as a very important result of the Kantian philosophy. For ordinary consciousness (i.e. the sensory consciousness of the understanding), the objects it knows [*weiß*] count in their individuatedness as independent and self-grounded, and insofar as they prove to be related to one another and conditioned by one another, this mutual dependence on each other is regarded as something external to the objects that does not belong to their essential nature. Against this, it must be maintained, of course, that the objects that we know [*wissen*] directly are mere appearances, which is to say that they do not have the ground of their being in themselves but in an other. However, everything depends then on how this other is determined. According to the Kantian philosophy, the things we know [*wissen*] are only appearances for *us*, and what they are *in themselves* remains for us an inaccessible world beyond this one [*Jenseits*]. The untutored consciousness has rightly objected to such a subjective idealism for which what forms the content of our consciousness is something belonging *merely* to ourselves, something only posited by *us*. The fact of the matter is indeed this, that the things we immediately know [*wissen*] are mere appearances not only *for us*, but *in themselves*, and that it is the proper determination of finite things to have the ground of their being not in themselves but in the universal divine *idea*. This interpretation of things is also to be designated as idealism, albeit as *absolute idealism* in contrast to the subjective idealism of the Critical philosophy. This absolute idealism, although it does go beyond ordinary realist consciousness, is to be regarded as anything but an exclusive possession of philosophy. To the contrary, it forms the foundation of all religious consciousness, insofar as the latter, too, regards the sum total of everything that is, in general the world as it exists, as created and governed by God.

§ 46

The need arises, however, of knowing [*erkennen*] this identity or the empty *thing-in-itself*. Now to *know* means nothing other than knowing [*wissen*] an

object in terms of its *determinate* content. A determinate content, however, contains multiple *connections* within itself and grounds connections with many other objects. For such a determination of the above infinite or *thing-in-itself* this kind of reason would have nothing but the *categories* at its disposal. Insofar as it wants to use them for this purpose, it *soars over* [*überfliegend*] objects (it becomes transcendent).

At this point, the second aspect of the *critique of reason* enters the scene, and this second aspect is as such more important than the first. The first is the view dealt with above, that the *categories* have their source in the unity of self-consciousness and that, as a result, knowledge by means of them does indeed contain nothing objective, and that the objectivity ascribed to them (cf. §§ 40, 41) is itself only something *subjective*. If this is the issue at stake, then the Kantian critique is merely a *subjective* (banal) *idealism* that does not engage the content, focuses only on the abstract forms of subjectivity and, indeed, remains ensconced one-sidedly in the former, i.e. subjectivity, as the final, absolutely affirmative determination. When it comes to considering the so-called *application* that reason makes of the categories for knowledge of its objects, then the content of the categories is being discussed, at least for some determinations, or at any rate this would be an occasion at which it might be discussed. It is of particular interest to see how *Kant* assesses this *application of the categories to the unconditioned*, i.e. metaphysics. This procedure shall be briefly presented and critiqued here.

§ 47

1. The *first unconditioned* that is considered is the *soul* (see above, § 34). – In my consciousness I find myself always (α) as the *determining subject*, (β) as *singular* or abstractly simple, (γ) as *one and the same, identical* in all the manifoldness of what I am conscious of, (δ) as something distinguishing *myself* as thinking from all *things outside me*.

Now the procedure of the former metaphysics is correctly described as substituting for these *empirical* determinations *thought-determinations*, i.e. the corresponding *categories*. In this way the following four statements result: (α) the *soul is a substance*, (β) it is *a simple substance*, (γ) it is *numerically identical* at different times of its existence, (δ) it stands in a *relationship* to the *spatial dimension* [*zum Räumlichen*].

In this substitution, a deficiency is noted, namely that two different determinations are exchanged for one another (*paralogism*), namely,

empirical determinations for categories, so that it would be illegitimate *to infer* the latter from the former, or generally to replace the former with the latter.

As can be seen, this critique expresses nothing but the *Humean* observation mentioned above in § 39 that the thought-determinations in general, namely universality and necessity, are not to be found in perception and that the empirical is different, in terms of content as in terms of its form, from the thought-determination.

If the empirical were to constitute the authentication of thought, then the latter would indeed have to be precisely demonstrated in perception. – Substantiality, simplicity, identity with itself and an independence that maintains itself while being in community with the material world cannot be asserted of the soul. The Kantian critique of metaphysical psychology attributes this exclusively to the fact that the determinations that consciousness lets us *experience* of the soul are not exactly the same as those that *thinking* produces in this connection. According to the presentation above, however, even Kant has *knowing*, indeed even *experiencing*, consist in the fact that *perceptions* are thought; that is to say, the determinations belonging at first to perception are *transformed* into determinations of thought. – In any case, it should be deemed a good result of the Kantian critique that philosophizing about spirit has been freed from the soul-*thing*, from the categories and thus from the questions concerning the *simplicity* or *compositeness*, the *materiality*, and so forth, of the soul. – However, the true viewpoint regarding the *illegitimacy* of such forms, even for ordinary human understanding, will surely not be that they are *thoughts*, but that such thoughts in and of themselves hold no truth. – If thought and appearance do not correspond to each other completely, one initially has the choice of regarding the one or the other as deficient. In Kantian idealism, insofar as it concerns what belongs to reason, the deficiency is blamed on the thoughts, such that they are held to be insufficient, because they do not adequately correspond to what is perceived and to a consciousness that restricts itself to the scope of perception, a consciousness in which the thoughts are not to be found. The content of thought in and of itself goes unmentioned here.

Addition. Generally speaking, paralogisms are faulty syllogisms whose mistake consists precisely in using one and the same word in a different sense in both premises. According to Kant, the procedure of the old metaphysics in rational

psychology is based on such paralogisms, insofar as merely empirical determinations of the soul are here regarded as belonging to it in and of itself. – It is quite correct, moreover, that predicates such as *simplicity*, *immutability*, and so on, are not to be attributed to the soul, yet not for the reason given by Kant, namely that reason would then overstep the limit set for it, but because abstract determinations of the understanding such as these are too poor for the soul and because it is something quite different from what is simple, immutable, and so on. Thus, for instance, the soul is indeed simple identity with itself, but qua active it is at the same time distinguishing itself from itself within itself. By contrast, the *merely*, i.e. the abstractly simple, precisely as such, is at the same time something dead. – The fact that Kant, through his polemic against the old metaphysics, removed those predicates from the soul and from spirit is to be regarded as a great result. However, he completely misses *why* it is.

§ 48

2. In reason's attempt to know the *second* unconditioned object (§ 35), the *world*, it falls into *antinomies*, i.e. the affirmation of two *opposite* sentences about the *same* object and, indeed, in such a way that each of these sentences must be affirmed with equal necessity. From this it follows that the worldly content, whose determinations incur such a contradiction, cannot be something *in itself*, but only appearance. The *resolution* is that the contradiction does not apply to the object in and of itself, but pertains solely to reason engaged in trying to know [*allein der erkennenden Vernunft zukommt*].

This is where it is brought up that it is the content itself, namely the categories themselves, that bring about the contradiction. This thought that the contradiction posited in the realm of reason [*am Vernünftigen*] by the determinations of the understanding is *essential* and *necessary* must be regarded as one of the most important and profound advances in the philosophy of recent times. The resolution is as trivial as the view is profound. It consists merely in a tenderness for worldly things. It is not supposed to be the worldly essence that bears the blemish of contradiction, but it is supposed to fall to thinking reason *alone*, the *essence of spirit*. Now probably nobody is going to object to the claim that the world *as it appears* displays contradictions to the spirit beholding it – for the world as it appears is the world for the subjective spirit, i.e. for *sensoriness* and *understanding*. But now if the worldly *essence* is compared with the spiritual *essence*, one can marvel at the naïveté with which the

humble claim has been put forth and repeated that it is not the worldly essence, but instead the thinking essence, i.e. reason, that is in itself contradictory. To use the expression that reason incurs contradiction *only* because of *the application of the categories* is of no help. For it is claimed in the process that this application is *necessary* and that reason possesses no other determinations for knowing than the categories. Knowing is indeed *determining* and *determinate* thinking. If reason is merely empty, indeterminate thinking, it thinks *nothing*. If reason is ultimately reduced to that *empty identity* (see the following section), then it is in the end happily freed from the above contradiction by the easy sacrifice of all content and import [*Inhalt und Gehalt*].

It can further be noted that the neglect of a deeper consideration of the antinomies initially led to Kant listing only *four* antinomies. He arrived at these four, because as with the so-called paralogisms he presupposed the table of categories and in so doing followed the manner that has since become so popular, namely to place the determination of an object under an otherwise ready-made *schema*, instead of deriving them from the concept. Further *desiderata* concerning the execution of the antinomies I have on occasion pointed out in my *Science of Logic*. – The main thing to be noted is that the antinomy occurs not only in the four specific objects taken from cosmology but instead in *all* objects of all genera, in *all* representations, concepts, and ideas. To know [*wissen*] this and to gain knowledge of objects thus characterized belongs to the essence of a philosophical consideration. This characteristic constitutes what determines itself further on as the *dialectical* moment of the logical.

Addition. From the standpoint of the old metaphysics it was assumed that, if knowing falls into contradictions, this would be only an accidental aberration and rest on a subjective mistake in making inferences and in formal reasoning [*räsonnieren*]. According to Kant, however, it is inherent in the nature of thinking itself to lapse into contradictions (antinomies) when it wants to gain knowledge of the infinite. Now, as mentioned in the Remark to the above section, pointing out the antinomies is to be regarded as a very important advancement of philosophical knowing insofar as, by this means, the rigid dogmatism of the metaphysics of the understanding was done away with and the dialectical movement of thought was indicated. Nonetheless, at the same time, despite this advancement, note must be taken of the fact that here, too, Kant stopped short at the merely negative result of the unknowability of the in-itself of things and did not press on to the true and positive significance of the antinomies. The true and positive significance of the antinomies consists in general in this: that everything actual contains within

itself opposite determinations, and that therefore knowing and, more specifically, comprehending [*Begreifen*] an object means nothing more or less than becoming conscious of it as a unity of opposite determinations. Now while, as pointed out earlier, in the consideration of objects the metaphysical knowledge of which was at issue, the old metaphysics went to work by applying abstract determinations of the understanding to the exclusion of their opposites, Kant sought, by contrast, to show how, for claims generated in this way, contrasting claims with an opposite content are to be posited with equal justification and equal necessity opposite them. In pointing out these antinomies, Kant restricted himself to the cosmology of the old metaphysics, and in his polemic against it he managed to produce four antinomies by presupposing the schema of the categories. The *first* concerns the question of whether the world is to be considered limited or not according to space and time. The *second* deals with the dilemma of whether matter is to be considered divisible ad infinitum or consisting of atoms. The *third* antinomy refers to the opposition between freedom and necessity, in the sense, namely, that the question is posed whether everything in the world must be considered to be conditioned by the causal nexus or whether free beings, i.e. absolute starting-points of action in the world, are to be assumed as well. To this is added finally, as the *fourth* antinomy, the dilemma of whether the world in general has a cause or not. – The method that Kant follows in his discussion of these antinomies is as follows. He juxtaposes the opposite determinations contained in them as thesis and antithesis and tries to prove both of them, i.e. to exhibit both of them as the necessary results of thinking them through. In the process he explicitly defends himself against the charge that he sought smoke and mirrors in order to perform a spurious lawyer's proof. However, the proofs that Kant proposes for his theses and antitheses must indeed be regarded as mere pseudo-proofs, since what is supposed to be proved is always already contained in the presuppositions that form the starting-point and only through the long-winded, apagogic process is the semblance of mediation produced. Nonetheless, the construction of these antinomies will always remain a very important and praiseworthy result of the Critical philosophy, insofar as the actual unity of those determinations that are kept apart by the understanding is thereby articulated, even if at first only in a subjective and immediate way. Thus, for example, the first of the aforementioned cosmological antinomies contains the notion that space and time are to be regarded not only as continuous but also as discrete, whereas in the old metaphysics one stopped short at mere continuity and, in keeping with this, the world was considered unlimited in terms of space and time. It is entirely correct to say that we can go beyond any given *determinate* space as well as any *determinate* time; but it is no less correct to say that space and time are actual only through their determinateness, i.e. as *here* and *now*, and that this determinateness is inherent in the concept of them. The same is true of the rest of the remaining antinomies listed earlier, for instance, the antinomy of *freedom* and *necessity* with which, looked at more closely, things stand as follows: what the understanding understands by freedom and necessity indeed concerns only the ideal moments of true freedom and true necessity, and the two in their separation amount to nothing true.

§ 49

3. The *third* object of reason is *God* (§ 36), who is supposed to be known [*erkannt*], i.e. *determined through thinking*. For the understanding, all determination is only a *limitation* [*Schranke*] of the simple *identity*, a negation as such. Thus all reality must be taken to be limitless, i.e. *indeterminate*, and God as the sum total of all realities or as the most real being [*Wesen*] becomes the simple *abstractum*, and for the determination [of God] there is left only the equally completely abstract determinateness, namely, *being*. Abstract *identity* (which is also called the concept here) and *being* are the two moments whose unification is what reason seeks. It is the *ideal* of reason.

§ 50

There are *two* possible *paths* or forms to this unification: one can begin from *being* and from there make the transition to the *abstractum of thinking* or, conversely, the transition can be effected from the *abstractum* to *being*.

As far as the beginning with being is concerned, being, as the immediate, presents itself as a being with an infinite variety of determinations, a world completely full. It can be further determined as a collection of infinitely many contingencies in general (as in the *cosmological* proof), or as a collection of infinitely many *purposes* and relationships adapted to purposes (as in the *physico-teleological* proofs). – To *think* this fullness of being [*dieses erfüllte Sein*] means to divest its form of individual and contingent [features] and to grasp it as a universal being, different from that first [fullness of being], to grasp it as necessary in and for itself, active and determining itself in accordance with universal purposes – in short, to grasp it as God. – The chief sense of the critique of this path is that it is an act of inferring, a transition. For insofar as *perceptions* and their aggregate, the world, do not as such exhibit the universality that thinking produces by its purification of that content, this universality is not justified in this way, it is argued, by that empirical representation of the world. Opposed accordingly to this process of thought ascending from the empirical representation of the world to God is the *Humean* standpoint (as with the paralogsms, see § 47), the standpoint that declares it illicit to *think* the perceptions, i.e. to lift the universal and necessary out from them.

Since it is the nature of a human being to think, neither healthy common sense nor philosophy will ever allow itself to be kept from elevating itself *from* and *out of* the empirical view of the world

[*Weltanschauung*] to God. This elevating has nothing else for its foundation than *thoughtful* [*denkende*], not merely sensory or animalistic observation [*Betrachtung*] of the world. The *essence*, the *substance*, the *universal power* and *purposive determination* of the world exist for thought and *only* for thought. The so-called proofs of the existence of God should be viewed merely as *descriptions* and analyses of *the inner route of the spirit* who is a *thinking* spirit and who thinks the sensory [world]. The *elevating* of spirit above the sensory, its *process of going beyond* the finite towards the infinite, the *leap* that is made into the infinite by breaking off the series of sensory [events], all this is thinking itself, this transitioning is *nothing but thinking*. If such a transition is not supposed to be made, this means that thinking is not supposed to happen. Indeed, the animals do not make such a transition, *they* stop short at sensory sensation and intuition, and for this reason they have no religion. Two remarks are in order here about the critique of this elevating of thought, both in general and in particular. *First*, if it is put into the form of *sylogisms* (so-called *proofs* of the existence of God), the *point of departure* is indeed the view of the world that is determined in one way or another as an aggregate of contingencies or purposes and purposive relationships. In thinking, insofar as it *sylogises*, this point of departure can appear *to remain* and *be left* as a *fixed foundation* and just as empirical as this material at first is. The relationship of the point of departure to the end-point towards which one progresses is thus represented as purely *affirmative*, as an inferring from *one thing* that supposedly *is* and *remains* to *something else* that supposedly *is as well*. Still, it is a grave error to want to recognize the nature of thinking only in the form it takes as understanding. To think the empirical world means, much more essentially, to modify its empirical form and to transform it into a universal. At the same time thinking applies a *negative* activity to that foundation. When determined by universality, the perceived material *does not maintain* its initial empirical form. Through elimination and *negation* of the crust (cf. §§ 13 and 23) the inner *basic content* [*Gehalt*] of what is perceived is brought out. The metaphysical proofs of the existence of God are insufficient explanations and descriptions of the elevation of spirit from the world to God for this reason because they do not express or rather bring out the moment of *negation* that is contained in this elevation. For it is inherent in the fact that the world is *contingent* [*zufällig*] that it is merely something *incidental* [*Fallendes*], something apparent, something that in and for itself *is*

not [ein *Nichtiges*]. The sense of the elevation of spirit is that, while being belongs to the world, this being is merely a semblance [*Schein*], not the true being, not absolute truth, and that this [truth] is instead beyond that appearance in God alone, that God alone truly exists. Insofar as this elevation is *transition* and *mediation*, it is equally a *sublating* of the *transition* and the *mediation*. For that through which God could seem to be mediated, i.e. the world, is instead declared to be what is not [*das Nichtige*]. Only the world's *being* in this manner of not being [*Nichtigkeit*] forms the bond of the elevation, such that what exists as the mediating element disappears and, by this means, the mediation is sublated in this mediation itself. – It is chiefly this relationship, conceived merely as affirmative and as a relationship between two beings, to which *Jacobi* clings, while he combats the constructing of proofs by the understanding. Against it, he rightly objects that *conditions* (i.e. the world) are thereby sought for the *unconditioned*, that the *infinite* (i.e. God) is in this way represented as *grounded* and *dependent*. And yet, that elevation as it occurs in spirit by itself corrects this semblance [*Schein*]; indeed, its entire basic content is the correction of this semblance. But this true nature of essential thinking, to sublate the mediation in the mediation itself, *Jacobi* failed to recognize. As a consequence, he erroneously mistook the correct objection that he levels against the merely reflective understanding for one that applies to thinking in general and thus also to the thinking based on reason.

As a means of elucidating how the *negative* moment is overlooked, we can cite as an example the objection made against *Spinozism*, namely that it is pantheism and atheism. To be sure, the *absolute substance* of Spinoza is not yet the absolute *spirit*, and it is rightly demanded that God must be determined as absolute spirit. If, however, Spinoza's determination is represented in such a way that he merges God with nature, i.e. with the finite world, and turns the world into God, it is thereby presupposed that the finite world possesses true actuality, *affirmative reality*. With this presupposition, to be sure, through the unity of God with the world, God is made utterly finite and downgraded to the merely finite, external manifoldness of existence. Apart from the fact that Spinoza does not define God as the unity of God and the world, but instead as the unity of *thinking* and extension (the material world), it lies already in this unity, even if taken in this initial, quite awkward way, that in

the Spinozistic system the world is in fact determined as a mere phenomenon to which true reality does not pertain, so that this system is to be regarded much more as *acosmism*. A philosophy that claims that God and *only* God *exists* should at least not be passed off as atheism. Even tribes who worship the monkey, the cow, or stone and iron statues, and so forth as God are being credited with having religion. But representation is even more averse to surrendering its own presupposition that its aggregate of finitude called *world* actually has reality. That *there is no world*, as representation might express itself, such an assumption is easily held to be completely impossible, or at least to be much less possible than the assumption that might come into one's head that *there is no God*. One believes, and not exactly to one's credit, much more easily that a system denies God than that it denies the world; one finds it far more conceivable that God is denied than that the world is.

The *second* remark concerns the critique of the *basic content* that the thinking elevation [mentioned above] first acquires. This basic content is, of course, not adequate to what is or ought to be understood by God if it consists only in determinations such as the *substance* of the world, its *necessary essence*, a *cause ordering* and *directing in a purposeful manner*, and so forth. But setting aside the practice of presupposing some representation of God and judging a result according to such a presupposition, the above determinations are indeed of great value and necessary moments of the idea of God. In order to bring the basic content in its true determination, the true idea of God, before thinking in this manner, the point of departure must, of course, not be taken from subordinate content. The *merely contingent* things of the world are a very abstract determination. The organic creations and determinations of their purposes belong to a higher circle, *life*. However, apart from the fact that the contemplation of living nature and of the rest of the relationships of things on hand to *purposes* can be tarnished by the triviality of purposes, or even by childish ways of citing purposes and their relations, nature that is merely alive is indeed itself not yet that from which the true *determination* of the idea of God can be grasped. God is more than living, he is spirit. The *spiritual* nature alone is the most dignified and the truest *point of departure* for thinking the absolute, insofar as thinking takes for itself a point of departure and wants to choose the nearest at hand.

§ 51

The *other path of the unification* through which the *ideal* is supposed to come about starts from the *abstractum of thought* and proceeds to the determination for which only *being* remains – the *ontological proof* of the *existence of God*. The opposition that occurs here is that of *thinking* and *being*, since on the first path being is common to both sides and the opposition concerns merely the difference between the individual instance [*Vereinzelten*] and the universal. What the understanding sets down in opposition to this second path is in itself the same as what was just mentioned, namely, that just as the universal cannot be found in the empirical, so also conversely the determinate is not contained in the universal, and the determinate here is being. Or, being supposedly cannot be derived from the concept or retrieved through analysis of it.

The Kantian critique of the ontological proof has no doubt found such unqualifiedly favourable attention and acceptance because of the example he used. In order to clarify what the difference is between thinking and being, he used the example of the *hundred dollars* that would be equal to a hundred, whether they be merely possible or real, as far as the *concept* of them is concerned and yet this would make an essential difference to the state of *my* resources. – Nothing can be so plain as the fact that what I think or imagine is for all that not yet *actual*, or so obvious as the thought that representation or even the concept are insufficient to reach being. Ignoring the fact that calling something like a hundred dollars a concept could be justly labelled barbaric, those who repeat again and again against the philosophical idea that *thinking* and *being* are *different* should at long last accept that this is likewise familiar to philosophers. For, is there anything that one is familiar with [*Kenntnis*] that could indeed be more trivial than that? Next, however, it ought to be considered that when *God* is under discussion, this is an object of a different kind from a hundred dollars and from *any sort of* particular concept, representation, or whatever one wants to call it. Indeed, everything *finite* is like this and this *alone*, that the *existence of it differs from its concept*. God, on the other hand, is explicitly supposed to be what can only be ‘*thought as existing*’, where the concept includes being. This unity of concept and being is what constitutes the concept of God. – To be sure, this is as yet only a formal determination of God, which for this reason

contains indeed merely the nature of the *concept* itself. However, that the latter, even in its entirely abstract sense, already includes *being* is easy to see. For the concept, however else it may be determined, is at the very least the relation emerging from sublating the mediation and thus the *immediate relationship* to itself; being, however, is nothing other than this. – One might well say that it would have to be very strange, if the innermost core of spirit (the concept) or if the I, not to mention the concrete totality that is God, were not even so rich as to contain within itself so impoverished a determination as *being*, which is, after all, the poorest and most abstract determination. In terms of the basic content, there can be nothing more trivial [*Geringeres*] for thought than *being*. Only this much may be even more trivial, namely, what one first imagines somehow with respect to being, such as an *external, sensory* existence like that of the paper here in front of me. But, after all, no one will want to talk about the sensory existence of a limited, transient thing. – Incidentally, the trivial remark of the *Critique*, that thought and being are different, is able at most to sidetrack but not put an end to the human spirit's progression from the *thought* of God to the certainty that he *exists*. It is this transition, too, the inseparability of the thought of God from his being, that has been re-established in its rightful position in the perspective of *immediate knowing* or *belief*, of which more will be said later.

§ 52

Determinateness remains something *external* for *thinking* in this way at its highest point; it continues to be an entirely *abstract thinking* that is called *reason* here throughout. Hence, the result is that the latter contributes nothing but the *formal unity* for the simplification and systematization of experiences. It is a *canon*, not an *organon* of *truth*, and is able to deliver not a *doctrine* of the infinite, but merely a *critique* of knowledge. In the final analysis, this critique consists in the *assurance* that thinking is in itself merely an *indeterminate unity* and the *activity* of this *indeterminate unity*.

Addition. It is true that Kant construed reason as the faculty of the unconditioned. However, if reason is reduced merely to an abstract identity, this at the same time entails renouncing its unconditioned status, and then reason is indeed nothing but empty understanding. Reason is unconditioned only in virtue of the fact that it is not determined from outside by some content alien to it, but instead determines itself and is by this means at home with itself in its content. Now,

according to Kant, the activity of reason explicitly consists merely in systematizing the material conveyed by perception and doing so through the application of the categories, that is to say, putting it into some external order, and its principle thereby is merely that of the absence of contradiction.

§ 53

(b) *Practical reason* is conceived as the will determining itself and, indeed, *in a universal manner*, i.e. as a *thinking* will. It is supposed to furnish imperative, objective laws of freedom, i.e. laws that state what *ought* to happen. The legitimacy of assuming that thinking is an *objectively determining* activity (i.e. indeed *a form of reason*), is located in the fact that practical freedom is *proven through experience*, i.e. that it can be demonstrated in the appearance of self-consciousness. This experience in consciousness is countered by everything that determinism, equally based on experience, brings forward against it, especially the sceptical (also *Humean*) induction of the *infinite diversity* of what counts as right and duty among human beings, i.e. as the laws of freedom that are supposed to be objective.

§ 54

As for what practical thought is supposed to make into a law for itself, i.e. the criterion for *determining* itself within itself, once again nothing is available but the same *abstract identity* of the understanding, namely, that no contradiction occur in the act of determining. Thus, practical reason does not advance beyond the formalism that is supposed to be the ultimate standpoint of *theoretical* reason.

But this practical reason does not merely posit *within itself* the universal determination, namely *the good*. Instead it is genuinely *practical* only in its demand that the good have worldly existence and external objectivity, i.e. that the thought should be not merely *subjective*, but altogether objective. More about this postulate of practical reason later.

Addition. What Kant had denied theoretical reason, namely free self-determination, he explicitly vindicated for practical reason. It is principally this side of the Kantian philosophy that has won it great favour, and rightly so. In order to recognize the value of our debt to Kant in this respect, we need first to call to mind that shape of the practical philosophy and specifically the moral philosophy that he encountered as the dominant one. This was generally speaking the system of *eudaemonism*. In reply to the question concerning the vocation of human beings, it answered that they had to aim for *happiness* as their goal. Now insofar as one understood by happiness the satisfaction of human beings' particular

inclinations, wishes, needs, etc., the contingent and the particular were thereby made into the principle of the will and its activity. Kant placed practical reason in opposition to this eudaemonism that dispenses with any firm hold within itself and opens the door to every whim and passing mood, and he enunciated in this way the requirement of a universal determination of the will that was equally binding on everybody. According to Kant, as has been noted in the preceding sections, theoretical reason is supposed to be only the negative faculty of the infinite and, without any positive content of its own, it is supposed to be limited to recognizing the finitude of knowledge of experience. But he explicitly recognized, by contrast, the positive infinity of practical reason and, indeed, in such a way that he ascribes to the *will* the capacity for determining itself in a universal manner, that is to say, in *thinking*. The will surely possesses this capacity and it is of enormous importance to know [*wissen*] that human beings are free only insofar as they possess this capacity and make use of it in their actions. But with this acknowledgment, the question concerning the *content* of the will or of practical reason is still not answered. When it is then said that human beings ought to make the *good* the content of their willing, the question of the content, that is to say, the question of the determinateness of this content, immediately recurs, and one does not advance a single step with the mere principle of the agreement of the will with itself or with the requirement to do one's duty for duty's sake.

§ 55

(c) The *power of reflective judgment* is credited with the principle of an *intuiting understanding*, in which the *particular*, which is supposed to be *contingent* with respect to the *universal* (i.e. the abstract identity) and not to be derivable from it, is determined by this very universal – something that is said to be experienced in the products of art and of *organic* nature.

The *Critique of the Power of Judgment* is distinguished by the fact that in it Kant has articulated the representation, indeed, the thought, of *the idea*. The representation of an *intuitive understanding*, of *inner purposiveness*, etc., is the *universal* simultaneously thought as *concrete* in itself. Thus, it is only in these kinds of representations that the Kantian philosophy shows itself to be *speculative*. Many, notably *Schiller*, have found in the idea of *fine art* [*des Kunstschoenen*], i.e. of the *concrete* unity of thought and sensory representation, the way out from the *abstractions* of an understanding that separates, while others have found it in the intuition and the consciousness of *the state of being alive* [*Lebendigkeit*] in general, be it natural or intellectual life. – To be sure, the product of art and the living individuality are limited in

their content. But in the postulated harmony of nature or necessity with the purpose of freedom, i.e. in the conception of the realization of the ultimate purpose of the world, Kant puts forth the idea that is all-encompassing in terms of content as well. And yet, with this highest idea, the laziness of *thought*, as it may be called, finds in the *ought* too easy a way out, by holding on to the separation of concept and reality against the actual realization of the ultimate purpose. By contrast, the *presence* of the living organizations and of the beautiful in the arts demonstrates the *actuality* of the *ideal* even for the *senses* and *intuition*. The Kantian reflections on these objects would have been particularly suited for introducing consciousness to the process of grasping and thinking the *concrete* idea.

§ 56

Here the thought of a relationship of the *universal* of the understanding to the *particular* of intuition is put forward, one that is different from the relationship that underlies the doctrine of theoretical and practical reason. But no connection is made with the insight that the former relationship is the *true* one, indeed that it *is* the *truth* itself. Instead, this unity is only taken up as it comes to exist in finite appearances and is displayed in *experience*. Within the *subject*, such experience is afforded in part by *genius*, the capacity to produce aesthetic ideas. The latter are representations of the free *power of imagination* that serve an idea and offer material for *thought* without expressing that content in a *concept* or allowing it to be expressed in one. The experience is also afforded by the *judgment of taste*, the feeling of the *harmony* of the *intuitions*' or representations' freedom with the *understanding* in its conformity to laws.

§ 57

Furthermore, the principle of the reflective power of judgment in relation to the *living products of nature* is determined as the *purpose*, the active *concept*, the universal that is determined and determining in itself. At the same time the idea of an extrinsic or finite purposiveness is removed, i.e. the purposiveness in which the purpose is merely an external form for the means and the material in which it realizes itself. In contrast to this sort of purposiveness, the purpose in *living things* is a determination and activity immanent in the matter, and all the members exist equally and mutually as means and end [*Zweck*] for each other.

§ 58

Now the relationship posited by the understanding between means and end, subjectivity and objectivity is sublated in such an idea. Nevertheless and in contradiction again of this fact, the purpose is still declared to be a cause that exists and is active *only as a representation*, i.e. as something *subjective*. Thus, the determination of the purpose is also declared to be a principle of judgment, belonging only to *our* understanding.

Since it is the result of the Critical philosophy anyway that reason can know only appearances, one should still at least have had a choice between two *equally subjective* ways of thinking about living nature and, in keeping with the Kantian presentation, even an obligation to come to know the products of nature not only according to the categories of quality, cause, and effect, composition, elements, and so forth. If the principle of *internal purposiveness* had been held on to and developed in its scientific application, it would have yielded an entirely different, higher mode of consideration of the products of nature.

§ 59

In keeping with this principle, the idea in its utter unlimitedness would be that the universality determined by reason, the absolute, ultimate purpose, *the good*, would be realized in the world and, indeed, through a third factor, the power positing this ultimate purpose and realizing it, namely *God*, in whom (as the absolute truth) those oppositions of universality and individuality, subjectivity and objectivity are resolved and declared to be not self-standing and to be untrue.

§ 60

However, the *good* in which the ultimate purpose of the world is located is determined from the start only as *our* good, as the moral law of *our* practical reason. As a result, the unity does not extend beyond the agreement of the state of the world and of world events with our morality.¹⁴

¹⁴ In Kant's *Critique of the Power of Judgment*'s own words [1st edition], p. 427 [§ 88]: 'Final purpose [*Endzweck*] is merely a concept of our practical reason and cannot be deduced *from any data of experience* for making judgments about nature, nor can it be related to [any] knowledge about it.'

Moreover, even with this limitation the *ultimate purpose*, the *good*, is an undetermined abstractum, as is what *duty* is supposed to be. More specifically, the opposition, posited as untrue in the harmony's content, is again revived and maintained against this harmony, with the result that the harmony is determined as something merely *subjective*, something that merely *ought* to be, that *does not* possess *reality*, i.e. as something *believed*, to which only subjective certainty applies, not truth, i.e. *not* the objectivity that corresponds to the idea. – If this contradiction seems to be concealed by virtue of the fact that the realization of the idea plays out in *time*, i.e. in a future in which the idea supposedly also exists, then such a sensory condition as time is rather the opposite of a resolution of the contradiction, and the corresponding representation of the understanding, namely the *infinite progression*, is at once nothing but the contradiction itself posited as perennially recurring.

A general remark may be added about the outcome that has resulted from the critical philosophy with regard to the nature of *knowing* [*des Erkennens*] and that has gained the status of one of the prejudices, i.e. one of the general assumptions of the age. In every dualistic system, and especially in the Kantian system, its basic flaw reveals itself through the inconsistency of *combining* [*vereinen*] what a moment ago has been declared to be independent and thus *incompatible* [*unvereinbar*]. While what had been combined was just declared to be true, so now instead it is declared to be true that the *two moments*, whose separate existence on their own has been denied to them in the combination which was to be their truth, possess truth and actuality only insofar as they exist in separation. Such philosophizing as this lacks the simple consciousness that in going back and forth in this way each of these individual determinations is declared to be unsatisfactory, and the flaw consists in the simple inability to bring together two thoughts (and in point of form there are only *two* of them present). It is therefore the greatest inconsistency to admit, on the one hand, that the understanding acquires knowledge of appearances only, while maintaining, on the other, that this kind of knowledge is something *absolute* by saying that knowing *cannot* go further, that this is the *natural*, absolute *barrier* [*Schranke*] for human knowledge [*Wissen*]. Natural things are

No use of this concept is possible, except by practical reason in accordance with moral laws; and the *final purpose of creation* is that constitution [*Beschaffenheit*] of the world that agrees with what we can definitely say based simply on laws, namely [to the extent that it agrees with] the final purpose of *our pure practical reason*, and indeed insofar as it is supposed to be practical.'

limited [*beschränkt*], and they are merely natural things, insofar as they *know* [*wissen*] *nothing* of their universal *barrier*, insofar as their determinacy is a barrier only *for us*, not *for them*. Something can be known [*gewußt*], even felt to be a *barrier*, a lack only insofar as one has at the same time *gone beyond* it. Living things have the prerogative over lifeless things of feeling pain. For the former, an *individual* determinateness becomes the sensation of something *negative*, because, qua alive, they carry within themselves the *universality* of the living nature that is *beyond* the individual, they maintain themselves even in the negative of merely themselves, and feel this *contradiction* as it exists within themselves. This contradiction is in them only insofar as both exist in the *one* subject, namely the universality of its feeling for life [*Lebensgefühl*] and the negative individuality opposed to this. A barrier, a lack of knowing is determined precisely *to be* a barrier or lack only through a *comparison* with the *existing* idea of the universal, of what is whole and complete. Therefore, it is merely a lack of consciousness not to realize that the designation of something as finite or limited contains the proof of the *actual presence* of the infinite, the unlimited, that the knowledge [*Wissen*] of a boundary can exist only insofar as the unbounded exists *on this side*, in consciousness.

This *further remark* may be added about the result concerning knowing, namely that the Kantian philosophy could not have had an influence on the treatment of the sciences. *It leaves the categories and the method of ordinary knowing completely unchallenged*. In scientific writings of the time, when they now and then start with sentences of the Kantian philosophy, the treatise shows in the sequel that those sentences were merely a superfluous embellishment, and that the same empirical contents would have appeared, if those several initial pages had been dropped.¹⁵

As far as the closer comparison of the Kantian philosophy with *metaphysicising empiricism* is concerned, *naïve* empiricism, it is true, takes its bearings from sensory perception, but it also allows for a spiritual actuality, a supersensible world, whatever its *content* may be, whether it stems from thought or fantasy, and so forth. In terms

¹⁵ Even in the *Handbook of Metres* by Hermann [Gottfried Hermann, *Handbuch der Metrik* (Leipzig, 1799)] the beginning is made with paragraphs of the Kantian philosophy. Indeed, in § 8 it is concluded that the law of rhythm must be (1) *objective*, (2) *formal*, (3) a law *determined* a priori. The reader ought to compare with these requirements and the subsequent principles of causality and reciprocity the treatment of the metres themselves, on which those formal principles have no influence at all.

of *form*, this content has its warrant in spiritual authority, just as the different content of empirical knowledge [*Wissen*] has it in the authority of outer perception. However, *reflective empiricism*, making *consistency* its principle, fights such dualism of the ultimate, highest content and negates the self-sufficiency of the thinking principle and of a spiritual world unfolding in it. *Materialism*, *naturalism* is the *consistent* system of empiricism. – The Kantian philosophy opposes this empiricism with the principle of thought and that of freedom in general, and sides with the first empiricism without in the least stepping outside its [that first empiricism's] general principles. The world of perception and of the understanding reflecting on it continues to exist on one side of its [the Kantian philosophy's] dualism. True, this world is put forward as a world of appearances. However, this is a mere label, a merely formal determination, for the source, substantive content, and manner of examination remain entirely the same. By contrast, on the other side there is the self-sufficiency of thinking that grasps itself, the principle of freedom that it shares with the former, usual metaphysics, but emptied of all content, unable to procure any other for it. This kind of thinking, called *reason* here, is stripped of all *authority* by being robbed of every determination. The chief effect that the Kantian philosophy has had is to have awakened consciousness of this absolute interiority. The latter, although unable to develop anything out of itself or to generate any determinations in the way either of knowledge or of moral laws due to its abstraction, nonetheless refuses categorically to acknowledge as valid or let take effect in it anything that has the character of something *external*. The principle of the *independence of reason*, of its absolute self-sufficiency within itself, must from now on be regarded as a universal principle of philosophy and equally as one of the prejudices of our time.

Addition 1. The Critical philosophy deserves great negative credit for promoting and validating the conviction that the determinations of the understanding belong to finitude and that a knowing that moves within these limits does not arrive at the truth. And yet, the one-sidedness of this philosophy consists in that the finitude of those determinations of the understanding is attributed to the fact that they pertain to our subjective thinking only, for which the thing-in-itself is supposed to remain an absolute beyond. In fact, however, the finitude of the determinations of the understanding does not lie in their subjectivity. Rather they are in themselves finite, and their finitude needs to be demonstrated in them themselves. According to Kant, however, what we think is false because *we* think it. – It is to be considered

a further deficiency of this philosophy that it offers only a historical description of thinking and a mere list of the moments of consciousness. To be sure, this list is mainly correct, and yet there is no mention of the necessity of what has thus been empirically gathered together. As a result of the reflections about the various levels of consciousness it is then said that the content of what we know [*wissen*] is only appearance. With this result one must concur, insofar as finite thinking has to do, indeed, only with appearances. Still, this level of appearances is not the end of it; rather there exists a yet higher terrain, which, however, remains an inaccessible beyond for the Kantian philosophy.

Addition 2. While in the Kantian philosophy the principle according to which thinking determines itself out of itself has been established first in a merely formal way, whereas the *how* and *in what respect* of this self-determination of thinking has not yet been demonstrated by Kant, it is *Fichte* who by contrast recognized this defect and who, while expressing the requirement for a deduction of the categories, at the same time undertook the attempt actually to deliver one. The Fichtean philosophy makes the I the point of departure for the philosophical development, and the categories are to emerge as the result of its activity. And yet, the I does not truly appear as a free, spontaneous activity here, since it is considered to be aroused first by a check [*Anstoß*] from outside itself. The I is then supposed to react against this check, and only through this reaction is it supposed to acquire a consciousness of itself. – With this, the nature of the check remains an unknown outside, and the I continues to be something conditioned having an other over against itself. Consequently, Fichte, too, stands pat with the result of the Kantian philosophy that only the finite can be known, while the infinite passes beyond [the realm of] thinking. What is called ‘the thing-in-itself’ in Kant is, in Fichte, the check from outside the I, this abstractum of something other than the I that has no other determination than being the negative or the not-I in general. The I is considered here as standing in relation to the not-I through which its self-determining activity is first aroused, and this in such a way that the I is only the continuous activity of freeing itself from the check, without, however, the actual liberation taking place. For with the cessation of the check the I itself, whose being is solely its activity, would cease to exist. Moreover, the content that the activity of the I produces is nothing but the ordinary content of experience, only with the addition that this content is only an appearance.

C. THIRD POSITION OF THOUGHT TOWARDS OBJECTIVITY

Immediate knowing

§ 61

In the Critical philosophy, thinking is construed in such a way that it is *subjective* and its *ultimate*, insuperable determination is *abstract universality*, i.e. formal identity. Thinking is thus placed in opposition to truth as the

universality that is in itself concrete. In this highest determination of thinking which is supposed to be reason, the categories do not come into consideration. – The opposite standpoint is to construe thinking as the activity only of *the particular*, and in this way likewise declare it to be incapable of grasping the truth.

§ 62

As the activity of the particular, thinking has only the *categories* for its product and content. In the way in which the understanding holds on to them, they are *limited* determinations, forms of what is *conditioned, dependent, mediated*. The infinite, the true does not exist for the thinking limited to these determinations. It is incapable of making any transition to the infinite and true (*pace* the proofs of the existence of God). These determinations of thinking are also called *concepts*, and to *conceptualize* an object means nothing but to grasp it under the form of something *conditioned* and *mediated*. As a result, insofar as the object is the true, the infinite, the unconditioned, to conceptualize it is to transform it into something conditioned and mediated, and in this way, instead of grasping the true through thinking, to pervert it into something untrue.

This is the sole and simple polemic brought forward by that standpoint which affirms only immediate knowledge of God and of the true. Previously, all kinds of so-called anthropopathic representations were removed from God for being finite and thus unworthy of the infinite, and God grew into a considerably empty entity in the process. However, the determinations of thinking were generally not yet subsumed under the rubric of the anthropopathic. Rather, thinking was held to be such as to strip away the finitude from representations of the absolute – in accordance with the universal prejudice, mentioned above [§ 5], that one arrives at the truth only through thinking things over. Now, finally, the determinations of thinking have also been declared generally to be a kind of anthropopathism and thinking the activity of *merely finitizing*. – In Appendix VII of the *Letters on Spinoza, Jacobi*¹⁶ presented this polemic in the most determinate manner, a polemic he derived from Spinoza's philosophy itself and applied to

¹⁶ Moldenhauer–Michel: Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, *Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn* (1785), new augmented edition 1789.

combating knowing in general. This polemic construes knowing to be of the finite only, as a *serial* progression in thought, from something *conditioned* to something else *conditioned*, in which everything that is a condition is in turn itself only something conditioned – [in other words, a progression] through *conditioned conditions*. According to this view, explaining and conceptualizing means showing that something is *mediated* by an *other*. Thus, all content is only *particular*, *dependent*, and *finite*. The infinite, the true, God lies outside the mechanism of such a connection to which knowing is allegedly restricted. – It is an important point that, while the Kantian philosophy had principally placed the finitude of the categories merely in the formal determination of their *subjectivity*, in this polemic the categories are discussed with a view to their determinateness and the category as such is recognized as finite. – Jacobi focused in particular on the dazzling successes of the sciences that relate to nature (the *sciences exactes*), in knowing natural forces and laws. And of course the infinite cannot be found immanently on this plain of the finite; as Lalande [the French astronomer, 1732–1807] said, he searched the entire heaven but did not find God (cf. note in § 60). On this plain, what emerged as the final result was the *universal* as an *indeterminate* aggregate of external finite things, i.e. *matter*. And Jacobi rightly saw no other way out on the path of the mere progression through *mediations*.

§ 63

At the same time it is maintained that *the truth is for the spirit*, so much so that it is through *reason* alone that a human being exists [*besteht*] and that reason is *the knowledge* [*Wissen*] of God. However, because mediated knowledge is supposed to be restricted to finite content alone, reason is *immediate knowing*, *faith* [*Glaube*].

Knowing [*Wissen*], *believing* [*Glauben*], *thinking*, *intuiting* are the categories that obtain for this standpoint, and since they are *presupposed* as *familiar* they are simply too often employed arbitrarily, based on mere psychological representations and distinctions. What their nature and concept are, i.e. the only thing that might matter, is not investigated. Thus one finds *knowing* ordinarily opposed to *believing*, while believing is at the same time specified as immediate knowing and thus recognized at once as also

a kind of knowing [*Wissen*]. Similarly, it will no doubt be found to be an empirical fact that what one believes is in consciousness, so that at least one *knows of it*; equally, that what one believes is in consciousness as something *certain*, so that one therefore knows it. – Moreover, *thinking* is primarily set in opposition to immediate knowing and believing, and in particular to intuiting. If the intuiting is determined to be *intellectual*, this can mean nothing but an intuiting that is *thinking*, unless by ‘intellectual’ here, where God is the object, one wants to understand fantasies and images as well. In the language of this philosophizing it so happens that believing is also said in reference to the sensory presence of ordinary things. We *believe*, says Jacobi, that we have a *body*, we believe in the *concrete existence of sensory things*. But if the talk is of belief in the true and the eternal, of the fact that God is revealed, given in the immediate knowing, in intuiting, then these are not sensory things but rather a content that is *in itself universal*, objects only for the spirit *that thinks*. Again, since what is understood is the I in its *singularity*, the *personality*, and to that extent not an *empirical* I or a *particular* personality, above all since the personality of God is before consciousness, we are talking about a *pure* personality, i.e. a personality that is *in itself universal*, and something of this sort is a thought and belongs only to thinking. – Pure *intuiting*, moreover, is altogether the same as pure thinking. Initially, ‘intuiting’ and ‘believing’ express the specific representations that we connect with these words in ordinary consciousness. In this respect they differ, of course, from thinking, and this difference is intelligible to just about everybody. But believing and intuiting are now supposed to be taken in a higher sense as well, as believing in God, as intellectually intuiting God; in other words, we are supposed to abstract precisely from what constitutes the difference of thinking from intuiting, from believing. It is impossible to say how believing and intuiting, transposed into this higher region, may still differ from thinking. With such differences that have become devoid of meaning, one alleges that one has said and maintained something very important and disputed determinations that are [in fact] the same as those that one has maintained. – The expression ‘believing’, however, has the particular advantage of reminding us of the *Christian, religious* faith. It seems to include or even to be practically the same as the latter, so that this faith-based philosophizing appears essentially pious, and pious in a Christian sense, and against the background of this piety

allows itself the freedom to offer its random assurances with pretentiousness and authority. One must, however, not let oneself be deceived by the semblance that can sneak in through the mere similarity of the words, but instead hold firmly on to the difference. Christian faith includes within it the authority of the Church; by contrast, the faith of that philosophizing standpoint has only the authority of one's own subjective revelation. Furthermore, that Christian faith is an objective content, rich in itself, a system of doctrine and knowledge. The content of this faith, however, is so indeterminate in itself that, while it will, to be sure, countenance that content in some way, it encompasses just as much the belief that the Dalai Lama, the bull, the monkey, and so forth, is God, and for its own part it restricts itself to the idea of a *God in general*, a *supreme being*. The faith in that would-be philosophical sense is itself nothing but the dry *abstractum* of immediate knowing, a completely formal determination, not to be confused with or mistaken for the spiritual fullness of the Christian faith, either from the side of the believing heart and the Holy Spirit dwelling within it or from the side of a doctrine abounding in content.

Moreover, what is here called believing and immediate knowing is exactly the same as what has also been called inspiration, revelation of the heart, a content implanted by nature in a human being; in particular it is also called sound human understanding, *common sense* or common sensibility [*Gemeinsinn*]. In the same way, all these forms make immediacy (the way a content is found in consciousness, the way it is a fact in consciousness) their principle.

§ 64

What this immediate knowing knows is that the infinite, the eternal, the God in our *representation* also *is* – that immediately and inseparably bound up with this *representation* in consciousness is the certainty of its *being*.

There can be nothing less sensible for philosophy than to want to contradict these propositions of immediate knowing. It could instead congratulate itself on the fact that these, *its own* old propositions which indeed express its entire universal content, have in any case become to a certain extent the universal philosophical prejudices of our time, even if in such a non-philosophical manner. Rather, one wonders how it could be alleged that these propositions

are contrary to philosophy – the propositions that what is held to be true is immanent in spirit (§ 63) and that truth exists for the spirit (ibid.). In a formal respect, the proposition is particularly interesting that God's *being* is immediately and inseparably bound up with the *thought* of God and that *objectivity* is similarly bound up with the *subjectivity* that attaches at first to thought. Indeed, in its abstraction the philosophy of immediate knowing goes so far as to claim that not only with the thought of God but even in intuition with the *representation* of my *body* and of *external* things the determination of their concrete existence is likewise inseparably conjoined. – If philosophy is intent on proving this unity, i.e. on showing that it is part of the nature of thought or subjectivity itself to be inseparable from being or objectivity, then whatever the standing of such proofs, philosophy must in any case be quite content that it is asserted and shown that its propositions are also *facts of consciousness* and therefore agree with *experience*. – The difference between the assertions of immediate knowing and those of philosophy comes down simply to the fact that immediate knowing assumes an *exclusive* posture, or that it places itself in opposition to philosophizing. – The proposition, *Cogito, ergo sum*, around which, as can be said, all the interest of modern philosophy turns, was also articulated in the form of immediacy by its author. In order to take that proposition for a syllogism, one need not know much more about the nature of the syllogism than that 'ergo' occurs in a syllogism. Where would the *medius terminus* be? It is, after all, far more essential to a syllogism than the word 'ergo' is. If, however, to justify the name, one wants to call that combination in Descartes an *immediate* syllogism, then this superfluous form means nothing but a *connection of distinct* determinations, *that is mediated by nothing*. But then the connection of being with our representations, expressed by the proposition of immediate knowing, is no more and no less a syllogism. – From Mr Hotho's 1826 dissertation on the *Cartesian* philosophy, I extract the quotes in which Descartes himself declares explicitly that the proposition *cogito, ergo sum* is not a syllogism. The passages come from *Respons. ad sec. Obiect. [Meditationes]; De Methodo IV; Epistolae I, 118*. From the first passage I cite the more precise expressions. Descartes says first that the fact that we are thinking beings is a 'prima quaedam notio quae ex nullo syllogismo concluditur', ['a certain basic notion that is not deduced from any syllogism']; and he

continues: ‘neque cum quis dicit: ego cogito, ergo sum sive existo, *existentiam ex cogitatione per syllogismum* deducit’ [‘if somebody says: “I think, therefore I am or exist”, he does not deduce *concrete existence from the thought by means of a syllogism*’]. Since Descartes knows what is needed for a syllogism, he adds that if there were supposed to be a deduction by means of a syllogism in the case of that proposition, then there would have to be in addition the major premise: ‘illud omne, quod cogitat, est sive existit’ [‘everything that thinks is or exists’]. This last proposition, however, is one that could only be derived from that first one.

Descartes’s pronouncements about the proposition of the inseparability of myself as a thinking thing from being, that this connection is contained and given in the *simple intuition* of consciousness, that this connection is absolutely first, a principle, the most certain and the most evident, such that no scepticism can be imagined to be so enormous as to disallow it – these pronouncements are so telling and specific that the modern propositions of Jacobi and others about this immediate connection can count only as superfluous iterations of them.

§ 65

This standpoint is not content with having shown the insufficiency of *mediated* knowledge [*Wissen*], taken *in isolation*, for the truth. Its distinctiveness consists in supposing that *immediate* knowing has the truth for its content only taken *in isolation*, to the *exclusion* of mediation. – In those very exclusions the identified standpoint immediately reveals itself to be a relapse into metaphysical understanding, into its *either-or*, and thus in fact a relapse even into the relationship of an external mediation based on holding fast to the finite, i.e. to one-sided determinations – the determinations that the view falsely believes that it has placed itself above and beyond. But let us leave this point without developing it further. Exclusively immediate knowing is maintained merely as a *fact*, and here in the Introduction it only needs to be taken up in accordance with this external reflection. What matters in itself is the logical dimension of the opposition of immediacy and mediation. However, the above standpoint declines to consider the nature of the basic matter, i.e. the concept, because such a consideration leads to mediation and even to knowledge. The true consideration, that of the logical dimension, has to find its place within the science itself.

The entire second part of the *Logic*, i.e. the doctrine of *essence*, deals with the essential, self-positing unity of immediacy and mediation.

§ 66

That said, we continue to stand by the position that immediate knowing is to be taken as a *fact*. With this, however, the consideration is directed towards the field of *experience*, to a *psychological* phenomenon. – In this respect, it should be noted that it is one of the most common experiences that truths (which one knows very well to be the result of the most intricate and highly mediated considerations) present themselves *immediately* in the consciousness of someone conversant with such knowledge. Like everybody else who has been trained in a science, the mathematician immediately has at his fingertips solutions to which a very complicated analysis has led. Every educated person has immediately present in his or her knowing [*Wissen*] a host of universal viewpoints and principles that have resulted only from repeated reflection and long life experience. The facility we have achieved in any sphere of knowing [*Wissen*], also in fine art, in technical dexterity, consists precisely in having those sorts of familiarity, those kinds of activity *immediately* present in one's consciousness in the case at hand, indeed, even in an activity directed outwards and in one's limbs. – In all these cases the immediacy of knowing does not only not exclude its mediation; to the contrary, they are so connected that immediate knowing is even the product and result of knowing [*Wissen*] that has been mediated.

An equally trivial insight is the connection of immediate *concrete existence* with its mediation. Seeds, parents are an immediate concrete existence that also initiates existence with respect to their children, etc., who are the ones generated. But the seeds or parents, even though they are *immediate* in general as concretely existing beings, are likewise generated entities, and the children, etc., despite their concrete existence being mediated, are now immediate, because they *are*. The fact that I *am* in Berlin, this my *immediate* presence, is *mediated* by the journey undertaken to get here, etc.

§ 67

However, as far as *immediately knowing God*, *legality*, and the *ethical* is concerned (including the other determinations of instinct, implanted, innate

ideas, common sense, natural reason, etc.), and whatever form one gives to an original dimension of this sort, it is a universal experience that (even for *Platonic recollection*) *education*, development is an essential requirement for bringing to consciousness what is contained therein (Christian baptism itself, although a sacrament, contains the further obligation of a Christian education). This means that as much as religion, ethical life are instances of *belief*, *immediate* knowing, they are absolutely conditioned by a mediation that is called variously 'development', 'education', 'formation'.

In the case of the claims on behalf of *innate* ideas and the objections against them, an opposition of mutually exclusive determinations prevailed that was similar to the one under consideration here. The opposition was, namely, that between – as it may be expressed – the essentially *immediate* connection of certain general determinations with the *soul* and another sort of connection that would occur in an external manner mediated by *given* objects and representations. Against claims for *innate ideas*, the empirical objection was made that every human being would have to have these ideas, such as the principle of non-contradiction, in their consciousness and would have to know [*wissen*] them, since this proposition along with others of the same sort was counted among innate ideas. This objection can be said to involve a misunderstanding since the determinations that were meant, while innate, need not for that reason already possess the *form* of ideas or representations of something known. But against immediate knowing this objection is quite fitting, for this knowing maintains its determinations explicitly insofar as they are supposed to be in consciousness. – When the standpoint of immediate knowing admits that, for religious faith in particular, a development and a Christian or religious education are *necessary*, then it is mere arbitrariness to want to ignore this again when it comes to talking about believing. Or else, it is thoughtlessness not to know that to admit the necessity of an education is precisely to express the essentialness of mediation.

Addition. When it is said in the Platonic philosophy that we *recollect* the ideas, this means that the ideas are undeveloped [*an sich*] in human beings and not (as the Sophists maintained) something foreign to human beings that comes to them from the outside. Yet through this construal of knowing as *recollection* the development of what is *undeveloped* in human beings is not ruled out, and this development is nothing but mediation. It is the same with the *innate ideas* that come up in Descartes and the Scottish philosophers. They are equally to be regarded as being

initially present only *as undeveloped* and in the manner of a disposition in human beings.

§ 68

In the experiences mentioned, appeal is made to what shows itself to be *bound up* with immediate knowing. If this bond is taken at first to be only an *external* or empirical connection, it nonetheless proves to be essential and inseparable even for the empirical consideration, because it is invariable. But furthermore, when in accordance with experience this immediate knowing is taken on its own terms [*für sich*], insofar as it is knowledge [*Wissen*] of God and the divine, this sort of consciousness is generally described as an *elevation above* the sensory and finite as well as above the immediate desires and inclinations of the natural heart – an elevation that passes over into faith in God and the divine and terminates in them, so that this faith is an immediate knowing and believing [*Fürwahrhalten*] but nonetheless has taken the route of mediation as its presupposition and condition.

It has already been noted that the so-called proofs of the existence of God that start with finite being express this elevation. They are not the inventions of an artificial reflection but the spirit's own, necessary mediations, even if they do not find their complete and correct expression in the ordinary form of those proofs.

§ 69

The transition (designated in § 64) from the subjective idea to being constitutes the main interest from the standpoint of immediate knowing, and the claim is made that this transition is essentially an original connection, devoid of mediation. Without paying any regard to seemingly empirical bonds, this central point exhibits the mediation *in it* [i.e. in that standpoint] itself and, indeed, in that mediation's true determination, not as a mediation with and through something external, but as establishing itself in itself [*sich in sich selbst beschließend*].

§ 70

The claim made from this standpoint is that neither the *idea* as a merely *subjective* thought nor a being solely for itself is what is true [*das Wahre*].

The being that is solely for itself, a being that is not that of the idea, is the sensory, finite being of the world. In this way, then, it is immediately claimed that only the idea *mediated* by being and, conversely, only the being *mediated* by the idea *is the true*. The proposition of immediate knowing rightly seeks not the indeterminate, empty immediacy, the abstract being or pure unity for itself, but instead the unity of *the idea* with being. But it is thoughtless not to see that the unity of *distinct* determinations is not just a purely immediate, i.e. completely indeterminate and empty unity, but instead that precisely in that unity it is posited that one determination possesses truth only by virtue of being mediated by the other or, if you like, that each is mediated with the truth only through the other. – By this means, it is thus shown to be a *fact* that the determination of a mediation is contained in that immediacy itself and the *understanding*, in keeping with its own principles of immediate knowing, should have nothing to object to this *fact*. It is only the ordinary abstract understanding that regards the determinations of immediacy and mediation each for itself as absolute and supposes itself to have a *firm* distinction in them. Thus it generates for itself the insuperable difficulty of uniting them, a difficulty that, as has been shown, is not on hand in the fact and, to the same extent, disappears in the speculative concept.

§ 71

The one-sidedness of this standpoint brings with it determinations and consequences and, following the discussion of the foundation, the task remains of drawing attention to their main features. *First*, because the *fact of consciousness* rather than the *nature of the content* is set up as the criterion of truth, the basis for what is alleged to be true is *subjective* knowing [Wissen] and the *assurance* that I find a certain content in *my* consciousness. What I find in *my* consciousness is thereby inflated to mean what is found in *everyone's* consciousness and alleged to be the *nature* of consciousness itself.

In previous times, the *consensus gentium* [the consensus of peoples], to which Cicero already appealed, was listed among the so-called proofs of the existence of God. The *consensus gentium* is a considerable authority, and the transition from saying that some content is found in *everyone's* consciousness to saying that it is part of the nature of consciousness itself and a necessary part of it is not far-fetched. Inherent in this category of *universal* agreement was the

essential consciousness, not escaping even the most uncultivated human sensibility, that the consciousness of the individual is at the same time something *particular, contingent*. If the nature of this consciousness is not itself investigated, i.e. if the particular and the contingent are not set apart from it (a laborious operation of thinking things through and the only means of finding out what is in and of itself universal in it), then only *everyone's* agreement about a given content can ground a respectable prejudice to the effect that that content is part of the nature of consciousness itself. To be sure, thinking needs to know [*wissen*] that what shows itself to be *universally* on hand is *necessary*, and the *consensus communis* does not suffice for this. But even within the limits of the assumption that the universality of the fact would be a satisfactory proof, it has been abandoned as a proof of this belief, because of the experience that there are individuals and peoples in whom belief in God is not found.¹⁷ But nothing is quicker and more convenient than to have given the mere *assurance* that I find some content in my consciousness together with the certainty of its truth, and that therefore this certainty is inherent, not in me as a particular subject, but in the nature of spirit itself.

¹⁷ Finding atheism and belief in God to be more or less widespread in experience depends on whether one is content with the determination of a God *in general* or whether a more specific knowledge of God is required. In the Christian world, it will not be admitted that the Chinese and Indian idols, etc. are God, nor will it be admitted regarding the African fetishes or even the Greek gods that such idols are God. Whoever believes in them thus does not believe in God. If, by contrast, it is considered that inherent in such belief in idols is nonetheless *as such* [*an sich*] a belief in God *in general* (just as the genus is in the particular individual), then the veneration of idols also counts as a belief, not only in an idol, but in God. Conversely, the Athenians treated as atheists the poets and philosophers who took Zeus, etc. to be just clouds, etc. and who maintained the existence of a God *in general* only. – It does not depend on what is contained in an object *as such* [*an sich*], but what has been *extracted* from this for consciousness. If one lets the confusion of these determinations stand, any human intuition, even the most ordinary sensory one, would be religion. For, to be sure, in any such intuition, in every spiritual phenomenon [*in jedem Geistigem*] there is contained *as such* the principle that, if developed and purified, expands into religion. But it is one thing *to be capable* of religion (and the *as such* [*An sich*] above expresses capability and possibility), and another *to have* religion. – Thus in recent times travellers (such as Captains Ross [Sir John Ross, 1777–1856, *A Voyage of Discovery . . . for the Purpose of Exploring Baffin's Bay*] and Parry [Sir William Edward Parry, 1790–1855]) have found peoples (e.g. the Eskimos) who in their judgment had no religion, not even the sort of religion one might still find in the African *magicians* (the *goëtes* of Herodotus). To mention an entirely different aspect, an Englishman who passed the first months of the last jubilee year in Rome says in his travel reports about today's *Romans* that the ordinary people are bigoted, but that those who know how to read and write are one and all atheists. – Incidentally, the accusation of atheism has become rarer in recent times, primarily, it would seem, because the basic content and requirements of religion have been reduced to a minimum (see § 73).

§ 72

Second, from the fact that *immediate knowing* is supposed to be the criterion of truth, it follows that all kinds of superstition and idolatry are declared to be true, and the most unjust and the most unethical content of the will is justified. The cow, the monkey, or the Brahman or Lama do not count as God for the Indian thanks to so-called mediated knowledge, reasoning, and syllogism; instead he *believes* it. However, natural desires and inclinations of themselves infuse consciousness with their interests, and the immoral purposes are present in it in a completely immediate way. The good or evil character would express the *determinate being* [*das bestimmte Sein*] of the will, which may be recognized in the [corresponding] interests and purposes, and recognized, to be sure, in the most immediate way.

§ 73

Finally, immediate knowledge of God is supposed to extend only to the fact *that* God exists, not *what* God is, for the latter would be a process of knowing [*Erkenntnis*] and would lead to mediated knowledge [*Wissen*]. By this means, God as the object of religion is explicitly limited to *God in general*, to the indeterminate supersensory domain, and religion's content is reduced to a minimum.

If it were actually necessary to effect only this much, namely, preserving the belief that *there is a God* or even establishing such a belief, one would still have to be amazed at the poverty of the age, willing as it is to count the most impoverished religious knowledge as a gain and having reached the point of returning in its church to the altar that had long since existed in *Athens* – dedicated to the *unknown God*!

§ 74

The general nature of the *form of immediacy* remains to be indicated briefly. For it is this very form which, because it is *one-sided*, renders its content one-sided as well and thus *finite*. To the *universal* it gives the one-sidedness of an *abstraction*, so that God becomes an essence devoid of any determination. But God can be called spirit only insofar as he is known [*gewußt*] as *mediating himself* in his very self *with himself* [*sich in sich selbst mit sich vermittelnd*]. Only in this way is he *concrete*, alive, and spirit.

For this reason, *knowing* [*wissen*] God as spirit contains mediation within itself. – The form of immediacy confers on the *particular* the determination to *be*, or to relate *itself to itself*. The particular, however, is precisely the relating of itself to an *other* outside it. Through that form [of immediacy], the *finite* is posited as absolute. Since, as utterly abstract, it is *indifferent* to *any content* and for that very reason receptive to any content, it is just as capable of sanctioning an idolatrous and immoral content as the opposite. Only the insight into that content, namely that it is not self-sufficient but *mediated by an other*, relegates it to its finitude and untruth. Since the content carries mediation with it, this sort of insight is a way of knowing [*Wissen*] that contains mediation. A content can be recognized as genuinely true [*das Wahre*] only insofar as it is not mediated by an other, is not finite, and thus mediates itself with itself and so is mediation and immediate relation to itself in one. – The understanding that supposes it has freed itself from finite knowing [*Wissen*], from *the identity of the understanding* characteristic of metaphysics and the Enlightenment, immediately re-makes this *immediacy*, i.e. *the abstract relation to itself*, the abstract identity, into the principle and criterion of truth. *Abstract thinking* (the form of reflective metaphysics) and *abstract intuiting* (the form of immediate knowing) are one and the same.

Addition. Because it is firmly maintained in opposition to the form of mediation, the form of immediacy is accordingly one-sided, and this one-sidedness is communicated to any content that is merely reduced to this form. Immediacy is in general an abstract relation to itself and thus at the same time abstract identity, abstract universality. If what is universal in and of itself is taken only in the form of immediacy, it is then merely the abstract universal and, from this standpoint, God acquires the significance of a completely indeterminate essence. If one then still speaks of God as spirit, this is only an empty word, for in any case spirit as consciousness and self-consciousness is a process of distinguishing itself from itself and from an other, and thus at the same time a mediation.

§ 75

The *assessment* of this third position attributed to thinking in relation to truth could only be undertaken in a manner that this standpoint immediately refers to and acknowledges in itself. It has been shown to be *factually* [*faktisch*] wrong that there *is* an immediate knowing, a knowing that is without mediation, whether it be with an other or with itself in it [that knowing] itself. It has been likewise explained to be factually untrue that thinking progresses *exclusively* through determinations *mediated by something else*, i.e. finite and conditioned ones, and that this mediation does not

just as much sublate itself in the mediation. But the Logic and the *entire philosophy exemplify* the *fact* that there is a kind of knowing that proceeds neither in one-sided immediacy nor in one-sided mediation.

§ 76

If the principle of immediate knowing is considered in relation to the point of departure (the earlier so-called *naïve* metaphysics), the result of the comparison is the same principle's *return* to the beginning that this metaphysics made in modern times as the *Cartesian* philosophy. Both maintain:

1. The plain inseparability of *thinking* and the *being* of the thinker – *cogito ergo sum* is completely the same as [the fact] that the being, reality, concrete existence of the I are immediately revealed to me in consciousness (in *Principia philosophiae* I, 9, Descartes explicitly declares at once that by thinking he understands *consciousness* in general and as such), and that this inseparability is the absolutely *first* (not mediated, not proven) and *most certain* knowledge.
2. Similarly, the inseparability of the representation of *God* and his *concrete existence*, so that the latter is contained in the very representation of God and there is absolutely no such representation without the determination of concrete existence, which is thus a necessary and eternal one.¹⁸
3. As far as the equally immediate consciousness of the concrete existence of *external* things is concerned, this means nothing but *sensory*

¹⁸ Descartes, *Principia philosophiae* I, 15: 'Magis hoc (ens summe perfectum existere) *credet*, si attendat, nullius alterius rei ideam apud se inveniri, in qua eodem modo necessariam existentiam contineri animadvertat; intelliget, illam ideam exhibere veram et immutabilem naturam, quaeque *non potest non existere*, cum necessaria existentia *in ea contineatur*.' [He will be all the more convinced (namely, that a most perfect being exists), when he notices that necessary existence is contained in no other of his ideas in the same manner; for he will recognize that this idea only represents a true and unchangeable nature that must exist, because necessary existence *is contained in it*. – tr. A. Buchenau.] A subsequent phrase that sounds like a mediation or proof does not detract from this first foundation. – With Spinoza, it is quite the same, namely, that God's *essence*, i.e. the abstract representation, includes his existence. The first definition by Spinoza is that of *causa sui*, namely, that it is such a thing '*cuius essentia* involvit existentiam; sive id, cuius *natura non potest concipi, nisi existens*' [whose essence includes existence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing, *Ethics* I, def. 1, tr. (into German) C. Gebhardt]; – the inseparability of the concept from being is the fundamental determination and the presupposition. But which concept is it to which this inseparability from being pertains? Not that of *finite things*, for these are precisely those whose existence is a *contingent* and created one. – That for Spinoza the eleventh proposition (according to which God exists necessarily) is followed by a proof and, similarly, the twentieth that God's existence and his essence are one and the same, this is a superfluous formalism of giving proofs. God is substance, and the only one at that; substance, however, is *causa sui*, *therefore* God exists necessarily – this means nothing but that God is that whose concept and being are inseparable.

consciousness. That we possess such a consciousness is the slightest instance of knowledge. The only thing of interest here is knowing that this manner of immediately knowing the *being* of external things is deception and error, and that in the sensory realm as such there is no truth; rather, the *being* of these external things is purely contingent, transitory, a *semblance*, i.e. that they are essentially such as to have a concrete existence that is separable from their concept, their essence.

§ 77

The two standpoints are nonetheless different:

1. From these unproven presuppositions, assumed to be unprovable, the Cartesian philosophy moves *on to further*, developed knowledge and by doing so has provided the origin for the sciences of the new era. By contrast, the modern standpoint has arrived at the result, important in its own right [*für sich*] (§ 62), that knowing which proceeds along *finite* mediations knows only the finite and contains no truth, and it demands that the consciousness of God stand pat with the above-mentioned quite abstract faith.¹⁹
2. On the one hand, in this process the modern standpoint does not change anything in the method, introduced by Descartes, of ordinary scientific knowing, and it continues entirely in the same way to pursue those sciences of the empirical and the finite that originated from that method. On the other hand, however, this standpoint discards this method and in the process, since it has no inkling of any other method, it discards *all* methods for knowing [*Wissen*] what is, in terms of its basic content, infinite. As a result, it gives itself over to the wild arbitrariness of imaginings and assurances, to moral self-conceit and the arrogance of sentiments or to an opining and rationalizing lacking any measure, while declaring itself most vehemently against philosophy and philosophical claims. For philosophy permits neither a mere offering of assurances, nor imaginings, nor the arbitrary back-and-forth thinking characteristic of rationalization [*Räsonnement*].

¹⁹ By contrast, *Anselm* says: '*Negligentia mihi videtur, si postquam confirmati sumus in fide, non studemus, quod credimus, intelligere*' (*Tractat. Cur Deus homo* [I, 1 – 'so it seems to me to be negligence, if, after having become firm in our faith, we do not make an effort to understand what we believe', tr. (into German) F. S. Schmitt]). – Anselm thus has, in the concrete content of Christian doctrine, a much more difficult task for knowing, completely different from what the modern faith mentioned above contains.

§ 78

The *opposition* between a self-standing immediacy of content or knowing and a mediation that is equally self-standing but incompatible with the former must be set aside, for one thing because it is a mere *presupposition* and an arbitrary *assurance*. Similarly, all other presuppositions or prejudices must be surrendered at the entry to science, whether they be taken from representation or from thought. For it is in science that all such determinations must first be examined and the status of them and their oppositions recognized.

Scepticism, as a negative science applied to all forms of knowing, would present itself as an introduction in which the vacuousness [*Nichtigkeit*] of such presuppositions would be exposed. But this path would be not only unpleasant but also superfluous since the dialectical element is itself an essential moment of the affirmative science, as will be noted in a moment. Moreover, scepticism would have to find the finite forms in a merely empirical and unscientific way and take them up as a given. The demand for such a consummate scepticism is the same as the demand that science ought to be preceded by *doubting everything*, i.e. by the complete *absence of any presupposition*. This demand is actually fulfilled in the resolve to *engage in pure thinking* and through the freedom that abstracts from everything and grasps its pure abstraction, the simplicity of thinking.

MORE DETAILED CONCEPTION AND DIVISION OF THE LOGIC

§ 79

In terms of form, the logical domain has three sides: (α) *the abstract* side or that of the *understanding*, (β) *the dialectical* or *negatively rational* side, (γ) *the speculative* or *positively rational* side.

These three sides do not constitute three *parts* of logic, but are *moments of every properly logical content* [*Momente jedes Logisch-Reellen*], that is to say, of every concept or everything true in general. They can all be brought under the first moment, i.e. *that of the understanding*, and thus separated and kept apart, but in this way they are not considered in their truth. – Like the division, the

statement made here about the determinations of the logical is at this point only anticipatory and historical.

§ 80

(α) Thinking as *understanding* does not budge beyond the firm determinateness [of what is entertained] and its distinctness over against others. A limited abstraction of this sort counts for it as self-standing and [as having] being [*als für sich bestehend und seiend*].

Addition. When one speaks of thinking in general or more specifically of comprehending [*Begreifen*], one often tends to have in mind only the activity of the understanding. Now, admittedly, thinking is at first a thinking by way of understanding. However, it does not stand still with this, and the concept [*Begriff*] is not a mere determination of the understanding. – The understanding's activity generally consists in imparting the form of universality to its contents. More precisely, the universal posited by the understanding is an abstract universal which, as such, is maintained in opposition to the particular and by that very fact is determined at the same time to be itself a particular in turn. By relating to its objects by separating and abstracting [them], the understanding is the opposite of immediate intuition and sensation which as such deal with the concrete throughout and do not budge beyond it.

Those oft-repeated reproaches that generally tend to be made against thinking refer to this opposition between the understanding and sensation, reproaches that come down to saying that thinking is rigid and one-sided and, as a consequence, leads to pernicious and destructive results. Insofar as those reproaches are justified in terms of their contents, the response to them has to be first that it is not thinking in general, and more specifically rational thought, that is subject to them, but only the thinking of the understanding. Furthermore, the thinking that is performed merely by the understanding must above all be accorded its rights and its merits. These consist in the fact that neither in the theoretical nor in the practical field is it possible to arrive at any firmness and determinateness without the understanding. First, as far as knowing is concerned, it starts by apprehending the objects on hand in terms of their determinate differences. Thus, in the contemplation of nature, for instance, matters, forces, genera, etc. are distinguished and fixed as such [*für sich*] in this their isolation. Thinking proceeds here as understanding, and its principle is identity, the simple relation to itself. This identity then also conditions the further progression from one determination to another in knowing. Thus notably in mathematics magnitude is *the* determination along which one proceeds while leaving all others out. Accordingly, in geometry one compares figures with each other by emphasizing what is identical between them. In other domains of knowing, too, such as in jurisprudence, one proceeds in accordance with identity at first. Here, inferring one determination from another is nothing but a progression in accordance with the principle of identity. – In the practical sphere no less than in the theoretical sphere, the understanding is indispensable.

Action essentially requires character, and a person [*Mensch*] of character is a human being who understands and, as such, eyes determinate purposes and firmly pursues them. Someone who wants to do something great must know, as Goethe says, how to limit himself. By contrast, someone who wants everything in fact wants nothing and accomplishes nothing. There are a lot of interesting things in the world: Spanish poetry, chemistry, politics, music. All of that is very interesting, and one cannot blame anybody who takes an interest in them. However, if as an individual one wants to achieve something in a particular situation, one must stick to something determinate and not split up one's power in various directions. Similarly, in every profession the point is to pursue it with understanding. Thus, a judge, for instance, must adhere to the law, pass judgment in accordance with it, avoid being distracted by this and that, refuse to accept any excuses, and act without looking right or left. – Furthermore, the understanding generally represents an essential aspect of education [*Bildung*]. An educated person is not satisfied with nebulous and vague things; instead, he grasps the objects in their firm determinacy, whereas the uneducated vacillate back and forth with uncertainty, and it often takes a great deal of effort to reach an agreement with such a person about the topic of the discussion and bring him to keep his eyes unerringly on the specific point dealt with.

Now furthermore, and following our earlier examination, since the logical sphere in general is to be construed not merely as a subjective activity, but instead as absolutely universal and therefore at the same time as objective, this is to be applied to the understanding as the first form of the logical as well. The understanding is thus to be regarded as analogous to what one calls the *loving kindness* [*Güte*] of God, insofar as we understand by this that finite things *are*, that they have a standing. Thus, for instance, in nature one recognizes the loving kindness of God in that the diverse classes and genera of both animals and plants have been endowed with everything they need in order to preserve themselves and flourish. It is the same with human beings, too, with individuals and entire peoples, who also partly find what is necessary for their continued existence and development as something immediately on hand (such as, for instance, the climate, composition, and products of the land) and partly possess it in the form of disposition and talent. Construed in this way, the understanding shows itself in every domain of the objective [*gegenständlich*] world, and it belongs essentially to the perfection of an object that the principle of the understanding receive its due in it. Thus, for instance, the state is imperfect if a specific differentiation of estates and professions has not yet emerged in it, and if the political and governmental functions that differ in accordance with the concept have not yet been formed into specific organs in the same way as is the case in the developed animal organism with its different functions of sensation, movement, digestion, etc. – From the discussion so far we learn, furthermore, that even in such domains and spheres of activity that, according to the ordinary representation of things, seem to be furthest removed from the understanding, the latter must nonetheless not be absent, and that to the extent that this is the case, it must be regarded as a defect. This is notably true of art, religion, and philosophy. Thus, for instance, in art the understanding is

evident in the way that the forms of the beautiful, differing conceptually as they do, are also maintained and exhibited in terms of this difference of theirs. The same is true of individual works of art. Thus it is characteristic of the beauty and perfection of a drama that the characters of the different personae are portrayed in their purity and determinacy, and also that the several goals and interests that are at play are presented clearly and decisively. – Next, insofar as the domain of the religious is concerned, the advantage of Greek over Nordic mythology, for example (apart from the diversity otherwise of content and conception), consists essentially in that in the former the figures of the individual gods are developed to the point of having a sculpted determinacy [*plastische Bestimmtheit*], whereas in the latter they merge together in the fog of a murky indeterminacy. – Finally, given what has been discussed up to this point, the fact that philosophy also cannot dispense with the understanding scarcely needs any particular mention. To do philosophy, it is above all required that each thought be grasped in its full precision and that one is not content with vagueness and indeterminacy.

It also, however, tends to be said that the understanding must not go too far. This is correct, insofar as the point of view of the understanding [*das Verständige*] is not something ultimate but far more something finite instead, and, more specifically, something of the sort that, pushed to the extreme, turns over into its opposite. It is the way of youth to relish abstractions, whereas a person with the experience of life does not indulge in the abstract *either-or*, clinging instead to what is concrete.

§ 81

(β) The *dialectical* moment is the self-sublation of such finite determinations by themselves and their transition into their opposites.

1. The dialectical, when taken in isolation by the understanding, constitutes *scepticism*, particularly when displayed in scientific concepts. It contains mere negation as the result of the dialectical.
2. The dialectic is usually regarded as an extraneous art that arbitrarily generates confusion among certain concepts and a mere *semblance* of *contradictions* among them, such that not these determinations but instead this semblance is supposedly something null and void and, in contrast to it, what belongs to the understanding is supposedly what is true. Furthermore, the dialectic is often nothing more than a subjective seesaw system of back-and-forth rationalizing, where the basic content is missing and this paucity is concealed by the astuteness that generates such rationalizing. – In its distinctive determinateness, the dialectic is far more the proper, true nature of the determinations of the understanding, of things, and of the finite

in general. Reflexion is at first a process of going beyond the isolated determinacy, i.e. a relating of it, whereby it is brought into a relationship, despite its being maintained in its isolated validity. The dialectic is, by contrast, this *immanent* process of going beyond [such determinacy] wherein the one-sided and limited character of the determinations of the understanding presents itself as what it is, namely as their negation. Everything finite is this, the sublation of itself. Thus, the dialectical moment constitutes the moving soul of the scientific progression and is the principle through which alone *an immanent connection and necessity* enters into the content of science, just as in general the true, as opposed to an external, elevation above the finite resides in this principle.

Addition 1. Properly construing and recognizing the dialectical dimension is of the highest importance. It is in general the principle of all movement, all life, and all actual activity. The dialectical is equally the soul of all truly scientific knowing. In our ordinary consciousness, not stopping short at the abstract determinations of the understanding appears to be only fair, in keeping with the adage 'Live and let live', such that one thing is valid, but *so, too, is the other*. Looked at more closely, however, the finite is not limited merely from the outside but, by virtue of its own nature, sublates itself and changes into its opposite on account of itself. Thus, for example, it is said that human beings are mortal, and dying is then regarded as something that has its cause in extraneous circumstances only. According to this way of viewing the matter, a human being has two particular properties, that of being alive and *also* that of being mortal. The true way to construe the matter, however, is that life as such carries within itself the germ of death and that, generally speaking, the finite contradicts itself in itself and for that reason sublates itself. – Furthermore, the dialectic must not be confused with mere *sophistic* technique, the essence of which consists precisely in upholding one-sided and abstract determinations in isolation from one another, depending on the individual's respective interests and particular situation. Thus, for example, in regard to action, it is essential that I exist and have the means to exist. But if I then lay emphasis exclusively on this side, this principle of my wellbeing, and derive from it the conclusion that I am therefore allowed to steal or betray my fatherland, this is sophistry. – Similarly in my actions my subjective freedom is an essential principle in the sense that I am engaged with insight and conviction in what I do. However, if I reason on the basis of this principle *alone*, then this is likewise sophistry and all principles of ethical life are thereby thrown overboard. – The dialectic differs essentially from such behaviour, for it aims precisely at contemplating things as they are in and for themselves, and from this emerges the finitude of the one-sided determinations of the understanding. – Incidentally, the dialectic is nothing new in philosophy. Among the ancients, Plato is called the inventor of the dialectic, and rightfully so, insofar as in the Platonic philosophy the dialectic occurs for the first time in its free, scientific and thus at the same time objective form. With Socrates, the dialectical

still has a predominantly subjective shape, namely that of *irony*, in keeping with the general character of his philosophizing. Socrates directed his dialectic against the ordinary consciousness in general and then against the Sophists in particular. In his conversations, he would assume the guise of someone who wanted to be instructed further about the matter under discussion. In this context he raised all sorts of questions and led those with whom he conversed to the opposite of what at first had seemed to them to be right. When, for instance, the Sophists called themselves teachers, Socrates would, through a series of questions, get the sophist Protagoras to admit that all learning is merely recollection. – In Plato's rigorous, scientific dialogues, by means of the dialectical treatment, he shows the finitude of all fixed determinations of the understanding in general. Thus, in the *Parmenides*, for instance, he derives the One from the Many and, in spite of this, shows how the Many is just this, namely to determine itself as the One. Plato treated the dialectic in this grand manner. – In more recent times, it was primarily Kant who brought back to memory the dialectic and reinstated it in its position of honour. He did this by elaborating the so-called antinomies of reason that we have already discussed (§ 48). In their case, in no way is it a matter of merely going back and forth between reasons and of a merely subjective activity. It is rather a matter of showing how each abstract determination of the understanding, taken merely in the way it presents itself, immediately turns over into its opposite. – Now however much the understanding is prone to resist the dialectic, the latter is by no means to be regarded as present only for the philosophical consciousness. Instead, what is in play here is already found in all other forms of consciousness and is found universally in experience. Everything that surrounds us can be viewed as an example of the dialectic. We know that all finite things, instead of being something fixed and ultimate, are really changeable and perishable, and this is nothing but the dialectic of the finite. By virtue of this dialectic, the same thing (as in itself the other of itself) is driven beyond what it immediately is and turns over into its opposite. Whereas earlier (§ 80) it was said the understanding should be regarded as what is contained in the representation of God's *goodness*, so now it should be noted in the same (objective) sense about the dialectic that its principle corresponds to the representation of God's *power*. We say that all things (i.e. everything finite as such) come to judgment, and with this we have a view of the dialectic as the universal, irresistible power which nothing, however secure and firm it may feel itself to be, can withstand. To be sure, the depth of the divine being, God's concept, is not yet exhausted by this determination. Still, it forms an essential moment in all religious consciousness. – Furthermore, the dialectic also establishes itself in all the particular domains and formations of the natural and the spiritual world as, for instance, in the movement of the celestial bodies. A planet stands now in this location, but it is in itself such as to be in a different location as well, and it brings its otherness into existence by undergoing movement. Similarly, the physical elements prove to be dialectical, and the metereological process is the manifestation of their dialectic. It is the same principle that forms the basis of all other processes in nature and through which nature is at the same time

driven beyond itself. As far as the occurrence of the dialectic in the spiritual world, and more specifically in the legal and the ethical domain is concerned, one need only be reminded of how, as follows from experience universally, the extremes of a state or an action tend to change into their opposite, a dialectic that proverbs acknowledge in multiple ways. Thus, for instance, it is said that *summum ius summa iniuria* ['utmost justice is the utmost injustice'] as a means of expressing that abstract justice, driven to the extreme, changes over into injustice. So, too, it is well known how in the area of politics the extremes of anarchy and despotism tend to provoke one another reciprocally. We find consciousness of the dialectic in the ethical domain, as far as its individual form is concerned, in the well-known proverbs: 'Pride goes before a fall', 'Too much wit outwits itself', etc. – Even feelings, bodily as well as mental, possess a dialectic of their own. It is well known how the extremes of pain and joy turn into one another; the heart filled with joy relieves itself through tears, and in some circumstances the most poignant melancholy tends to announce itself with a smile.

Addition 2. Scepticism must not be regarded merely as a doctrine of doubt. Rather, it is absolutely certain of the matter it is concerned with, namely the nothingness of all things finite. The person who is still doubting continues to harbour the hope that his doubt can be lifted and that one or the other of the determinate points between which he is vacillating will turn out to be firm and true. By contrast, scepticism proper is the complete despair of anything solid in understanding and the attitude that results from it is an unshakeable mind that rests in itself. This is the high-minded ancient scepticism as we find it presented notably in Sextus Empiricus and as it developed as a complement to the dogmatic systems of the Stoics and Epicureans during the later Roman period. We must not confuse this high-minded ancient scepticism with the modern scepticism already mentioned earlier (§ 39) that partly preceded and partly developed out of the Critical philosophy. This modern scepticism consists simply in denying the truth and certainty of the supersensory domain and in designating the sensory and what is on hand in immediate sensation as what we have to cling to.

Incidentally, if scepticism is often regarded even today as an irresistible enemy of all positive knowing [*Wissen*] whatsoever and thus also of philosophy, insofar as the latter deals with positive knowledge [*Erkenntnis*], then it needs to be said in response that it is in fact only the finite, abstract thinking of the understanding that has to fear scepticism and cannot withstand it, whereas philosophy, by contrast, contains the sceptical within itself as one of its moments, namely as the dialectical. But then philosophy does not rest with the merely negative result of the dialectical as is the case with scepticism. The latter misjudges its result by clinging to it as a mere (i.e. abstract) negation. Because the dialectic has the negative as a result, the negative is equally positive, precisely as a result, for it contains within itself that from which it results, containing the latter as something it has sublated, and is not without what it has sublated. This, however, is the fundamental determination of the third form of the logical, namely of the *speculative* or positively rational.

§ 82

(γ) The *speculative* or the *positively rational* grasps the unity of the determinations in their opposition, the *affirmative* that is contained in their dissolution and their passing over into something else.

1. The dialectic has a *positive* result, because it has a *determinate content* or because its result is in truth not an *empty, abstract nothing*, but instead the negation of *definite determinations* that are contained in the result precisely because it is not an *immediate nothing*, but a result instead. 2. Therefore, although it is something thought, even abstract, the rational is at the same time something *concrete*, because it is not a *simple, formal* unity, but a *unity of distinct determinations*. For this reason, philosophy does not deal at all with mere abstractions or formal thoughts, but exclusively with concrete thoughts. 3. The mere *logic of the understanding* is contained in the speculative logic and can instantly be extracted from it. Nothing more is needed for this than to remove the dialectical and the rational from it. In this way, it becomes what the *ordinary logic* is, namely a *historical record* of diverse, juxtaposed determinations of thought that in their finitude count as something infinite.

Addition. In terms of *content*, the rational is so far from being the possession merely of philosophy that it must be said instead that it is available to all human beings at whichever level of education and mental development they may find themselves. In this sense, human beings have, since ancient times, rightly been designated as rational beings [*Wesen*]. The general empirical manner in which the rational is known [*wissen*] is at first that of prejudice and presupposition and, according to our previous discussion (§ 45), the nature of the rational is generally to be something unconditioned which for that reason contains its determinateness within itself. In this sense, human beings know about the rational first and foremost insofar as they know of God and know him as determined by himself alone. Following that, a citizen's knowledge of his fatherland and its laws is similarly a knowledge of what is rational, insofar as this counts for him as something unconditioned and at the same time as something universal to which he has to submit his individual will. In the same sense, even the knowledge and volition of a child is already rational, insofar as it knows and embraces the will of its parents.

Furthermore, the *speculative* is nothing else than the rational (the positively rational, that is) insofar as it is *thought*. In ordinary life, the expression *speculation* tends to be used in a very vague and at the same time subordinate sense, as, for instance, when one speaks of speculations concerning marriage or commerce. What is understood by such 'speculation', then, is merely the fact that, on the one hand, one should go beyond what is immediately on hand and, on the other, what

forms the content of such speculations is initially merely something subjective but should not remain so but instead be realized or translated into objectivity.

What was remarked earlier about the idea holds likewise for this ordinary use of language concerning speculation, to which may be added the further remark that those who count themselves among the more educated also often speak of speculation as something *merely* subjective. They say, namely, that a certain construal of natural or spiritual conditions and circumstances may be very well and good when taken in a merely speculative manner, but that experience does not agree with it and nothing like it can be countenanced in actuality. Against this position it must be said that, as far as its true meaning is concerned, the speculative is neither provisionally nor even definitively something merely subjective. Instead, it is explicitly what contains those oppositions at which the understanding stops short (thus including the opposition of the subjective and the objective) and contains them as something sublated within itself and precisely by this means proves itself to be concrete and a totality. For this reason, a speculative content can also not be expressed in a one-sided sentence. If we say, for instance, 'the absolute is the unity of the subjective and the objective', this is, to be sure, correct but one-sided insofar as only the *unity* is expressed here and emphasis is placed on it alone, whereas in fact the subjective and the objective are indeed not only identical but also distinct.

As regards the significance of the speculative, it bears mentioning here that the same thing is to be understood by it as formerly used to be called the *mystical*, especially when referring to religious consciousness and its content. When one speaks of the mystical today, it is normally taken to be synonymous with the mysterious and the incomprehensible, and the mysterious and incomprehensible are then – depending on the respective educational background and mindset – regarded by some as something genuine and true, but by others as belonging to superstition and deception. In this regard, it should be noted first that the mystical is indeed something mysterious, but only for the understanding, simply because abstract identity is the principle of the understanding, whereas the mystical (taken as synonymous with the speculative) is the concrete unity of those determinations that count as true for the understanding only in their separation and opposition. So when those who recognize the mystical as the true are likewise happy to call it the absolutely mysterious and leave it at that, they express that, as far as they are concerned, thinking likewise has the significance solely of positing abstract identities, and that in order to attain to the truth one must renounce thinking or, as also tends to be said, that one must take reason captive. But as we have seen, the abstract thinking of the understanding is so far from being something firm and ultimate that, to the contrary, it turns out to be constantly sublating itself and changing over into its opposite, whereas the rational as such consists precisely in containing the opposites as ideal moments within itself. Thus, everything rational is to be called at the same time 'mystical', by which, however, nothing more or less is said than that it goes beyond the understanding and in no way that it is to be regarded generally as inaccessible to thinking and as incomprehensible.

§ 83

The Logic falls into three parts:

1. The doctrine of being.
2. The doctrine of essence.
3. The doctrine of the concept and the idea.

That is, into the doctrine of thought

1. In its *immediacy* – the concept-in-itself,
2. In its *reflection* and *mediation* – the *being-for-itself* and the *shining* [*Schein*] of the concept.
3. In its *having returned back into itself* and in its developed being-with-itself – the concept *in-and-for-itself*.

Addition. The division of the Logic here given, as well as the entire discussion of thinking up to this point, is to be regarded as a mere anticipation, and the justification or proof of it can only result from the completed treatment of thinking itself. For in philosophy, demonstrating [*beweisen*] is equivalent to showing how the object makes itself – through and out of itself – into what it is. – The relationship in which the above-mentioned three major stages of thought or of the logical idea stand to each other is generally to be construed in such a way that only the *concept* is what is true [*das Wahre*] and, more precisely, the truth of *being* and of *essence*, both of which, held fast for themselves in their isolation, are to be regarded at the same time as untrue: *being* because it is at first only what is *immediate*, and *essence* because it is at first only what is *mediated*. One might raise the question, then, why, if this is so, we begin with the untrue and not right away with the true. The answer to this is that the truth has to *prove* [*bewähren*] itself precisely to be the truth, and here, within the logical sphere, the proof consists in the concept demonstrating itself to be mediated through and with itself and thereby also as what is truly immediate. The aforementioned relationship of the three stages of the logical idea displays its concrete and real shape in the way that we know God (who is the truth) in his truth, i.e. as absolute spirit, only insofar as we recognize at the same time that the world created by him, i.e. nature and finite spirit, are, in their difference from God, untrue.

First subdivision of the Logic: The doctrine of being

§ 84

Being is the concept only as it is *in itself*. Its determinations have *being*, i.e. in their difference they are *others* opposite one another, and their further determination (the form of the dialectical) is a *process of passing over into an other*. This progressive determination is at once a matter of *setting forth* and thereby unfolding the concept, as it is *in itself*, and at the same time the process of being *entering into itself*, a deepening of it within itself. The explication of the concept in the sphere of being becomes the totality of being, precisely to the extent that the immediacy of being or the form of being as such is sublated in the process.

§ 85

Being itself as well as the subsequent determinations, not only those of being but also the logical determinations in general, can be regarded as the definitions of the absolute, as *metaphysical definitions of God*. More specifically, only the first simple determination within a given sphere, and then the third, which is the return from a difference to the simple relation to itself, can always be regarded in this way. For, to define God metaphysically means to express his nature in *thoughts* as such. But logic comprises all thoughts as they are while still in the form of thoughts. By contrast, the *second* determinations, making up a given sphere in its *difference* [*Differenz*], are the definitions of the *finite*. But if the form of definitions were used, this would entail envisaging a representational substratum. For even *the absolute*, what is supposed to express God in the sense and in the form of thought, remains merely an *intended* thought, i.e. a substratum that as such is indeterminate, relative to its predicate as the determinate and actual expression in thought. Because the thought, the basic matter solely at issue here, is contained only in the predicate, the form of a proposition, like that

subject, is something completely superfluous (cf. § 31 and the chapter on the judgment below [§§ 166 *et seq.*]).

Addition. Each sphere of the logical idea proves to be a totality of determinations and a presentation of the absolute, and so too does being, which includes within itself the three stages of *quality*, *quantity*, and *measure*. *Quality* is, to begin with, the determinacy that is identical with being in the sense that something ceases to be what it is when it loses its quality. By contrast, *quantity* is the determinacy that is external to being and indifferent in relation to it. Thus, for instance, a house remains what it is, whether it is bigger or smaller, and red remains red, be it brighter or darker. The third stage of being, *measure*: is the unity of the first two, qualitative quantity. All things have their measure: that is, they are quantitatively determined, and their being either this big or bigger is indifferent to them. At the same time, however, this indifference has its limits, and if those limits are overstepped by an additional more or less, things cease to be what they were. From measure there then results the progression to the second main sphere of the idea, namely *essence*.

The three forms of being mentioned here are also the poorest, that is to say, the most abstract, just because they are the first. The immediate sensory consciousness, insofar as its behaviour involves thinking, is chiefly limited to the abstract determinations of quality and quantity. This sensory consciousness is usually regarded as the most concrete and thus also the richest. It is so, however, only in terms of its material, whereas it is in fact the poorest and most abstract consciousness with respect to the content of its thoughts.

A. QUALITY

a. *Being*

§ 86

Pure being constitutes the beginning, because it is pure thought as well as the undetermined, simple immediate, and the first beginning cannot be anything mediated and further determined.

All the doubts and reminders that might be raised against beginning the science with abstract, empty *being* take care of themselves through the simple consciousness of what is implied by the nature of a beginning. Being can be determined as 'I = I', as the *absolute indifference* or *identity*, etc. In the need to begin with something absolutely *certain*, i.e. the certainty of oneself, or with a definition or intuition of the *absolutely true*, these and other similar forms can be regarded as what must be the first. However, insofar as *mediation* is

already present within each of these forms, they are not truly the first. Mediation means to have gone from a first to a second and to emerge from something differentiated [*Hervorgehen aus Unterschiedenen*]. If 'I = I' or even the intellectual intuition is genuinely taken as simply the first, then in this pure immediacy it is nothing else but *being*, just as, conversely, pure being, insofar as it is no longer this abstract being, but being that contains mediation within itself, is pure thinking or intuiting.

When *being* is expressed as a predicate of the absolute, this provides the first definition of the latter: *the absolute is being*. This is (in the thought) the absolutely first, most abstract, and most impoverished definition. It is the definition of the *Eleatics*, but at the same time also the familiar one that *God is the sum total* [*Inbegriff*] *of all realities*. The point is that one is supposed to abstract from the limitedness inherent in every reality, so that God is nothing but the *real* in all reality, the *supremely real*. Insofar as reality already contains a reflection, this idea is expressed more immediately in what Jacobi says about the God of Spinoza, namely that he is the *principium of being in all existence*.

Addition 1. When beginning with thinking, we have nothing but thought in the sheer absence of any determination of it [*in seiner reinen Bestimmungslosigkeit*], since for a determination one and an other are required. In the beginning, however, we have as yet no other. The indeterminate [*Bestimmungslose*], as we have it here, is the immediate, not the mediated absence of determination, not the sublation of all determinacy, but the immediacy of the absence of determination, the absence of determination prior to all determinacy, the indeterminate as the very first. But this is what we call 'being'. It is not to be sensed, intuited, or represented; instead it is the pure thought, and as such it constitutes the beginning. Essence, too, is something indeterminate, but the indeterminate that, having gone through the mediation, contains within itself the determinacy as already sublated.

Addition 2. We find the various stages of the logical idea in the history of philosophy, in the shape of philosophical systems that have successively emerged, each of which has a particular definition of the absolute as its foundation. Now just as the unfolding of the logical idea proves to be a progression from the abstract to the concrete, so, too, the earliest systems in the history of philosophy are the most abstract and thus at the same time also the most impoverished. The relationship of the earlier to the later philosophical systems is, generally speaking, the same as the relationship of the earlier to the later stages of the logical idea and, to be sure, in such a way that the later ones contain within them the earlier ones as sublated. This is the true meaning of the refutation of one philosophical system by another, and more specifically of the earlier by the later system, a common occurrence in the history of philosophy that is so often misunderstood.

When the refutation of a philosophy is discussed, this tends at first to be taken merely in an abstractly negative sense, such that the refuted philosophy has no validity whatsoever anymore, that it has been discarded and done away with. If this were so, the study of the history of philosophy would have to be regarded as an altogether sad business, since study of it teaches how all philosophical systems that have appeared over time have been refuted. However, just as one must admit that all philosophies have been refuted, it must also be maintained that no philosophy has ever been refuted or is even capable of being refuted. The latter is the case in two connections, on the one hand, inasmuch as every philosophy worthy of the name has the idea as such for its content, and on the other, inasmuch as each philosophical system has to be regarded as the presentation of a particular moment, or a particular stage in the process of the development of the idea. Hence, refuting a philosophy merely means that its limitation has been transcended and its particular principle downgraded to an ideal moment. Accordingly, as far as its essential content is concerned, the history of philosophy deals not with the past, but with what is eternal and absolutely present, and its result must be compared not to a gallery of errors of the human spirit, but rather to a pantheon of divine figures [*Göttergestalten*]. These divine figures are the various stages of the idea as they emerged successively in the dialectical development. Now it is left to the history of philosophy to demonstrate in greater detail the extent to which the unfolding of its contents that takes place in it agrees with the dialectical unfolding of the pure, logical Idea, on the one hand, and diverges from it, on the other. All that needs to be mentioned here is that the beginning of the logic is the same as the beginning of the history of philosophy proper. We find this beginning in the Eleatic philosophy, and more specifically in that of Parmenides who construes the absolute as being when he says that ‘only being is, and nothing is not’. This is to be regarded as the proper beginning of philosophy because philosophy is, generally speaking, a process of knowing by way of thinking [*denkendes Erkennen*], but here for the first time pure thinking has been taken hold of and become an object [*gegenständlich*] for itself.

Human beings have thought from the beginning, to be sure, since they distinguish themselves from animals only through thinking. And yet it took thousands of years before it came to grasping thought in its purity and at the same time as absolutely objective. The Eleatics are famous for being bold thinkers. However, this abstract admiration is often accompanied by the remark that these philosophers nonetheless went too far by recognizing being alone as the true and denying the truth of everything else that forms the object of our consciousness. Now it is indeed perfectly correct to say that one must not stop at mere being. Still, it is thoughtless to regard the remaining contents of our consciousness as existing so to speak *alongside* and *outside* of being or as something that is there merely *in addition* to it. By contrast, the true relationship here is that being as such is not something fixed and ultimate but, rather, that it changes over dialectically into its opposite, which, likewise taken immediately, is *nothing*. Thus it remains true in the end that being is the first pure thought, and that whatever else may be made the beginning (whether the ‘ $I = I$ ’, the absolute indifference, or God himself),

it is at first only something represented and not something thought, and that in terms of its thought contents it is only being after all.

§ 87

Now this pure being is a *pure abstraction* and thus the *absolutely negative* which, when likewise taken immediately, is *nothing*.

1. The second definition of the absolute, namely that it is *nothing*, followed from this. This conclusion is, indeed, entailed by saying that the thing-in-itself is the undetermined, utterly devoid of form and therefore of content. So, too, if it is said that God *is simply* the *supreme being* and nothing else, then he is being declared, as such, to be the very same negativity. The *nothing* that *Buddhists* make the principle of everything and the ultimate end and goal of everything is the same abstraction. – 2. When the opposition is expressed in this immediate way as one of *being* and *nothing*, it seems all too evident that it is null and void for one not to try to fix [upon some determinate sense of] being and to save it from this transition. In this respect, thinking the matter over is bound to fall prey to looking for a fixed determination for being through which it would be differentiated from nothing. For instance, one may take it to be what persists in all change, the infinitely determinable *matter* and so forth, or again, without thinking it through, to be any given *individual* concrete existence [*einzelne Existenz*], the next best sensory or spiritual entity. However, none of these further and more concrete determinations leave being as *pure being*, as it is here immediately in the beginning. It is *nothing* only in and because of this pure indeterminacy, something *inexpressible*; its difference from nothing is a mere *opinion* [*eine bloße Meinung*]. – We are concerned here exclusively with the consciousness of these beginnings, namely that they are nothing but these empty abstractions and that each of them is as empty as the other. The *drive* to find in being or in both a fixed meaning is the very *necessity* that expands [*weiterführt*] being and nothing and gives them a true, i.e. concrete meaning. This development is the logical elaboration and the progression presented in what follows. The process of *thinking them over* that *finds* deeper determinations for them is the logical thinking by means of which these determinations produce themselves, not in a contingent but in

a necessary manner. – Each subsequent meaning they receive is therefore to be regarded only as a *more specific determination* and a *truer definition of the absolute*. Such a definition will then no longer be an empty abstraction like being and nothing, but rather something concrete in which both being and nothing are moments. – The highest form of nothingness for itself would be *freedom*, but freedom is the negativity that deepens itself within itself to the point of the utmost intensity and is itself affirmation, and absolute affirmation at that.

Addition. Being and nothing are at first only *supposed* to be distinguished, i.e. their difference is at first only *in itself*, but not yet *posited*. If we talk about a difference at all, then we have *two* and in each case a determination not to be found in the one applies to the other. But being is absolutely devoid of all determination, and nothing is the very same lack of determination. The difference between these two is therefore only intended – the totally abstract difference that is at the same time no difference. In all other cases of distinguishing we always also have something common that subsumes the distinct items under it. For instance, when we speak of two different genera, then the genus is what is common to both. Similarly, we say there are natural and spiritual essences. Here, the essence is something that belongs to both. In the case of being and nothing, however, the difference is bottomless, and precisely for that reason there is none, for both determinations represent the same bottomlessness. Suppose one wanted to say, for instance, that both are after all thoughts, and hence thought is common to both. One would then overlook the fact that being is not a specific, determinate thought but rather the as yet entirely undetermined thought, and for that very reason indistinguishable from nothing. – Again, being may also be represented as absolutely rich and nothing as absolutely poor. But when we regard the entire world and say of it that everything is and nothing further, we leave all determinateness aside and instead of absolute fullness we only retain absolute emptiness. The same comment can be made about its application to the definition of God as mere being. Standing over and against this definition with equal justification is the Buddhist definition that God is nothingness, with its implication that a human being becomes God through self-annihilation.

§ 88

Conversely, *nothing*, as this immediate, self-same [category], is likewise *the same as being*. The truth of being as well as of nothing is therefore the *unity* of both; this unity is *becoming*.

1. The proposition '*Being and nothing are the same*' appears to be such a paradoxical proposition for the *representation* or the understanding that one perhaps believes that it is not meant seriously. And indeed it is one of the hardest thoughts that thinking imposes upon itself, for

being and nothing are the opposite in its complete *immediacy*, that is to say, without there already being *posited* in one of them a determination that would contain its relation to the other. And yet, they *do contain* this determination, as has been demonstrated in the previous section, namely, the determination that is the same in both. The deduction of their *unity* is thus entirely *analytical*, just as in general the whole progression in philosophizing (insofar as it is a methodical, i.e. a *necessary* progression) is nothing other than merely the *positing* of what is already contained in a concept. – But as correct as the unity of being and nothing is, so it is *also* correct that *they are absolutely different*, i.e. that the one is *not* what the other is. However, since at this point the difference has not yet become determinate (for being and nothing are still what is immediate), how it bears on them is something *that cannot be said*, it is something merely *meant* [*die bloße Meinung*].

2. It does not require a great deal of wit to ridicule the proposition that being and nothing are the same, or rather to bring up absurdities with the false assurance that they are the consequences and applications of it; for example, that according to that proposition it would be the same whether my house, my assets, the air we breathe, this city, the sun, right, spirit, God *are* or *not*. For one thing, in examples such as these, *particular purposes* or the *utility* something has for me are surreptitiously introduced, and it is asked whether it makes no difference *to me*, if the useful thing exists or not. Philosophy is indeed just the doctrine that is meant to liberate man from an infinite number of finite purposes and goals, and to make him indifferent to them such that it is indeed all the same to him whether such things are or not. But generally speaking, as soon as we are talking about some *contents*, a connection is thereby posited with *other* concretely existing things, purposes, etc. that are *presupposed* as valid, and it is then made dependent on *such presuppositions*, whether the being or not-being of a *determinate content* is *the same* or *not*. A difference *full of content* is surreptitiously substituted for the empty difference between being and nothing. – But for another thing, purposes that are in themselves essential, absolute concrete existences [*absolute Existenzen*] and ideas are placed under the determination of being or not-being. Such concrete objects are something quite different from mere *beings* or *not-beings*; poor abstractions such as being and nothing (which are the poorest of all just because they are the determinations only of the beginning) are completely inadequate to the nature of those objects; a genuine content has long since transcended these abstractions themselves and their opposition. – In general, if something concrete is surreptitiously substituted for being and nothing, the usual

thing happens to this thoughtlessness, namely it entertains and talks about something quite different from what is at issue. And what is at issue here is merely abstract being and nothing.

3. It can easily be said that one does not *comprehend* the unity of being and nothing. The concept of it, however, was stated in the preceding sections, and it is nothing over and above what has been stated. Comprehending it means nothing other than apprehending this. But by 'comprehending', something broader than the concept proper is understood. A more manifold, richer consciousness, a representation is demanded, with the result that a concept of this sort is put forward as a concrete case with which thinking in its ordinary routine would be more familiar. To the extent that the inability to comprehend expresses only that one is unaccustomed to holding onto abstract thoughts without any sensory input and to grasping speculative sentences, there is nothing further to be said than this, namely that philosophical knowledge [*Wissen*] is indeed of a different sort from the kind of knowledge one is accustomed to in ordinary life, as it also is from what reigns in other sciences. If, however, the inability to comprehend means only that one is unable to *represent* this unity of being and nothing to oneself, then this is in fact so little the case that to the contrary everybody possesses infinitely many representations of this unity. That one does not possess such representations can mean only that one fails to recognize the concept under discussion in any of those representations and that one does not know that they are examples of it. The example that comes most readily to mind is that of *becoming*. Everybody has a representation of becoming and will equally admit that it is *one* representation; further, that when one analyses it the determination of *being*, but also that of its absolute other, *nothing*, is contained therein; furthermore, that these two determinations exist undivided in this *one* representation, so that becoming is thereby the unity of being and nothing. – Another example equally ready to hand is that of the *beginning*. The basic matter *is not yet* in its beginning, but the beginning is not merely its *nothing* either; rather *being* is already contained therein. The beginning is itself also a becoming, but it already expresses the relation to the further progression. – If one wanted to follow the usual procedure of the sciences, one might start the Logic with the representation of the beginning thought in its purity, i.e. with the beginning qua beginning, and to analyse this representation. Perhaps one would then more easily accept as the result of this analysis that being and nothing show themselves as undivided in a single thought [*in Einem ungetrennt*].

4. In addition, we must further note that the expressions 'Being and nothing are *the same*' or '*the unity* of being and nothing' and similarly all other such *unities* (e.g. that of subject and object [*Objekt*], and so on) are rightly objectionable. The awkwardness and incorrectness lies in the fact that the *unity* is emphasized, and while the difference [*Verschiedenheit*] is indeed contained in it (because the unity posited is one of being and nothing, for instance), this difference is not simultaneously stated and acknowledged. Instead, it seems that one is merely abstracting illegitimately from it and not taking it into consideration. Indeed, a speculative determination cannot properly be expressed in the form of such a proposition: unity is supposed to be articulated *in* the difference that is simultaneously *present* and *posited*. As their unity, *becoming* is the true expression of the result of being and nothing. It is not only the *unity* of being and nothing, but the *unrest* in itself – the unity that as relation to itself is not merely immobile, but is within itself against itself on account of the difference of being and nothing contained in it. – *Existence* [*Dasein*] is, by contrast, this *unity*, or becoming in this form of unity; this is why existence is *one-sided* and *finite*. It is as if the opposition had disappeared. It is contained in the unity only *in itself*, but not *posited* in the unity.
5. Standing in contrast to the proposition that being is the transitioning into nothing and nothing the transitioning into being (this being the principle of *becoming*) is the proposition that '*Nothing comes from nothing*' or 'something can only come from something', i.e. the proposition of the eternity of matter, pantheism. The ancients made the simple reflection that the proposition 'something comes from something' or 'nothing comes from nothing' does indeed sublate becoming. For that out of which something comes to be and that which comes to be are one and the same. There is nothing here but a proposition of the identity of the abstract understanding. It must strike one as curious, however, to see the propositions 'nothing comes from nothing' or 'something comes only from something' put forward quite naïvely even in our times with neither any awareness that they are the foundation of pantheism, nor any familiarity with the fact that the ancients considered these propositions quite exhaustively.

Addition. Becoming is the first concrete thought and thus the first concept, whereas being and nothing are empty abstractions. When we talk about the concept of being, the latter can consist only in becoming, since as being it is the empty nothing and as such the empty being. In being, then, we have nothing and in it being. This being, however, that persists in being with itself in nothing is

becoming. In the unity of becoming, the difference [*Unterschied*] must not be left out, for without it one would return to abstract being. Becoming is merely the positedness [*das Gesetzsein*] of what being truly is.

One very often hears the claim that thinking is opposed to being. In the face of such an affirmation, however, it should first be asked what we are to understand by being. When we take up being as it is determined by reflection, the only thing we can say about it is that it is the absolutely identical and affirmative. If we then consider thinking, it cannot escape us that at the very least it is likewise absolutely identical to itself. To both being and thinking, then, the same determination applies. This identity of being and thinking must, however, not be taken in a concrete sense, and hence one is not to say that a stone that has being is the same as a thinking human being. Something concrete is quite different from the abstract determination as such. But in the case of being, there is no talk of anything concrete, for being is precisely what is entirely abstract. Accordingly, the question concerning the being of God who is in himself infinitely concrete, is also of little interest.

As the first concrete determination of thought, becoming is also at the same time the first true determination of thought. In the history of philosophy, it is the system of Heraclitus that corresponds to this stage of the logical Idea. When Heraclitus says 'Everything is in flux' (πάντα ῥεῖ), becoming is thereby pronounced to be the fundamental determination of all there is, whereas the Eleatics by contrast, as mentioned earlier, construed being alone – rigid being, devoid of any process – as true. With reference to the principle of the Eleatics Democritus later comments: 'Being is no more than not-being' (οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸ ὄν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἐστί). He thereby expresses the negativity of abstract being and its identity, posited in becoming, with a nothing that is equally untenable in its abstraction. – At the same time we have here an example of the true refutation of one philosophical system by another, a refutation that consists precisely in exhibiting the dialectic of the principle of the refuted philosophy and in downgrading this principle to an ideal moment in a higher, more concrete form of the idea. – But furthermore, becoming, too, is in and for itself as yet a supremely impoverished determination that has to further deepen and fulfil itself in itself. We have such a deepening of becoming within itself in, for instance, *life*. The latter is a becoming, but its concept is not exhausted by this. We find becoming in an even higher form in *spirit*. Spirit is likewise a becoming, but a more intensive, richer one than the merely logical becoming. The moments whose unity is spirit are not the mere abstractions of being and nothing, but the system of the logical idea and nature.

b. Existence

§ 89

The being in becoming, as one with nothing, and the nothing that is likewise one with being are only vanishing [moments]. Due to its inner

contradiction, becoming collapses into the unity in which both are sublated. Its *result* is therefore *existence*.

In connection with this initial example, we are once and for all to be reminded of what was stated in § 82 and in the Remark. What alone can ground [*begründen*] a progression and a development in knowing [*Wissen*] is to hold on to the results in their truth. Suppose a contradiction is pointed up in any sort of object or concept (and there is simply nothing anywhere in which a contradiction, i.e. opposite determinations, could not and would not have to be pointed out, for the understanding's process of abstracting violently holds on to *one* determinacy, while striving to obscure and eliminate the consciousness of the other determinacy that is contained in it). When such a contradiction is recognized, the conclusion is usually drawn that '*Therefore*, the object is *nothing*', just as *Zeno* first demonstrated with regard to movement, namely that it contradicts itself and that therefore it does not *exist*, or as the ancients recognized the two kinds of becoming, namely *coming-to-be* and *passing away*, to be untrue determinations by stating that the *One*, i.e. the absolute, neither comes into being nor passes away. This kind of dialectic thus merely stops at the negative side of the result and abstracts from what is at the same time actually on hand, namely a *determinate* result, here a pure *nothing*, but a *nothing* that contains *being* and likewise a being that contains nothing within itself. Thus, existence is (1) the unity of being and nothing in which the immediacy of these determinations has disappeared and with it the contradiction in their relationship, – a unity in which they are now only moments. (2) Since the result is the sublated contradiction, it is in the form of a *simple unity* with itself or itself as *being*, but a being with negation or determinateness. It is becoming posited in the *form* of *one* of its moments, that of being.

Addition. It is also contained in our representation that when there is becoming, something comes out of it and that therefore becoming has a result. But there then arises the question how becoming manages not to remain mere becoming but to have a result. The answer to this question derives from what above has shown itself to us as becoming. For becoming contains within itself being and nothing, and in such a way that these two change over into one another absolutely and mutually sublimate each other. In this way, becoming proves itself to be what is restless through and through, yet unable to preserve itself in this abstract restlessness. For because being and nothing disappear in becoming and its concept consists in this alone, becoming is thus itself something vanishing,

like a fire that extinguishes itself by consuming its material. The result of this process, however, is not empty nothing but being that is identical with negation – something we call *existence* and whose meaning for now proves to be this: to have *become*.

§ 90

(α) *Existence* [*Dasein*] is being with a *determinacy* that is immediate or that simply is, i.e. *quality*. Existence qua reflected into itself in this its determinacy is *an existent* [*Daseiendes*], *something* [*Etwas*]. – The categories that develop in connection with existence need to be specified in a summary fashion only.

Addition. Generally speaking, *quality* is the determinacy that is identical with being and immediate, in contrast with *quantity* that is to be considered next. Quantity is, to be sure, likewise a determinacy of being, but one that is no longer identical with it. Quantity is instead a determination indifferent to being and external to it. – Something is what it is by virtue of its quality, and when it loses its quality it stops being what it is. Moreover, quality is essentially a category merely of the finite. For this reason, it has its proper place only in nature, not in the spiritual world. Thus, for instance, in nature the so-called simple types of matter, e.g. oxygen, nitrogen, etc., are to be considered concretely existing qualities [*existierende Qualitäten*]. By contrast, in the sphere of spirit quality occurs only in a subordinate manner and not in such a way that any given determinate shape of spirit would be exhaustively characterized by means of it. For instance, when we consider subjective spirit, the object of psychology, it is indeed possible to say that the logical meaning of what one calls *character* is that of quality. But this is not to be understood as though character were a determinacy that penetrates the soul and is immediately identical with it as is the case with the simple types of matter in nature mentioned above. Quality, however, shows itself in a more determinate manner even in connection with spirit to the extent that the latter is in an unfree, sick condition. This is notoriously the case with the state of passion and with passion that has escalated to madness. It can fittingly be said of a mad person whose consciousness is completely pervaded by jealousy, fear, etc., that his consciousness is determined as a quality.

§ 91

As a determinacy that simply is [*seiende Bestimmtheit*] over against the *negation* that is contained in it but distinct from it, quality is *reality* [*Realität*]. Negation, no longer as the abstract nothing but as an existent and *something*, is only the form in the latter, it is as *being-other*. Because this being-other is its own determination, but at first distinct from it, quality is

being-for-another – a breadth of existence, of something. The *being* of quality as such, as opposed to this relation to something other, is *being-in-itself*.

Addition. The foundation for every determinacy is negation (*omnis determinatio est negatio* [all determination is negation], as Spinoza says). Thoughtless opining regards determinate individual things alone as positive and fastens on to them under the form of being. Nothing much is accomplished, however, with mere being, for as we saw earlier it is what is absolutely empty and insubstantial. Incidentally, this much is correct concerning the confusion mentioned here of existence as being that is determined [*Dasein als bestimmtes Sein*] with abstract being, namely that the moment of negation is, indeed, still contained merely in a veiled state, as it were, in existence, while the moment of negation emerges freely only in being-for-itself and there assumes its rightful position. – If now we consider existence also as a determinacy that simply is, we then have what is understood by *reality*. In this way one talks of the reality of a plan, for instance, or of an intention, and understands by it that such things are no longer merely something inner, subjective, but instead have emerged into existence. In the same sense, the body may then be called the reality of the soul, and this particular right the reality of freedom or, quite generally, the world may be called the reality of the divine concept. In addition, however, there is also talk of reality in still another sense, where what is understood by it is that something behaves in accordance with its essential determination or its concept. This happens, for instance, when it is said ‘this is a real [*reell*] occupation’ or ‘this is a real [*reell*] human being’. In these cases it is a matter not of the immediate, external existence, but instead of the agreement of an existent [*eines Daseienden*] with its concept. So construed, however, reality is not that different from ideality, which we will initially come to know as being-for-itself.

§ 92

(β) The being that is fastened onto as distinct from determinacy, i.e. the *being-in-itself*, would be merely the empty abstraction of being. In existence, determinacy is one with being, and at the same time posited as negation, i.e. *limit*, *barrier*. Being other is thus not something indifferent outside of it but instead its own moment. By virtue of its quality, *something* is, first, *finite* and, second, *alterable*, so that finitude and alterability belong to its being.

Addition. In existence, negation is still immediately identical with being, and it is negation that we call a *limit*. Something is what it is only *within* its limit and *due to* its limit. Hence one must not regard the limit as something that is merely external to existence; rather it permeates existence as a whole. The construal of the limit as a merely external determination of existence is due to the conflation of the quantitative with the qualitative limit. At issue here is for now the qualitative limit. If we consider, for instance, a plot of land that is three acres, this is then

its quantitative limit. In addition, however, this plot of land is also a meadow and not a forest or a pond, and this is its qualitative limit. – Insofar as human beings want to be actual, they must exist [*muß dasein*] and to this end they must limit themselves. Those who are too dismayed at the finite do not accomplish anything actual, but instead remain trapped in the abstract and fade away into themselves.

When we now consider more closely what we have here in the case of the limit, we find that it contains in itself a contradiction and thus proves itself to be dialectical. For, on the one hand, the limit constitutes the reality of existence, but on the other hand it is the negation of the latter. Moreover, however, as the negation of [the] something the limit is not an altogether abstract nothing, but a nothing that is [*ein seiendes Nichts*] or what we call an other. When thinking of the something, the [concept of the] other immediately comes to mind, and we know that there is not only something but also an other as well. But the other is not just something that we simply find such that the something could also be thought without it. Rather, something is *in* itself the other of itself, and in the other the limit of the something becomes objective for it. When we now ask about the distinction between the something and the other, it is evident that both are the same, an identity that is expressed in Latin by the designation of both as *aliud – aliud*. The other opposed to the something is itself a something, and accordingly we say ‘something else’ [*etwas Anderes*: lit. ‘something other’]. So, too, the first something is in turn itself an other vis-à-vis the other that is likewise determined as a something. When we say ‘something else’, we at first imagine that the something, taken by itself, is only something and the determination of being an other accrues to it on account of an external consideration alone. Thus, for instance, we think that the moon, which is something other than the sun, could also exist even if the sun did not. In fact, however, the moon (as a something) has its other in and of itself [*an ihm selbst*] and this constitutes its finitude. Plato says: ‘God made the world from the nature of the One and the Other (τοῦ ἑτέρου); these he brought together and out of them fashioned a third which is of the nature of the One and the Other’.²⁰ – With this, the nature of the finite is being expressed as such, which qua something does not stand over against the other indifferently, but is in itself the other of itself and in this way alters itself. In the alteration the inner contradiction shows itself with which existence is intrinsically beset and which drives it beyond itself. Existence at first appears to the representation as simply positive and at the same time as remaining tranquilly within its boundary. To be sure, we also know that all finite things (and such is existence) are subject to alteration, but this alterability of existence appears to the representation as a mere possibility, the realization of which is not grounded in itself. In fact, however, it is part of the concept of existence to alter itself, and alteration is merely the manifestation of what existence is in itself. Living things die, and they do so simply because they carry the germ of death in themselves.

²⁰ Translators’ note: see the two elements of the indivisible and the divisible in *Timaeus* 34–5.

§ 93

Something becomes an other, but the other is itself a something, hence it likewise becomes an other, and so on and so forth ad infinitum.

§ 94

This *infinity* is the *bad* or *negative* infinity in that it is nothing but the negation of the finite, which, however, re-emerges afresh and thus is just as much not sublated. In other words, this infinity expresses only that the finite *ought* to be sublated. The progression to infinity stops short at expressing the contradiction that is contained in the finite, namely that it is *something* as well as its *other* and that it is the perpetual continuance of the alternation of these determinations each of which brings about the other.

Addition. When we let the moments of existence, namely something and the other, fall apart, we have the following: something becomes an other, and this other is itself a something that then as such likewise alters itself, and so on ad infinitum. Reflection believes it has reached something very lofty here, indeed even the loftiest [thought]. This progression to the infinite is, however, not the true infinite. The latter consists, rather, in being with itself in its other, or, put in terms of a process, to come to itself in its other. It is of great importance to grasp the concept of the true infinity properly and not merely to stop short at the bad infinity of the infinite progression. When the infinity of space and time is under discussion, it is at first the infinite progression that one tends to focus on. Thus one says, for instance, 'this time', 'now', and this boundary is then continuously surpassed, backwards and forwards. It is the same with space about whose infinity edifying astronomers put forth many empty declamations. It is then also typically asserted that thinking must give up when it starts to contemplate this infinity. This much is indeed correct, namely that we eventually abandon proceeding further and further in such contemplation, but on account of the tediousness, not the sublimity, of the task. Engaging in the contemplation of this infinite progression is tedious because the same thing is incessantly repeated here. A limit is posited, it is surpassed, then again a limit, and so on endlessly. So there is nothing here but a superficial alternation that remains stuck in the finite. If it is thought that through stepping forth into that infinity one liberates oneself from the finite, then this is indeed merely the liberation of fleeing. The one who flees, however, is not yet free, for in fleeing he is still dependent on what he flees. If it is then further said that the infinite cannot be reached, then this is quite right, but only because the determination of being something abstractly negative is read into it. Philosophy does not waste its time with such empty and merely transcendent [*Jenseitigen*] things. What philosophy deals with is always something concrete and absolutely present. – The task of philosophy has occasionally been framed by saying that it

must answer the question of how the infinite resolves to move beyond itself. To this question, which is predicated on the fixed opposition between the infinite and the finite, one can only answer that this opposition is something untrue and that the infinite is indeed eternally beyond itself and also eternally not beyond itself. – Moreover, when we say the infinite is the *not*-finite, we have thereby indeed already uttered the truth, for since the finite is the first negative, the not-finite is the negative of negation, i.e. the negation that is identical with itself and thus at the same time true affirmation.

The infinity of reflection here under discussion is merely the attempt to reach the true infinity; [in other words, it is] a hapless hybrid. Generally speaking, this is the standpoint of philosophy that has been maintained and upheld [*geltend gemacht*] in Germany in recent times. The finite here merely *ought* to be sublated, and the infinite ought to be not merely something negative, but something positive as well. This ought always carries within itself the impotence of recognizing something as legitimate that nonetheless cannot maintain and uphold itself. With respect to ethics, the Kantian and the Fichtean philosophy have stopped short at this standpoint of the ought. The perennial approximation to the law of reason is the utmost that can be achieved on this path. The immortality of the soul was then also based on this postulate.

§ 95

(γ) What is in fact the case is that something becomes an other and the other generally becomes something other. In the relation to an other, something is itself already an other opposite it. Hence, since that into which it makes the transition is entirely the same as that which makes the transition (both have no further determination than this, which is one and the same, the determination to be an *other*), something comes together *only with itself* in its transition into something other, and this relation to itself in its transition and in the other is the *true infinity*. Or, considered negatively, what is altered [*verändert*] is the *other* [*das Andere*]; it becomes the *other* of the *other*. In this way, being – but as negation of negation – is re-established and is *being-for-itself*.

The dualism that makes the opposition of the finite and the infinite insuperable fails to make the simple observation that in this manner the infinite is at once only *one of the two*, that it is thus made into merely one *particular* for which the finite is the other particular. Such an infinite that is only a particular, *next to* the finite which makes up its boundary and limit, is *not* what it is supposed to be, not the infinite, but merely *finite*. – In such a relationship, where the finite is *hither*, the infinite *thither*, the one placed *on this side*, the

other *on the other side*, the finite is accorded the *same honour* of subsisting and being self-standing [*Bestehen und Selbständigkeit*] that the infinite is. The being of the finite is made into an absolute being. In such a dualism, it stands firmly for itself. If it were touched by the infinite, so to speak, it would be annihilated. But it is supposed to be untouchable by the infinite. There is supposedly an abyss, an insurmountable chasm between the two, with the infinite *remaining* absolutely on the other side and the finite on this side. While one may believe that the assertion that the finite persists steadfastly opposite the infinite gets one beyond all metaphysics, it in fact stands squarely on the grounds of the most ordinary metaphysics of the understanding. The same thing happens here which is expressed by the infinite progression. At one moment, it is admitted that the finite *does not exist in and for itself*, that it is *not* a self-standing actuality, not an *absolute* being, that it is only transitory. The *next* moment, this is immediately forgotten and the finite is represented as existing entirely over against the infinite, absolutely separated from it and exempted from annihilation, as self-standing and persisting for itself. – While such thinking believes that it is elevating itself to the infinite in this manner, the opposite happens to it – it arrives at an infinite that is merely finite, and, instead of leaving the finite behind, permanently holds onto it, making it into an absolute.

Based on these considerations concerning the emptiness [*Nichtigkeit*] of the understanding's opposition of the finite and the infinite (one may benefit from comparing Plato's *Philebus* with it), it is easy to lapse into the expression that therefore the infinite and the finite *are one*, that the true, i.e. true infinity, is determined and declared to be the *unity* of the infinite and the finite. It is true that phrasing the matter in such a way is in some sense correct, but it is equally skewed and false (as was mentioned earlier with regard to the *unity* of being and nothing). Furthermore, it invites the just reproach of having finitized the infinite, the reproach of a finite infinite. For in the above phrasing the finite appears as if untouched, i.e. it is not explicitly stated that the finite has been *sublated*. – Or, when one reflects that the finite, in being posited as one with the infinite, could not indeed remain what it was outside this unity, and that it would suffer at least some modification in its determination (just as an alkali combined with acid loses some of its properties), then the same thing should happen to the infinite, which, as the

negative, should have to be blunted by the other equally in turn. And this is indeed what happens to the abstract, one-sided infinite of the understanding. However, the true infinite does not behave merely like the one-sided acid, but instead preserves itself. Negation of negation is not a neutralization. The infinite is the affirmative, and only the finite is what is sublated.

In being-for-itself, the determination of *ideality* has made its entry. *Existence*, construed at first only in terms of its being or its affirmative nature, has *reality* (§ 91). Thus, too, finitude is at first determined in terms of reality. But the truth of the finite is rather its *ideality*. Likewise, the infinite of the understanding, which posited *next to* the finite is itself merely one of the two finites, is something untrue, something ideal [*ideelles*]. This ideality of the finite is the chief proposition of philosophy, and every true philosophy is for that reason *idealism*. The only thing that matters is not to take as the infinite what is at once made into something particular and finite in the determination of it. – This is why we have drawn attention to this distinction here at some length. The fundamental concept of philosophy, the true infinite, depends on this. This distinction is taken care of by the very simple, and therefore perhaps unremarkable, but irrefutable reflections contained in this section.

c. *Being-for-itself*

§ 96

(α) Being-for-itself as relation to itself is *immediacy*, and as the relation of the negative to itself it is a being that is for itself [*Fürsichseiendes*], the *One* – what is in itself devoid of any distinction, hence, what *excludes* the *other* from itself [*das Andere aus sich Ausschließende*].

Addition. Being-for-itself is perfected quality and as such contains being and existence as its ideal moments within itself. Qua *being*, being-for-itself is the simple relation to itself, and qua existence it is determined. This determinacy, however, is no longer the finite determinacy of something in its difference from the other, but the infinite determinacy that contains in itself the difference as sublated.

We have the most obvious example of being-for-itself in the *I*. To begin with, qua existing we know ourselves to be distinct from other existents and related to them. Furthermore, we know this expanse of existence to be at the same time

sharpened, so to speak, into the simple form of being-for-itself. Saying 'I' is the expression of an infinite and at the same time a negative relation to oneself. It can be said that human beings distinguish themselves from animals and hence from nature generally by knowing themselves [in each case] as an I. At the same time, by this means, one expresses that natural things do not attain [the status of] free being-for-itself. Instead, by being confined to existence they are forever merely being-for-another. – In addition, being-for-itself must be construed as *ideality* generally, whereas existence, by contrast, was previously designated as *reality*. *Reality* and *ideality* are often regarded as a pair of determinations standing over and against one another, each with the same self-standing character, and it is accordingly said that apart from reality there is *also* an ideality. However, ideality is not something that there is apart from and alongside reality. Rather, the concept of ideality consists expressly in being the *truth* of reality; that is to say, reality posited as what it is in itself proves to be ideality. Hence, one must not believe that one has accorded ideality the proper honour if one merely concedes that reality alone does not suffice and that one must also acknowledge an ideality apart from reality. An ideality such as this, along with or even above reality, would indeed be only an empty name. Ideality has content only by being the ideality of something. This something, however, is not merely an indeterminate this or that, but an existence that is determined as reality and which possesses no truth, if taken in isolation. It is not without reason that the difference between nature and spirit has been construed in such a way that the former should be traced back to reality and the latter to ideality as their fundamental determinations. Now nature is indeed not something fixed and finished for itself, something that could therefore subsist without spirit. Rather, nature achieves its end and truth only in spirit, and spirit for its part is similarly not just an abstract beyond of nature; rather, it *exists* and validates itself as spirit only insofar as it contains in itself nature as sublated. We are to be reminded here of the dual meaning of our German expression '*aufheben*' [to sublate]. By '*aufheben*' we understand on the one hand something like clearing out of the way or negating, and we accordingly speak of a law, for instance, or an institution as having been '*aufgehoben*'. On the other hand, however, *aufheben* also means something like *preserving*, and in this sense we say that something is well taken care of [*gut aufgehoben*, taken out of harm's way and put in a safe place]. This dual sense in linguistic usage according to which one and the same word has a negative as well as a positive meaning must not be regarded as a coincidence or even made the object of reproach to the language as causing confusion. Rather, in it we should recognize the speculative spirit of our language that transcends the either/or of mere understanding.

§ 97

(β) The relationship of the negative to itself is a *negative* relationship, hence the distinguishing of the One from itself, the *repulsion* of the One, i.e. a

positing of *many Ones*. In accordance with the immediacy of that which is a being-for-itself, these many are *beings*, and the repulsion of the Ones that have being becomes in this respect their repulsion *against each other* insofar as they are on hand, or a mutual *excluding*.

Addition. When we talk about the One, the first thing that tends to occur to us is the Many. The question then arises where the Many come from. In representational thought no answer is to be found to this question, since it considers the Many to be immediately on hand, and since the One counts simply as one among the Many. In terms of the concept, however, the One constitutes the presupposition for the Many, and it is inherent in the thought of the One to posit itself as the Many. For unlike being, the One as being-for-itself as such does not lack relatedness; rather, it is a relation just as existence is. However, it does not relate as something does to an other but instead, as the unity of something and an other, it is relation-to-itself, and, furthermore, this relation is negative relation. With this, the One proves to be what is absolutely incompatible with itself, what repels itself from itself, and what it posits itself as is the *Many*. We may designate this side in the process of being-for-itself with the figurative expression *repulsion*. One speaks of repulsion first and foremost in considering matter, and one understands by it that, as a Many in each one of these many Ones, matter behaves by excluding all the others. Moreover, the process of repulsion must not be construed in such a way that the One does the *repelling* and the Many are *what is repelled*. Rather, as was mentioned earlier, the One is precisely just this, namely to exclude itself from itself and to posit itself as the Many. Each of the Many, however, is itself a One and, because it behaves as such, this ubiquitous repulsion changes over into its opposite, namely *attraction*.

§ 98

(γ) Of the *Many*, however, one is what the others are; each is a One as well as one of the Many. They are therefore one and the same. Or, considered in itself, repulsion as the negative *behaviour* of the many Ones to each other is equally essentially their *relation* to each other. And since those to which the One relates in its repelling are Ones, it relates to itself in them. Thus repulsion is equally essentially *attraction*, and the excluding One or being-for-itself sublates itself. The qualitative determinacy that has reached in the One its determinacy in-and-for-itself has thus passed over into determinacy qua *sublated*, i.e. into being as *quantity*.

The *atomistic* philosophy is the standpoint on which the absolute determines itself as being-for-itself, as One, and as many Ones. Repulsion, which shows itself in the concept of the One, has also

been assumed to be its fundamental force. Not, however, attraction but *coincidence*, i.e. something thoughtless, is supposed to bring them together. If one is fixated on the One as One, its coming together with others must indeed be regarded as something quite extrinsic. – The *void* that is adopted as the other principle in addition to the atoms is repulsion itself, represented as the *existing* nothing in between the atoms. – The more recent atomism (and physics continues to hold on to this principle) has given up atoms insofar as it focuses on small particles, the molecules. In this, it has drawn closer to sensory representation and abandoned thoughtful determination. – Moreover, insofar as a force of attraction is set alongside the force of repulsion, the opposition has, it is true, been made *complete*, and the discovery of this so-called force of nature has been touted a lot. But the relationship of both to one another that constitutes what is concrete and true about them would need to be rescued from the state of cloudy confusion in which it has been left even in Kant's *Metaphysical Foundations of the Natural Sciences*. – In recent times, the atomistic approach has become even more important in the *political* than in the physical sphere. According to this view, the will of the *individual* as such is the principle of the state. The attractive force is the particularity of the needs and inclinations, and the universal, the state itself, is [based on] the external relationship of the contract.

Addition 1. The atomistic philosophy constitutes an essential stage in the historical development of the idea, and the principle of this philosophy generally is being-for-itself in the shape of the Many. If today the atomistic doctrine is held in high esteem even by those physicists who shun metaphysics, one should remember here that one does not escape metaphysics, and more specifically the reduction of nature to thoughts, by throwing oneself into the arms of atomism. For the atom is indeed itself a thought, and hence the interpretation of matter as consisting of atoms is a metaphysical interpretation. It is true that Newton explicitly warned physics to guard against metaphysics. But to his credit it must be said that he did not himself act by any means in accordance with this warning. Indeed, only the animals are pure, unadulterated physicists, since they do not think, whereas a human being as a thinking being is a born metaphysician. The only thing that matters, therefore, is whether the metaphysics one applies is of the right kind, namely whether, instead of the concrete logical idea, it is one-sided thought determinations fixed by the understanding that one holds on to and that form the basis of our theoretical as well as practical activities. This is the objection that applies to the philosophy of atomism. As is often the case even today, the ancient atomists regarded everything as a Many, and coincidence was then supposed to

bring together the atoms that floated around in the void. But the relationship of the Many to each other is by no means merely accidental; this relationship has its ground instead, as previously mentioned, in the Many themselves. It is Kant who deserves the credit for having brought the way matter is construed to completion, by regarding it as the unity of repulsion and attraction. What this view gets right is the fact that attraction must indeed be recognized as the other moment contained in the concept of being-for-itself and that, as a consequence, attraction belongs to matter just as essentially as repulsion does. But this so-called dynamic construction of matter suffers from the defect that repulsion and attraction are postulated as being on hand without further ado and are not deduced. From this deduction the how and why of their merely alleged unity would have followed. By the way, Kant explicitly insisted that one must regard matter not as on hand for itself and equipped in passing, so to speak, with the two forces mentioned here, but as obtaining instead only in their unity, and for a time German physicists went along with this pure dynamics. In more recent times, and against the warning of their colleague, the late Kästner, the majority of these physicists has found it more comfortable to return to the atomistic standpoint and to regard matter as consisting of infinitely small things called 'atoms'. These atoms are then supposed to be set in relation to each other due to the play of the attractive, repulsive, and whatever other forces that attach to them. This is then likewise a metaphysics and one has, to be sure, quite sufficient reason to guard against it, given the lack of thought in it.

Addition 2. The transition from quality to quantity indicated in the preceding section is not to be found in our ordinary consciousness. The latter takes quality and quantity to be a pair of self-standing determinations existing side by side and it is accordingly said that things are not only qualitatively but *also* quantitatively determined. Where these determinations come from and how they relate to each other, these questions are not raised here. But quantity is nothing other than quality sublated, and it is the dialectic of quality studied here by virtue of which this sublation comes to pass. At first, we had *being*, and becoming resulted as its truth. This formed the transition to existence whose truth we saw to be alteration. Alteration, in turn, showed itself in its result to be being-for-itself that was exempt from the relation to an other and from its transition into it. And, finally, being-for-itself proved to be the sublating of itself, and thus of quality in general, in the totality of its moments on both sides of its process. Now this sublated quality is neither an abstract nothing nor the equally abstract and indeterminate being, but rather being that is indifferent to determinacy. It is this shape of being that also surfaces in our ordinary representation as *quantity*. Accordingly, we consider things first from the viewpoint of their quality, and the latter we take to be the determinacy that is identical with the being of the thing. As we proceed next to considering quantity, it offers us at once the representation of an indifferent, external determinacy in the sense that, even if a thing's quantity changes and it becomes greater or smaller, it still remains what it is.

B. QUANTITY

a. *Pure quantity*

§ 99

Quantity is pure being in which determinacy is posited as no longer one with being itself, but as *sublated* or *indifferent*.

1. The expression *magnitude* is unsuitable for quantity, insofar as it signifies first and foremost *determinate* quantity. 2. Mathematics usually defines magnitude as what can be *increased* or *decreased*. As faulty as this definition is (inasmuch as it repeats what is to be defined [*Definitum*]), it still conveys this much, namely, that the determination of magnitude is such that it is posited as *alterable* and *indifferent*. Hence, apart from any alteration of it, e.g. an increase in extension or intensity, the basic matter, for instance, a house or red, does not cease to be a house or red. 3. The absolute is pure quantity. This standpoint generally coincides with determining the absolute as *matter* in which the form is indeed on hand, but as an indifferent determination. Quantity also constitutes the basic determination of the absolute, when it is grasped in such a way that in it (as the absolutely indifferent) every distinction is only quantitative. – Pure space, time, etc. may equally be taken as examples of quantity, insofar as one is supposed to construe the real as an *indifferent* filler of space or time.

Addition. At first glance mathematics' customary definition of magnitude as what can be increased or decreased seems to be more illuminating and plausible than the conceptual determination contained in the above section. Looked at more closely, however, it contains in the form of a presupposition and representation the same [determination] as the concept of quantity that was the result of the logical development. For, if it is said of magnitude that its concept consists in being able to be increased or decreased, then it is stated precisely with this that magnitude (or, more correctly, quantity, as distinct from quality) is a determination of the sort that the specific basic matter behaves indifferently towards its alteration. As for the earlier criticized deficiency in the customary definition of quantity, it consists more specifically in the notion that increasing and decreasing mean nothing other than determining a magnitude in different ways. But if this were the case, quantity would then be merely something alterable in general. But quality is alterable, too, and the previously mentioned difference between quantity and quality is then

expressed as a matter of increasing *or* decreasing. This implies that the basic matter remains what it is, regardless of the direction in which the determination of magnitude is changed. – At this point, it should also be noted that in philosophy we are not at all concerned merely with correct definitions, much less with merely plausible definitions, i.e. definitions whose correctness is immediately obvious to representational consciousness. Rather, we are concerned with definitions that have a *proven record*, i.e. definitions whose content has not merely been taken up as something found, but one that is known to be grounded in free thinking and thus at the same time known to be grounded in itself. This finds its application in the current case in such a way that, however correct and immediately obvious mathematics' customary definition of quantity might be, this would still not satisfy the requirement of knowing to what extent this particular thought is grounded in universal thinking and therefore necessary. There is a further consideration that is linked to this point here. When quantity is taken up directly from representation without being mediated by thinking, it easily happens that quantity is overestimated with respect to its scope and even raised to an absolute category. This is indeed the case when only those sciences whose objects can be submitted to a mathematical calculus are recognized as *exact* sciences. Here that bad metaphysics mentioned earlier (§ 98 Addition) shows itself again, replacing the concrete idea with one-sided and abstract determinations of the understanding. Our knowing would indeed be in bad shape, if, renouncing exact knowledge, we generally had to be satisfied merely with a vague representation of such objects as freedom, law, the ethical life, even God himself, merely because they cannot be measured and calculated or expressed in a mathematical formula; and if, when it comes to the more specific or particular details of those matters, it would then be left to each individual's whim to make of it what they want. – It is immediately obvious what kind of pernicious practical consequences result from such a view. Looked at more closely, the exclusively mathematical standpoint mentioned here (for which *quantity*, this specific stage of the logical idea, becomes identical with the logical idea itself) is none other than *materialism*. Indeed, this is fully confirmed in the history of scientific consciousness, notably in France since the middle of the last century. The abstractness of matter is precisely this: that the form is indeed on hand in it, but merely as an indifferent and external determination. – Incidentally, the remarks added here would be greatly misunderstood, if one intended to construe them as detracting in any way from the dignity of mathematics, or as if by designating quantitative determination as merely external and indifferent, they were supposed to encourage lethargy and superficiality, as though one could set the quantitative determinations aside or at least that it was thus not necessary to take them seriously. Quantity is in any case a stage of the idea to which justice must be done, initially as a logical category, but then also in the objective [*gegenständlich*] world, the natural as well as the spiritual world. But here the difference between them also becomes at once apparent, namely that the determination of magnitude is not of equal importance with respect to the objects of the natural and the spiritual world. For in nature, taken as the idea in the form of otherness and at the same time of being-outside-itself, quantity is – precisely for that reason – of greater

importance than in the world of spirit, which is the world of free interiority. To be sure, we consider the spiritual content from the quantitative viewpoint as well, but it is immediately obvious that when we contemplate God as a trinity the number *three* has a much more subordinate significance than if we were to contemplate the three dimensions of space, not to mention the three sides of a triangle whose basic determination is just this, namely to be a surface delimited by three sides. Furthermore, the difference mentioned between a greater and lesser importance of the quantitative determination is also found in nature and, indeed, in the sense that quantity plays, so to speak, a more important role in inorganic nature than in organic nature. If then within inorganic nature we also distinguish the sphere of mechanics from that of physics and chemistry in the narrower sense, the same difference presents itself again. As is commonly acknowledged, mechanics is the scientific discipline least capable of forgoing the assistance of mathematics; indeed hardly a single step can be taken in mechanics without it, and for that reason mechanics is also usually regarded, next to mathematics itself, as the exact science *par excellence*. In this connection, though, it is necessary to recall again the above comment concerning the coincidence of the materialist and the exclusively mathematical standpoints. – Incidentally, after all that has been detailed here, it must be called one of the most disruptive prejudices, precisely for knowledge of an exact and thorough sort, if, as often happens, all difference and all determinacy in the domain of the objective [*des Gegenständlichen*] are sought in what is merely quantitative. To be sure, there is more to spirit than to nature: for instance, more to the animal than to the plant. But one also knows very little about these objects and their difference, if one merely stops short at this kind of a more or less and does not proceed to construe them in the determinacy that is peculiar to them, a determinacy that is here initially qualitative.

§ 100

Quantity, posited at first in its immediate relation to itself or in the determination of equality [*Gleichheit*] with itself as posited by attraction, is *continuous*. According to the other determination contained in it, namely that of the *One*, it is a *discrete magnitude*. The former quantity, however, is equally discrete, since it is merely the continuity of the *Many*. The latter is equally continuous, for its continuity is the *One* as *the same* in the many Ones, i.e. the *unity* [of a mathematical unit].

1. Continuous and discrete magnitudes thus must not be regarded as *species*, as though the determination of the one did not belong to the other. Rather, they differ only in virtue of the fact that *the same whole* is posited now under one and now under the other of its determinations.
2. The antinomy of space, time, or matter (with respect to their divisibility ad infinitum or their being composed of

indivisibles) is nothing but the assertion that quantity is now continuous, now discrete. When space, time, etc. are posited only with the determination of continuous quantity, they are *divisible* ad infinitum; but with the determination of a discrete magnitude they are in themselves *divided* and consist of indivisible ones. The one is as one-sided as the other.

Addition. As the next result of being-for-itself, quantity contains the two sides of its process, repulsion and attraction, as ideal moments within itself, and consequently it is both continuous and discrete. Each of these two moments equally contains the other within itself, and hence there is *neither* a solely continuous *nor* a solely discrete magnitude. If in spite of this one speaks of both as two particular, mutually opposed species of magnitude, this is merely the result of our abstracting reflection that in contemplating specific magnitudes ignores now the one and now the other moment of the two contained in inseparable unity in the concept of quantity. Thus it is said, for instance, that the space that this room occupies is a continuous magnitude, and that these one hundred people who are gathered together in it form a discrete magnitude. But space is continuous and discrete at the same time, and we accordingly speak of points in space and then also divide space; for instance, we divide a given extension into so many feet, inches, etc. This can happen only under the supposition that space is *in itself* discrete as well. On the other hand, the discrete magnitude consisting of a hundred people is simultaneously continuous as well, and what they have in common, namely the human species that permeates all the individuals and connects them to each other, is that in which the continuity of this magnitude is grounded.

b. Quantum

§ 101

Quantity, *posited* essentially with the exclusive determinacy that is contained in it, is *quantum*, limited quantity.

Addition. Quantum is the *existence* of quantity, whereas pure quantity corresponds to *being* and degree (to be considered shortly) to *being-for-itself*. – As far as the detail of the progression from pure quantity to quantum is concerned, this progression is grounded in the fact that while in pure quantity the difference, as a difference between continuity and discreteness, is at first on hand only in itself, in the quantum, by contrast, this difference is posited, and indeed in such a way that quantity now generally appears to be distinct or limited. As a result, however, quantum simultaneously falls apart into an indeterminate assortment of quanta or determinate magnitudes as well. Each of these determinate magnitudes, as distinct from the others, forms a unity [the unity of a mathematical unit], while on the

other hand, when considered in itself it is a Many. In this way, however, quantum is determined as *number*.

§ 102

Quantum has its development and complete determinacy in *number*, which contains the One as its element within itself and, as its qualitative moment, the *amount* [*Anzahl*], which is the moment of discreteness, and the *unity* [of a mathematical unit], which is the moment of continuity.

In arithmetic, the *kinds of calculation* are usually listed as contingent ways of treating numbers. If there is to be any necessity and thus some rhyme and reason to them, it must lie in a principle, and that principle can lie only in the determinations that are contained in number itself. This principle shall be briefly expounded here. – The determinations of the concept of number are the *amount* [*Anzahl*] and the *unity* [of the mathematical unit], and number is the unity of both. But the unity [of the mathematical unit], when applied to empirical numbers, is merely the *equality* of them. Hence the principle of the kinds of calculation must be to put numbers into the relationship of the amount and the unity [of the mathematical unit], and to produce the equality of these determinations.

Since the Ones or numbers are themselves indifferent towards each other, the unity into which they are placed appears generally to be an extraneous gathering together. For this reason, to calculate generally means *to count*, and the difference between the *kinds* of calculating resides exclusively in the qualitative make-up [*Beschaffenheit*] of the numbers that are being added together, and the determination of the unity [of the mathematical unit], and the amount is the principle of their qualitative make-up.

To number or to generate number *in general* comes first, a matter of taking arbitrarily many *Ones* together. – But calculation of a particular sort is a matter of counting together items that are already numbers, not the mere One.

Numbers are *immediately* and *at first* quite undetermined numbers in general and, hence, unequal in general. Taking them together or counting them is *adding*.

The *next* determination is that numbers are in general *equal*. Thus they constitute *a unity* [i.e. a mathematical unit] and there exists a certain amount [*Anzahl*] of them. To count numbers such as these is

to *multiply*, in which case it does not matter how the determinations of the amount and the unity [the mathematical unit] are distributed to the two numbers or factors, i.e. which is taken to be the amount and which the unity [the mathematical unit].

The *third* determinacy, finally, is the *equality* of *amount* and *unity* [the mathematical unit]. Counting together the numbers determined in this way is the *raising of the power*, and first of all *squaring*. – The further raising of the power is the formal continuation of the multiplication of number with itself, a continuation that leads again to the indeterminate amount [*Anzahl*]. – Since perfect equality of the only difference on hand, that of the amount and their unity, is attained in this third determination, there cannot be more than these three kinds of calculation. – To each of these ways of counting together there corresponds the dissolution of numbers in accordance with the same determinacies. Consequently, besides the three kinds listed, which in that regard could be called *positive*, there also exist three *negative* ones.

Addition. Because number in general is the quantum in its complete determinacy, we use the quantum to determine not only so-called discrete magnitudes but also so-called continuous magnitudes. For this reason, number must also be utilized in geometry where the task is to indicate specific configurations of space and their relationships.

c. Degree

§ 103

The *limit* is identical to the whole of quantum itself. Insofar as it is, *in itself*, manifold [*vielfach*], it is the *extensive* magnitude, but insofar as it is, in itself, a *simple* determinateness, it is *intensive* magnitude, or *degree*.

The difference between the continuous and discrete magnitudes and the extensive and intensive ones consists in the fact that the former apply to *quantity in general*, while the latter apply to the *limit* or its determinacy as such. – Extensive and intensive magnitudes are likewise not two species, each of which would contain a determinacy that the other lacked. What is extensive magnitude is just as much intensive magnitude, and vice versa.

Addition. *Intensive magnitude* or *degree* differs conceptually from *extensive magnitude* or *quantum*. It must therefore be called illegitimate when, as often happens, this distinction is not acknowledged and both forms of magnitude are identified without further ado. This is notably the case in physics, for instance, when the difference in specific weight is explained by saying that a body whose specific weight is double that of another contains within the same space twice as many material particles (atoms) as the other. The same goes for heat and light when the different degrees of temperature and luminosity are supposed to be explained by a greater or lesser amount of heat or light particles (or molecules). When confronted with the illegitimacy of such explanations, physicists who avail themselves of them tend to offer as an excuse that the in-itself of such phenomena (which as we know is unknowable) is not supposed to be decided at all thereby, and that they avail themselves of the expressions mentioned merely for the sake of their greater *convenience*. But first, as far as the greater convenience is concerned, this is supposed to be related to the easier application of the calculus. But it is by no means obvious why intensive magnitudes, which find their determinate expression in number as well, should not be as conveniently calculable as extensive magnitudes. It would indeed be even more convenient to abandon all calculation as well as thinking itself entirely. Further, against the excuse mentioned it must be remarked that by engaging in these kinds of explanations one certainly goes beyond the domain of perception and experience and enters the domain of metaphysics and speculation (something that is otherwise declared to be idle or even pernicious). Experience will indeed show that, if one of two purses filled with dollars is twice as heavy as the other, then this is so because one of the purses contains two hundred and the other only one hundred dollars. One can see these coins and altogether perceive them with one's senses. By contrast, atoms, molecules, and things of this sort lie outside the realm of sensory perception, and it is up to thinking to decide on their admissibility and significance. But as mentioned earlier (§ 98, Addition), it is the abstract understanding that fixes on the moment of the Many (contained in the concept of being-for-itself) and does so in the shape of atoms, holding fast to this moment as something ultimate. And it is the same abstract understanding that in the case at hand again considers extensive magnitude to be the only form of quantity, something that contradicts the untutored intuition just as much as it does truly concrete thinking. Where intensive magnitudes present themselves it does not acknowledge them in their characteristic determinacy, but instead, relying on a hypothesis that is in itself untenable, tries to reduce them by force to extensive magnitudes. Among the reproaches that have been brought against recent philosophy, this one has been heard particularly frequently, namely that it reduces everything to identity (and thus it has been mockingly called 'identity philosophy'). From the discussion conducted here, it may be concluded that it is precisely philosophy that presses for discriminating what is diverse in terms of the concept as well as the experience of it, whereas it is professional empiricists who elevate abstract identity to the highest principle of knowing and whose philosophy for that reason should be more fittingly designated 'identity philosophy'. Incidentally, it is quite right that just as little as there are magnitudes that are

exclusively continuous or discrete, so also there are no exclusively intensive or extensive magnitudes, and that therefore the two determinations of quantity do not stand opposite one another as self-standing species. Every intensive magnitude is likewise extensive, and the same holds conversely. Thus, for instance, a certain degree of temperature is an intensive magnitude to which as such an utterly simple sensation also corresponds. If we then go and look at the thermometer, we find how a certain expansion of the mercury column corresponds to this degree of temperature and how that extensive magnitude changes in accordance with the temperature as the intensive magnitude. It is the same with the domain of spirit: a more intensive character reaches farther with its impact than a less intensive one.

§ 104

In the [concept of] degree, the *concept* of quantum is *posited*. It is the magnitude as indifferently *for itself* and simple, but in such a way that it has the determinacy through which it is quantum entirely *outside itself* in other magnitudes. With this contradiction, namely that the indifferent limit that is *for itself* is the absolute *externality*, the *infinite* quantitative *progression* is posited, – an *immediacy* that immediately changes over into its opposite, i.e. into being mediated (i.e. transcending the quantum just posited) and vice versa.

Number is thought, but thought as a being that is utterly external to itself. It does not belong to intuition because it is thought, but it is the thought that has the externality of intuition for its determination. – For this reason, not only *can* quantum be increased or decreased to infinity, it is through its concept this *propelling* [*Hinausschicken*] of itself beyond itself. The infinite quantitative progression is likewise the thoughtless repetition of the same contradiction that quantum is in general and, when quantum is posited in its determinacy, of the same contradiction that degree is. Regarding the redundancy of expressing this contradiction in the form of an infinite progression, *Zeno* rightly says in Aristotle: ‘it is the same thing to say something *once* and to be saying it *always*.’²¹

Addition 1. When in mathematics, following the usual definition mentioned earlier (§ 99), magnitude is designated as what can be increased or decreased – and there is nothing objectionable about the underlying intuition here – the question nevertheless still remains of how we come to assume something that is *capable of being increased and decreased*. If one were to appeal simply to experience to answer this question, this would not be sufficient, since it might prove to be

²¹ Translators’ note: See Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* 29 (Zenon) B1, Weidmann’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1992.

only one possibility (of being increased and decreased) and the insight into the necessity of behaving in this way would be missing, quite apart from the fact that in that case we would merely possess the representation and not the thought of magnitude. By contrast, in the course of our logical development, not only has quantity resulted as one stage of self-determining thinking, but it has also been shown that it is inherent in the *concept* of quantity simply to propel itself beyond itself and that therefore we are here dealing not merely with something possible, but with something necessary.

Addition 2. When reflective understanding is concerned with the infinite in general, it tends to cling to the quantitative infinite progression above all. Now the same thing that was mentioned earlier regarding the qualitative infinite progression holds good for this form of infinite progression as well, namely, that it is the expression not of the true, but of the bad infinity that does not advance beyond the mere *ought* and therefore in fact remains at a standstill in the finite. More specifically, as far as the quantitative form of this finite progression is concerned – something Spinoza rightly designates a merely imagined infinite (*infinitum imaginationis*) – even poets (notably Haller and Klopstock) have frequently made use of this representation in order to illustrate by means of it not only the infinity of nature but also that of God himself. In Haller, for instance, we find a famous description of God's infinity, which reads:

I amass colossal numbers,
Millions of mountains,
I pile time upon time
And world upon worlds galore,
And when from this terrifying height
With vertigo I look to you again:
If all the mighty numbers
Were increased thousand-fold,
They would not even be a part of you.

So here we have, first, that constant propelling of quantity and, more specifically, of number beyond itself that Kant describes as horrifying, although the actual horror is perhaps only the boredom of a limit constantly being set and then sublated so that, as a result, one does not make any headway. But, furthermore, the poet mentioned aptly adds to this description of the bad infinity the conclusion:

I remove them, and you lie before me entire

– thereby making it explicit that the true infinite is not to be regarded as something merely beyond the finite and that, to attain consciousness of it, we must renounce that *progressus in infinitum*.

Addition 3. As is well known, Pythagoras philosophized in numbers and took number to be the fundamental determination of things. At first glance, this way of construing things necessarily appears quite paradoxical, even crazy to ordinary consciousness, and the question therefore arises what is to be made of it. To answer this question it must be remembered first that the task of philosophy

generally consists in tracing things back to thoughts, and specifically to determinate thoughts. Now number is, of course, a thought and, indeed, the thought that stands closest to the sensory [sphere] or, put more precisely, the thought of the sensory itself, insofar as we understand by it in general the [way things are] outside of one another and a multiplicity. In the attempt to construe the universe as number we thus recognize the first step towards metaphysics. Pythagoras stands in the history of philosophy, as is known, midway between the Ionian philosophers and the Eleatics. Now while the former did not budge, as Aristotle has already remarked, from regarding the essence of things as something material (as a *hyle*), and the latter, Parmenides in particular, advanced to pure thinking in the form of being, it is the Pythagorean philosophy whose principle forms the bridge, so to speak, between the sensory and the supersensory. From this it follows what one should think about the view of those who believe that Pythagoras obviously went too *far* since he construed the essence of things as mere numbers, and then noted that one may indeed count things (there being nothing objectionable about that) but that things are after all *more* than mere numbers. Now as far as the '*more*' is concerned that is attributed to things, it may be readily admitted that things are more than mere numbers, but what matters is what is to be understood by this '*more*'. In keeping with its standpoint, the ordinary sensory consciousness will not hesitate to answer the question raised here by pointing to sensible perception and to note accordingly that things are not just countable but beyond that also visible, capable of being smelt, felt, etc. Expressed in our modern terms, the reproach made against the Pythagorean philosophy would thus be reducible to saying that it is too idealistic. But it in fact behaves in exactly the opposite way, as can already be gleaned from what was noted earlier about the historical position of the Pythagorean philosophy. For if it must be admitted that things are *more* than mere numbers, this is to be understood in such a way that the mere thought of *number* does not yet suffice to express the specific essence or the concept of things. Instead of claiming, therefore, that Pythagoras went too *far* with his philosophy of numbers one should say, on the contrary, that he did not go *far enough*, and the Eleatics had already made the next step towards pure thinking. – Furthermore, there are, if not things, at least states of things and natural phenomena in general whose determinacy rests essentially on specific numbers and proportions of numbers. This is notably the case with the difference between sounds and their harmonic accord. The familiar story is told that the perception of this phenomenon motivated Pythagoras to interpret the essence of things as number. Now although in the interest of science it is crucial to trace those appearances that are based on specific numbers back to them, it is in no way legitimate to regard the determinacy of thought generally as a merely numerical determinacy. To be sure, one may be induced initially to connect the most general thought-determinations to the first numbers and thus to say that *one* is the simple and immediate, *two* the difference and mediation, and *three* the unity of both. These combinations are, however, quite external, and it is not inherent in the numbers named, as such, to be the expression of just these determinate thoughts. Moreover, the further one progresses in this manner, the more the sheer arbitrariness of combining specific numbers with specific thoughts

becomes apparent. Thus, for instance, one might regard 4 as the unity of 1 and 3 and the thoughts connected with them. But 4 is just as much the doubling of 2, and in the same vein 9 is not only the square of 3 but also the sum of 8 and 1, of 7 and 2, and so on. If even today certain secret societies place such a great weight on all kinds of numbers and figures, this is to be regarded on the one hand as a harmless game, but on the other hand as a sign of ineptness in thinking. True, one likes to say that a deeper meaning lies hidden behind such things and that one can think much to oneself thereby. However, what matters in philosophy is not that one *can* think something, but that one *actually* thinks, and the true element of thought must be sought not in arbitrarily chosen symbols but only in the thinking itself.

§ 105

Quantum's *being external* to itself in the determinacy of its *being-for-itself* constitutes its *quality*. In being external, it is precisely itself and related to itself. The externality, i.e. the quantitative, and the being-for-itself, i.e. the qualitative, are united therein. – Posited thus *in itself* [*an ihm selbst*], quantum is quantitative *proportion* [*Verhältnis*] – a determinacy that is just as much an *immediate* quantum – i.e. the exponent – as it is *mediation*, i.e. the *relation* [*Beziehung*] of a given quantum to another, these being the two sides of the proportion that at the same time are not to be taken in their immediate value, but whose value lies exclusively in this relation.

Addition. The quantitative infinite progression initially appears to be an incessant propelling of number beyond itself. Looked at more closely, however, the quantity proves to be recursive [*zu sich selbst zurückkehrend*] in this progression, for what is contained therein in terms of thought is that number is determined generally by number, and this yields the *quantitative proportion*. When we say, for instance, 2 in relation to 4, we have two magnitudes that are not to be taken to be valid in their immediacy as such, but for which the relation to each other is alone at issue. This relation, however, i.e. the exponent of the proportion [i.e. 2 in this case] is itself a magnitude that distinguishes itself from the magnitudes that are related to each other in that the proportion changes when they change. By contrast, the proportion is indifferent to the change of both of its sides and remains the same as long as the exponent does not change. This is why instead of 2:4 we can also put 3:6 in its place without altering the proportion, since the exponent '2' remains the same in both cases.

§ 106

The *sides* of the proportion are still immediate quanta and the qualitative and quantitative determinations are still external to each other. But as for what they truly are, that the quantitative in its externality is itself

the relation to itself, or that being-for-itself and the indifference of the determinacy are united, this is *measure*.

Addition. Due to the dialectical movement through its moments considered so far, quantity has proven to be the return to quality. The concept of quantity was initially that of sublated quality, i.e. the determinacy that was not identical with being, but instead indifferent, merely external to it. It is this concept that also underlies mathematics' customary definition of magnitude, as mentioned earlier, namely to be what can be increased and decreased. Now, according to this definition it can seem at first as if magnitude were merely that which is alterable in general (for to increase as well as to decrease just means to determine a magnitude differently). But if that is the case, then magnitude would not be distinct from *existence* (i.e. the second stage of quality) since according to its concept it is equally alterable and the content of that definition would then have to be made complete in such a way that in quantity we have something alterable that despite its alteration remains the same. The concept of quantity thus proves to contain a contradiction within itself, and it is this contradiction that constitutes the dialectic of quantity. But the result of this dialectic is by no means a mere return to quality, as if the latter was the true and quantity²² by contrast the untrue. The result is instead the unity and truth of these two, qualitative quantity, or *measure*. – In this context, it should be noted that when we are operating with quantitative determinations in our examination of the objective [*gegenständlich*] world it is indeed always already measure that we have in view as the goal of such an examination. This is indicated, moreover, in our language by the fact that the process of ascertaining quantitative determinations and relationships is something that we designate as *measuring*. Thus, for instance, one measures the lengths of various strings that are made to vibrate with a view to the qualitative difference of the sounds produced by the vibration, insofar as that difference corresponds to the difference in length. Similarly, in chemistry the quantity of substances [*Stoffe*] that are combined with one another is ascertained in order to come to know the measurements that condition these combinations, i.e. those quantities that underlie specific qualities. In statistics, too, one deals with numbers but they are of interest only because of the qualitative results conditioned by them. By contrast, the mere ascertaining of numbers as such (without the guiding perspective specified here) rightly counts as an empty curiosity that is unable to satisfy either any theoretical or any practical interest.

C. MEASURE

§ 107

Measure is the qualitative quantum, at first in the *immediate* sense as a quantum with which an existence or a quality is bound up.

²² Translators' note: Taking *Qualität* here to be a miscue and that *Quantität* is meant.

Addition. Measure as the unity of quality and quantity is thus at the same time completed being. When we speak of being, it appears at first to be entirely abstract and without determination. But being is essentially this, namely to determine itself, and it attains its complete determinacy in measure. Measure can also be regarded as a definition of the absolute, and it has been said accordingly that God is the measure of all things. It is also this intuition that forms the basic tone of so many ancient Hebraic songs in which the glorification of God essentially amounts to the fact that *he* sets the limit for all things, for the sea and the land, the rivers and mountains, and likewise for the various species of plants and animals. – In the religious consciousness of the Greeks we find the divinity of measure in closer connection to the ethical and represented as *nemesis*. This representation contains the notion in general that everything human – wealth, honour, power, and likewise joy, pain, etc. – has its specific measure that, if overstepped, leads to ruin and demise. – Now as far as the occurrence of measure in the objective [*gegenständlich*] world is concerned, we find in nature initially concrete existences [*Existenzen*] whose essential content is formed by measure. This is notably the case with the solar system that we are generally to regard as the realm of free measures. Proceeding further in the contemplation of inorganic nature, measure recedes into the background, so to speak, insofar as the qualitative and quantitative determinations on hand here prove to be indifferent towards each other in multiple ways. Thus, for instance, the quality of a rock or a river is not tied to a specific magnitude. Looked at more closely, however, we find that even objects like those mentioned are not absolutely measureless, for in a chemical analysis the water in a river and the several components of a rock turn out to be qualities that are again conditioned by quantitative proportions of the substances [*Stoffe*] contained in them. But measure becomes decidedly more prominent again for immediate intuition with organic nature. The various genera of plants and animals possess a certain measure both overall and in their individual parts. Note should be taken, moreover, of the circumstance that the less perfect organic forms that are closer to inorganic nature distinguish themselves from the higher ones in part by the greater indeterminacy of their measure. Thus, for example, among the petrifacts we find so-called Ammon horns that are recognizable only in a microscope and others that can be as large as a carriage wheel. The same indeterminacy of measure also shows itself in many plants that are at a low level of organic development, as is the case, for instance, with ferns.

§ 108

Insofar as quality and quantity only exist in *immediate* unity in measure, their difference emerges in them in an equally immediate manner. Insofar as this is the case, the specific quantum is in part mere quantum, and existence is capable of increase and decrease without the measure being sublated thereby (the measure is in this respect a *rule*). In part, however, the alteration of the quantum is likewise an alteration of quality.

Addition. The identity of quality and quantity present in measure is initially only *in itself* but not yet *posited*. On account of this, these two determinations whose unity is measure can render them each valid for itself such that, on the one hand, the quantitative determinations of existence can be altered without its quality being thereby affected but that, on the other hand, this process of indiscriminately increasing and decreasing has its limits and the quality is altered by overstepping those limits. Thus, for instance, the degree of the temperature of water is initially irrelevant to its drop-forming fluidity. But in the course of increasing or decreasing the temperature of water in its fluid, drop-forming state, a point is reached where this state of cohesiveness changes qualitatively and water is transformed into vapour on the one hand and ice on the other. When a quantitative change occurs, it appears at first as something quite innocuous, and yet there is still something else hidden behind it and this seemingly innocuous alteration of the quantitative is so to speak a ruse [*List*] through which the qualitative is captured. The antinomy of measure contained herein is something that the Greeks have already illustrated in many different guises, such as, for example, in the question of whether *one* grain of wheat makes a heap of wheat or in that other question of whether plucking *one* hair from the tail of a horse makes a bald tail. While one may be initially inclined to respond negatively to these questions in view of the nature of quantity as an indifferent and external determinacy of being, one will nonetheless quickly have to admit that such indifferent increasing and decreasing also has its limits and that there finally comes a point where the result of the continued addition of only *one* grain at a time is a heap of wheat and the result of the continued plucking of *one* hair at a time is a bald tail. Similar to these examples is that tale of a peasant who continued to increase by *one* ounce at a time the load of his donkey that was trotting along cheerfully until it eventually collapsed under what had become an unbearable burden. One would be very wrong if one were to declare such things to be merely idle grammar school chatter, for they have in fact to do with thoughts with which it is of great importance to be familiar also in a practical and more specifically in an ethical connection. Thus, for instance, in connection with the expenditures we make there is at first a certain latitude within which a more or less does not matter. If, however, a certain measure, which is determined by the respective individual situation, is overstepped, the qualitative nature of measure makes itself felt (in the same way as in the previously mentioned example of the different temperatures of water); and what just now had to be regarded as good budgeting turns into stinginess or squandering. – The same point finds its application to politics as well and, indeed, in the sense that the constitution of a state must be regarded as both independent of and dependent on the extent of its territory, the number of its inhabitants, and other such quantitative determinations. For instance, looking at a state with a territory of one thousand square miles and a population of four million inhabitants one will at first have to admit without hesitation that a few square miles of territory or a few thousand inhabitants more or less cannot have a significant influence on the constitution of such a state. But in contrast to this, it is no less unmistakable that in the continued enlargement or shrinking of a state there finally comes a point when because of this quantitative alteration, apart from all other circumstances, the qualitative [aspect] of the constitution cannot remain

unchanged anymore. The constitution of a small Swiss canton does not fit a great empire, and equally unsuitable was the constitution of the Roman Republic when transferred to small German cities of the [Holy Roman] Empire.

§ 109

The *measureless* is initially this process of a measure, by virtue of its quantitative nature, of passing beyond its qualitative determinacy. However, since the other quantitative relationship, [namely,] the measurelessness of the first, is equally qualitative, the measureless is likewise a measure. Both transitions, from quality to quantum and from the latter to the former, can be represented again as an *infinite progression* – as the suspending [*Aufheben*] and re-establishing of the measure in the measureless.

Addition. As we have seen, quantity is not only *capable* of alteration, i.e. of increase and decrease; instead it is as such the process of stepping out [*das Hinausschreiten*] beyond itself in general. Quantity confirms this – its nature – in measure as well. But as the quantity on hand in measure oversteps a certain limit, the quality corresponding to it is thereby likewise sublated. With this, however, it is not quality in general that is negated, but only this specific quality whose position is immediately re-occupied by another quality. This process of the measure proves to be alternately the mere alteration of quantity and then a tipping over [*Umschlagen*] of quantity into quality as well. One can make this process intuitively clear by using the image of a knotted line. We first find knotted lines such as these in nature under many different forms. Earlier we considered the qualitatively different states of the aggregation of water that are dependent on increase and decrease. It is similar with the different stages of the oxidation of metals. The differences between sounds can also be regarded as an example of transforming what is at first merely quantitative into a qualitative alteration, a transforming that occurs in the process of measure.

§ 110

What in fact happens here is that the *immediacy*, which still belongs to the measure as such, is sublated. Quality and quantity themselves are first in the measure as *immediate*, and it is merely their *relative identity*. Yet measure turns out to sublate itself in the measureless. The latter, while it is the negation of measure, is nonetheless itself the unity of quantity and quality, and hence displays itself just as much as simply coming together *with itself*.

§ 111

The infinite, the affirmation as negation of negation, now has for its sides quality and quantity instead of the more abstract sides of being and

nothing, something and an other, and so on. Those [sides of the infinite] have *made the transition* (α) first of quality into quantity (§ 98) and of quantity into quality (§ 105) and been demonstrated by this means to be *negations*. (β) But in their *unity* (i.e. measure) they are at first distinct and one is only *by being mediated by* the other. And (γ), after the immediacy of this unity has proved to be self-sublating, this unity is now *posited* as what it is *in itself*, as simple relation-to-itself that contains being in general and its sublated forms within itself. – Being or the immediacy that is mediation *with itself* and relation to itself through the negation of itself, and thus equally mediation that sublates itself towards relation to itself, i.e. towards immediacy, is *essence*.

Addition. The process of measure is not merely the bad infinity of the infinite progression in the form of a process of constantly changing over from quality into quantity and from quantity into quality, but at the same time the true infinity of coming together with itself in its other. In measure, quality and quantity stand opposite one another at first as something and an other. Quality, however, is *in itself* quantity, and conversely, quantity is equally *in itself* quality. By thus passing over into each other in the process of measure, each one of these two determinations merely becomes what it already is in itself, and we now obtain being that is negated in its determinations, or being that is altogether sublated and thus is *essence*. In measure, essence was already present in itself, and its process consists merely in positing itself as what it is in itself. – Ordinary consciousness takes things up as simply being [*seiende*] and regards them in terms of quality, quantity, and measure. But these immediate determinations then show themselves not as fixed but as passing over, and essence is the result of their dialectic. In essence, no passing over occurs any more, only a relation. Initially, i.e. in being, the form of relation is merely our reflection. By contrast, in essence relation is its [essence's] own determination. When (in the sphere of being) something becomes an other, the something has thereby disappeared. Not so with essence. Here we have no true other but only difference, the relation of one to *its* other. The passing over of essence is thus at the same time no passing over, for in the passing over of the different into the different, the different does not disappear; instead the differences remain in their relation. When, for example, we say *being* and *nothing*, being is for itself and so, too, is nothing for itself. It is quite different with the *positive* and the *negative*. To be sure, these have the determinations of being and nothing, but the positive makes no sense taken by itself; rather, it is completely related to the negative. It is the same with the negative. In the sphere of being, relatedness is *only in itself*; by contrast, in essence it is posited. This is then in general the difference between the forms of being and those of essence. In being, everything is immediate; in essence, by contrast, everything is relative.

Second subdivision of the Logic: *The doctrine of essence*

§ 112

The essence is the concept insofar as it is simply *posited*; in the essence, the determinations are only *relative*, they are not yet fully reflected in themselves. For this reason, the concept is not yet *for itself*. As being that mediates itself with itself in virtue of its negativity, essence is relation to itself only insofar as it is relation to an other that is, however, not immediately a being, but something *posited* and *mediated*. – Being has not disappeared; instead, in the first place, the essence, as a simple relation to itself, is being; in the second place, moreover, in keeping with being's one-sided determination as *something immediate*, being has been *demoted* to something merely negative, to a shine [*Scheine*]. – The essence is accordingly being as shining in itself [*Scheinen in sich selbst*].

The absolute is *essence*. – This definition is the same as the definition that it is *being*, insofar as being is also the simple relation to itself; but at the same time it is higher since the essence is being that has gone *into itself*, that is to say, its simple relation to itself is this relation, posited as the negation of the negative, as mediation of itself in itself with itself. – However, when the absolute is determined as *essence*, negativity is frequently taken only in the sense of *an abstraction* from all determinate predicates. This negative act, the abstracting, then falls outside of the essence and the essence itself is thus only a result *without these, its premises*, the *caput mortuum* of abstraction. But since this negativity is not external to being, but instead is its own dialectic, then its truth, the essence, is the being that has gone *into itself* or is *in itself*; that *reflection*, its process of shining in itself, constitutes its difference from immediate being and is the distinctive determination of the essence itself.

Addition. Any talk of essence entails distinguishing it from being as immediate and considering the latter as a mere *semblance* in regard to the essence. This semblance, however, is not by any means denied; it is not nothing, but is instead being as sublated. – In general, the standpoint of the essence is that of reflection. The expression ‘reflection’ is initially used of light insofar as, in its rectilinear progression, it hits upon a mirroring surface that casts it back. We have here, accordingly, two things: first, something immediate, a being [*Seiendes*], and then, second, the same being as something mediated or posited. But now this is precisely the case when we reflect on an object or (as one would also say) *think it over* [*nachdenken*]. For what matters here is not the object in its immediacy; we want instead to know [*wissen*] it as mediated. Indeed, according to the common construal of the task or purpose of philosophy, it is supposed to come to know the essence of things and that simply means that things are not supposed to be left in their immediacy but instead demonstrated to be mediated or justified by something else. The immediate being of things is represented here, as it were, as a crust or as a curtain behind which the essence is hidden. – The further claim that ‘all things have an essence’ is a way of declaring that they are not truly what they immediately show themselves to be. It then is also not enough merely to traipse from one quality to another and merely proceed from the qualitative to the quantitative and vice versa; instead, there is something enduring in things and this primarily is the essence. As far as the remaining meaning and the use of the category of essence are concerned, it may be first recalled how, in German, we make use of *Wesen* [the German word for ‘essence’] for the auxiliary verb *sein* [‘to be’] to designate the past of the expression, by designating being that has elapsed as *gewesen* [‘having been’]. Underlying this irregularity of the use of language is a proper view of the connection of being to essence, insofar as we are able to consider the essence as being that has elapsed, whereby it needs to be noted that what is past is, therefore, not abstractly negated but instead only sublated and accordingly conserved at the same time. If we say, for example, ‘Caesar *has been* in Gaul [*ist in Gallien gewesen*]’, only the immediacy of what is asserted here of Caesar is thereby negated, but not his sojourn in Gaul altogether. For it is, indeed, precisely this that forms the content of this assertion, content that is here represented as lifted up [*aufgehoben*] into another dimension. – Talk of essence in common life frequently has only the meaning of a group or a sum. Accordingly, one speaks, for example, of the ‘press’ [*Zeitungswesen*], the ‘post office’ [*Postwesen*], or ‘revenue service’ [*Steuerwesen*], and so forth. What is understood by these expressions is simply that these things are not to be taken in their immediacy, as single items, but instead as a complex, and then further in their diverse relations as well. Such use of language contains only in this approximate fashion what essence has come to mean for us. – One speaks also of *finite* essences and names human beings finite essences [i.e. finite beings]. But in speaking of essences, one is actually beyond finitude and this designation of the human being is to that extent imprecise. If it is said further that there is [*es gibt*] a highest essence [i.e. supreme being] and God is supposed to be designated by this, then two sorts of things need to be noted about this. First, the expression for ‘there is’

[the giving, *geben* of 'es gibt'] is the sort of expression that points to something finite; we say, for example, 'there are so and so many planets' or 'there are plants of such and such constitution'. What there is in this way, is accordingly something outside of and next to which there is still something else. But now God, as the unqualifiedly infinite, is not the sort of entity that there simply is and *outside of* and *next to* which there are also still other essences [i.e. beings]. Whatever there otherwise is outside of God, nothing essential accrues to it in its separation from God; in this isolation it is to be considered far more to be something devoid of support and essence, a mere semblance. For this reason then, *second*, talk of God as the *highest* essence [i.e. supreme being] must be deemed inadequate. Indeed, the category of quantity applied here has place only in the realm of the finite. Thus we say, for example, 'this is the highest mountain on earth' and thereby entertain the representation that, outside this highest mountain, there are also still other, similarly high mountains. The same sort of thing obtains when we say of someone that he is the richest or most learned man in his country. But God is not simply *one* and also not simply the *highest*; God is instead far more *the* essence, whereby then, however, the following must also be immediately noted. Although this conception of God forms an important and necessary step in the development of religious consciousness, by no means does it exhaust the depths of the Christian representation of God. If we consider God only as the essence without qualification and remain with this, then we know [*wissen*] him only as the universal power that cannot be withstood or, otherwise expressed, as the *Lord*. Now fear of the lord is, indeed, the beginning, but only the beginning of wisdom. – It is first the Jewish and then, further, the Moslem religion in which God is construed as the Lord and essentially *only* as the Lord. The deficiency of these religions consists in general in the fact that here the finite does not get its due; maintaining this finitude for itself (be it as something natural or as a finite character of the spirit) constitutes a characteristic of pagan and hereby, at the same time, polytheistic religions. – Furthermore, the claim has also frequently been made that God, as the highest essence, cannot be known. This is generally the standpoint of the modern Enlightenment and, more precisely, of the abstract understanding that is satisfied with saying '*il y a un être suprême*', and then lets it go at that. If said in this way and if God is considered as the highest, *other-worldly* essence, then one has the world before oneself as something solid, something positive, and thereby forgets that the essence is precisely what sublates everything immediate. As the abstract, other-worldly essence whose difference and determinacy thus fall outside itself, God is in fact a mere name, a mere *caput mortuum* of the abstracting understanding. The true knowledge of God begins with knowing [*wissen*] that things in their immediate being have no truth.

Not only in relation to God but also in relation to other things, it often happens that one makes use of the category of essence in an abstract manner and then, in the course of considering things, fixes their essence as something obtaining for itself and indifferent to the determinate content of their appearance. For example, it is customarily said that what matters in human beings is their essence and not their action and deportment. What is right about this resides, to be sure, in the fact that

what a human being does should be considered, not in its immediacy, but only as mediated by his inner make-up and as a manifestation of his inner make-up. Only it should not be overlooked thereby that the essence and then, further, the inner make-up confirm themselves as such only by virtue of the fact that they make their appearance. In contrast to this, underlying that appeal of human beings to their essence, as distinct from the content of their action, is merely the intention of validating their sheer subjectivity and evading what is valid in and for itself.

§ 113

The relation-to-itself within the essence is the form of *identity*, of the *reflection-in-itself*; this has taken the place of *immediacy* here; both are the same abstractions of the relation-to-itself.

Sensoriness's thoughtlessness, i.e. of taking everything limited and finite to be a being, passes over into the understanding's stubbornness, i.e. of grasping it as *something identical with itself, something not contradicting itself in itself*.

§ 114

Originating from being, this identity seems at first to be beset only with determinations of being and related to it as something *external*. If being is taken as thus detached from the essence, it is called the *inessential*. But the essence is being-in-itself, it is *essential* only insofar as it possesses within itself the negative of itself, the relation-to-another, the mediation. It thus has in itself the inessential as its own shine [*seinen eignen Schein*]. But since the differentiating is contained in the shining [*Scheinen*] or mediating and since what is differentiated acquires the form of identity due to its difference from the identity from which it emerges and in which it is not or in which it lies only as a shine – because of this, what is differentiated is in the manner of the immediacy that relates to itself, or of being. By this route, the sphere of the essence becomes a still imperfect combination of *immediacy* and *mediation*. Everything is so posited in the sphere of essence that it refers to itself and at the same time has passed beyond it – as a *being of reflection*, a being in which an other shines and which in turn shines in an other. – It is thus also the sphere of the *posited contradiction* [*gesetzter Widerspruch*] that is only *in itself* in the sphere of being.

Because the *one* concept is the substantial element [*das Substantielle*] in everything, the same determinations surface in the development

of the essence as in the development of being, but in *reflected* form. Hence, instead of *being* and *nothing*, the forms of the *positive* and the *negative* now enter in, the former initially corresponding to the opposition-less being as *identity*, the latter (shining in itself) developed as the *difference*; – then, further, in the same way, *becoming* as *ground* itself of *existence* [*Dasein*] that, as reflected onto the ground, is *concrete existence* [*Existenz*], and so forth. – This (the most difficult) part of logic contains pre-eminently the categories of metaphysics and the sciences in general – [containing them] as products of the understanding insofar as it reflects, assuming the differences to be *self-standing* and at the same time *also* positing their relativity, but merely combining both aspects as next to and after one another through an ‘also’, without bringing these thoughts together and unifying them into a concept.

A. THE ESSENCE AS GROUND OF CONCRETE EXISTENCE

a. *The pure determinations of reflection*

α. *Identity*

§ 115

The essence shines *within itself* or is pure reflection and, as such, it is only a relation to itself, not as immediate but instead as reflected – *identity with itself*.

Formal identity or *identity of the understanding* is this identity insofar as one fastens on it and *abstracts* from the difference. Or the *abstraction* is rather the positing of this formal identity, the transformation of something in itself concrete into this form of simplicity – be it that a part of the manifold on hand in what is concrete is *omitted* (through so-called *analysing*) and only *one* of the manifold parts is taken up or that, with the omission of its diversity, the manifold determinations are *pulled together* into *one*.

If identity is combined with the absolute as the subject of a sentence, the sentence reads as follows: ‘The *absolute* is *what is identical with itself*.’ As true as this sentence is, it is ambiguous whether it is intended in its true significance. The expression of it at least is incomplete for this reason. For it is left undecided whether

the abstract *identity* of the understanding, i.e. in contrast to the other determinations of the essence, is meant or whether the identity is meant as in itself *concrete*; in the latter sense it is, as will become evident, first the *ground* and then at a higher level of truth the *concept*. – Even the word ‘*absolute*’ has itself frequently no further meaning than that of ‘*abstract*’; thus, *absolute* space, *absolute* time means nothing further than abstract space and abstract time.

The determinations of essence, taken as *essential* determinations, become predicates of a presupposed subject that is *everything* because those determinations are essential. The sentences that arise thereby have been pronounced *the universal laws of thinking*. The principle of identity [*Satz der Identität*] accordingly reads: ‘*Everything is identical with itself*; $A = A$ ’; and negatively: ‘*A cannot be A and not A at the same time*.’ – This principle, instead of being a true law of thinking, is nothing but the law of the *abstract understanding*. The *form of the sentence* [*Form des Satzes*] already contradicts it itself since a sentence also promises a difference between subject and predicate, but this sentence does not accomplish what its form requires. But it will be sublated in particular by the subsequent so-called laws of thinking that make into laws the opposite of this law. – If one maintains that this sentence cannot be proven but that *each* consciousness proceeds in accord with it and experientially concurs with it as soon as it hears it, then it is necessary to note, in opposition to this alleged experience of the school, the general experience that no consciousness thinks, has representations, and so forth, or speaks according to this law, that no concrete existence of any sort exists according to this law. Speaking according to this alleged [*seinsollenden*] law of truth (‘a planet is – a planet’, ‘magnetism is – magnetism’, ‘the spirit is – a spirit’) is considered, quite correctly, to be silly; this is presumably a universal experience. The school in which alone such laws are valid has, along with its logic which seriously propounds them, long since been discredited in the eyes of healthy common sense and in the eyes of reason.

Addition. Identity is, first, again the same as what we earlier had as being, but as having become [what it is] through sublation of the immediate determinacy. – It is accordingly being as ideality. It is enormously important to come to a proper understanding of the true meaning of identity. What pertains, above all things, to this is that it be construed not merely as abstract identity, i.e. not as identity to the exclusion of difference. This is the point by means of which all bad philosophy distinguishes itself from what alone deserves the name

of philosophy. The identity in its truth, as ideality of what immediately is, is an eminent determination as much for our religious consciousness as for all other thinking and consciousness generally. One can say that true knowledge [*Wissen*] of God begins with knowing [*wissen*] him as identity – as absolute identity, in which at the same time it lies that all power and all splendour of the world sinks away in the face of God and can only obtain as the shining [*Scheinen*] of *his* power and *his* splendour. – It is the same, too, for the identity that is the consciousness of itself, through which human beings distinguish themselves from nature in general and from animals in particular (since an animal does not manage to grasp itself as an I, i.e. as pure unity of itself in itself). As for what further concerns the meaning of identity in relation to thinking, it is a matter here, above all things, of not confusing the true identity (the identity containing in itself being and its determinations as sublated) with the abstract, merely formal identity. All those reproaches so frequently made against thinking, namely, from the standpoint of sentiment and immediate intuition, reproaches of one-sidedness, rigidity, emptiness, and so forth are grounded in the perverted presupposition that the activity of thinking is only that of abstractly positing identity, and it is formal logic itself that confirms this presupposition by setting up the allegedly highest law of thinking, illumined in the above section. If thinking were nothing more than that abstract identity, then it would have to be declared the most superfluous and most boring business. To be sure, the concept and, further, the idea are self-identical, but only insofar as they contain the difference in themselves at the same time.

β. Difference

§ 116

The essence is pure identity and shine [*Schein*] within itself only insofar as it is the negativity that relates itself to itself, thus the repelling of itself from itself. Hence, it essentially contains the determination of *difference*.

Being other is here no longer the *qualitative* [sense of being other], the determinacy, the limit but instead, in the essence as relating itself to itself, negation is at the same time relation, *difference*, *positedness*, *being-mediated*.

Addition. If someone asks: ‘How does identity come to difference?’, he presupposes that the identity, as mere, i.e. abstract identity, is something for itself, and that difference then is also something else, equally for itself. By means of this presupposition, meanwhile, answering the proposed question is rendered impossible, for if the identity is regarded as distinct from the difference, then one has in fact thereby merely the difference and, for that reason, the progression to the

difference cannot be demonstrated since the point of departure for it is not on hand for anyone who inquires into the manner of the progression. On closer inspection, this question proves to be quite thoughtless and anyone who proposes it should first be confronted with the other question, namely, what he understands by identity, in which case it would turn out that he understands precisely nothing in this connection by it and that identity for him is simply an empty name. In addition, to be sure, identity is something negative, as we have seen; nevertheless, it is not the abstract, empty nothing in general but instead the negation of being and its determinations. As such, identity is at the same time relation, and indeed negative relation, to itself or the distinguishing of itself from itself.

§ 117

Difference is (1) *immediate* difference, *the diversity* in which each of what is differentiated *is for itself* what it is and indifferent to its relation to the other which is thus a relation external to it. Because of the indifference of the diverse [things] to their difference, that difference falls outside them into a third [thing], *which does the comparing*. As the identity of the related [things], this external difference is [their] *likeness*; as their non-identity, it is their *unlikeness*.

The understanding allows these determinations themselves to be so separate from one another that, although the comparison has one and the same substrate for likeness and unlikeness, these are supposed to be diverse *sides* and *respects* in the same [substrate]. But likeness is for itself simply the foregoing, the identity, and unlikeness is for itself the difference.

Diversity has likewise been transformed into a sentence, the principle *that everything is diverse* or *that there are no two things that are completely like one another*. Here ‘*everything*’ is provided with a predicate that is the opposite of the *identity* attributed to it in the *first* principle; thus, a law contradicting the first [law of thinking] is given. Yet, insofar as diversity pertains only to the external comparison, something *is supposed* to be only *identical* with itself *for itself* and thus this second principle is supposed not to contradict the first. But then, too, diversity does *not pertain* to something or everything; it does not constitute any essential determination of this subject; thus, the second principle cannot be stated in this way at all. – If, however, something is *itself* diverse, according to the principle, then it is so through *its own* determinacy; but with this then it is no

longer diversity as such that is meant but the *determinate* difference instead. – This is also the sense of the Leibnizian principle.

Addition. In committing itself to the consideration of identity, the understanding is in fact already beyond that and what it has before it is difference in the form of mere diversity. If, for example, following the so-called principle of identity, we say ‘the sea is the sea’, ‘the air is the air’, ‘the moon is the moon’, and so forth, then these objects hold for us in the sense of being indifferent to one another and, in this way, it is not the identity, but instead the difference that we have before us. But then we also do not stand pat, regarding the things merely as diverse. Instead we *compare* them with one another and by this means acquire the determinations of *likeness* and *unlikeness*. A large part of the business of the finite sciences consists in the application of these determinations and nowadays, in speaking of a scientific treatment, one would be inclined to understand by this primarily the procedure that aims at comparing with one another the objects that have been taken into consideration. There can be no mistake that, by following this path, one has arrived at several, very important results and, in this connection, the enormous achievements of modern times deserve to be called to mind, particularly in the domains of comparative anatomy and the comparative study of language. Nevertheless, by the same token, it should not only be noted that one goes too far if one thinks that this comparative procedure is to be applied to all domains of knowing with the same success, but beyond that it should also be particularly emphasized that the mere comparing still cannot ultimately satisfy the scientific need and that results of the previously mentioned sort are to be considered merely as (to be sure, indispensable) preliminary labours for the sort of knowing that truly comprehends matters. – Insofar, moreover, as the point of comparing is to trace differences on hand back to identity, mathematics must be regarded as the science in which this goal is most perfectly attained and, to be sure, by reason of the fact that the quantitative difference is merely the entirely external difference. Thus, for example, in geometry a triangle and a rectangle, while qualitatively diverse, are equated with one another with respect to their size, in abstraction from that qualitative difference. Mention has already been made earlier (§ 99 *Addition*) of the fact that mathematics is not to be envied on account of this advantage, either from the side of the empirical sciences or from the side of philosophy; moreover, it also follows from what was previously noted about the mere identity of the understanding. – The story is told that, as Leibniz propounded the principle of diversity [i.e. the identity of indiscernibles] at court one day, gentlemen and ladies of the court, walking around in the garden, attempted to find two leaves indistinguishable from one another, in order to refute the philosopher’s principle by displaying them. This is without doubt a convenient, and still popular manner of occupying oneself with metaphysics even today. Nevertheless, with regard to the Leibnizian principle, it should be noted that the difference is precisely not to be construed merely as the external and indifferent diversity, but is to be construed instead as difference in itself and that it is inherent in the things in themselves to be different.

§ 118

Likeness is an identity only of such as are *not the same*, not identical to one another, and unlikeness is a *relation* of what is not alike. Hence, neither falls indifferently outside the other into diverse sides or aspects; instead, each is a shining into the other [*ein Scheinen in die andere*]. Diversity is thus difference of reflection or *difference in itself*, *determinate* difference.

Addition. While mere diversities prove to be indifferent to one another, likeness and unlikeness are, by contrast, a pair of determinations that refer straightforwardly to one another, neither of which can be thought without the other. This movement from mere diversity to opposition can also already be found in ordinary consciousness to the extent that we grant that comparing makes sense only on the supposition that some difference is present and, conversely, that distinguishing makes sense only on the supposition that some likeness is present. Accordingly, when the task of indicating a difference is posed, no great acuity is ascribed to someone who merely distinguishes objects whose difference is immediately evident (as, for example, a pen and a camel). By the same token, someone who only knows [*weiß*] how to compare what lies close to one another – a beech with an oak, a temple with a church – will not be said to have made much progress in comparing. We accordingly require identity together with the difference and the difference together with the identity. Nevertheless, it happens quite frequently in the domain of the empirical sciences that one of these two determinations is forgotten over the other and that scientific interest is at one time only set on tracing differences on hand back to some identity and, at another time, is just as one-sidedly set on finding new differences. This is notably the case in the natural sciences. Here one first makes it one's business to discover new and more and more new materials, forces, genera, species, and so forth or, in a different turn, to prove that bodies, previously held to be simple, are composite. Modern physicists and chemists smile bemusedly at the ancients who were satisfied only with four (and not even simple) elements. But then, on the other side, people have their eyes set on the mere identity. Accordingly, for example, not only are electricity and chemical transformations regarded as essentially the same, but even the organic processes of digestion and assimilation are regarded as a merely chemical process. It was already noted earlier (§ 103 *Addition*) that, if more recent philosophy is frequently mocked as a 'philosophy of identity', it is precisely philosophy and, indeed, in the first place, the speculative logic that points up the nullity [*Nichtigkeit*] of the mere identity of understanding, abstracting as it does from difference, and that also urges just as much for not leaving things with the mere diversity but instead for knowing the inner unity of everything that is there.

§ 119

(2) Difference *in itself* is *essential* difference, [the difference between] *the positive* and the *negative*, such that the former is the identical relation

to itself in such a way that it is *not* the negative and the latter is the differentiated for itself in such a way that it is *not* the positive. Because each is for itself insofar as *it is not the other*, each *shines* in the other and is only insofar as the other is. The difference of the essence is thus the *opposition* according to which what is differentiated does not have an *other in general* but instead has *its* other opposite it. That is to say, each has its own determination only in its relation to the other, is only reflected in itself insofar as it is reflected in the other and the same holds for the other. Each is thus the other's *own* other.

Difference in itself yields the principle: 'Everything is something essentially differentiated' – or, as it has also been expressed, '*Only one of two opposite predicates pertain to a particular something and there is no third.*' – This principle of the opposition contradicts the principle of identity in the most explicit way, since something, according to the one principle, is supposed to be merely the *relation to itself*, but according to the other, is something *opposite*, *the relation to another*. It is the peculiar thoughtlessness of abstraction to place two such contradictory principles as laws next to one another without even so much as comparing them. – The principle of *the excluded third* is the principle of the determinate understanding that wants to refrain from contradiction and, in doing so, contradicts itself. *A* is supposed to be $+A$ or $-A$; but the third, the *A*, is thereby articulated, something which is *neither + nor –* and that is posited *just as much as* $+A$ and as $-A$ are. If $+W\ 6$ means 6 miles in a westerly direction and $-W\ 6$ means 6 miles in an easterly direction, and $+$ and $-$ cancel one another [*sich aufheben*], then the 6 miles of the way or space remain what they were with and without the opposition. Even the mere plus and minus of the number or the abstract direction have, if one will, zero [*die Null*] as their third. But it should not be denied that the empty opposition of the understanding, signalled by $+$ and $-$, also has its place in the case of such abstractions as number, direction, and so forth.

In the doctrine of contradictory concepts one concept means, for example, 'blue' (since even something like the sensory presentation of a colour is named a concept in such a doctrine), the other 'not-blue' so that this other would not be something affirmative, such as *yellow*, but instead would be fixed upon merely [as] something negative in an abstract sense. – That the negative in itself is just as much positive, see the following section; this also lies

already in the determination that something opposed to another is *its* other. – The emptiness of the opposition of so-called contradictory concepts was completely displayed in the, as it were, grandiose expression of a universal law that one of *every* such opposite predicate and not the other pertains to *each* thing, such that [for example,] the spirit is either white or not-white, yellow or not yellow, and so on ad infinitum.

Because it is forgotten that identity and opposition are themselves opposed, the principle of opposition is also taken for that of identity in the form of the principle of contradiction, and a *concept* to which none or both of two mutually contradictory characteristics apply is declared logically false such as, for example, a circle with four corners. Now, although a circle with multiple corners and a rectilinear arc equally contradict this principle, geometers have no reservations about considering and treating the circle as a polygon with rectilinear sides. But something like a circle (its mere determinacy) is still no *concept*; in the concept of the circle, centre and periphery are equally essential and yet periphery and centre are opposed and contradictory to one another.

The notion of *polarity* that is so prominent in physics contains within itself the more correct determination of opposition; but if physics, in regard to its thoughts, holds itself to the ordinary logic, then it would easily be aghast, were it to unfold [the concept of] polarity for itself and arrive at the thoughts that lie within it.

Addition 1. The positive is the identity again but in its higher truth as the identical relation to itself and, at the same time, such that it is not the negative. The negative for itself is nothing other than the difference itself. The identical as such is, in the first place, devoid of determination; the positive, by contrast, is identical with itself but is determined as opposite an other and the negative is the difference as such in the determination of not being identity. This is the difference of the difference in itself. – With the positive and the negative, one thinks that one has an absolute difference. Both, however, are in themselves the same and one could, for that reason, name the positive also the negative and, vice versa, the negative the positive. In this way, too, assets and debts are not two particular types of assets, obtaining for themselves. The same thing that in the case of the one, as debtor, is something negative is, in the case of the other, the creditor, something positive. Something similar holds for a path to the east that is at the same time a path to the west. Positive and negative are thus essentially conditioned by one another and only are [what they are] in their relation to one another. The north pole on a magnet cannot be without the south pole and the south pole cannot be without the north pole. If one cuts a magnet in half, one

does not have the north pole in the one piece and the south pole in the other. So, too, in the case of electricity, the positive and the negative electricity are not two diverse flows, each obtaining for itself. In the opposition, what is differentiated has not only *an* other but *its* other opposite it. Ordinary consciousness regards what is differentiated as indifferent to one another. Thus, one says: I am a human being, and around me are air, water, animals, and other things generally. Here, everything falls apart. The aim of philosophy, by contrast, is to ban the indifference and come to know the necessity of things so that the other appears standing opposite it as *its* other. Thus, for example, inorganic nature is to be considered, not merely as something other than the organic, but instead as the necessary other of the latter. Both are in essential relation to one another, and one of the two is only to the extent that it excludes the other from itself and, precisely by this means, relates itself to the other. In a similar way nature, too, is not without the spirit and the latter not without nature. It is generally an important step if, in thinking, one has got away from saying: 'Now, something else is still possible, too.' For by speaking in this manner, one is still burdened by the contingent, in contrast to which, as was previously noted, true thinking is a thinking of necessity. – If, in more recent natural science, one has come to recognize as a universal law of nature the opposition first perceived in magnetism as polarity and to recognize this opposition as running through nature in its entirety, then this is to be regarded without doubt as an essential progress of science. Except that in this case it should be a prime concern not to let mere diversity stand, without further ado, alongside the opposition. Thus, for example, while on the one hand one at first correctly considers colours as standing opposite each other in polar opposition (as so-called 'complementary colours'), on the other hand one then turns around and considers them as the indifferent and merely quantitative difference of red, yellow, green, and so forth.

Addition 2. Instead of speaking in terms of the principle of excluded middle (the principle of abstract understanding), one should rather say: everything is opposed. Indeed, neither in heaven nor on earth, neither in the spiritual nor in the natural world, is there any such abstract either/or of the sort that the understanding maintains. Everything that is some sort of thing is something concrete, something that is in itself thereby differentiated and opposed. The finitude of things consists then in the fact that their immediate existence [*Dasein*] does not correspond to what they are in themselves. Thus, for example, in inorganic nature, an acid is in itself at the same time a base, that is to say, its being is simply only this, to be related to its other. With this, however, an acid is also not something quietly perduring in opposition but instead is striving to posit itself as what it is in itself. Contradiction is what moves the world in general and it is ridiculous to say that contradiction cannot be thought. What is right about this claim is merely this: that the matter does not end there in the contradiction and that the contradiction sublates itself through itself. The sublated contradiction is then, however, not the abstract identity, for this is itself only the one side of the opposition. The most immediate result of the opposition posited as a contradiction is the *ground*, which contains in itself

both the identity and the difference as sublated and set down as merely ideal moments.

§ 120

The *positive* is that *diverse* [aspect] that is supposed to be for itself and at the same time *not* indifferent to its relation *to its other*. The *negative* is supposed *to be* equally self-standing, the negative relation *to itself, for itself*, but at the same time, as simply negative, is supposed to have this its relation to itself, its positive [aspect], only in the other. Both are, accordingly, the posited contradiction; both are *in themselves* the same. Both are so also *for themselves* since each is the sublating of the other and of itself. With this they collapse, falling to the *ground*. – Or the essential difference, as difference in and for itself, immediately is only the difference of itself from itself and hence contains the identical. Hence, identity belongs just as inherently as difference itself to difference in and for itself and as a whole. – *As self-referring*, difference is likewise already declared to be *identical with itself* and the *opposed* is in general what contains *the one* and *its other, itself*, and *its opposite*, in itself. Essence's being-in-itself, so determined, is the *ground*.

γ. Ground

§ 121

The *ground* is the unity of identity and difference; the truth of what the difference and the identity have turned out to be – the reflection-in-itself that is just as much reflection-in-another and vice versa. It is *the essence* posited as *totality*.

The *principle of the ground* [Satz vom Grund] reads: 'Everything has its sufficient *ground* [or reason]'; that is to say, the true essence [*wahre Wesenheit*] of anything is not the determination of it as identical with itself or as diverse or as merely positive or merely negative. It is instead the fact that it has its being in an other that, as its identity-with-itself, is its essence. The latter is equally not an abstract reflection *in itself* but *in an other* instead. The ground is the essence being *in itself* and this is essentially ground and it is ground only insofar as it is ground of something, of an other.

Addition. If it is said of the ground ‘it is the *unity* of identity and difference’, then by this unity is not to be understood the abstract identity, since we would then have merely another name and, as far as the thought is concerned, we would merely have once again the identity of the understanding itself that has been recognized to be untrue. For this reason, in order to avoid that misunderstanding, one can also say that the ground is not merely the unity, but just as much the difference of the identity and the difference. By this means, the ground, which first presented itself to us as the sublation of the contradiction, thus appears as a new contradiction. But as such it is not something persisting [*Beharrende*] peacefully in itself but rather the repelling [*Abstoßen*] of itself from itself. The ground is only ground insofar as it grounds [*begründet*]. However, what has emerged from the ground is itself and therein lies the formalism of the ground. The grounded and ground are one and the same content and the difference between both is the mere difference of form between the simple relation to itself and the mediation or state of being posited. If we ask for the grounds of things, then this is generally the already earlier mentioned (§112 *Addition*) standpoint of reflection. We want to see the basic matter then, as it were, doubled, first in its immediacy and second in its ground where it is no longer immediate. This is then also the simple sense of the so-called principle [*Denkgesetz*] of sufficient reason, by means of which it is simply expressed that things must be considered essentially as mediated. Formal logic, incidentally, provides the other sciences with a bad example, inasmuch as it demands that the sciences not allow their content to be immediately valid, and nonetheless sets up this principle without deriving it and pointing out its mediation. With the same reason that the logician maintains that our capacity of thinking is simply so constituted that we have to ask for a ground in every case, the physician, asked why someone who falls into the water drowns, could also answer that human beings are simply so constructed not to be able to live under water. So, too, a judge, if asked why a criminal is punished, could answer that civil society is simply so constituted that criminals are not allowed to go unpunished.

But even if one is to set aside the demand addressed to the logic for a justification of the principle of the ground, then logic must at least answer the question of what one is to understand by the ‘ground’. The usual explanation, namely that the ground is what has a consequence [*Folge*], seems at first glance to be more illuminating and comprehensible than the determination of the concept given above. If, however, one asks further, what ‘consequence’ is, and receives the answer, the consequence is what has a ground, then it becomes apparent that the ease of comprehending this explanation consists merely in the fact that in it is presupposed what emerged for us as the result of a foregoing movement of thought. But, now, the business of logic is precisely this alone, to point up the merely represented and, as such, uncomprehended and unproven thoughts as stages of thinking that determines itself, so that they can then be at the same time comprehended and proven. – In ordinary life and equally in the finite sciences one quite frequently avails oneself of this form of reflection with the intention, by applying it, of getting to the bottom of how matters actually stand with the objects under consideration. Now, there is nothing objectionable about this manner of consideration insofar

as it merely concerns the immediate, everyday need [*Hausbedarf*] of knowing, so to speak. Nevertheless, at the same time it must be noted that this manner of consideration can guarantee a definitive satisfaction neither in a theoretical nor in a practical respect and, indeed, cannot because the ground still has no content, determinate in and for itself, and by considering something as grounded, we accordingly preserve the merely formal difference between immediacy and mediation. One thus sees, for example, an electrical phenomenon, and asks for the ground of it; if we receive the answer, the electricity is the ground of this phenomenon, then this is the same content that we had immediately before us, merely translated into the form of something internal. – Furthermore, however, the ground is not merely what is simply identical with itself, but also different from itself and, for this reason, diverse grounds can be put forward for one and the same content, a diversity of grounds that proceeds according to the concept of difference, then further to opposition in the form of grounds *for* and *against* the same content. – If, for example, we consider an action, more specifically a theft, then this is a content relative to which several sides can be distinguished. By means of it, property has been violated; but by means of it as well the thief who was in need obtained the means to satisfy his needs; and it can also be the case that the person from whom he stole did not make good use of his property. Now, to be sure, it is right that the violation of property that has taken place here constitutes the decisive point of view; other points of view must withdraw into the background relative to it. But this decision does not lie in the principle of the ground. To be sure, according to the ordinary construal of this principle, one speaks not merely of the ground but of the *sufficient* ground and, hence, one might think that, in the case of the action mentioned as an example, viewpoints other than the violation of property that were also mentioned might well be grounds, but that these grounds are not sufficient. In this regard it should be noted, however, that if one speaks of the sufficient ground, this predicate is either pointless or of the sort that, by means of it, one has already passed beyond the category of ground as such. The predicate thought of here is pointless and tautological if it is merely supposed to express the capacity of grounding [*begründen*] at all, since the ground is only ground to the extent that it expresses this capacity. If a soldier runs away from a battle in order to save his life, then he acts in a manner that is contrary to his duty, but it must not be maintained that the ground that determined him to act in this manner was not sufficient, for otherwise he would have remained at his post. Furthermore, it must then also be said that just as, on the one hand, all grounds suffice, so, on the other hand, no ground as such suffices and, indeed, precisely because, as already noted above, the ground still has no content determinate in and for itself and, hence, is not active on its own and productive. It is the *concept* that will subsequently present itself to us as content that is determinate in and for itself and thereby active on its own, and it is this that matters for Leibniz when he speaks of the sufficient ground and urges that things be considered from this viewpoint.

Here Leibniz has in mind a merely mechanical manner of construing things that many still cherish even today and that he rightly declares insufficient. Thus it is, for example, a merely mechanical construal of the organic process of the circulation

of blood if it is reduced simply to the contraction of the heart. Equally mechanical are those theories of punishment that consider the purpose of punishment to be neutralization, deterrence, or other external grounds of that sort. One does Leibniz an injustice if one thinks that he was satisfied with something so scanty as the formal principle of the ground is. The manner of considering things that he advocates is precisely the opposite of that formalism that, where it is a matter of knowing conceptually, lets mere grounds suffice. In this respect Leibniz contrasts *causas efficientes* and *causas finales* with one another and makes the demand that one not stand pat with the former, but press on to the latter. According to this distinction, for example, light, warmth, moistness are, of course, to be considered as *causae efficientes* but not as the *causa finalis* of the plant's growth, the *causa finalis* being, of course, nothing other than the concept of the plant itself. – Here it can be noted that standing pat with mere grounds, precisely in the domain of the juridical and the ethical, is generally the standpoint and the principle of the Sophists. When one speaks of sophism, one frequently understands it to be merely the sort of consideration that is concerned with twisting what is right and what is true and presenting things generally in a false light. This tendency, however, does not lie immediately in sophism, the standpoint of which is nothing other than that of rationalization [*Räsonnement*]. The Sophists made their appearance among the Greeks at a time when mere authority and tradition no longer sufficed for them in religious and ethical domains, and they felt the need to be aware of what was supposed to hold for them and aware of it as a content mediated by thinking. The Sophists met this demand by giving directions for looking for the various viewpoints from which things might be considered, various viewpoints that then are precisely nothing other than grounds. Since, as was previously noted, the ground still has no content, determinate in and for itself, and grounds are to be found for the unlawful and unjust no less than for the ethical and lawful, the decision about what grounds are supposed to hold falls to the subject and it is a matter of the subject's individual disposition and intentions, which grounds it will settle for. By this means, then, the objective basis of what is valid in and for itself, recognized by everyone, is undermined and it is this negative side of sophism that has deservedly given it the previously mentioned, bad reputation. As is well known, Socrates battled the Sophists everywhere, not indeed by simply opposing their rationalization with authority and tradition, but rather by dialectically pointing out the untenability of mere grounds and by urging, to the contrary, the consideration of the just and the good, in general the universal and the concept of willing. When one often prefers nowadays not only in discussions about worldly things but even in sermons to go to work in a rationalizing manner and, for example, all possible grounds are given for gratitude to God, then Socrates and even Plato would not have hesitated to declare this as sophistry. For, as I have said, in this case it has to do, not with the content, which can even be the true content, but with the form of the grounds through which everything can be defended, but also attacked. In our rationalizing time, so rich in reflection, one need not have advanced very far in order to know [*weisß*] how to produce a good ground for everything, even for the worst and most perverted position. Everything that has been ruined in the world

has been ruined on good grounds. If one is confronted with specific grounds, one is initially inclined to step back in the face of this; but if one has had the experience of how this works, then one becomes hard of hearing towards this and does not let oneself be further impressed by it.

§ 122

The essence is at first shining [*Scheinen*] and mediation *within itself*. Now, as the totality of the mediation, its unity with itself is *posited* as the self-sublating [*Sichaufheben*] of the difference and thereby of the mediation. This is therefore the re-establishment of *immediacy* or *being*, but of being insofar as it is *mediated by the sublating of mediation – concrete existence* [*Existenz*].

The ground has as yet no *content* that is determinate in and for itself; neither is it *a purpose*, thus it is not *active*, nor is it *productive*; instead a concrete existence merely *emerges* from the ground. For that reason, the *determinate* ground is something formal; it is any sort of a determinacy, insofar as it is *related to itself*, posited as affirmation, in relation to the immediate concrete existence connected with it. Precisely by the fact that it is *ground*, it is also a *good* ground, since '*good*' quite abstractly also means nothing more than something affirmative and each determinacy is good that can be articulated in any way as something affirmative that is granted. Thus, a ground can be found and given for everything, and a *good* ground (e.g. a good ground of motivation for acting) can effect something *or not*, can have a consequence *or not*. A ground of motivation that effects something comes about, for example, through its assumption into a will that first makes it into something active and a cause.

b. Concrete existence

§ 123

Concrete existence [*Existenz*] is the immediate unity of reflection-in-itself and reflection-in-another. It is thus the indeterminate set of concretely existing entities [*Existierenden*] as reflected-in-themselves that are at the same time just as much a shining-in-another [*in-Anderes-scheinen*], i.e. are *relative*, and form a *world* of reciprocal dependency and an infinite

connection of grounds and grounded entities. The grounds are themselves concrete existences and the concretely existing entities are from multiple sides just as much grounds as they are grounded.

Addition. The expression ‘existence’ (derived from *existere*) points to a having-gone-forth [*Hervorgegangensein*] and the concrete existence [*Existenz*] is the being that has gone forth from the ground, the being re-established through the sublation of the mediation. The essence, as the sublated being, has demonstrated itself to us first as a shining in itself and the determinations of this shining are the identity, the difference, and the ground. This [the ground] is the unity of the identity and the difference and, as such, at the same time the differentiating of itself from itself. But now, as what is differentiated from ground it is just as little the mere difference as it is itself the abstract identity. The ground is the sublating of itself and that in relation to which it sublates itself, the result of its negation, is concrete existence. As what has gone forth from the ground, this [concrete existence] contains the same [the ground] in itself and the ground does not remain back behind concrete existence; instead it is precisely and merely this, to sublate itself and translate itself into concrete existence. This can also be found then in ordinary consciousness to the extent that, when we consider the ground of something, this ground is not something abstractly internal but instead itself in turn something existing concretely [*Existierendes*]. Thus, for example, we consider a bolt of lightning that has set a building on fire to be the ground of a blaze and, equally, a people’s customs and vital connections to be the ground of its constitution. This is now generally the form under which the concretely existing world first presents itself to reflection, as an indeterminate set of concretely existing entities that, as at once reflected in themselves and the other, behave towards one another reciprocally as ground and grounded. In this colourful play of the world as the sum of concretely existing things, a firm foothold nowhere presents itself, everything appearing here merely as relative, conditioned by another and equally conditioning the other. The reflecting understanding makes it its business to investigate and pursue these ubiquitous relations; but the question concerning the final purpose remains unanswered in the process and, hence, with the further development of the logical idea, reason’s need to grasp matters conceptually passes beyond this standpoint of mere relativity.

§ 124

The reflection-in-another of what exists concretely [*des Existierenden*] is, however, not separate from the reflection-in-itself; the ground is their unity, from which the concrete existence has gone forth. What exists thus concretely contains in itself relativity and its multiple connection with other entities existing concretely. Thus, too, it is *reflected* in itself as *ground*. As such, what exists concretely [*das Existierende*] is a *thing*.

The *thing-in-itself* that has come to be so famous in Kantian philosophy shows itself here in its origin, namely, as the abstract reflection-in-itself that is held on to in its opposition to the reflection-in-another and the differentiated determinations in general as their empty *foundation* [*Grundlage*].

Addition. When the claim is made that the *thing-in-itself* is unknowable, this is to be conceded insofar as, by ‘knowing’, one is supposed to understand apprehending an object in its concrete determinacy; but the thing-in-itself is nothing other than the completely abstract and indeterminate thing in general. Moreover, just as one speaks of the *thing-in-itself*, one might by the same right also speak of the quality-in-itself, the quantity-in-itself, and equally of all the remaining categories, whereby these categories would have to be understood in their abstract immediacy, that is to say, apart from their development and inner determinacy. To this extent, it must be considered an arbitrary act of the understanding to fix precisely upon the in-itself of the thing alone. Furthermore, the in-itself is also customarily employed for the content of the natural as much as the spiritual world; thus, one speaks of electricity *in itself* or the plant *in itself*, for example, and equally of the human being or the state *in itself*. What is understood by the ‘in-itself’ of these objects is what rightly and properly pertains to them. The case is here no different from that of the thing-in-itself in general. More specifically, if one stands pat with the mere in-itself of the objects, they are construed, not in terms of the truth about them, but in the one-sided form of mere abstraction. Thus, for example, the human being-in-itself is the child whose task consists, not in obdurately persisting in this abstract and undeveloped in-itselfness, but in becoming also *for itself* what it is initially *in itself* – namely, a free and rational being. Similarly, the state-in-itself is the still undeveloped, patriarchal state in which the various political functions residing in the concept of the state have not yet attained their constitutional form in keeping with the concept of them. In the same sense the seed can also be regarded as the plant-in-itself. What should be taken from these examples is that one finds oneself very much in error if one thinks that the in-itself of things or the thing-in-itself in general is something inaccessible for our cognizing. All things are initially *in themselves* but they are not thereby left at that, and just as the seed which is the plant in itself is only this, to develop itself, so too the thing in general advances beyond its mere in-itself as the abstract reflection-in-itself, proving itself to be reflection-in-another as well, and thus it has properties.

c. The thing

§ 125

The *thing* is the totality as the development, posited in one, of the determinations of the ground and concrete existence [*Existenz*]. According to

one of its moments, the *reflection-in-another*, it has the differences in it, and, in keeping with those differences, it is a *determinate* and concrete thing. (α) These determinations are diverse *from one another*; they have their reflection-in-itself in the thing, not in themselves. They are *properties* of the thing and their relation to it is one of *having*.

Having enters as relation in place of *being* [*Sein*]. *Something*, to be sure, also has *qualities* in it, but this transposition of having onto beings [*das Seiende*] is imprecise because the determinacy as quality is immediately one with the something [that has the quality], and something *ceases to be* if it loses its quality. But, the *thing* is the reflection-in-itself as the identity that is also different from the difference, its determinations. – *Having* is used in many languages to designate the *past* – rightly so, since the past is the *sublated being* and the spirit its reflection-in-itself, the spirit in which it alone still obtains, but which also distinguishes this being, sublated in it, from itself.

Addition. All the determinations of reflection recur, as concretely existing, in the thing. Thus, the thing, initially as thing-in-itself, is what is identical with itself. However, the identity is, as we have seen, not devoid of difference, and the properties the thing has are the concretely existing difference in the form of diversity. While the diverse [aspects] earlier proved to be indifferent to one another, and their relation to one another was posited merely by the comparison external to them, we now have in the thing a bond which links the diverse properties to one another. The property, moreover, is not to be confused with the quality. To be sure, one also says that something has qualities. Yet this designation is inappropriate insofar as ‘having’ suggests a self-standing status that does not yet pertain to something immediately identical with its quality. Something is what it is, thanks to its quality alone; by contrast, the thing, while also existing concretely only insofar as it has properties, is nevertheless not bound to this or that determinate property and thus can even lose that very property without ceasing for that reason to be what it is.

§ 126

(β) But in the *ground*, the reflection-in-another is also in itself immediately the reflection-in-itself. Thus, the properties are just as much identical with themselves, *self-standing*, and freed from their being-bound to the thing. However, because they are the thing’s determinacies, *different from one another* as reflected-in-themselves, they are not themselves things which

are concrete, but instead concrete existences, reflected in themselves as abstract determinacies, *sorts of matter* [*Materien*].

The sorts of matter, e.g. magnetic, electric sorts of matter, are also not called *things*. – They are the genuine qualities, one with their being, the determinacy that has attained immediacy, but a being that is a reflected [being], concrete existence.

Addition. Making the properties which the thing *has* into self-sufficient sorts of matter or stuff of which it consists is grounded, to be sure, in the concept of the thing and, for that reason, is also found in experience. However, it runs counter to thought as well as experience to infer from the fact that certain properties of a thing (for example, the colour, the odour, and so forth) can be exhibited as particular colour-stuff, stuff-for-smelling, and so forth, that by this means everything is accomplished and that, in order to get to the bottom of how things actually are, one has nothing further to do than to analyse things into the sorts of stuff out of which those things are composed. This analysis into self-standing stuff has its proper place only in inorganic nature and it is the chemist's right to analyse cooking salts or gypsum, for example, into the stuff they consist of and then to say that the former consists of hydrochloric acid and sodium bicarbonate and the latter of sulphuric acid and calcium. Similarly, it is right for the geologist to regard granite to be composed of quartz, feldspar, and mica. The sorts of stuff, of which the thing consists, are then in turn themselves partially things that can be again analysed into more abstract sorts of stuff as, for example, sulphuric acid that consists of sulphur and oxygen. Now, while these sorts of stuff or matter can in fact be exhibited as subsisting for themselves, it also frequently happens that other properties of things are similarly regarded as particular materials which, however, are not self-standing in this way. One speaks, for example, of warmth-stuff, of electrical and magnetic matter, sorts of stuff and matter, meanwhile, that are to be considered mere fictions of the understanding. This is generally the manner of abstract reflection by the understanding, arbitrarily seizing upon individual categories that have validity only as determinate stages of development of the idea and then, as it is said, for the purposes of explanation, albeit in contradiction with the unprejudiced observation and experience, wielding these categories in such a way that every object considered is reduced to them. In this manner, then, the way a thing consists of self-standing stuff is also applied in multiple ways to the sorts of domains where it is no longer valid. Even within nature, in the case of organic life, this category proves to be insufficient. One says, indeed, that this animal consists of bones, muscles, nerves, and so forth, but it is immediately apparent that the context here is different from the piece of granite consisting of the aforementioned sorts of matter. These sorts of matter behave in a manner utterly indifferent to their unification and can just as well subsist without the latter. By contrast, the diverse parts and members of the organic body subsist only in their unification and, separate from one another, they cease to exist concretely as such.

§ 127

Matter is thus the *abstract* or indeterminate reflection-in-*another* or the reflection-in-itself as *determinate* at the same time; it is thus *existing thingness* [*daseiende Dingheit*], the subsisting of the thing. In this way, the thing has, in the sorts of matter, its reflection-in-itself (the opposite of § 125); it does not subsist in itself, but consists *of sorts of matter* and is only their superficial combination, an external linkage of them.

§ 128

(γ) As the *immediate unity* of concrete existence with itself, matter is also indifferent to the determinacy; the many diverse sorts of matter thus go together into the *one matter*, the concrete existence in the determination-of-reflection of identity, in contrast to which these differentiated determinacies and their external *relation*, which they have to one another in the thing, are the *form* – the determination-of-reflection of the *difference*, but as existing concretely and as the totality.

This one matter, devoid of determination, is also the same as the thing-in-itself, only the latter is in itself completely abstract, the former is in itself also for-another, initially a being for the form.

Addition. The diverse sorts of matter of which the thing consists are *in themselves* the same as one another. By this means we get the *one matter* in general [*die eine Materie überhaupt*] in which the difference is posited as external to it, that is to say, as mere *form*. The construal of things as having altogether one and the same matter and as being diverse merely externally, i.e. in terms of their form, is quite customary for the reflecting consciousness. Matter in this connection is held to be utterly indeterminate in itself yet capable of every determination and, at the same time, absolutely permanent and remaining self-same in every change and every alteration. This indifference of matter to determinate forms is to be found in finite things, to be sure; thus, for example, it is indifferent to a block of marble whether it is given the form of this or that statue or even a pillar. Yet in this connection it should not be overlooked that such matter as a block of marble is only relatively (in relation to the sculptor) indifferent to the form and that it is in no way altogether formless. The mineralogist accordingly considers the merely relatively formless marble as a determinate rock formation in its difference from other, equally determinate formations as, for example, sandstone, porphyry, and the like. Thus, it is merely the abstracting understanding that fixes the matter in isolation and as formless in itself. By contrast, the thought of the matter does indeed contain in itself the principle of the form and, for that reason, too, a formless matter does not occur anywhere, as concretely existing, in experience.

Incidentally, the construal of matter as originally on hand and as in itself formless is quite ancient, and we meet it already among the Greeks, first in the mythical form of the chaos which is represented as the formless foundation of the concretely existing world. As a consequence of this representation, God is regarded not as the creator of the world but rather as the mere sculptor of the world, as the demiurge. The deeper intuition, by contrast, is this: that God created the world out of nothing. This is a means of generally articulating that, on the one hand, matter as such is not self-standing and, on the other hand, that the form does not reach the matter from the outside but instead, as a totality, bears within itself the principle of matter, the free and infinite form that will shortly turn out for us to be the *concept*.

§ 129

The thing thus breaks down into *matter* and *form*, each of which is the *totality* of thinghood and self-standing for itself. But the *matter*, which is supposed to be the positive, indeterminate concrete existence [*Existenz*], contains as concrete existence just as much the reflection-in-another as being-in-itself. As the unity of these determinations, it is itself the totality of the form. However, as the totality of the determinations, the form already contains the reflection-in-itself or, as *self-referring form*, it has what is supposed to make up the determination of matter. Both are *in themselves* the same. This unity of them, qua *posited*, is in general the *relation* of matter and form that are just as much distinguished [from one another].

§ 130

The thing as this totality is the contradiction of being (in keeping with its negative unity) the *form* in which the matter is determined and relegated to *properties* (§ 125), and at the same time of *consisting* of *sorts of matter* that, in the reflection-in-itself of the thing, are at once both self-standing and negated. The thing, being thus the essential concrete existence as one that sublates itself in itself [*eine sich in sich selbst aufhebende*], is *appearance*.

The *negation* as well as the independence of the sorts of matter *posited* in the thing surface in physics as *porosity*. Each of the many sorts of matter (colour-matter, odorous matter, and other sorts of matter; according to some also sonorous matter, then caloric matter, electrical matter, and so forth) is *also negated* and in this, their

negation, their pores, are the many other self-standing sorts of matter that are likewise porous and allow the others to concretely exist thus reciprocally in themselves. The pores are nothing *empirical* but instead contrivances of the understanding that represents the aspect of the negation of the self-standing sorts of matter in this way and covers the further development of the contradictions with that nebulous confusion in which everything is *self-standing* and everything is likewise *negated* in one another. – If in the same way in the spirit the faculties or activities are hypostasized, then their living unity likewise becomes the confusion of the acting of one on the other.

(We are talking here, not of the pores in the organic, those of wood, skin, and so on, but instead of pores in the so-called sorts of matter, as in the colour-matter, caloric-matter, and so forth, or in metals, crystals, and the like.) Just as there is no verification of the pores in observation, so also matter itself is a product of the reflective understanding as is a form separated from the matter, the thing and its consisting of sorts of matter or that it itself subsists and has only properties. All are products of the reflective understanding that, while observing and alleging to present what it observes, generates instead a metaphysics that is from all sides a contradiction, albeit a contradiction that remains hidden from it.

B. APPEARANCE

§ 131

The essence must *appear* [*erscheinen*]. Its shining within itself [*sein Scheinen in ihm*] is the sublating itself and becoming an immediacy which, as reflection-in-itself, is as much a *subsisting* [*Bestehen*] (matter) as it is *form*, reflection-in-another, subsisting *in the process of sublating itself*. Its shining is the determination through which the essence is not being but essence, and the shining, once developed, is the appearance. The essence is thus not *behind* or *beyond* the appearance; instead, by virtue of the fact that it is the essence that exists concretely, concrete existence is appearance.

Addition. Concrete existence [*Existenz*], posited in its contradiction, is the appearance [*Erscheinung*]. The latter is not to be confused with the mere semblance [*bloßen Schein*]. The shine [*Schein*] is the proximate [*nächste*] truth of being or

immediacy. The immediate is not what we think we have in it, it is not something self-sufficient and resting on itself, but instead merely semblance [*Schein*] and, as such, it is gathered together [*zusammengefaßt*] into the simplicity of the essence that is in itself. This is initially the totality of the shining within itself, but then does not stand pat with this interiority, having emerged instead as ground into concrete existence which, having its ground not in itself, but in an other instead, is precisely mere appearance. When we speak of an appearance, we associate with it the representation of an indeterminate multiplicity of concretely existing things whose being is simply mediation alone and which accordingly do not rest on themselves, but instead have validity only as moments. At the same time, however, it also lies herein that the essence does not remain behind or beyond the appearance but instead is, as it were, the infinite goodness [*Güte*] of releasing its shine into immediacy and granting it the joy of existing [*Daseins*]. The appearance posited in this way does not stand on its own feet and does not have its being in itself but in an other. Just as God as the essence is goodness by lending concrete existence to the moments of his shining in himself in order to create a world, so, too, God as the essence proves himself to be, at the same time, the power over it and the righteousness that makes manifest that the content of this concretely existing world is mere appearance, insofar as it wants to exist concretely for itself.

The appearance is in general a very important stage of the logical idea and one can say that philosophy distinguishes itself from ordinary consciousness by the fact that it regards as mere appearance what holds for the latter as a being [*Seiendes*] and as self-sufficient. However, what matters is that the meaning of appearance is construed properly. If, for example, it is said of something that it is merely an appearance, then this can be misunderstood as though, when compared with this mere appearance, a being or the immediate is of a higher order. In fact, precisely the reverse holds, namely, such that the appearance is something higher than a mere being. The appearance is in general the truth of being [*Sein*] and a richer determination than the latter insofar as appearance contains united in itself the moments of reflection-in-itself and reflection-in-another. In contrast to this, being or immediacy is still the one-sided absence of relation [*Beziehungslose*] and (seemingly) resting only on itself. But furthermore, this 'only' of the appearance points, of course, to a deficiency, a deficiency consisting in the fact that the appearance is as yet what is in itself broken, not having its footing in itself. What is higher than the mere appearance is first the *actuality*, which, as the third stage of the essence, will be treated later. – In the history of modern philosophy, it is Kant who deserves the credit of first rehabilitating the previously mentioned difference between ordinary and philosophical consciousness. Kant, meanwhile, stalled at the halfway point insofar as he construed the appearance merely in a subjective sense and, outside of it, established the abstract essence as the *thing in itself*, inaccessible to our cognition. To be appearance alone, this is the proper nature of the immediately objective [*gegenständliche*] world itself and, insofar as we know [*wissen*] the latter as such, we there recognize at the same time the essence which does not remain behind or beyond the appearance but instead manifests itself as the

essence insofar as it lowers the world to the level of mere appearance. – Moreover, the naïve consciousness, with its demand for a totality, is not to be blamed if it is reluctant to content itself with subjective idealism's claim that we simply have to do with appearances alone. Only it easily occurs to this naïve consciousness, bent on saving the objectivity of knowing, to return to abstract immediacy and, without further ado, to hold fast to it as the true and actual. In a small work with the title, *A Crystal Clear Report to the General Public Concerning the Actual Essence of the Newest Philosophy: An Attempt to Force the Reader to Understand* [Berlin 1801],²³ Fichte treated in a popular format the contrast between subjective idealism and immediate consciousness in the form of a dialogue between author and reader. He endeavoured to demonstrate the legitimacy of the standpoint of subjective idealism. In this dialogue the reader complains to the author of his distress that he simply would not succeed in transporting himself to that standpoint and expresses how disconsolate he is about the notion that the things surrounding him are supposed to be not actual things but mere appearances. The reader is, of course, not to be blamed for this grievance insofar as he is supposed to regard himself as encapsulated in an impenetrable sphere of merely subjective representations. Moreover, apart from the merely subjective construal of appearance, it must be said, meanwhile, that we have plenty of reasons to be satisfied with the fact that, in regard to the things surrounding us, we have to do merely with appearances and not with solid and self-sufficient concrete existences, since in this case we would soon die of hunger, bodily as well as spiritually.

a. The world of appearance

§ 132

What appears concretely exists in such a way that its *subsisting* is immediately sublated; it is only *one* moment of the form itself. The form encompasses in itself the subsisting or the matter as one of its determinations. What appears thus has its ground in the form as its essence, its reflection-in-itself as opposed to its immediacy, but thereby has it only in another determinacy of the form. This, its ground, is just as much something appearing, and thus the appearance continues on to an infinite mediation of the subsisting through the form and thus equally through not subsisting. This infinite mediation is at once a unity of relation-to-itself, and concrete existence develops into a *totality* and *world* of appearance, of reflected finitude.

²³ Translators' note: Transl. John Botterman and William Rash, in *Philosophy of German Idealism*, ed. Ernst Behler (New York, 1987).

b. *Content and form*

§ 133

The manner of being-outside-one-another that is characteristic of the world of appearances is a totality and completely contained in its *relation-to-itself*. The relation of the appearance to itself is thus completely determined, has the *form* in itself and because [it is] in this identity, has that form as its essential subsistence. Thus the form is *content* and, in keeping with its developed determinacy, it is the *law* of the appearance. The negative side of the appearance, what is alterable and not self-sufficient, falls to the *form* as *not reflected in itself*—it is the indifferent, *external form*.

For the contrast of form and content, it is essential to keep in mind that the content is not formless but instead has the *form within itself* just as much as it [the form] is *something external* to it. A doubling of the form presents itself; at one time, insofar as it is reflected in itself, it is the content and, at another time, as not reflected in itself, it is the external concrete existence, indifferent to the content. What presents itself here *in itself* is the absolute relation of content and of form, namely, their turning over [*Umschlagen*] and into one another, so that *the content* is nothing but *the form turning* into content and the *form* nothing other *than the content turning* into the form. This ‘turning over’ is one of the most important determinations. It is *posited*, however, only in the *absolute relationship*.

Addition. The reflecting understanding quite frequently makes use of form and content as a pair of determinations, and indeed above all by considering the content essential and self-sufficient, and the form, by contrast, as inessential and not self-sufficient. Against this use, however, it should be noted that both are in fact equally essential and that, while there is no more a formless content than there is a formless stuff, these two (content and stuff-or-matter) are different from one another precisely by virtue of the fact that the latter, although in itself not devoid of form, nevertheless demonstrates itself in its existence [*Dasein*] to be indifferent to the form, whereas the content as such, in contrast to this, is what it is only by virtue of the fact that it contains the developed form in itself. In addition, however, we then find the form also as a concrete existence [*Existenz*] indifferent to the content and external to it, and this is the case because the appearance in general is still beset with externality. If we consider a book, for example, then as far as its content is concerned, it is, of course, irrelevant whether it is written or

printed, whether it is bound in paper or leather. But then, by this means, it is in no way said that, apart from the external and irrelevant form, the content of the book itself is devoid of form. There are, to be sure, enough books that should rightly be designated formless in relation to the content as well. Yet in this relation to the content, formlessness means the same as informality [*Unförmlichkeit*], by which is understood not the absence of form altogether, but only the absence of the *proper* form. But the proper form is so far from being indifferent to the content that it is much more the content itself. A work of art lacking the proper form is, precisely for this reason, not proper, that is to say, not truly a work of art, and it is a poor excuse for an artist as such if it is said that the contents of his works is good, to be sure (indeed, even splendid), but they lack the proper form. Genuine works of art are precisely those whose content and form prove to be thoroughly identical. One can say of the *Iliad* that its content is the Trojan war or, more specifically, Achilles' wrath; in this way we have everything and yet only very little since what makes the *Iliad* the *Iliad* is the poetic form that that content has been shaped into. So, too, the content of *Romeo and Juliet* is the demise of two lovers, a demise brought about by the clash of their families; but this hardly does justice to Shakespeare's immortal tragedy. – Further, in regard to the relation of content and form in the scientific domain, it is necessary in this connection to recall the difference between philosophy and the other sciences. The finitude of the latter generally consists in the fact that thinking here, as a merely formal activity, takes up its content as something given from outside it. Moreover, the content is not known [*gewußt*] as determined from within by the thought underlying it, with the result that form and content do not completely pervade one another. In philosophy, by contrast, this separation falls away, and philosophy, for this reason, should be designated infinite knowing. Nevertheless, philosophical thinking is also quite frequently regarded as a merely formal activity and its contentlessness holds as a settled matter, especially when it comes to logic, which, it must be conceded, deals only with thoughts as such. If by 'content' one understands merely what is tangible in general, what can be perceived via the senses, then, of course, it will be willingly acknowledged that philosophy in general and logic in particular have no such content, i.e. no content perceivable by the senses. But, then, with respect to what is understood by 'content', even ordinary consciousness and the general use of language by no means stops short at what is merely perceivable via the senses or even at mere existence in general. When one speaks of a book devoid of content, what one understands by that is, as is well known, not merely a book with empty pages but rather the sort of book whose content is as good as no content. On closer inspection, it will turn out, in the last analysis, that what is initially designated as content has, for a cultivated consciousness, no other meaning than that of having the form of thought [*Gedankenmäßigkeit*]. With that, however, it is then also admitted that the thoughts are not to be regarded as indifferent to the content and as empty forms in themselves, and that, as in art, so too in every other domain, the truth and soundness [*Gediegenheit*] of the content rests essentially upon the fact that it demonstrates itself to be identical to the form.

§ 134

The *immediate* concrete existence, however, is the determinacy of the subsisting itself as well as of the form; it is thus just as much external to the determinacy of the content as this externality, which it has through the element of its subsisting, is essential to it. The appearance, so posited, is the *relationship* such that one and the same, [namely] the content, is as the developed form, as the externality and *opposition* of self-standing concrete existences and their *identical* relation, the relation in which alone the differentiated elements are what they are.

c. *The relationship*

§ 135

(α) The *immediate* relationship is that of the whole and *the parts*: the content is the whole and *consists of* the parts (the form), the opposite of it. The parts are diverse from one another and are what is self-standing. But they are only parts in their identical relation to one another or insofar as, taken together, they make up the whole. But *that* 'together' is the opposite and negation of the part.

Addition. The essential relationship is the determinate, completely general manner of appearing. Everything that exists concretely stands in relationship and this relationship is what is truthful in each concrete existence. What exists concretely is thereby not abstractly for itself but only in an other, but in this other it is the relation to itself and the relationship is the unity of the relation to itself and the relation to an other.

The relationship of the whole and the parts is *untrue* insofar as its concept and reality do not correspond to one another. The concept of the whole is that of containing parts [*Teile*]; if then, however, the whole is posited as what it is in terms of its concept, if it is partitioned [*geteilt*], then it thereby ceases to be a whole. Now, to be sure, there are things that correspond to this relationship, but these are also, precisely for that reason, merely low-level and untrue concrete existences [*Existenzen*]. In this connection generally, it should be remembered that, if one speaks of the untrue in a philosophical discussion, this should not be understood as though nothing of this sort concretely exists. A bad state or a sick body may, nonetheless, exist concretely; but these objects are untrue for their concept and their reality do not correspond to one another. – The relationship of the whole and the parts, as the immediate relationship, is generally the sort of relationship that very readily suggests itself to the reflecting understanding and that it thus frequently makes do with, even when much more profound relationships are in fact at issue. Hence, for example, the members and organs of a living body are

not to be considered merely as its parts, since they are what they are only in their unity, and by no means do they behave indifferently towards this unity. These members and organs first become mere parts in the hands of the anatomist who has to deal no longer with living bodies but with cadavers. This is not to say that such dissection should not take place at all, but that the external and mechanical relationship of the whole and the parts does not suffice to know organic life in its truth. – This is the case to a much higher degree in the application of this relationship to the spirit and the formations of the spiritual world. If in psychology one does not speak explicitly of parts of the soul or the spirit, the representation of that finite relationship nevertheless underlies the treatment of this discipline by the understanding, insofar as the diverse forms of the spiritual activity are enumerated and described, one after another, solely in isolation as so-called particular powers and faculties.

§ 136

(β) What is one and the same in this relationship (the relation to itself that is on hand in it) is thus an immediately *negative* relation to itself and, to be sure, as the mediation to the effect that one and the same is *indifferent* to the difference, and that it is the *negative* relation *to itself* that repels itself, as reflection-in-itself, towards the difference, and posits itself, concretely existing as reflection-into-another and, in reverse direction, conducts this reflection-into-another back to the relation to itself and to the indifference – the *force* and its *expression*.

The *relationship of the whole and the parts* is the immediate relationship; hence, the thoughtless relationship and the process of the identity-with-itself turning over into diversity. There is a passage from the whole to the parts and from the parts to the whole, and in the one [the whole or the part] the opposition to the other is forgotten since each is taken as a self-standing concrete existence, the one time the whole, the other time the parts. Or since the parts are supposed to subsist *in* [*bestehen in*] the whole and the whole to consist *of* [*bestehen aus*] the parts, one time the one, the other time the other is the *subsisting* [*Bestehende*] and the other is each time the *unessential*. The *mechanical* relationship, in its superficial form, consists generally in the fact that the parts are taken as self-sufficient opposite one another and opposite the whole.

The *infinite progression* that concerns the *divisibility* of *matter* can avail itself of this relationship too, and then it is the thoughtless oscillation of both sides of the relationship. A thing is taken one

time as a *whole*, then there is a passage to the *determination of it as a part*; this determination is then forgotten and what was a part is regarded as a whole; the determination of it as a part resurfaces and so on, ad infinitum. Taken as the negative that it is, however, this infinity is the *negative* relation of the relationship to itself, the *force*, the whole that is identical with itself as being-in-itself [*Insichsein*], – and as this being-in-itself sublating itself and expressing itself and, conversely, the expression that disappears and goes back into the force.

This infinity notwithstanding, the force is also finite. For the content, the *one and the same* that the force and the expression are, is initially this identity only *in itself*. The two sides of the relationship are not yet themselves, each for itself its concrete identity, not yet the totality. In relation to one another, they are thus diverse and the relationship is a finite one. The force is thus in need of solicitation from without; it acts blindly, and, thanks to this deficiency of the form, the content is also limited and contingent. It is not yet truly identical with the form, is not yet the concept and purpose that is the determinate in and for itself. – This difference is supremely essential, but not easy to grasp; it has to be determined more precisely and only in terms of the concept of purpose. If it is overlooked, this leads to the confusion of construing God as force, a confusion from which Herder's God suffers especially.

It is usually said that the *nature of force* itself is *unknown* [*unbekannt*] and only its expression is known. On the one hand, the entire *determination of the content of force* is just the same as that of the *expression*; on account of this, the explanation of a phenomenon on the basis of a force is an empty tautology. What is supposed to remain unknown is therefore in fact nothing but the empty form of the reflection-in-itself, by means of which alone the force is distinguished from the expression, – a form that is equally something well known [*Wohlbekanntes*]. This form adds nothing in the slightest to the content and to the law, which are supposed to be known simply on the basis of the phenomenon alone. Assurances are also given everywhere that, with this, nothing is supposed to be claimed about the force; as a result, it is impossible to see why the form of force has been introduced into the sciences. – But, on the other hand, the nature of force is, of course, something unknown since the necessity of the connection of its content is still lacking, not only in itself but also and equally insofar as it is for itself

limited and thus acquires its determinacy by means of an other outside it.

Addition 1. In comparison with the immediate relationship of the whole and parts, the relationship of force and its expression should be regarded as infinite since in it the identity of both sides is posited, whereas in the former it was on hand only in itself. The whole, although in itself consisting of parts, nonetheless ceases to be a whole by being partitioned; by contrast, the force preserves itself as force only by expressing itself and, in its expression, returning to itself since the expression is itself force in turn. Furthermore, however, this relationship, too, is in turn finite, and its finitude consists in general in this mediatedness just as, conversely, the relationship of the whole and the parts has demonstrated itself to be finite on account of its immediacy. The finitude of the mediated relationship of the force and its expression exhibits itself first in the fact that each force is conditioned and, in order to subsist, needs something other than itself. Thus, for example, magnetic force, as is well known, is borne especially by iron whose other properties (colour, specific weight, relationship to acids, and so forth) are independent of this relation to magnetism. Something similar is the case for all other forces that prove themselves to be thoroughly conditioned and mediated by something other than themselves. – The force's finitude shows itself further in the fact that, in order to express itself, it is in need of solicitation. That by means of which the force is solicited is itself in turn the expression of a force that must likewise be solicited in order to express itself. In this way, we get either the infinite progress again or the reciprocity of soliciting and being solicited, whereby then, however, an absolute beginning of the movement is still missing. The force is not yet the purpose, what determines itself in itself; the content is a specifically given content and by expressing itself, the force is accordingly, as one would say, blind in its effect, by which, then, precisely the difference between an abstract expression of force and purposive activity is to be understood.

Addition 2. The claim, repeated so often, that only the expression of forces, not forces themselves, are to be known, must be rejected as unfounded since the force is precisely this alone, to express itself, and we accordingly recognize at the same time the force itself in the totality of the appearance, construed as law. Nevertheless, it must not be overlooked thereby that a correct intimation of the finitude of this relationship is contained in this claim about the unknowability of the forces in themselves. The individual expressions of a force initially confront us in an indeterminate multiplicity and in their instantiation [*Vereinzelung*] as contingent. We then reduce this multiplicity to its inner unity which we designate as force and become aware of the seemingly contingent as something necessary, in that we recognize the law reigning therein. But, now, the diverse forces themselves are in turn a manifold and appear, merely next to one another, as contingent. One speaks accordingly in empirical physics of forces of weight, magnetism, electricity, and so forth; so, too, in empirical psychology one speaks of the power of memory, the power of imagining, the power of the will, and all sorts of other powers of the soul. Here, then, the need recurs of attending to these diverse forces likewise

as a unified whole, and this need would not be satisfied by reducing the diverse forces somehow to one primal force [*Urkraft*] common to them. In such a primal force we would in fact have simply an empty abstraction as devoid of content as the abstract thing in itself. In addition, the relationship of force and its expression is essentially the mediated relationship and so it contradicts the concept of force, if force is construed as original or resting on itself. – Given the way things stand with the nature of force, we readily tolerate those who say that the concretely existing world is an expression of divine forces, but we will take exception to regarding God himself as a mere force, since force is still a subordinate and finite determination. When people, with the reawakening of the sciences, proceeded to reduce the individual appearances of nature to forces underlying them, it was in this sense that the Church also condemned this undertaking as godless since, if the forces of gravitation, vegetation, and so forth should occasion the movement of the celestial bodies, the growth of plants, and so forth, then nothing would remain for the divine governance of the world to do, and God would thus be diminished to an idle spectator in such a play of forces. Now, to be sure, researchers of nature and especially Newton, while availing themselves of the form of reflection of force for the explanation of natural phenomena, initially recommend explicitly that, in doing so, there should be no breach to the honour of God as the creator and ruler of the world. But it is one of the consequences of explaining things on the basis of forces that understanding by way of rationalizing progresses to the point of establishing the individual forces, each for itself, and clinging to them in this finitude as ultimate, such that, over against the finitized world of self-sufficient forces and stuffs, what remains for the determination of God is only the abstract infinity of an unknowable, supreme, other-worldly being. This is then the standpoint of materialism and the modern Enlightenment which, having renounced any claim to know [*wissen*] *what* God is, reduces its knowledge of God to the mere fact *that* God is. Now, the finite forms of understanding by no means suffice for knowing either nature or the formations of the spiritual world as they truly are and, insofar as they do not suffice, it must be admitted that the Church and religious consciousness are right in the polemic mentioned here. Nevertheless, on the other hand the formal legitimacy, first, of the empirical sciences must not be overlooked, a legitimacy that generally consists in vindicating the world on hand in the determinacy of its content for the thoughtful knowledge of it and not leaving matters merely with the abstract belief in God's creation and governance of the world. If our religious consciousness, supported by the authority of the Church, teaches us that it is God who created the world through his almighty will and that it is he who guides the stars on their paths and lends every creature its subsistence and flourishing, the *Why?* still remains to be answered and it is above all the answer to this question that forms the common task of science, empirical as well as philosophical. When religious consciousness, not recognizing this task and the right contained in it, appeals to the inscrutability of the ways of God, it itself takes up in this way the previously mentioned standpoint of the mere Enlightenment of the understanding. Such an appeal must be considered no more than an arbitrary assurance that contradicts the explicit command of the Christian

religion to know God in spirit and in truth and that derives from a humility that is in no way Christian but instead conceited and fanatical.

§ 137

As the whole that is, in its very self, the negative relation to itself, force is this: the process of repelling itself from itself and *expressing* itself. But since this reflection-in-another, the difference of the parts, is just as much a reflection-in-itself, the expression is the mediation by means of which the force that returns into itself is force. Its expression is itself the sublation of the diversity on both sides, which is on hand in this relationship, and the positing of the identity that *in itself* makes up the content. Its truth is, for that reason, the relationship, the two sides of which are distinguished only as *inner* and *outer*.

§ 138

(γ) The *inner* is the ground as the mere form of the one *side* of the appearance and the relationship, the empty form of the reflection-in-itself. Standing opposite it is concrete existence [*Existenz*] as the form likewise of the other side of the relationship, with the empty determination of the reflection-in-another as *outer*. Their identity is the fulfilled identity, the *content*, the *unity* of the reflection-in-itself and the reflection-in-another, posited in the movement of force. Both are the same, one totality, and this unity makes them into the content.

§ 139

The outer is thus, *in the first place, the same content* as the inner is. What is internal is also on hand externally and vice versa. The appearance shows nothing that is not in the essence and there is nothing in the essence that is not manifested.

§ 140

In the second place, however, inner and outer are also *opposed* to one another as determinations of the form [*Formbestimmungen*] and, to be sure, unqualifiedly so, as the abstractions of identity with itself and of sheer multiplicity or reality. Yet, since they are essentially identical as moments of the one form, what is *only* posited initially in the one abstraction is also *immediately*

only in the other. Hence, what is *only* something *internal* is also, by this means, *only* something *external* and what is *only* something *external* is as yet also *only* something *internal*.

It is the usual mistake of reflection to take the *essence* as the merely *inner*. When it is taken merely in this way, then this consideration is also a completely *external* one and that essence is the empty external abstraction.

The *inner* side of nature – a poet says –
No created spirit can penetrate,
Fortunate enough if he knows [*weißst*] merely the *outer* shell.²⁴

It should have been said, rather, that precisely when he determines the essence of nature as something *inner*, he knows [*weiß*] only the *outer* shell.²⁵ – Since in *being* in general or even in merely sensory perception, the *concept* is only the inner at first, it is something external for it [i.e. sensory perception] – a subjective being as well as thinking, devoid of truth. – In nature as in the spirit, insofar as the concept, purpose, law are at first only *inner* dispositions, pure possibilities, they are only an external, inorganic nature at first, science of a third, alien power [*Gewalt*], and so forth. – As a human being is externally, i.e. in his actions (not, of course, in his merely corporeal externality), so he is internally; and if he is *only* internally virtuous, moral, and so forth, i.e. *only* in intentions and sentiments and his outer life is not identical with them, then the one is as hollow and empty as the other.

Addition. Like the unity of the two preceding relationships, the relationship of inner and outer is the sublation at once of mere relativity and appearance

²⁴ Moldenhauer–Michel: Cf. Goethe's annoyed exclamation, *Zur Naturwissenschaft [Zur Morphologie]*, vol. I, 3 [1820; p. 304]:

Das hör ich sechzig Jahre wiederholen,
Und fluche drauf, aber verstohlen, . . .
Natur hat weder Kern noch Schale,
Alles ist sie mit einemmale, usw.

²⁵ Moldenhauer–Michel: Cf. Albrecht von Haller, 'Die Falschheit der menschlichen Tugenden' (in *Versuch schweizerischer Gedichte* (Bern, 1732), V. 289 f.:

Ins Innere der Natur dringt kein erschaffner Geist,
Zu glücklich, wenn sie noch die äußere Schale weist!

The context shows that Hegel means *weißst*, i.e. 'knows', instead of *weist*, i.e. 'shows', as in Haller's poem, where the subject is nature.

altogether. Yet because the understanding, nonetheless, holds fast to the inner and outer in separation from one another, these are a pair of empty forms, the one as void [*nichtig*] as the other. – It is of enormous importance in the consideration of nature as well as the spiritual world to grasp properly what is involved in the relationship of inner and outer and to guard against the error of presuming that only the *former* is essential and what actually matters, while the latter is inessential and irrelevant. We meet with this error initially when, as often happens, the difference between nature and spirit is reduced to the abstract difference between outer and inner. As far as the construal of nature is concerned in this connection, it is what is external in general not only for the spirit but also *in itself*. Yet this ‘in general’ is not to be taken in the sense of an abstract externality since there is no such thing. Instead it should be taken in such a way that the idea (which forms the common content of nature and spirit) is at hand in nature merely externally but precisely for that reason at the same time merely internally as well. Now, however much the abstract understanding with its ‘either/or’ might resist this construal of nature, we nonetheless find this manner of construing nature in our other modes of consciousness and, most definitely, in our religious consciousness. According to the latter, nature is no less a revelation of God than the spiritual world is, and they differ from one another by the fact that, while nature does not manage to become conscious of its divine essence, this is the explicit task of the (accordingly, initially finite) spirit. Those who regard the essence of nature as something merely internal and therefore inaccessible to us, come to occupy the standpoint of those ancients who regarded God as envious (against whom, however, Plato and Aristotle already declared their opposition). God communicates, God reveals what he is and, indeed, first through and in nature. – Furthermore, the lack or imperfection of an object generally consists in its being merely something internal and thereby at the same time merely something external or, what is the same, being merely external and thereby merely internal. A child, for example, as a human being in general, is, of course, a rational being, but the reason of the child as such is on hand at first merely internally, i.e. as disposition, calling, and so forth; for the child, this merely internal character, as the will of his parents, the familiarity with his teachers, and generally the rational world surrounding him, has the form of something merely external. The education and formation of the child consists, then, in the fact that it also becomes *for itself* what it at first is only *in itself* and thereby for others (adults). Reason, at hand in the child at first only as an inner possibility, is made actual by education, and so too, conversely, the child becomes conscious of the ethical world, religion, and science as something that is its own and internal to it, after these had first been regarded as an external authority. – As things go with the child, they go in this connection with the adult as well, insofar as the adult, contrary to his vocation [*Bestimmung*], remains caught up in the naturalness of his knowing [*Wissen*] and willing. Thus, for example, for the criminal, the punishment to which he is subjected has, to be sure, the form of an external coercion [*Gewalt*], but it is in fact only the manifestation of his own criminal will. – We should also take from the discussion so far what we are to think of the fact that someone, in the face of his meagre accomplishments, indeed,

reprehensible actions, appeals to the inner make-up distinct from them, the inner make-up of his allegedly splendid intentions and sentiments. To be sure, in an individual instance it may be the case that well-meant intentions are thwarted by unfavourable external circumstances, that purposeful plans come to naught in the execution. Still, in general, even here the essential unity of the inner and the outer holds such that it must be said: a human being *is* what he *does* and the mendacious vanity that comforts itself with the consciousness of an inner splendiddness must be countered with the words of the Gospel: 'By their fruits, you shall know them' [Matt. 7:16]. These majestic words hold in the first place in an ethical and religious respect, but they are valid in relation to scientific and artistic achievements as well. As far as the latter are concerned, a teacher with a sharp eye, convinced of a boy's decisive potential, may express the opinion that a Raphael or a Mozart lies hidden in the boy, and [the degree of] success will then instruct us on the extent to which the opinion was justified. But when an amateurish painter and a bad poet console themselves that they are full of high ideals on the inside, that is a poor consolation, and if they make the demand to be judged not by their accomplishments but by their intentions, such pretension is rightly dismissed as empty and unjustified. Conversely, it is then also frequently the case that, in judging others who have brought about something right and respectable, people avail themselves of the false distinction of inner and outer in order to claim that what those others have brought about was merely external, while internally it is about something quite different for them, such as the satisfaction of their vanity or some other reprehensible passions. This is the sentiment of envy that, itself incapable of achieving greatness, strives to put down and belittle what is great. We should remember, by contrast, Goethe's beautiful saying that, in the face of the great superiorities of others, the only means of saving ourselves is love. If then, further, in an attempt to take away from others' praiseworthy accomplishments, there is talk of hypocrisy, it should be noted against this that while a human being in an individual instance can, of course, act a part and conceal a great deal, he cannot conceal his inner make-up altogether, which announces itself infallibly in the *decursus vitae* [the course of life], such that, in this connection, it must also be said that a human being is nothing other than the series of his actions. In particular, the so-called 'pragmatic' historiography, by fallaciously separating the inner from the outer, has sinned in the modern era in a variety of ways with respect to great historical characters, clouding and distorting an unadulterated construal of them. Instead of satisfying themselves with simply narrating the great deeds accomplished by world-historical heroes and recognizing their inner make-up as corresponding to the content of these deeds, they considered themselves justified and obligated to sniff out allegedly secret motives behind what lies out in the open and then thought that historical research is all the more profound, the more it succeeds in stripping away the aura of what, until then, was celebrated and praised, putting it down, as far as its origin and genuine meaning is concerned, to the level of common mediocrity. The study of psychology has then also frequently been recommended for the purposes of such pragmatic, historical research, since by means of it one allegedly acquires information about what the actual motives are by

means of which human beings are determined to act at all. The psychology referred to here, meanwhile, is nothing other than that small-minded acquaintance with people, which principally considers merely the particularities and contingencies of individualized drives, passions, and so forth, rather than the universal and essential character of human nature. For this psychological-pragmatic procedure in relation to the motives underlying the great deeds, the choice would still remain for the historian between substantial interests of the fatherland, justice, religious truth, and so forth, on the one hand, and the subjective and formal interests of vanity, dominance, greed, and so forth, on the other hand. Yet, while this choice remains, the latter interests are regarded as the genuinely motivating ones, since otherwise, indeed, the presupposition of the opposition between the inner (the sentiment of the agent) and the outer (the content of the action) would not be confirmed. But, now, since inner and outer have the same content as far as the truth is concerned, then, over against that pedantic propriety, it must be explicitly maintained that, were it a matter merely of subjective and formal interests of the historical heroes, they would not have accomplished what they did and that, in view of the unity of inner and outer, it should be recognized that great men willed what they did and did what they willed.

§ 141

The empty abstractions, by means of which the one identical content is still supposed to obtain in the relationship, sublimate themselves in the immediate transition, the one in the other; the content is itself nothing other than their identity (§ 138), they are the shine [*Schein*] of the essence, posited as shine. Through the force's expression, the inner is *posited* in concrete existence; this *positing* is the *mediating* by means of empty abstractions; it vanishes in itself into the *immediacy* in which the *inner* and *outer* are *in and for themselves* identical and their difference is determined as mere positedness [*Gesetztsein*]. This identity is the *actuality*.

C. ACTUALITY

§ 142

Actuality is that unity of essence and concrete existence [*Existenz*], of inner and outer, that has immediately come to be. The expression [*Äußerung*] of the actual is the actual itself, so that in the expression it remains something equally essential and is something essential only insofar as it is in immediate, external [*äußerlich*] concrete existence.

As forms of the immediate, *being* and *concrete existence* [*Existenz*] surfaced earlier; *being* is completely unreflected immediacy and [the] *passing over* into an other. The *concrete existence* is immediate unity of being and reflection, thus *appearance*, coming from the ground and returning to it. The actual is the *positedness* of that unity, the relationship that has become identical with itself. It is thus exempted from the *passing over* and its *externality* is its energy; in that externality, it is reflected in itself; its existence [*Dasein*] is only the *manifestation of itself*, not of an other.

Addition. There is a tendency to oppose in a trivial manner actuality and thought, or, more precisely, the idea, and in keeping with this practice, one can frequently hear it said that while there is nothing objectionable in a certain thought as far as its rightness and truth are concerned, nothing of the sort is to be found or carried out in actuality. Those who speak in this way, however, prove thereby that they have not suitably grasped either the nature of thought or that of actuality. For, on the one hand, in such talk thought is assumed to mean the same as a subjective representation, plan, intention, and the like and, on the other hand, actuality is assumed to mean the same as the external concrete existence, available to the senses. Talk of this sort may be indulged in ordinary life where one does not take things so exactly when it comes to categories and their designation and, moreover, it may be the case that, for example, while the plan or the so-called 'idea' of a certain tax proposal is in itself quite good and appropriate, the same thing is neither to be found in the likewise so-called 'actuality' nor capable of being implemented under the circumstances at hand. But if the abstract understanding gets hold of these determinations and then intensifies the difference to the point of regarding it as a hard and fast opposition, such that in this actual world we have to put the ideas out of our heads, then in the name of science and sound reason we have to reject this sort of understanding in the most decisive terms. For, on the one hand, the ideas are not at all merely stuck in our heads and the idea is not at all something so impotent, the realization of which would have to be brought about or not at our whim. The idea is, instead, much more something that is unqualifiedly active and at the same time also actual. On the other hand, the actuality is not as bad and irrational as imagined by those of a practical bent who are thoughtless or whose thinking is decrepit and rundown. The actuality in contrast to the mere appearance, at first the unity of inner and outer, is so far from being something else opposite reason that it is far more the rational and, because of this, what is not rational should not be considered actual. There is an educated way of speaking, moreover, that corresponds to this conception of actuality, namely, insofar as one hesitates to recognize as an 'actual' poet or and 'actual' statesman a poet or statesman incapable of producing anything competent and rational. – The common conception of actuality discussed here and the confusion of it with the tangible and immediately perceivable is also the place to look for the ground of that widespread prejudice regarding the relationship of the Aristotelian to the Platonic

philosophy. According to this prejudice, the difference between Plato and Aristotle is supposed to consist in the fact that, while the former recognizes the idea and only the idea as the true, the latter, dismissive of the idea, clings, by contrast, to the actual and is to be considered, for that reason, the founder and protagonist of empiricism. On this point, it must be noted that, while actuality indeed forms the principle of Aristotelian philosophy, it is nevertheless not the common actuality of what is immediately on hand, but instead the idea as actuality. Aristotle's polemic against Plato consists then, more precisely, in the fact that the Platonic idea is designated as mere *dunamis* and that Aristotle makes valid the notion, to the contrary, that the idea, recognized by both of them likewise as what is alone true, is to be considered essentially as *energeia*, i.e. as the inner [dimension] that is absolutely out there and thus as the unity of inner and outer or as the actuality in the emphatic sense of the word discussed here.

§ 143

The actuality, as this concrete [dimension], contains those determinations and their difference; it is, for that reason, also their development so that they are determined in it at once as a shine, as merely posited (§ 141). (α) As *identity* generally it is initially the *possibility*; – the reflection-in-itself that is posited as the *abstract* and *unessential essentiality* in contrast to the *concrete* unity of the actual. Possibility is *what is essential* for actuality but such that it is at the same time *only* possibility.

It is probably the determination of *possibility* that caused *Kant* to regard it, along with actuality and necessity, as *modalities*, 'because these determinations did not in the slightest add to the concept as object [*Objekt*] but instead express only the connection to the capacity of knowing' [*Critique of Pure Reason*, B 266]. Possibility is indeed the empty abstraction of the reflection-in-itself, what was previously called 'the inner', with the only difference that it is now determined as the sublated, *merely posited*, external inner, and thus, to be sure, is also *posited* as a mere modality, as insufficient abstraction, something that, taken more concretely, pertains only to subjective thinking. Actuality and necessity are, by contrast, truly anything but a mere *sort* and *manner* for an other; rather, they are precisely the opposite, posited as the not merely posited but instead as the concrete [dimension] that is complete in itself. – Because possibility, initially contrasted with the concrete as something actual, is the mere form of *identity-with-itself*, the rule for it is merely that something not be self-contradictory and thus *everything is*

possible; for this form of identity can be given to any content through abstraction. But *everything* is just as much *impossible*, for in every content, since it is something concrete, the determinacy can be grasped as determinate opposition and thus as contradiction. – There is, thus, no more empty way of speaking than about this sort of possibility and impossibility. In philosophy, in particular, there should not be any talk of showing *that something is possible* or *that something else is also possible* and that something, as one also expresses it, is *thinkable*. The historian is also directly advised not to use this category that was already declared to be untrue for itself; but the acumen of empty understanding is never more pleased with itself than when it emptily devises possibilities and an abundant supply of them.

Addition. To [the faculty of] representation, possibility appears *prima facie* to be the richer and more encompassing determination, and actuality, by contrast, to be the poorer and more restricted determination. It is accordingly said: everything is possible, but not everything that is possible is therefore also actual. But, actuality is in fact, i.e. in terms of the thought, the more encompassing since, as the concrete thought, it contains possibility as an abstract moment within itself. This can also be found in our ordinary consciousness when, in speaking of the possible in distinction from the actual, we designate it as something ‘*merely*’ possible. – It is usually said in general of the possible that it consists in the thinkability. What is understood by ‘thinking’ here, however, is only the process of grasping a content in the form of abstract identity. Now since every content can be put into this form (and that means merely that it is detached from its relations), even the most absurd and incongruous things can be considered possible. It is possible that this evening the Moon will fall to the Earth, since the Moon is a body separate from the Earth and, therefore, can fall down just as much as a stone thrown into the air can. It is possible that the Turkish Sultan becomes Pope since he is a human being and, as such, can convert, become a Catholic priest, and so on. In talking in this way of possibilities, it is above all the principle of sufficient reason [*Denkgesetz vom Grunde*] that is used in the manner discussed earlier, and in this connection it means that if a ground of something can be given, then it is possible. The more uneducated someone is, the less familiar he is with the specific relations between the objects to which he directs his attention and the more inclined he is to entertain all sorts of empty possibilities, as is the case, for example, among so-called ‘pundits’ in the political arena. Furthermore, it often happens in a practical context that an evil will and laziness are adept at hiding behind the category of possibility in order to escape specific obligations, and in this respect the same thing holds that was noted earlier about the use of the principle of sufficient reason. Rational, practical people do not allow themselves to be impressed by the possible just because it is possible. Instead they latch on to the actual, though what is then to be understood

by the latter is, of course, not merely an immediate existent [*das unmittelbar Daseiende*]. In common life, moreover, there is no shortage of proverbs of all sorts that express the appropriate low assessment of abstract possibility. It is said, for example, 'a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.' – Yet, in addition, everything should be considered impossible by the same right that it is considered possible, especially to the extent that each content (which, as such, is always something concrete) contains in itself not only diverse, but also opposite determinations. Thus, for example, nothing is more impossible than the fact that I am, since the I is at once a simple relation to itself and relation to another through and through. The same is the case for every other content of the natural and spiritual world. One can say that matter is impossible, since it is the unity of repulsion and attraction. The same holds for life, right, freedom, and, above all, for God himself as the true, i.e. triune God, the concept of which the Enlightenment, in keeping with the principle of its abstract mode of understanding things, has repudiated as allegedly contradicting thought. It is generally the empty understanding that knocks around with these empty forms; and, in relation to them, the business of philosophy consists simply in pointing out their vapidness [*Nichtigkeit*] and lack of content. Whether something is possible or impossible depends upon the content, i.e. the totality of the moments of the actuality, which in the unfolding of those moments proves itself to be the necessity.

§ 144

(β) In its difference from possibility as the reflection-in-itself, however, the actual is itself only the *externally* concrete [dimension], the immediate *in an inessential way*. Or immediately, insofar as it initially is (§ 142) as the simple, itself immediate unity of the inner and the outer, it is what is external *in an inessential way* and is thus at the same time (§ 140) what is *only* internal, the abstraction of the reflection-in-itself; it itself is thereby determined as something *only* possible. In this value of a mere possibility, the actual is something *contingent* [*Zufälliges*] and, vice versa, possibility is mere contingency [*Zufall*] itself.

§ 145

Possibility and contingency are the moments of actuality, inner and outer, posited as mere forms that constitute the *externality* of the actual. In the actual qua determined *in-itself*, [i.e.] in the *content* as the essential ground of their determination, they have their reflection-in-itself. The finitude of the contingent and possible thus consists, more precisely, in the fact that the form determination is differentiated from the content and, *hence, whether something is contingent and possible depends on the content*.

Addition. The possibility, as the merely inner [dimension] of actuality, is precisely by this means also the merely external actuality or the *contingency*. The contingent is in general such as has the ground of its being not in itself but in another. This is the form [*Gestalt*] in which the actuality first presents itself to consciousness and which is frequently confused with actuality itself. The contingent, however, is merely the actual in the one-sided form of the reflection-into-another or the 'actual' with the meaning of something merely possible. We accordingly consider the contingent as something that can be or also not be, that can be so or also otherwise, and the ground of whose being or not-being, whose 'being so' or 'being otherwise' is not grounded in itself but in another instead. Now, overcoming the contingent, so construed, is generally the task of knowing [*Erkennens*], on the one hand, as much as in the domain of practice, on the other, it is a matter of not standing pat with the contingency of willing or arbitrary choice [*Willkür*]. Nonetheless, especially in the modern era, it has often happened that contingency has been elevated to an illegitimate level and accorded a value in relation to nature as well as the spiritual world that does not in fact suit it. As far as nature is at first concerned in this respect, it is not uncommon for contingency to be principally an object of wonder simply because of the riches and manifoldness of its formations. This richness as such, apart from the development of the idea at hand therein, presents no higher interest of reason and, in the great manifoldness of inorganic and organic formations, it affords us merely a look at the contingency as it peters out into indeterminacy. In any case, the colourful play of individual varieties of animals and plants, conditioned by external circumstances as it is, and the configuration and grouping of clouds and the like, alternating in manifold ways, are not to be esteemed higher than the equally contingent inspirations of a spirit giving itself up to its arbitrary whim. The wonder devoted to such a phenomenon is a very abstract way of behaving, from which it is necessary to take leave and move on to a deeper insight into the inner harmony and lawfulness of nature. – Of particular importance next is the proper evaluation of contingency in relation to the will. In talk of freedom of the will, what is frequently understood by it is merely the arbitrary choice, i.e. the will in the form of contingency. Now, to be sure, arbitrary choice as the capacity to determine oneself to this or that, is an essential moment of the free will in keeping with its concept. Nevertheless, it is in no way freedom itself but rather first merely formal freedom. The truly free will contains in itself arbitrary choice as sublated and is conscious of its content as a content firm in and for itself and knows [*weiß*] the same at the same time as its own without qualification. By contrast, the will that stands pat at the level of arbitrary choice, even if it makes the true and right decision with respect to the content, still remains beset with the vanity of presuming that, were it to its liking, it would have been able to make a different decision. Under closer examination, moreover, arbitrary choice proves to be contradictory insofar as form and content still stand opposite one another here. The content of arbitrary choice is a given content and known [*gewußt*] to be a content grounded [*begründet*], not in the will itself, but in external circumstances. Hence, in relation to such content, freedom consists merely in the form of choosing, a formal freedom that is then to be considered a merely alleged freedom insofar as, in the final analysis, it turns out that the fact

that the will decides exactly for this and not for that must be ascribed to the same external circumstances in which the content found by the will as already given is grounded.

Now, although contingency, as a consequence of what has been discussed up to this point, is only a one-sided moment of actuality and therefore not to be confused with the latter itself, contingency is still to be accorded its due even in the objective [*gegenständlich*] world, since it is a form of the idea in general. This holds first for nature on the surface of which contingency has, so to speak, its free sway which should also be recognized then as such, without the pretension (at times erroneously ascribed to philosophy) of intending to find in it an instance of being able to be only so and not otherwise. In a similar way, the contingent asserts itself in the spiritual world as well, such as was already noted previously with respect to the will that contains in itself what is contingent in the form of arbitrary choice, albeit only as a sublated moment. Even in relation to the spirit and its activity, one has to guard against letting the well-intentioned endeavour of rational knowledge mislead one into purporting to demonstrate to be necessary or, as one is accustomed to say, to construe as a priori, appearances that possess the character of contingency. Thus, for example, in language, although it is as it were the body of thinking, chance undoubtedly also still plays its decisive role and something similar is the case with the formations of right, art, and so forth. It is quite right that the task of science and, more precisely of philosophy in general, consists in knowing the necessity hidden beneath the semblance of contingency. Yet this should not be so understood as if the contingent pertained merely to our subjective representation and that, therefore, it must be completely set aside in order to arrive at the truth. Scientific endeavours that single-mindedly pursue this direction will not escape from the fair-minded reproach of vacuously playing around and being obstinately pedantic.

§ 146

That *externality* of actuality contains more precisely this: that the contingency as immediate actuality is essentially what is identical with itself only as *being posited* [*Gesetztsein*], but a being posited that is just as much sublated [*aufgehoben*], i.e. an existing externality [*eine daseiende Äußerlichkeit*]. It is thus something *presupposed*, the immediate existence [*Dasein*] of which is at the same time a *possibility* and has the determination of being sublated – of being the possibility of another – the *condition*.

Addition. The contingent, as the immediate actuality, is at the same time the possibility of something else [*eines Anderen*], yet no longer merely that abstract possibility that we had at first, but instead the possibility as *being* [*seiend*] and, hence, it is a *condition*. If we speak of the condition of a basic matter, there lie therein the following two aspects: first, an existence [*ein Dasein*], a concrete existence [*eine Existenz*], in general something immediate, and, second, the determination of this immediate something to be sublated and to serve for the actualization of something else. – Now, in general, the immediate actuality as such is not what

it is supposed to be but instead a finite actuality, broken in itself, and it is its determination to be used up [*verzehrt*]. However, the other side of the actuality is its essentiality. This is at first the inner [dimension] that, as mere possibility, is equally determined to be sublated. As sublated possibility, it is the emerging of a new actuality that the first, immediate actuality had as its presupposition. This is the alternation that the concept of 'condition' contains in itself. If we consider the conditions of a subject matter, then these appear as something completely innocent. In fact, however, such immediate actuality contains in itself the seed of something completely other than it. This other is at first only something possible, the form of which then sublates itself and transposes itself into actuality. This new actuality which thus emerges is the immediate actuality's own inner side that the new actuality uses up. A completely different shape of things thus comes to be and there also comes to be nothing different; for the first actuality is only posited in terms of its essence. The conditions that sacrifice themselves up, perish, and are used up, only join up with themselves in the other actuality. – Now, the process of actuality in general is of such nature. This is not merely some immediate being [*ein unmittelbar Seiendes*], but instead as the essential being it is the sublation of its own immediacy and, by this means, mediating itself with itself.

§ 147

(γ) This externality, developed in the manner depicted, is a *circle* of determinations of possibility and of the immediate – actuality, their *mediation* by one another, the *real possibility* in general. As such a circle, it is furthermore the totality, thus the *content*, the *basic matter* [*Sache*] determined in and for itself, and equally, in keeping with the difference of determinations in this unity, the concrete *totality of the form* for itself, the immediate self-transposing of the inner into the outer and of the outer into the inner. This self-moving of the form is *activity*, activation of the basic matter as the *real* ground that sublates itself and comes to be actual, and activation of the contingent actuality, the conditions, namely, their reflection-in-themselves and their self-sublating [*Sichaufheben*] to become another actuality, the actuality of the *basic matter*. If *all conditions* are at hand, the basic matter *must* become actual and the basic matter is itself one of the conditions since as something initially inner, it is itself only something presupposed. The *developed* actuality as the alternation of the inner and the outer collapsing into one, the alternation of its opposite movements that are united into *one* movement, is *necessity*.

Necessity has been rightly defined, to be sure, as the unity of possibility and actuality. But this determination is superficial and, for that reason, not understandable if expressed only in this way.

The concept of necessity is very difficult and, indeed, it is so because it is the concept itself whose moments still are as actualities that, nonetheless, have to be grasped at the same time merely as forms, as in themselves broken and transitional. For this reason, in both of the following sections, the exposition of the moments that constitute the necessity has to be given in even greater detail.

Addition. If it is said of something that it is necessary, we first ask ‘why?’ Hence, the necessary is supposed to prove itself as something posited, something mediated. If, however, we do not move beyond the mere mediation, then we still do not have what is understood by ‘necessity’. What is merely mediated is what it is, not by means of itself, but by means of another and, hence, it is also merely something contingent. We demand of the necessary, by contrast, that it be what it is by means of itself and thus mediated, to be sure, yet at the same time containing in itself the mediation as sublated. Of the necessary we accordingly say: ‘It *is*’ and accordingly for us it has the value of a simple relation to itself, in which the sense of being conditioned by another falls away. – It is customarily said of necessity that it is blind and, to be sure, this is right insofar as, in the process that necessity is, the *purpose* is not yet on hand as such *for itself*. The process of necessity begins with the concrete existence of scattered circumstances that seem to have nothing to do with one another and to have no connection between them. These circumstances are an immediate actuality which collapses into itself and a new actuality emerges from this negation. We have here a content that is twofold, as far as its form is concerned. First, it is content of the basic matter at issue and, second, it is content of the scattered circumstances that appear as something positive and initially assert themselves in this way. This content, as a ‘nothing’ [*Nichtiges*] in itself, is accordingly inverted into its negative and thus becomes content of the basic matter. The immediate circumstances go under [*zugrunde gehen*] as conditions, but at the same time are also preserved as content of the basic matter. It is then said that something completely different emerged from such circumstances and conditions and, for this reason, the necessity of this process is called blind. If, by contrast, we consider purposive activity, then we have here, in the purpose, a content that is already known [*gewußt*] in advance and this activity is therefore not blind but instead sees [*sehend*]. When we say that the world is governed by providence, we are saying that the purpose in general is what effects things, doing so as something determinate in and for itself in advance, so that what comes about corresponds to what was known and intended in advance. Incidentally, one must not consider the construal of the world as determined by necessity and the belief in a divine providence as in any way mutually exclusive. What underlies the thought of divine providence will turn out for us subsequently to be the concept. This is the truth of necessity and contains the latter as sublated in itself just as, conversely, necessity in itself is the concept. Necessity is blind only insofar as it is not comprehended and there is, therefore, nothing more wrong than the reproach of a blind fatalism, a charge made against the philosophy of history, because it regards its task to be the knowledge of the necessity of what has happened. The philosophy of history acquires thereby the meaning of a theodicy, and, while

there are those who believe themselves to be honouring the divine providence by excluding necessity from it, by this abstraction they in fact degrade it to a blind, arbitrary choice, devoid of reason. The innocent religious consciousness speaks of God's eternal and inviolable decrees and therein lies the explicit recognition of necessity as belonging to God's essence. In contrast to God, and given their particular opining and willing, human beings act according to mood and arbitrary choice and thus it happens to them that, in their actions, what comes about is something completely different from what they intended and wanted. By contrast, God knows [*weiß*] what he wants and, in his eternal will, he is not determined by inner or outer chance, instead bringing about, without resistance, what he wants. – The standpoint of necessity is generally of great importance in relation to our attitude [*Gesinnung*] and our comportment. Since we regard what occurs as necessary, then this seems at first glance to be a completely unfree relationship. The ancients, as is well known, construed necessity as *fate* and the modern standpoint is, by contrast, the standpoint of *consolation*. This consists generally in the fact that, while we give up our purposes, our interests, we do so with the prospect of acquiring a substitute for them. Fate, by contrast, is without consolation. If, now, we consider the ancients' attitude to fate more closely, then it nonetheless affords us in no way the intuition of unfreedom, but instead much more that of freedom. This lies in the fact that the lack of freedom is grounded in clinging to an opposition of the sort that we regard what *is* and happens as standing in contradiction to what *should* be and happen. In the attitude of the ancients, by contrast, it was implied that *because* something is the way it is, it is, and the *way* it is, is the way it ought to be. Here, therefore, no opposition is at hand and, with it, also no lack of freedom, no pain, and no suffering. Now, as previously noted, this comportment towards fate is, to be sure, without consolation, but such an attitude is also not in need of consolation and, indeed, because subjectivity here has still not reached its infinite meaning. It is this viewpoint that must be seen as the decisive one in the comparison of the ancient and our modern, Christian attitude. If, by subjectivity, one understands merely the finite, immediate subjectivity with the contingent and arbitrary content of its particular inclinations and interests, in general what one calls the 'person' in contrast to 'basic matter' in the emphatic sense of the word (in which sense one would say – and, to be sure, correctly – that something depends upon the *basic matter* and not on the person), then one cannot help but wonder at the ancients' serene surrender to fate and recognize this attitude as the higher and more dignified one than that modern attitude that selfishly pursues its subjective purposes and, if it sees itself necessitated to renounce the attainment of them, consoles itself merely with the prospect of acquiring a substitute in another form. Furthermore, however, the subjectivity is not merely the bad and finite subjectivity, standing opposite the basic matter; instead it is, in keeping with its truth, immanent to the basic matter and, accordingly as infinite subjectivity, is the truth of the basic matter itself. So construed, then, the standpoint of consolation acquires a completely different and higher meaning and it is in this sense that the Christian religion is to be regarded as the religion of consolation and, indeed, of absolute consolation. Christendom contains, as is

well known, the doctrine that God wants all human beings to be helped and this is a way of articulating that subjectivity has an infinite value. More precisely, the consoling quality of the Christian religion lies in the fact that, because God himself is known [*gewußt*] here as the absolute subjectivity, and subjectivity contains in itself the aspect of particularity, *our* particularity is also by this means recognized, not merely as something that is to be abstractly denied, but at the same time as something to be preserved. The ancients' gods were, to be sure, likewise recognized as personal; the personality of a Zeus, an Apollo, and so forth is, however, not an actual, but an imagined personality or, to put it differently, these gods are mere personifications that, as such, do not *know* [*wissen*] *themselves* but are only *known* [*gewußt*]. We also find this deficiency and impotence of the ancient gods in the ancients' religious consciousness, insofar as they regarded not only human beings but even gods themselves as subject to fate (the *pepromenon* or the *heimarmene*), a fate which one has to imagine as the undisclosed [*unenthüllte*] necessity and thus as utterly impersonal, devoid of self, and blind. In contrast to this, the Christian God is the God not merely known [*gewußt*] but the unqualifiedly self-knowing [*sich wissende*] God, and not merely imagined but instead an absolutely actual personality. – For further elaboration of the points touched on here, reference should be made to the philosophy of religion. Nevertheless, note can still be taken here of how important it is that the human being construe what befalls him in the light of that ancient proverb which says that everyone is the architect of his own fortune. Herein lies the fact that the human being in general is given only himself to enjoy. The opposite view is that we shove the blame for what befalls us onto other human beings, onto unfavourable circumstances, and the like. This, then, is again the standpoint of unfreedom and at the same time the source of dissatisfaction. Insofar as a human being recognizes, to the contrary, that what he experiences is merely an evolution of himself and that he bears only his own guilt, he behaves as someone free, and in everything that confronts him he has the belief that no injustice is done to him. Someone who lives in dissatisfaction with himself and his lot [*Geschick*] does much that is wrong and twisted precisely because he is of the false opinion that others are doing him an injustice. Now, to be sure, in what happens to us, there is much that is contingent, too. This contingent element, however, is grounded in the naturalness of the human being. However, insofar as in another respect the human being has the consciousness of his freedom, the unpleasant things that confront him will not destroy the harmony of his soul, the peace of his mind. It is, therefore, the view of necessity through which the satisfaction and the dissatisfaction of human beings and thereby their fate itself are determined.

§ 148

Among the three moments, the *condition*, the *basic matter*, and the *activity*

- a. the *condition* is (α) something presupposed [*das Vorausgesetzte*]; as only something *supposed* [*Gesetztes*], it is merely in the sense of being relative

to the basic matter, but as *pre-supposed* [*voraus*] it is in the sense of a contingent, external condition, concretely existing for itself without regard for the basic matter. But at the same time, in this contingency, in regard to the basic matter which is the totality, this presupposition is a *complete circle of conditions*. (β) The conditions are *passive*, they are used as material for the basic matter, and thereby enter into the *content* of the basic matter. They are just as much suited to this content and already contain its *entire determination* within themselves.

- b. The *basic matter* is equally (α) something presupposed; as *supposed* [*gesetzte*], it is initially merely something internal and possible and, as *pre-supposed*, a self-sufficient content for itself. (β) Through the use of the conditions, it obtains its external concrete existence, realizing the determinations of its content, determinations that correspond mutually to the conditions, so that it both proves itself to be the basic matter on the basis of these conditions and emerges from them.
- c. The *activity* is (α) also something self-sufficient and existing concretely for itself (a human being, a character) and, at the same time, it has its possibility solely thanks to the conditions and the basic matter. (β) It is the movement of translating the conditions into the basic matter and the basic matter into the conditions as the side of concrete existence; but the movement only of setting the basic matter forth from the conditions (in which it is on hand *in itself*) and by way of sublating [*Aufhebung*] the concrete existence of the conditions, providing the basic matter with concrete existence.

Insofar as these three moments have the shape of a *self-sufficient concrete existence* opposite one another, this process is the *external necessity*. – This necessity has a *limited* content with respect to its basic matter. For the basic matter is this whole in a *simple* determinacy. But since it is in its form external to itself, it is thereby also external to itself in itself and in its content, and this externality with respect to the basic matter is a limitation [*Schranke*] of its content.

§ 149

Necessity is thus in itself the *one essence*, identical *with itself* but full of content, the essence that shines in itself [*in sich scheint*] in such a way that its differences have the form of *self-sufficient actuals* and this identity [*dies Identische*], as the absolute *form*, is at the same time the *activity* of sublating [*Tätigkeit des Aufhebens*] [immediacy] in mediated being and the mediation in immediacy. – What is necessary is through an *other*

that has broken up into the *mediating ground* (the basic matter and the activity) and an *immediate* actuality, something contingent that is at the same time a condition. Insofar as it is through an other, the necessary is not in and for itself but instead something merely *posited* [*Gesetztes*]. But this mediation is just as immediately the sublation of itself; the ground and the contingent condition are transposed into immediacy, by means of which that positedness is sublated to become actuality and the basic matter has *come together with itself*. In this return into itself, the necessary is in an *unqualified way*, as unconditioned actuality. – The necessary is the way it is, *mediated* by a circle of circumstances, – it is so, because the circumstances are so; and, at the same time, it is the way it is, *unmediated*, – it is so, because it is.

a. The relationship of substantiality

§ 150

The necessary is in itself the *absolute relationship*, i.e. the process (developed in the preceding sections) in which the relationship equally sublates itself to become absolute identity.

In its immediate form, it is the relationship of *substantiality* and *accidentality*. The absolute identity of this relationship with itself is the *substance* as such which, as necessity, is the negativity of this form of interiority, thus positing itself as *actuality*, but which is just as much the *negativity* of this outer dimension, in keeping with which the actual as immediate is only something *accidental* that, thanks to this, its mere possibility, passes over into another actuality; a *passing over* which is the substantial identity as the *activity of the form* (§§ 148, 149).

§ 151

The substance is accordingly the totality of the accidents in which it reveals itself as their absolute negativity, i.e. as *absolute power* and at the same time as the *wealth of all content*. This content, however, is *nothing other than this manifestation itself* since the determinacy itself, reflected in itself [and thus made into] the content, is only a moment of the form, a moment that passes over into the *power* of the substance. The substantiality is the absolute activity of the form and the power of the necessity, and all content

is only a moment that belongs to this process alone, – the absolute turning over of form and content into one another.

Addition. In the history of philosophy, we encounter *substance* as the principle of the Spinozistic philosophy. Since the time of Spinoza there has been a great deal of misunderstanding and much talk back and forth about the meaning and value of this philosophy, which is equally acclaimed and defamed. It is customary to reproach the Spinozistic system above all for being atheistic and then for being pantheistic, and to make these charges because God is construed as substance and only as substance in this system. What one should think of these reproaches immediately follows from the place occupied by the substance in the system of the logical idea. The substance is an essential stage in the process of the development of the idea. Nevertheless, it is not this idea itself, not the absolute idea, but instead the idea in the still limited form of necessity. Now, to be sure, God is the necessity or, as one can also say, God is the *absolute basic matter* [*absolute Sache*], but also at the same time the absolute *person*, and this is the point not reached by Spinoza. In this connection, it must be admitted that the Spinozistic philosophy lagged behind the true concept of God, which forms the content of Christian consciousness. Spinoza was a Jew by descent and what found expression in the form of thought in his philosophy is in general the oriental intuition according to which everything finite appears merely as something transient, as something vanishing. Now, this oriental intuition forms, to be sure, the foundation of all true further development, but it is not possible to stand pat with it. What is missing in it is the Western principle of individuality, a principle that first took shape in philosophy at the same time as Spinozism in the Leibnizian monadology. – If we look back from this vantage point at the reproach of atheism, directed at Spinoza's philosophy, then it will have to be dismissed out of hand as unjustified insofar as, according to this philosophy, God is not only not denied but instead recognized as the only true being [*der allein wahrhaft Seiende*]. It will also not be possible to maintain that, while Spinoza may speak, to be sure, of God as the only truth, this Spinozistic God is not the true God and therefore as good as no God. With the same right, all the other philosophers who in their philosophizing did not move beyond some subordinate level of the idea would have to be blamed for being atheistic. That would include not only Jews and Moslems because they know [*wissen*] God merely as the *Lord*, but also all the many Christians who regard God merely as the unknowable, supreme, and other-worldly being. On closer examination, the reproach of atheism, directed at the Spinozistic philosophy, reduces to this, that in it the principle of difference [*Differenz*] or finitude does not attain the legitimacy befitting it. As a result, this system would have to be designated not an 'atheism' but instead the reverse, an '*acosmism*', since according to this philosophy there is actually no world at all in the sense of something positively being [*eines positiv Seienden*]. What one should think of the reproach of *pantheism* follows from this then as well. If, as is often the case, one understands by 'pantheism' a doctrine that considers finite things as such and the complex of them to be God, then one cannot help but acquit the Spinozistic philosophy of the reproach of pantheism since absolutely no truth at all accrues to finite things or the world according to

the Spinozistic philosophy. To the contrary, this philosophy is, indeed, pantheistic precisely on account of its acosmism. The deficiency that has been recognized here with regard to the *content* proves to be a deficiency at the same time with regard to the *form* as well. This is apparent first insofar as Spinoza places substance at the pinnacle of his system and defines it as the unity of thinking and extension, without demonstrating how he arrives at this difference and at its reduction to the substantial unity. The further treatment of the content then follows in the so-called 'mathematical method' and, in keeping with this, definitions and axioms are immediately set up, followed by a series of principles, the proof of which consists merely in a reduction to those unproven presuppositions, a reduction befitting the understanding. Although it is customary, even for those who utterly reject the content and results of the Spinozistic philosophy, to applaud it on account of the rigorous consistency of its method, this unconditioned recognition of the form is, nonetheless, as unjustified as the unconditioned rejection of the content. The deficiency of the Spinozistic content consists precisely in the fact that the form is not recognized as immanent to the content and, for that reason, it is only as external, subjective form that it comes to the content. Substance, just as it is immediately construed by Spinoza without the prior dialectical mediation, is, as the universal negative power, only this dark, shapeless abyss, as it were, that swallows up into itself every determinate content as vacuous [*nichtig*] from the outset and produces nothing that has a positive standing [*Bestand*] in itself.

§ 152

Substance, qua absolute power, is the power that *relates itself to itself* as only inner possibility, determining itself thereby to accidentality, whereby the externality thus posited is distinguished from it. Just as it is substance in the first form of necessity, so substance is, according to the moment just described, genuine *relationship* – the *relationship of causality*.

b. The relationship of causality

§ 153

Substance is *cause* [*Ursache*] insofar as it is reflected in itself against its passing over into accidentality and is thus the *original basic matter* [*ursprüngliche Sache*], but just as much supersedes the reflection-in-itself or its mere possibility, posits itself as the negative of itself and in this way brings forth an *effect*, an actuality which is only a posited actuality, but through the process of effecting is at the same time a necessary actuality.

As the *original basic matter*, the cause has the determination of absolute self-sufficiency and a subsisting that maintains itself opposite the effect. But in the necessity, the identity of which constitutes that originality itself, it has merely passed over into the effect. There is no content in the effect that is not in the cause, insofar as it is possible again to talk of a determinate content. That identity is the absolute content itself. But it is also equally the determination of form, the originality is sublated in the effect in which it *makes* itself *something posited*. With this, however, the cause has not vanished such that the actual would be only the effect. For this positedness is immediately superseded just as much; it is indeed the reflection-in-itself of the cause, its originality; the cause is first actual and cause in the effect. The cause is thus in and for itself *causa sui* [cause of itself]. – *Jacobi*, firmly caught up in the one-sided representation of the *mediation*, took the *causa sui* (the *effectus sui* is the same), this absolute truth of the cause, merely for a formalism.²⁶ He also put forward that God must be determined, not as ground, but essentially as cause. That this move did not achieve what he intended would have emerged from thinking over the nature of cause much more thoroughly. Even in a *finite* cause and its representation, this identity in regard to the content is at hand; the rain, the cause, and the wetness, the effect, are one and the same concretely existing water. In regard to the form, the cause (the rain) thus falls away in the effect (the wetness); but so does the determination of the effect that is nothing without the cause and there remains only the indifferent wetness.

The cause in the common sense of the causal relationship is *finite* insofar as its content is finite (as in the finite substance) and insofar as cause and effect are represented as two different, self-sufficient concrete existences – which they are only because one abstracts from the relationship of causality in their case. Because in [the sphere of] finitude one does not move beyond the *difference* between the determinations of form in their relation, the cause is also alternately determined as something *posited* or as *effect*. The latter then has another cause in turn and in this way there arises here the progression from effects to causes ad infinitum. The same holds for the *descending* progression in that the effect, in keeping with its

²⁶ Moldenhauer–Michel: Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, *Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn* (1785), new augmented edition 1789.

identity with the cause, is itself determined as cause and at the same time as *another* cause that has other effects in turn and so on ad infinitum.

Addition. To the same degree that the understanding is accustomed to resisting [the idea of] substantiality, it is, by contrast, at home with causality, i.e. the relationship of cause and effect. If construing a content in a necessary fashion is what matters, then reflection at the level of the understanding makes it its business to reduce that content to the relationship of causality above all. Now this relationship, to be sure, pertains to necessity, but it is only the one side in the process of necessity which is just as much this, to sublimate the mediation contained in causality and demonstrate itself to be a simple relation-to-itself. If one does not move beyond causality as such, then one does not have it as it truly is, but instead as a finite causality, and the finitude of this relation then consists in the fact that cause and effect are firmly maintained in their difference. Yet these two are not only distinct, but also just as much identical, something that can also be met with in our ordinary consciousness when we say of a cause that it is this only insofar as it has an effect and of an effect that it is this effect only insofar as it has a cause. Both cause and effect are thus one and the same content, and the difference between them is immediately only that of *positing* and *being posited*, a formal difference that, however, then equally sublates itself in turn in such a way that the cause is not only cause of something else but also cause of itself and the effect is not only effect of something else but also the effect of itself. The finitude of things accordingly consists in the fact that, while cause and effect are identical in terms of their concept, these two forms occur in separation in *such* a way that the cause is, to be sure, also effect and the effect is, to be sure, also cause, yet the former not in the same relation in which it is cause and the latter not in the same relation in which it is effect. This yields then in turn the infinite progression in the shape of an endless series of causes that shows itself at the same time to be an endless series of effects.

§ 154

The effect is *different* from the cause; the effect is, as such, a *being-that-is-positing*. But positedness is equally reflection-in-itself and immediacy, and the cause's effecting, its positing, is at the same time a *presupposing*, insofar as the difference of the effect from the cause is maintained. There is accordingly *another substance* at hand, in regard to which the effect happens. This [substance] is, as *immediate*, not self-relating negativity and *active*, but *passive* instead. But, as substance, it is equally active, it sublates [*hebt auf*] the presupposed immediacy and the effect posited in it; it *reacts*, i.e. it sublates the activity of the first substance which, however, is just as much this sublating [*dies Aufheben*] of its immediacy or

the effect posited in it, and, with this, sublates the activity of the other and reacts. With this, causality has passed over into the relationship of *reciprocity*.

In reciprocity, although causality is not yet posited in its true determination, the progress of causes and effects ad infinitum is sublated in a genuine manner as progress, since the linear movement from causes to effects and from effects to causes is *bent around* and *back into* itself. This manner of bending the infinite progress around to a relationship closed in itself is, as everywhere, [based in] the simple reflection that in that thoughtless repetition there is only one and the same, namely, *one* and *another* cause and their relation to one another. However, the development of this relation, the reciprocal effecting, is itself the alternation of *differentiating* not causes but moments, in *each of which for itself* – again in keeping with the identity according to which the cause is in the effect (and vice versa), in keeping with this inseparability – the *other* moment is likewise posited as well.

c. Reciprocity

§ 155

The determinations that have been kept separate in reciprocity are (α) *in themselves* the same; one side like the other is cause, original, active, passive, and so forth. So, too, presupposing another and having an effect on it, the immediate primordiality [*Ursprünglichkeit*] and the positedness by way of alternation are one and the same. The cause assumed to be *first* is, on account of its immediacy, *passive*, a *positedness*, and an *effect*. The difference between the causes, identified as *two*, is thus empty and what is at hand is *in itself* only *one* cause that, in its effect sublates itself as substance just as much as it renders itself self-sufficient in this effecting.

§ 156

(β) But this unity is also *for itself*, since this whole alternation is the cause's own *positing*, and its *being* is nothing but this positing. The vacuousness [*Nichtigkeit*] of the differences is not only in itself or our reflection (see preceding section), but this reciprocity is itself also the process of sublating each of the posited determinations in turn, inverting each into the opposite

determination, and thus positing that vacuousness of the moments that is in itself. An effect is posited in the primordially; that is to say, the primordially is sublated. The action of a cause becomes a reaction, and so forth.

Addition. Reciprocity is the relationship of causality, posited in its complete development, and it is also this relationship in which reflection customarily takes refuge, if the consideration of things from the standpoint of causality proves to be inadequate on account of the previously mentioned infinite regress. Thus, for example, in historical considerations the question first negotiated is whether the character and customs of a people are the cause of its constitution and laws or whether the former are the effect of the latter. There is then a progression to the point of construing both of them, character and customs, on the one side, and constitution and laws, on the other, from the viewpoint of reciprocity in such a way that the cause, in the same relation in which it is cause, is at the same time effect and that the effect, in the same relation in which it is effect, is at the same time cause. The same thing happens also in the consideration of nature and particularly of a living organism, the individual organs and functions of which likewise prove to be reciprocally related to one another. Reciprocity is, to be sure, the proximate truth about the relationship of cause and effect and it stands, so to speak, on the threshold of the concept. Nevertheless, precisely for this reason, one should not be satisfied with the application of this relationship, insofar as what matters is to know conceptually. If one does not move beyond considering a given content merely from the viewpoint of reciprocity, this is in fact an utterly conceptless way of behaving. One is then dealing merely with a dry fact and the requirement of mediation (what is *prima facie* at stake in the application of the relationship of causality) still remains unsatisfied. If it is considered more precisely, what is unsatisfactory in the application of the relationship of reciprocity consists in the fact that this relationship, instead of being able to hold as an equivalent of the concept, first needs to be comprehended itself, and this happens, not by leaving the two sides of it as something immediately given, but instead (as was shown in the two previous sections) by coming to know them as moments of a third, higher [dimension], which is precisely the concept. If we consider, for example, the customs of the Spartan people as the effect of its constitution and then, vice versa, this as the effect of its customs, this consideration may for all that be correct; but this construal, for this reason, does not provide any ultimate satisfaction, since by this means neither the constitution nor the customs of this people are in fact comprehended. That happens only by virtue of the fact that those two sides, and equally all the remaining particular sides revealed by the life and history of the Spartan people, are known to be grounded [*begründet*] in this concept.

§ 157

(γ) This sheer alternation with itself is, accordingly, the *unveiled* or *posited necessity*. The bond of necessity as such is the identity that is still *inner* and

hidden because it is the identity of those [things] that count as *actual*, but whose self-sufficiency is, nevertheless, supposed to be precisely the necessity. The course taken by the substance through causality and reciprocity is thus merely the process of *positing* that the *self-sufficiency* is the infinite, *negative relation to itself*: *negative* in the general sense that in it the differentiating and mediating become an original condition of *actualities* that are *self-sufficient vis-à-vis* one another – an infinite *relation to itself*, since their self-standing status is precisely nothing other than their identity.

§ 158

This *truth* of *necessity* is thus *freedom*, and the *truth* of *substance* is the *concept* – the self-sufficiency that is the repelling of itself from itself into different self-sufficient [moments] and, as this repelling, is identical with itself and, enduring *by itself*, is this alternating movement only *with itself*.

Addition. Necessity tends to be called ‘hard’ and rightly so insofar as there is no movement beyond it as such, i.e. in its immediate shape. We have here a status or in general a content that subsists for itself, and necessity then entails *prima facie* that something else affects such content, destroying it. This is what is hard and sad about immediate or abstract identity. The identity of both, which appear bound to one another in necessity, losing their self-sufficiency in the process, is at first only an inner identity and is not yet at hand for those that are subjected to the necessity. So, too, from this standpoint, freedom is first merely the abstract freedom that is only saved through renunciation of what one immediately is and has. – Furthermore, however, as we have seen up to this point, the process of necessity is of the sort that through it the rigid externality initially on hand is overcome and its inner dimension revealed. By this means, it then becomes apparent that the two sides bound to one another are in fact not alien to one another but instead only moments of *one* whole, each of which, in its relation to the other, is with itself and comes together with itself. This is the transfiguration of necessity into freedom, and this freedom is not merely the freedom of abstract negation but instead a concrete and positive freedom. From this then it should also be gathered how wrong it is to consider freedom and necessity mutually exclusive of one another. Although, to be sure, necessity as such is not yet freedom, freedom presupposes necessity and contains in itself the latter as sublated. An ethical human being is conscious that the content of his action is something necessary, something valid in and for itself, and so little does he suffer a breach of his freedom on that account that it is through this consciousness that such freedom first becomes freedom that is actual and replete with content, distinct from arbitrary choice as the freedom still devoid of content and merely possible. A criminal who is being punished may regard the punishment meted out to him as a limitation of his freedom. Nevertheless, the punishment is in fact not an alien force to which he is subjected but only the manifestation of his own action and

insofar as he recognizes this, he behaves as someone who is free. This is, in general, a human being's supreme self-sufficiency, to know [*wissen*] himself as unqualifiedly determined by the absolute idea, a consciousness and comportment that Spinoza designated as *amor intellectualis Dei* [*intellectual love of God*].

§ 159

The *concept* is accordingly the *truth of being and essence*, since the shining of reflection within itself is itself at the same time self-sufficient immediacy and this *being* of diverse actuality is immediately only a shining *in itself*.

In that the concept has proven itself to be the truth of being and essence, both of which *have gone back into* it as into its *ground*, it has *developed inversely*, from *being* as from its *ground*. The former side of the progression can be considered a *deepening* of being in itself, the inner [dimension] of which has been unveiled by this progression; the latter side can be considered the emergence of *the more perfect from the less perfect*. Philosophy has been reproached for considering such development from the latter side alone. The more determinate content that the superficial thoughts of the less perfect and the more perfect have here is the difference between *being* qua immediate unity with itself, and the *concept* qua free mediation with itself. Since *being* has shown itself to be a *moment* of the concept, the concept has demonstrated itself to be the truth of being; as this, its reflection-in-itself, and as the sublating [*Aufheben*] of the mediation, it *presupposes the immediate* – a presupposing that is identical with the return-into-itself, the identity that makes up the freedom and the concept. If the *moment* is thus named the imperfect, then, of course, the concept, the perfect, is this, to develop itself from the imperfect, for it is essentially this sublating of its presupposition. However, at the same time, it is the concept alone that, qua positing itself makes the presupposition, as was the outcome in causality in general and more specifically in reciprocity.

In relation to being and essence, the concept is determined in such a way that it is the *essence* that has *gone back to being* as *simple immediacy*, the essence whose shining thereby has actuality and whose actuality is at the same time the process of *freely shining in itself*. In this manner the concept has being as its simple relation to itself or as the immediacy of its unity *in itself*; being is so

impoverished a determination that it is the very least that can be pointed up in the concept.

The transition from necessity to freedom or from the actual into the concept is the hardest transition, because the self-sufficient actuality is supposed to be thought as having its substantiality only in the process of passing over and in the identity with the self-sufficient actuality *other* than it. The concept is also the hardest then, because it is itself precisely this identity. The actual substance as such, however, the cause that, in its being-for-itself, does not want to let anything penetrate into it, is already subject to the *necessity* or fate of passing over into positedness, and this subjection is the hardest by far. By contrast, *thinking* the necessity is rather the dissolving of that hardness; for it is the process of its coming-together with *itself* in an other, – the *liberation* which is not the flight of abstraction but instead the liberation of having itself not as other but of having its own being and positing in something else actual with which what is actual is bound together by the power of necessity. As *concretely existing for itself*, this liberation is called ‘I’, as developed in its totality ‘free spirit’, as feeling ‘love’, as enjoyment ‘blessedness’. – The great intuition of the Spinozistic substance *is* only *in itself* the liberation from finite being-for-itself; but the concept itself is *for itself* the power of necessity and the *actual* freedom.

Addition. If, as has happened here, the concept is designated the truth of being and essence, then one must expect the question why this study did not begin with it. What serves as an answer to this is the fact that, where it is a matter of knowing through thinking, it is not possible to begin with the truth, because the truth, insofar as it forms the beginning, rests on a mere assurance while the truth that is thought has to verify itself, as such, to thinking. If the concept were placed at the pinnacle of logic and defined as the unity of being and essence (as is completely correct in terms of the content), the question would then arise what one is supposed to think by ‘being’ and by ‘essence’ and how both of these come to be brought together into the unity of the concept. In this way, one would have started with the concept in name only and not as the basic matter. The genuine beginning would be made with being, such as also happened here, only with the difference that the determinations of being and, similarly, those of essence would have to be taken up immediately from the representation. In contrast, we have considered being and essence in their own dialectical development and come to know them as sublating themselves towards the unity of the concept.

Third subdivision of the Logic: The doctrine of the concept

§ 160

The concept is the *free* [actuality] [*das Freie*], as the *substantial power that is for itself*, and it is the *totality*, since *each* of the moments is *the whole* that *it* is, and each is posited as an undivided unity with it. So, in its identity with itself, it is what is *determinate in and for itself*.

Addition. The standpoint of the concept is in general that of absolute idealism, and philosophy is knowing conceptually [*begreifendes Erkennen*]. It is conceptual knowing insofar as everything that ordinary consciousness regards as an entity, and in its immediacy as independent, is known [*gewußt*] merely as an ideal moment in it. In logic at the level of the understanding [*Verstandeslogik*] the concept is usually considered as a mere form of thinking and, more precisely, as a universal representation. The claim, so often repeated from the side of sentiment and the heart, that concepts as such are something dead, empty, and abstract, refers to this low-level construal of the concept. Meanwhile, just the opposite holds and the concept is instead the principle of all life and thereby, at the same time, something absolutely concrete. That such is the case has emerged as the result of the entire logical movement up to this point and hence does not need first to be proven here. As far as the opposition of form and content is concerned in this connection, namely, with respect to the concept as allegedly merely formal, this opposition, like all the other oppositions held fast by reflection, is already behind us as something overcome dialectically, that is to say through itself, and it is precisely the concept which contains all the earlier determinations of thinking as sublated determinations in itself. To be sure, the concept needs to be considered as form, but only as infinite, fecund form that encompasses the fullness of all content within itself and at the same time releases it from itself. By the same token, the concept may also be called 'abstract', if by 'concrete' one understands what presents itself to the senses as concrete – what can be perceived in any immediate way at all. We cannot grasp the concept as such with our hands and, when it comes to the concept, we generally have to take leave of seeing and hearing. Nonetheless, the concept is at the same time, as already noted, the absolutely concrete, and indeed is so insofar as it contains in itself being and essence, and accordingly contains the entire richness of these two spheres in an ideal [*ideeller*] unity. – If,

as previously noted, the diverse stages of the logical idea can be considered as a series of definitions of the absolute, then the definition of the absolute that is the result for us here is that the absolute is the *concept*. To be sure, one must in this case then construe the concept in a sense different from and higher than occurs in logic at the level of the understanding, for which the concept is regarded merely as a form of our subjective thinking, a form devoid of content in itself. In light of this, there is only one question that could still be raised. If in speculative logic 'concept' has a meaning completely different from the one that would otherwise be ordinarily associated with the expression, why is what is completely different in this sense [*dieses ganz Andere*] nonetheless called the 'concept' here, when doing so occasions misunderstanding and confusion? The reply to such a question would be that, however great the distance between the concept of formal logic and the speculative concept, it still turns out, on closer inspection, that the profounder meaning of the concept is by no means as alien to the ordinary use of language as might at first seem to be the case. One speaks of the derivation of a content, such as, for example, the derivation of legal determinations concerning property from the concept of property, and one speaks also conversely of tracing such a content back to the concept. With this, however, it is recognized that the concept is not merely a form devoid of content in itself, since, on the one hand, there would be nothing to derive from the latter and, on the other, in tracing a given content back to the empty form of the concept, the content would not only be robbed of its determinacy; it would also not be known.

§ 161

The way the concept proceeds is no longer passing over or shining in an other. It is instead *development* since what are differentiated are at the same time immediately posited as identical with one another and with the whole, each being the determinacy that it is as a free being [*ein freies Sein*] of the whole concept.

Addition. Passing over into an other is the dialectical process in the sphere of *being* and the process of shining in an other within the sphere of *essence*. The movement of the *concept* is, by contrast, the *development*, by means of which that alone is posited that is already on hand in itself. In nature it is the organic life, which corresponds to the stage of the concept. Thus, for example, the plant develops itself out of its seed. This seed contains the entire plant in itself already, but in an ideal manner and so one should not construe its development as if the various parts of the plant, root, stem, leaves, and so forth were already *really* in the seed yet merely in utterly miniature fashion. This is the so-called 'Chinese box hypothesis', the deficiency of which consists in the fact that what is only on hand initially in an ideal manner is considered as already concretely existing. What is right in this hypothesis is, by contrast, this: that the concept, in its process, remains with itself and that nothing new is posited by this means with respect to the content. Instead only an alteration of form is brought forth. It is then, too, this nature

of the concept (that of demonstrating itself in its process as self-development) that one has one's eyes on when one speaks of ideas innate to human beings or considers all learning, as Plato did, merely as recollection. Yet this likewise should not be understood as if what makes up the content of the consciousness educated by instruction were already on hand previously in the same consciousness in the specific way that that content unfolds. – The movement of the concept is to be considered, as it were, merely as a play; the other posited by it is in fact not an other. In the Christian religious doctrine, this is articulated in such a way that God not only created a world that as an other stands over against him, but also that he has, from all eternity, produced a son in whom he is with himself as spirit.

§ 162

The doctrine of the concept is divided into the doctrine of (1) the subjective or *formal* [*formellen*] concept, (2) the concept as determined to immediacy, or the *objectivity*, (3) the *idea*, the subject-object [*Objekt*], the unity of the concept and objectivity, the absolute truth.

Ordinary logic apprehends only matters in themselves that surface here as a *part* of the *third* part of the whole and, in addition, the so-called 'laws of thinking' (that surfaced earlier) and, in applied logic, some from the sort of knowing bound up with material that is still psychological, metaphysical, and otherwise empirical, since those forms of thinking in the end no longer sufficed for it. Nonetheless, this science thereby lost any solid orientation. – Moreover, those forms that pertain at least to the genuine domain of logic are taken merely as determinations of conscious thinking and, indeed, conscious thinking at the level merely of the understanding, not of reason.

The preceding logical determinations, the determinations of being and essence, are not mere determinations of thought, to be sure. In their process of passing over (the dialectical moment), and in their return into themselves and in their totality, they have proven themselves to be *concepts*. But they are (compare §§ 84 and 112) merely *determinate* concepts, concepts in themselves or, what is the same, concepts *for us* since the *other* (into which each determination *passes over* or in which it *shines* and is accordingly something relative) is determined not as something *particular*. Nor is the third factor determined as something *individual* or as a *subject*, which is to say that the identity of the determination is not *posited* in the determination opposite it, that its freedom is not posited, since it is

not *universality*. – What is usually understood by ‘*concepts*’ are determinations of understanding, even merely universal *representations*, hence, in general, *finite* determinations (compare § 62).

The logic of the concept is usually understood as a merely formal [*formelle*] science, revolving around the *form* as such of the concept, the judgment, and the syllogism, but not at all around whether something is *true*; this depends, to the contrary, completely on the *content* alone. Were the logical forms of the concept actually dead, ineffective, and indifferent receptacles of representations or thoughts, then familiarity with them would be a *historical record* that is quite superfluous and dispensable for the truth. In fact, however, as forms of the concept, they are, to the contrary, *the living spirit of the actual*, and what is true of the actual is *true* only *by virtue* of these forms, *through them*, and *in them*. However, the truth of these forms for themselves, let alone their necessary connection, has never been considered and investigated until now.

A. THE SUBJECTIVE CONCEPT

a. *The concept as such*

§ 163

The *concept* as such contains the moments of *universality* (as the free sameness with itself in its determinacy), *particularity* (the determinacy in which the universal remains the same as itself, unalloyed), and *individuality* (as the reflection-in-itself of the determinacies of universality and particularity, the negative unity with itself that is the *determinate in and for itself* and at the same time identical with itself or universal).

The individual is the same as the actual, with the difference that the former has gone forth from the concept and is accordingly *posited* as universal, as the negative identity with itself. Because it is first only *in itself* or *immediately* the *unity* of the essence and concrete existence [*Existenz*], the *actual* [*das Wirkliche*] can be productive [*wirken*]. But the individuality of the concept is simply *what produces* [*schlechthin das Wirkende*] and, indeed, no longer as the *cause* with the semblance [*mit dem Scheine*] of producing an other, but as what

produces *its very self*. – The individuality, however, is not to be taken in the sense of only *immediate* individuality in terms of which we speak of individual things, human beings. This determinate sense of individuality surfaces first in the case of judgment. While each moment of the concept is itself the entire concept (§ 160), individuality, the subject, is the concept *posited* as the totality.

Addition 1. When there is talk of concepts, one usually has in view an abstract universality and the concept would then also be customarily defined as a universal representation. One accordingly speaks of colour, plant, animal, and so forth, and these concepts are supposed to arise by way of the fact that, in the process of leaving aside the particular factor through which the diverse colours, plants, animals, and so forth are distinguished from one another, we hold fast to what is common to them. This is the manner in which the understanding construes the concept and it is right for sentiment [*Gefühl*] to declare such concepts to be hollow and empty, mere schemata and shadows. But the universal factor of the concept is not merely something common, opposite which the particular has its standing for itself. Instead the universal factor is the process of particularizing (specifying) itself and remaining in unclouded clarity with itself in its other. It is of the most enormous importance as much for knowing as for our practical comportment that the merely common is not confused with the truly universal factor [*Allgemeinen*], the universal [*Universellen*]. All the reproaches that tend to be raised from the standpoint of sentiment against thinking in general, and then, more particularly, against philosophical thinking, are grounded in this confusion, as is the often-repeated claim about the dangerousness of thinking, allegedly driven to extremes. Moreover, in its true and encompassing meaning, the universal is a thought, of which it has to be said that it cost millennia before entering into human consciousness and which attained full recognition only through Christendom. The Greeks, who were otherwise so highly cultivated, knew neither God in his true universality nor even the human being. The Greek gods were only the particular powers of the spirit, and the universal God, the God of nations, was still the hidden God for the Athenians. So, too, for the Greeks there was an absolute chasm between them and the barbarians, and the human being as such was not yet recognized in his infinite worth and his infinite justification. When, indeed, the question has been posed why slavery has disappeared in modern Europe, first the one and then the other particular circumstance is cited to explain this phenomenon. The true reason why there are no longer slaves in Christian Europe is to be sought in nothing other than the principle of Christendom itself. The Christian religion is the religion of absolute freedom, and only for the Christian is the human being as such valid, in his infiniteness and universality. What the slave lacks is the recognition of his personhood; the principle of personhood, however, is the universality. The master regards the slave not as a person but as a basic matter [*Sache*] devoid of a self, and the slave himself does not count as an 'I'; instead, the master is his 'I'. – The previously mentioned difference between the merely

common and the truly universal is articulated in Rousseau's well-known *Contrat social* in a quite fitting manner where it is said that the laws of a state would have to proceed from the universal will (*volonté générale*) without, however, needing at all to be the will of all (*volonté de tous*). In relation to the theory of the state, Rousseau would have accomplished something more thorough, had he always kept this distinction in mind. The universal will is the *concept* of the will and the laws are the particular determinations of the will, grounded [*begründet*] in this concept.

Addition 2. In regard to the usual discussion in logic [operating] at the level of the understanding, about the emergence and formation of concepts, it remains to be noted that *we* do not form the concepts at all and that the concept in general is not to be considered something that has a genesis at all. To be sure, the concept is not merely being or the immediate; instead, mediation is also part of it. However, this mediation lies in the concept itself, and the concept is what mediates itself through itself and with itself. It is wrong to assume, first that there are objects which form the content of our representations and then our subjective activity comes along behind them, forming the concepts of objects by means of the earlier mentioned operation of abstracting and gathering together what is common to the objects. On the contrary, the concept is what is truly first and the things are what they are, thanks to the activity of the concept dwelling in them and revealing itself in them. In our religious consciousness this surfaces in such a way that we say, 'God created the world out of nothing' or, to put it otherwise, 'the world and finite things have gone forth out of the fullness of divine thoughts and divine decrees'. In this manner it is recognized that the thought and, more precisely, the concept is the infinite form or the free, creative activity, which is not in need of some stuff on hand outside itself, in order to realize itself.

§ 164

The concept is what is utterly *concrete* since the negative unity with itself (as being-determined-in-and-for-itself which is the individuality) itself makes up its relation to itself, the universality. To this extent, the moments of the concept cannot be detached from one another; the determinations of reflection *are supposed* to be grasped and to be valid each for itself, detached from the opposed determination. Since, however, their *identity* is *posited* in the concept, each of its moments can be immediately grasped only on the basis of and with the others.

Taken in an abstract sense, universality, particularity, and individuality are the same as identity, difference, and ground. But the universal is what is identical with itself *explicitly in the sense* that at the same time the particular and the individual are contained in

it. Furthermore, the particular is what has been differentiated or the determinacy, but in the sense that it is universal in itself and as an individual. Similarly, the individual has the meaning of being the *subject*, the foundation which contains the genus and species in itself and is itself substantial. This is the *posited* inseparability of the moments in their difference (§ 160), – the *clarity* of the concept in which no difference interrupts or obscures the concept, but in which each difference is instead equally transparent.

There is nothing said more commonly than that the concept is something *abstract*. This is correct in part insofar as its element is thinking generally and not the empirically concrete sphere of the senses, in part insofar as it is not yet the *idea*. In this respect, the subjective concept is still *formal* [*formell*], yet not at all as if it should respectively have or acquire some other content than itself. – As the absolute form itself, the concept is every *determinacy*, but as it is in its truth. Thus, although the concept is at the same time abstract, it is what is concrete [*das Konkrete*] and, indeed, the absolutely concrete [*das schlechthin Konkrete*], the subject as such. The absolutely concrete [*das Absolut-Konkrete*] is the spirit (see the note to § 159), – the concept insofar as it *concretely exists* as concept, differentiating itself from its objectivity which, despite the differentiating, remains the concept's *own* objectivity. Everything else concrete, as rich as it may be, is not so inwardly identical with itself and, for that reason, in itself not as concrete, least of all what one commonly understands by the concrete, a manifold externally held together. – What are also called concepts and, to be sure, determinate concepts, e.g. human being, house, animal, and so forth, are simple determinations and abstract representations, – abstractions that, taking only the factor of universality from the concept while omitting the particularity and individuality, are thus not developed in themselves and accordingly abstract precisely from the concept.

§ 165

The moment of *individuality* first *posits* the moments of the concept as differences, since it is the concept's negative reflection-in-itself. Thus it is *initially* the free differentiating of the concept as the *first negation*, by means of which the *determinacy* of the concept is posited, but posited as *particularity*. That is to say, first, that the moments differentiated have

the determinacy of conceptual moments only opposite one another and, second, that their identity (that the one is the other) is equally *posited*. This *posited* particularity of the concept is the *judgment*.

The usual species of *clear*, *distinct*, and *adequate* concepts pertain, not to the concept, but to psychology insofar as, by 'clear and distinct concepts', *representations* are meant, where 'clear' means an abstract, simply determinate representation and 'distinct' the sort of representation in which a *distinguishing mark* [*Merkmal*], i.e. some sort of determinacy has been singled out as a sign for *subjective* knowing. Nothing is so much the distinguishing mark of the externality and decay of logic than the cherished category of the *distinguishing mark*. The *adequate* concept is more of a play on the concept, indeed even the idea, but still expresses nothing but the formal aspect [*das Formelle*] of the agreement of a concept or even a representation with its object [*Objekt*], some external thing. – Underlying the so-called *subordinate* and *coordinate* concepts is [a] the concept-less difference between the universal and the particular as well as [b] their relatedness in an external reflection. An enumeration of species of *contrary* and *contradictory*, *affirmative*, *negative* concepts and so forth is, moreover, nothing other than a process of arbitrarily reading off determinacies of thought that for their part belong to the sphere of being or essence, where they have already been considered, and that have nothing to do with the determinacy of the concept itself as such. – The genuine differences of the concept – the universal, particular, and individual – constitute *species* of the concept, if at all only insofar as they are held apart from one another by external reflection. – The immanent differentiating and determining of the concept is on hand in the *judgment*, since the judging is the determining of the concept.

b. The judgment

§ 166

The *judgment* is the concept in its particularity as the differentiating *relation* of its moments, which are posited as being for themselves and, at the same time, as identical with themselves, not with one another.

In the case of a judgment one usually thinks first of the *self-sufficiency* of the extremes, subject and predicate, such that the subject is a thing or a determination for itself and the predicate, too, is a universal determination outside that subject, in my head somehow. I then bring the predicate together with the subject and, by this means, I judge. However, since the copula 'is' asserts the predicate of the subject, that external, subjective *subsuming* is sublated in turn and the judgment is taken as a determination of the *object* itself. – The *etymological* meaning of 'judgment' [*Urteil*] in our language is profounder and expresses the unity of the concept as what comes first [*das Erste*] and its differentiation as the *original* division [*Teilung*] that the judgment truly is.

The abstract judgment is the sentence: 'the *individual* is the *universal*'. These are the determinations that the *subject* and *predicate* first have opposite one another, in that the moments of the concept are taken in their immediate determinacy or first abstraction. (The sentences 'the *particular* is the *universal*' and 'the *individual* is the *particular*' belong to the further determination of the judgment.) It has to be viewed as an amazing lack of attentiveness that in the logic books there is nowhere to be found [acknowledgment of] the fact that in *each* judgment one is articulating a sentence such as 'the individual is the universal' or, even more determinately, 'the subject is the predicate' (e.g. 'God is absolute spirit'). To be sure, the determinations – individuality and universality, subject and predicate – are also distinct, but on that account, nonetheless, the completely universal *fact* remains that each judgment asserts them as identical.

The copula 'is' comes from the concept's nature, namely, to be *identical* with itself in its externalization. The individual and the universal, as *its* moments, are the sort of determinacies that cannot be isolated. The earlier determinacies of reflection, in their relationships, are *equally* related to one another, but their connection is only that of *having*, not *being*, the *identity posited as such* or the *universality*. For this very reason, the judgment is the true *particularity* of the concept, since it is the determinacy or differentiation of the same, a differentiation that, however, remains the universality.

Addition. The judgment is customarily regarded as a combination of concepts and, indeed, diverse sorts of concepts. What is right in this construal is this, that

the concept forms the presupposition of the judgment and makes its appearance in the judgment in the form of the difference. But it is wrong to speak of diverse sorts of concepts, for the concept, although concrete, is still essentially *one* and the moments contained in it are not to be considered as diverse sorts. Moreover, it is equally false to speak of a *combination* of the sides of the judgment since, when there is talk of a combination, then what are combined are thought of as being on hand for themselves even apart from the combination. This external construal is evident then in an even more determinate fashion if it is said of a judgment that it comes about by virtue of the fact that a predicate is attributed to a subject. In this connection the subject counts as something obtaining externally for itself and the predicate as something occurring in our head. Meanwhile, the copula 'is' already contradicts this representation. If we say 'this rose *is* red' or 'this painting *is* beautiful', what is thereby said is not that it is *we* who in some external fashion make the rose red or the painting beautiful, but instead that these are the objects' own determinations. A further deficiency of the usual way of construing judgment (usual in formal logic) consists in the fact that, as a consequence of this construal, the judgment generally appears as something merely contingent and the progression from concept to judgment is not demonstrated. The concept as such, however, is not something in itself stagnant [*verharrend*], devoid of process, as the understanding thinks. To the contrary, as infinite form, it is absolutely active, as it were, the *punctum saliens* of all vitality, and accordingly differentiates itself from itself. This diremption posited by the concept's own activity, the diremption of the concept into the difference between its moments, is the *judgment*, the meaning of which is accordingly to be construed as the *particularization* of the concept. *In itself*, the concept is, to be sure, already the particular but, in the concept as such, the particular is not yet *posited*, but is instead still in transparent unity with the universal. Thus, for example, as earlier noted (§ 160 *Addition*), the seed of a plant already contains the particular factor of the root, of the branches, of the leaves, and so forth. But this particular factor is at first only on hand *in itself* and is only posited in that the seed discloses itself, something which is to be considered the judgment of the plant. This example can also serve to draw notice to the fact that neither the concept nor the judgment are merely occurrences in our head and are not fashioned merely by us. The concept is something that dwells within the things themselves, by means of which they are what they are, and to comprehend [*begreifen*] an object means accordingly to become conscious of its concept [*Begriff*]. If we then take the next step to judging the object, it is not our subjective doing that accounts for attributing this or that predicate to the object. Instead we consider the object in the determinacy posited by its concept.

§ 167

Judgment is usually taken in the *subjective* sense as an *operation* and form that surfaces merely in *self-conscious* thinking. This difference, however, is not yet on hand in the logical [sphere, where] judgment is supposed to be

taken in the completely universal sense: *all things are a judgment*, – i.e. they are *individuals* which are a *universality* or inner nature in themselves, or a *universal* that is *individuated*. The universality and individuality distinguish themselves in them [the things] but are at the same time identical.

The sense of the judgment that is supposed to be merely subjective – as if it were *I* who *attributes* a predicate to a subject – is contradicted by the objective expression of the judgment: ‘the rose *is* red’, ‘gold *is* metal’, and so forth; *I* do not first attribute something to them. – Judgments are different from *sentences*; the latter contain the determination of the subjects that does not stand in a connection of universality with them – a condition, an individual action, and the like; ‘Caesar was born in Rome in such and such a year, conducted the war in Gaul for ten years, crossed the Rubicon, and so forth’ are sentences, not judgments. There is, furthermore, something quite empty in saying that sentences of the sort, e.g. ‘I slept well last night’ or even ‘Present arms!’ *can* be put into the form of judgments. A sentence like ‘a carriage is passing by’ would be a judgment and, to be sure, a subjective one only if it could be doubted whether what is moving by is a carriage or whether it is the object that is moving and not the standpoint from which we are observing it; where what then matters is finding the determination for a representation not properly determined yet.

§ 168

The standpoint of the judgment is *finitude*, and from this standpoint the *finitude* of things consists in the fact that they are a judgment, that their existence [*Dasein*] and their universal nature (their body and their soul) are, certainly unified (otherwise the things would be nothing), but that these, their moments, are both already diverse and generally able to be separated.

§ 169

In the abstract judgment ‘the individual is the universal’, the subject relates itself negatively to itself and, as such, is the immediately *concrete*, while the predicate is, by contrast, the *abstract*, indeterminate, the *universal*. But since they are joined by ‘is’, the predicate in its universality must also contain the determinacy of the subject and it [that determinacy] is the *particularity*

and the latter is the *posited identity* of the subject and predicate. As thus indifferent to this difference of form, it is the *content*.

Only in the predicate does the subject have its explicit determinacy and content; hence, taken by itself [*für sich*] it is a mere representation or a bare name. In the judgments ‘*God* is the supremely real’ and so forth or ‘the *absolute* is identical with itself’ and so forth, ‘*God*’ and ‘*absolute*’ are mere names. What the subject *is*, is first said in the predicate. What it might otherwise also be as something concrete does not matter to *this* judgment (compare § 31).

Addition. If one says: ‘The subject is that of which something is asserted and the predicate is what is asserted of it’, then this is to say something quite trivial. One learns nothing more precise about the difference between the two by this means. As far as the thought of the subject is concerned, it is initially the individual and the predicate the universal. In the further development of the judgment, it then happens that the subject does not remain merely the immediately individual and the predicate merely the abstract universal. Subject and predicate then also acquire a [new] meaning, the former that of the particular and universal, the latter that of the particular and individual. This exchange in the meaning of the two sides of the judgment is what takes place under the two designations of ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’.

§ 170

As far as the more precise determinacy of subject and predicate is concerned, the *former*, as the negative relation to itself (§§ 163, 166 *Addition*), is the underlying fixity [*das Feste*] in which the predicate has its subsistence and is in an ideal way (it *inheres* in the subject). Moreover, since the subject is generally and *immediately* concrete, the determinate content of the predicate is only *one* of the *many* determinacies of the subject and the latter is richer and broader than the predicate.

Conversely, the *predicate*, as the universal subsisting for itself and indifferent to whether this subject is or not, goes beyond the subject, *subsumes* the subject under it, and is, for its part, broader than the subject. The *determinate content* of the predicate (see preceding section) alone makes up the identity of both.

§ 171

Subject, predicate, and the determinate content or the identity [of them] are initially posited in the judgment, in their relation, as themselves *diverse*,

falling outside one another. But *in themselves*, i.e. in terms of the concept, they are *identical*, since the concrete totality of the subject is this, not to be some sort of indeterminate manifold, but instead *individuality* alone, the particular and universal in an identity, and precisely this unity is the predicate (§ 170). – In the copula, furthermore, the *identity* of the subject and predicate is of course *posited* but initially only as the abstract ‘is’. In keeping with this *identity*, the subject is also to be posited in the determination of the predicate, by means of which the latter also acquires the determination of the subject and the copula *is fulfilled*. This is the *further determination* of the judgment, by means of the copula full of content, into the *syllogism*. But first, in terms of the judgment, there is the further determination of it, the determining of the initially abstract, *sensory universality* into *a set of all* [*Allheit*], *genus*, and *species* and into the developed *universality of the concept*.

Only knowledge of the further development of the judgment gives a *context* as well as a *sense* to what are customarily put forward as *species* of judgment. In addition to appearing completely contingent, the usual enumeration is superficial and even barren and wild in the presentation of the differences. In part, the manner in which positive, categorical, and assertoric judgments are differentiated is generally pulled out of the air and in part it remains undetermined. The various judgments should be considered as following necessarily from one another and as *a further determining of the concept*, since the judgment is nothing other than the *determinate* concept.

In relation to the two previous spheres of *being* and *essence*, the *determinate concepts*, qua judgments, are reproductions of these spheres, but posited in the simple relation of the concept.

Addition. The various species of judgment are to be construed not merely as an empirical manifold, but instead as a totality determined by thinking. One of Kant’s great services is to have provided some validation for this demand. Kant divided judgments, according to the schema of his table of categories, into judgments of quality, quantity, relation, and modality. Although this division set up by Kant cannot be recognized as adequate (in part because of the merely formal application of the schema of these categories, in part also because of their content), underlying this division, nevertheless, is the genuine intuition that it is the universal forms of the logical idea itself through which the diverse species of judgment are determined. Accordingly, we initially obtain three main species of judgment, which correspond to the stages of being, essence, and concept. The second of these main species is then doubled in turn, corresponding to the character of essence as the stage of difference [*Differenz*]. The inner ground of this systematic [character] of the

judgment is to be sought in the fact that, since the concept is the ideal unity of being and essence, its unfolding, as it comes about in the judgment, also has to reproduce initially these two stages in a transformation [*Umbildung*] that conforms to the concept, while it itself, the concept, demonstrates itself to be the determining factor for the genuine judgment. – The various species of judgment are to be considered, not as standing next to one another with the same value but instead as forming a sequence of stages, whose differences rest upon the logical meaning of the predicate. This sort of consideration is also already at hand in ordinary consciousness to the extent that one does not hesitate to ascribe a very slight capacity for judgment to those only used to making such judgments like ‘this wall is green’, ‘this stove is hot’, and so forth. At the same time, by contrast, it will be said that someone truly understands how to judge only if his judgments concern whether a certain artwork is beautiful, an action is good, and the like. In judgments of the first-mentioned species, the content forms merely an abstract quality and the immediate perception suffices to decide on its presence, whereas, by contrast, if it is said that an artwork is beautiful or that an action is good, the objects named are compared with what they ought to be, i.e. with their concept.

α. Qualitative judgment

§ 172

The immediate judgment is the *judgment of existence* [*Urteil des Daseins*]: the subject posited in a universality, as its predicate, which is an immediate (thus sensory) quality. (1) *Positive judgment*: the individual is a particular. But the individual is *not* a particular; more precisely, such an individual quality does not correspond to the concrete nature of the subject; (2) *negative judgment*.

It is one of the most essential logical prejudices that such qualitative judgments as ‘the rose is red’ or ‘the rose is not red’ can contain truth. They can be *correct*, i.e. in the limited sphere of perception, finite representing, and thinking. This depends upon the content, which is just as much a finite content, untrue for itself. But the truth rests solely on the form, i.e. the posited concept and the reality corresponding to it; but such truth is not at hand in the qualitative judgment.

Addition. Correctness and truth are very frequently considered to mean the same thing in ordinary life and one accordingly speaks of the truth of some content where it is a matter of mere correctness. Correctness generally affects merely the formal agreement of our representation with its content; however this content may be otherwise constituted. The truth consists, by contrast, in the agreement of the object with itself, i.e. with its concept. It may be correct anyway that someone is

sick or that someone has stolen something. But such content is not true since a sick body is not in agreement with the concept of life, and so too theft is an action that does not correspond to the concept of human action. What is to be taken from these examples is that an immediate judgment, in which an abstract quality is asserted of something immediately individual, however correct it might be, still contains no truth since subject and predicate do not stand in the judgment in the connection of reality and concept to one another. – The lack of truth of the immediate judgment consists, further, in the fact that its form and content do not correspond to one another. If we say ‘this rose is red’, then it lies in the copula ‘is’ that subject and predicate agree with one another. But now the rose, as something concrete, is not merely red; instead it also has an odour, a determinate form, and many other sorts of determinations that are not contained in the predicate ‘red’. On the other side, this predicate, as an abstract universal, does not apply merely to this subject. There are also, in addition, other flowers and generally other objects that are likewise red. Subject and predicate in the immediate judgment thus come into contact with one another, as it were, only at *one* point but they do not cover one another. The state of affairs is quite different in the conceptual judgment. If we say ‘this action is good’, this is then a conceptual judgment. One notices immediately that here, between subject and predicate, there is not this loose and external connection as there is in the immediate judgment. In the immediate judgment the predicate consists in some abstract quality or other which may or may not apply to the subject. In the conceptual judgment, by contrast, the predicate is, as it were, the soul of the subject, by means of which the subject, as the body of this soul, is determined through and through.

§ 173

In this as *first* negation there still remains the *relation* of the subject to the predicate, which is thereby something relatively universal, the *determinacy* of which has only been negated (‘the rose is *not* red’ entails that it still has colour – immediately another [colour] which, however, would only be a positive judgment in turn). The individual, however, is also *not* a universal. (3) Hence, (aa) the judgment collapses in itself into the empty *identical* relation: the individual is the individual – *identical* judgment; and (bb) it collapses into itself as the present, complete inadequacy of the subject and predicate: a so-called *infinite* judgment.

Examples of the latter are ‘the spirit is no elephant’, ‘a lion is no table’, and so forth – sentences that are correct but as nonsensical [*widersinnig*] as the identical sentences ‘a lion is a lion’, ‘the spirit is spirit’. These sentences are, to be sure, the truth of the immediate, so-called qualitative judgment, but not judgments at all, and they can only surface in a subjective thinking that can fix upon an untrue

abstraction. Objectively considered, they express the nature of *beings* [*des Seienden*] or *sensory* things, namely, that they collapse into an *empty* identity and into a *fulfilled* relation that is, however, the *qualitative otherness of what is related*, their complete inadequacy.

Addition. The negative-infinite judgment, in which no relation at all between subject and predicate is on hand any more, is usually cited in formal logic merely as a senseless [*sinnlos*] curiosity. Nevertheless, this infinite judgment is in fact not to be considered merely as a contingent form of subjective thinking. Instead it ensues as the very next dialectical result of the preceding, immediate judgments (of the positive and the simply negative), whose finitude and lack of truth explicitly come to light in it. Crime can be regarded as an objective example of the negative-infinite judgment. Whoever commits a crime, more precisely a theft, does not merely negate, as in the civil juridical dispute, the particular right of someone else to this specific matter. Instead he negates the right of that person altogether and, for this reason, he is not merely ordered to restore the matter which he stole, but is instead punished in addition because he violated the right as such, i.e. the right in general. The civil juridical dispute is, by contrast, an example of the simple-negative judgment since in it merely this particular right is negated and right in general is recognized in the process. The connection here is thus as it is for the negative judgment 'this flower is not red', by means of which merely this particular colour, but not colour altogether, is negated in regard to the flower since it can still be blue, yellow, and so forth. Likewise then, too, death is a negative-infinite judgment in contrast to sickness, which is a simple-negative judgment. In a sickness, merely this or that particular vital function is restricted or negated; by contrast, in death, as one would say, body and soul separate from one another, i.e. subject and predicate fall completely outside one another.

β. *The judgment of reflection*

§ 174

The individual, posited *as* individual (reflected in itself) in the judgment, has a predicate, opposite which the subject, relating itself to itself, remains at the same time an *other*. – In the *concrete existence* [*Existenz*], the subject is no longer immediately qualitative, but is instead in a *connection with* and *joined to an other*, an external world. The *universality* has acquired hereby the meaning of this relativity. (For example, useful, dangerous; weight, acidity, – then drive, and so forth.)

Addition. The judgment of reflection is distinguished generally from the qualitative judgment by the fact that its predicate is no longer an immediate, abstract quality but instead of the sort that, by means of it, the subject demonstrates itself to be related to the other. If we say, for example, 'this rose is red', we consider the

subject in its immediate individuality without relation to another. If, by contrast, we make the judgment 'this plant has healing powers', we consider the subject, the plant, as standing in relation with another (the illness to be healed by it) through its predicate, the healing capacity. Matters are similar with the judgments 'this body is elastic', 'this instrument is useful', 'this punishment works as a deterrent', and so forth. The predicates of such judgments are generally determinations of reflection, by means of which one has moved beyond the immediate individuality of the subject while the concept of it is still not given. – The usual sort of rationalizing [*Räsonnement*] tends above all to immerse itself in this manner of judgment. The more concrete the object of concern, the more viewpoints it presents for reflection, by means of which, meanwhile, the distinctive nature, i.e. its concept, is not exhausted.

§ 175

(1) The subject, the individual *as* individual (in the *singular* judgment), is a universal [*ein Allgemeines*]. (2) In this relation it is elevated above its singularity. This expansion is an external one, the subjective reflection, at first the indeterminate *particularity* (in the *particular* judgment which is, immediately, negative as well as positive; – the individual is in itself divided, it relates itself in part to itself, in part to another). (3) Some are the universal, so the particularity is expanded to universality; or this universality, determined by the individuality of the subject, is the *set of all* (commonality, the usual universality-of-reflection).

Addition. Since it is determined in the *singular* judgment as universality, the subject by this means moves beyond itself, past itself as this mere individual. When we say 'this plant has healing powers', this entails not merely that this individual plant has them but that several or some do and this results in the *particular* judgment ('Some plants have healing powers', 'Some human beings are inventive', and so forth). Through this particularity, the immediately individual [subject] loses its self-sufficiency and enters into a connection [*Zusammenhang*] with another. The human being is, as *this* human being, no longer merely this individual human being; instead he stands alongside other human beings and is thus one in a group [*Menge*]. Precisely by this means, however, it also belongs to the universal and is thereby elevated. The particular judgment is positive as well as negative. If only some bodies are elastic, then the rest are not elastic. – Herein lies, then, again the progression to the third form of the judgment-of-reflection, i.e. to the judgment of the set of all ('all human beings are mortal', 'all metals are conductors of electricity'). The set of all [*Allheit*] is that very form of universality towards which reflection at first tends. In this connection the individuals form the foundation and it is our subjective act by means of which the individuals are gathered together and are determined [as belonging together] in their entirety [*als Alle bestimmt*]. The universal appears here only as an external bond which

encompasses the individuals subsisting for themselves and indifferent to it. The universal is, nevertheless, in fact the ground and basis, the root and substance of the individual. If we consider, for example, Caius, Titus, Sempronius, and the other inhabitants of a city or a country, then the fact that they are collectively human beings is not merely something common to them, but their *universal*, their *genus*, and all these individuals would not be at all without this, their genus. In contrast to this, matters are different with that superficial, only so-called universality that is in fact something that merely accrues to all individuals and is common to them. It has been noted that human beings, in contrast to animals, have this in common with one another, that they are equipped with ear lobes. It is, meanwhile, apparent that if, somehow, one or the other should not have ear lobes, the rest of his being, his character, his capacities, and so forth would not be affected by this. It would, by contrast, make no sense to assume that Caius could somehow not be a human being but be brave, learned, and so forth. What the individual human being is in particular, this is only insofar as he is, above all, a human being as such and in the universal sense [*im Allgemeinen*], and this universal is not only something external to and alongside other abstract qualities or mere determinations of reflection. Instead it is much more what pervades everything particular, encompassing it within itself.

§ 176

By the fact that the subject is likewise determined as universal, the identity of it and the predicate is *posited* as indifferent, as is, thanks to this, the determination of the judgment itself. This unity of the *content* as the universal identical with the subject's negative reflection-in-itself makes the relation of the judgment a *necessary* relation.

Addition. The progression from the reflexive judgment of the set of all to the necessary judgment can be found already in our ordinary consciousness insofar as we say: 'what accrues to everything, accrues to the genus and is, therefore, necessary.' When we say: '*all* plants', '*all* humans', and so forth, this is the same as if we say '*the* plant', '*the* human', and so forth.

γ. Judgment of necessity

§ 177

The judgment of necessity as the identity of the content in its difference (1) contains within the predicate in part the *substance* or *nature* of the *subject*, the *concrete* universal – the *genus*; in part, since this universal equally contains in itself the determinacy as negative, the *excluding* essential determinacy – the *species*; – *categorical* judgment.

(2) In keeping with their substantiality, the two sides acquire the form of self-sufficient actuality, the identity of which is only an *inner* identity, and with that the actuality of the one is at the same time *not its* actuality, but instead the being *of the other*; – *hypothetical* judgment.

(3) At the same time, in this externalization of the concept, the inner identity is *posited* and so the universal is the genus that is identical with itself in its excluding individuality. The judgment which has this universal on both sides of it, the one time as such, the other time as the sphere of its self-excluding particularization – the *either/or* of which just as much as the *as well as* is the genus – is the *disjunctive judgment*. With this, the universality at first as genus and then also as the scope of its species is determined and posited as a totality.

Addition. The categorical judgment ('Gold is a metal', 'The rose is a plant') is the *immediate* judgment of necessity and corresponds, in the sphere of essence, to the relationship of substantiality. All things are a categorical judgment, i.e. they have their substantial nature, which forms the fixed and unchangeable foundation of them. Only when we regard things from the viewpoint of their genus and as determined by it with necessity, does the judgment begin to be a true one. It must be designated a deficiency in someone's training in logic, if judgments like these: 'Gold is expensive' and 'gold is a metal' are regarded as standing on the same level. That gold is expensive concerns an external relation of it to our inclinations and needs, to the costs of acquiring it, and so on, and the gold remains what it is, even if that external relation alters or falls away. By contrast, being a metal constitutes the substantial nature of gold, without which it or anything else that is otherwise in it or asserted of it cannot subsist. Matters are the same if we say 'Caius is a human being'; in this way we declare that everything that he may otherwise be only has value and meaning insofar as it corresponds to this, his substantial nature, to be a human being. – Furthermore, however, even the categorical judgment remains deficient insofar as in it the factor of particularity does not yet receive its due. Thus, for example, the gold is indeed metal, but silver, copper, iron, and so forth are likewise metals, and being metal as such behaves indifferently to the particular character of its species. Herein lies the progression from the categorical to the *hypothetical* judgment which can be expressed by the formula: 'if A is, then B is'. We have here the same progression as earlier from the relationship of substantiality to the relationship of causality. In the hypothetical judgment, the determinacy of the content appears as mediated, as dependent upon another, and this is then precisely the relationship of cause and effect. The meaning of the hypothetical judgment is then generally this, that through it the universal is posited in its particularization and, with this, we acquire, as the third form of necessary judgment, the *disjunctive* judgment. 'A is either B or C or D'; the poetic artwork is either epic or lyrical or dramatic; the colour is either yellow or blue or red, and so on. The two sides of the disjunctive judgment are identical. The genus is the totality of its species and the totality of the species is the genus. This unity

of the universal and the particular is the concept and it is this, which now forms the content of the judgment.

δ. *The judgment of the concept*

§ 178

The *judgment of the concept* has the concept, the totality in simple form, for its content, the universal with its complete determinacy. The subject is (1) initially an individual that has, as its predicate, the *reflection* of the particular existence on its universal, – the agreement or lack of agreement of these two determinations: good, true, correct, and so forth – *assertoric* judgment.

In ordinary life, too, one only calls it judging when a judgment is of this sort, e.g. the judgment whether an object, action, and so forth is good or bad, true, beautiful, and so forth. One will not ascribe a power of judgment to someone [simply] for knowing, for example, how to make positive or negative judgments such as ‘this rose is red’, ‘this painting is red, green, dusty’, and so forth.

Even in philosophy, through the principle of immediate knowing and believing, the assertoric judgment has been made into the sole and essential form of the doctrine (despite the fact that in society the assertoric judgment counts as improper, when someone claims that it is supposed to be valid by itself). In the so-called philosophical works that maintain that principle, one can read hundreds upon hundreds of *assurances* about reason, knowing [*Wissen*], thinking, and so forth, which seek to gain credence for themselves through endless repetitions of one and the same point, since external authority no longer counts for much.

§ 179

In what is at first the immediate subject of the assertoric judgment, this judgment does not contain that relation of the particular and the universal that is expressed in the predicate. This judgment is thus merely a *subjective* particularity and the opposite assurance stands over against it with the same right or, rather, the same lack of right. It is thus (2) at the same time only a *problematic* judgment. But (3) [insofar as] the objective particularity is *posited* in the *subject*, [i.e.] its particularity as the constitution

[*Beschaffenheit*] of its existence, the subject then expresses the relation of that particularity to its constitution, i.e. to its genus and, with this, expresses what (see preceding section) makes up the content of the predicate (*this* – the immediate individuality – *house* – genus –, *so and so constituted* – particularity –, is good or bad) – *apodictic* judgment. – *All things* are a *genus* (their determination and purpose) in one *individual* actuality with a *particular* constitution; and their [i.e. all things'] finitude consists in the fact that their particular [character] may or may not be adequate to the universal.

§ 180

In this way, subject and predicate are each themselves the entire judgment. The immediate constitution of the subject shows itself at first as the *mediating ground* between the individuality of the actual and its universality, as the ground of the judgment. What has in fact been posited is the unity of the subject and the predicate, as the concept itself; it is the fulfilment of the empty '*is*', the copula, and since its moments are at the same time differentiated as subject and predicate, it is posited as their unity, as the relation mediating them – *the syllogism*.

c. The syllogism

§ 181

The syllogism is the unity of the concept and the judgment; – it is the concept as the simple identity (into which the judgment's differences of form have gone back), and [it is] judgment insofar as it is posited at the same time in reality, namely, in the difference of its determinations. The syllogism is what is *rational* and *everything* rational.

The syllogism tends to be put forward usually as the *form of the rational*, but as a subjective form and without pointing up any sort of connection between it and any other rational content, e.g. a rational grounding principle, a rational action, idea, and so forth. In general, there is much and frequent talk of *reason* and appeal is made to it without indicating *what* it is, what its *determinacy* is and without giving the slightest thought to what inferring via syllogism [*schließen*] is. In fact, *formally inferring via syllogism* is the rational in such a non-rational [*vernunftlose*] manner, that it has nothing to do

with a rational basic content. Since, however, such a content can be rational only through the determinacy through which *thinking* is reason, it can be rational only through the form which the syllogism is. – This, however, is nothing else than the *posited*, (at first formally) *real concept*, as this section expresses. The syllogism is, on account of this, the *essential ground of everything true*; and the *definition of the absolute* is from now on that it is the syllogistic inference or, articulated in the form of a sentence, it is this determinacy: ‘*everything is a syllogism*’. Everything is a *concept*, and its existence is the difference of its moments, so that its *universal* nature provides itself with external reality through *particularity* and, by this means and as negative reflection-in-itself, makes itself something *individual*. – Or conversely, the actual is an *individual* that by means of *particularity* elevates itself into *universality* and makes itself identical with itself. – The actual is one, but [it is] similarly the segregation of the moments of the concept, and the syllogism is the cyclical course taken by the mediation of its moments, a course through which it posits itself as one.

Addition. Like the concept and the judgment, the syllogism also tends to be regarded merely as a form of our subjective thinking and, in keeping with this tendency, it is said that the syllogism is the justification [*Begründung*] of the judgment. Now, to be sure, the judgment points to the syllogism, but it is not merely our subjective doing through which this progression comes about. Instead it is the judgment itself that posits itself as syllogism and, in doing so, returns to the unity of the concept. More precisely, it is the apodictic judgment that forms the transition to the syllogism. In the apodictic judgment we have an individual that relates itself, thanks to its constitution, to its universal, i.e. its concept. The particular appears here as the mediating middle between the individual and the universal and this is the basic form of the syllogism, the further development of which, formally construed, consists in the fact that the individual and the universal also occupy this place, by means of which the transition from subjectivity to objectivity is then formed.

§ 182

The *immediate* syllogism is such that the determinations of the concept stand opposite one another in an external *connection* as *abstract* determinations, so that the two *extremes* [are] the *individuality* and *universality*, but the concept, as the *middle* joining the two together, is likewise only the abstract *particularity*. The extremes are accordingly posited as subsisting *for themselves*, as *indifferent* to one another as they are to the middle [term that

joins them]. This syllogism is thus rational but non-conceptual [*begrifflos*] – it is the formal *syllogism of the understanding*. – In it the subject is joined together with *another* determinacy; or through this mediation the universal subsumes a subject *external* to it. In a rational syllogism, by contrast, the subject joins *itself* together *with itself* by means of this mediation. It is only a subject in this way, or the subject is only in itself the syllogism of reason.

In the following consideration, the syllogism of the understanding is expressed in terms of its ordinary, usual meaning, [namely,] in the subjective manner attributed to it in the sense that *we* make such syllogistic inferences. In fact it is *only* a *subjective* inferring via syllogism, though this has equally the objective meaning that it expresses only the *finitude* of things, but in the determinate manner that the form has attained here. With respect to finite things, subjectivity as thinghood, separable from its properties, [i.e.] its particularity, is equally separable from its universality insofar as this is the mere quality of the thing and its external connection with other things as its genus and concept.

Addition. In keeping with the construal of the syllogism, mentioned above, as the form of the rational, reason itself has been defined as the capacity to make syllogistic inferences and understanding, by contrast, as the capacity to form concepts. Underlying these definitions is a representation of the spirit as the mere sum of powers or capabilities lying next to one another. Apart from this superficial representation, what is to be noted about this combination of the understanding with the concept and reason with the syllogism is that just as little as the concept is to be regarded merely as a determination of the understanding, so, too, the syllogism is to be regarded without further ado as rational. On the one hand, what is usually treated in formal logic in the doctrine of the syllogism is in fact nothing other than the mere syllogism of the understanding, which in no way deserves the honour of counting as the form of the rational, indeed, as the rational itself. On the other hand, the concept as such is so little merely a form of understanding that it is rather the understanding in the mode of abstracting alone, through which the concept is demoted to this level. In accordance with this, there is also a tendency to distinguish mere concepts of the understanding [*Verstandesbegriffe*] and concepts of reason [*Vernunftbegriffe*], which is nevertheless not to be understood as though there *were* two distinct species of concepts but instead much more so that it is *our* doing either to stand pat merely with the negative and abstract form of the concept or to construe it, in keeping with its true nature, as at the same time positive and concrete. Thus, for example, the concept of freedom, insofar as it is a mere concept of the understanding, is freedom considered as the abstract opposite of necessity, while the true and rational concept of freedom contains in itself necessity as sublated. Similarly, the definition of God put forward by so-called

deism, is the concept of God insofar as it is a mere concept of the understanding, while by contrast the Christian religion, knowing [*wissen*] God as the triune God, contains the rational concept of God.

α. *Qualitative syllogism*

§ 183

The first syllogism is *the syllogism of existence* [*Schluss des Daseins*] or the *qualitative syllogism*, as it was portrayed in the previous section, (I) I – P – U [individuality, particularity, universality], that a subject as individual is *joined together*, through a *quality*, with some *universal determinacy*.

That the subject (*terminus minor*) has even further determinations than that of individuality, similarly that the other extreme (the predicate of the conclusion, the *terminus maior*) is further determined than being merely a universal, does not come into consideration here; only the forms through which they constitute the *syllogism* [come into consideration].

Addition. The *syllogism* of existence is a syllogistic inference merely at the level of understanding and, indeed, insofar as the individuality, the particularity, and the universality stand opposite one another in an entirely abstract manner here. Thus, this *syllogism* is then the most extreme way that the concept comes to be outside itself. We have here something immediately individual as a subject; some particular side, a property, in this subject is then emphasized and by means of this property the individual demonstrates itself to be a universal. So, for example, we say ‘this rose is red; red is a colour, therefore, this rose is something coloured’. It is this form [*Gestalt*] of the *syllogism*, above all, that is typically discussed in ordinary logic. In former times, the *syllogism* was considered the absolute rule of all knowing and a scientific claim obtained then as something justified only if it was demonstrated in a manner mediated by a *syllogism*. Today one encounters the diverse forms of the *syllogism* almost exclusively only in compendia of logic, and acquaintance with those various forms counts as empty pedantry, of no further use of any sort either in practical life or even in science. In this regard, it deserves to be noted, first, that although it would be superfluous and pedantic to enter on the scene at each occasion with the entire elaboration of formal modes of inferring, the diverse forms of inference nonetheless continue to impose themselves on our knowing. For example, if someone waking up in the morning during the wintertime hears carriages clanging on the street and this occasions him to consider that things may well have frozen solid, he performs an operation of inferring and we repeat this operation daily amidst the most manifold complications. Becoming explicitly conscious of this, one’s daily actions as a thinking being might thus at least be of no slighter interest than the well-recognized interest in becoming acquainted,

not only with the functions of our organic life, e.g. the functions of digestion, production of the blood, breathing, and so forth, but also with the functions of the processes and formations of nature surrounding us. It will undoubtedly have to be conceded in this connection that just as little as a foregoing study of anatomy and physiology is needed in order to digest properly, to breath properly, and so on, one needs to have studied logic first in order to draw proper conclusions. – It is Aristotle who first observed and described the diverse forms and so-called figures of the syllogism in their subjective meaning and, indeed, did so with such sureness and determinacy that essentially nothing further had to be added. Although this accomplishment brings Aristotle great honour, by no means is it the forms of syllogistic inference at the level of understanding or at the level generally of finite thinking that he employed in his genuine philosophical investigations (see the note to § 189).

§ 184

This syllogism is (α) completely *contingent* with respect to its determinations since the middle, as an abstract particularity, is *merely any sort of determinacy* of the subject, of which, as something *immediate* and thus empirically concrete, it has several. Hence, it can be joined together just as much with *many sorts of other* universalities, just as an *individual* particularity in turn can also have several diverse determinacies in itself. Thus, the subject can be related to *different* universals by means of *the same medius terminus* [middle term].

It is more that formally inferring has gone out of fashion than that its incorrectness has been detected and that the lack of its use has been justified on that basis [i.e. its incorrectness]. This and the following section indicate the vacuousness [*Nichtigkeit*] of such inferring for the truth.

By means of such syllogisms (according to the side indicated in the section), the most diverse sorts of things can be *proved*, as it is said. The only thing required is to take up the *medius terminus* from which the transition to the desired determination can be made. Yet, with a different *medius terminus*, something else, even something opposite, may be *proven*. – The more concrete an object is, the more sides it has that inhere in it and can serve as *medii termini*. Which of these sides is more essential than the other must depend again on the sort of inferring that fixes upon the individual determinacy and can likewise easily find for it a side and a *respect* in terms of which it can be rendered *important* and *necessarily valid*.

Addition. As little as in the daily course of life one tends even to think of inference at the level of understanding, it nonetheless plays its role incessantly there. Thus, for example, in the civil dispute of law, it is the business of the advocates to make the most favourable claim to a right [*Rechtstitel*] for their parties. In a logical respect, however, such a claim to a right is nothing other than a *medius terminus*. The same also takes place in diplomatic negotiations if, for example, diverse powers lay claim to one and the same land. In this connection, the right of inheritance, the geographical location of the land, the descendancy and language of its inhabitants, or any sort of other ground can be taken up as *medius terminus*.

§ 185

(β) This syllogism is equally contingent on account of the form of the *relation* in it. According to the concept of the syllogism, the true is the relation of differentiated entities [*Unterschiedenen*], through a middle that is their unity. The relations of the extremes to the middle (the so-called *premises*, the major [*Obersatz*] and the minor [*Untersatz*]) are, however, *immediate* relations.

This contradiction of the syllogism expresses itself again through an infinite *progression* [*Progreß*] as the demand that each of the premises likewise be proven by means of a syllogism; since this syllogism, however, has two immediate premises of the same sort, this demand then repeats itself and, indeed, as a demand constantly doubling itself, ad infinitum.

§ 186

What here (on account of the empirical importance) has been noted as a *deficiency* of the syllogism, to which in this form absolute correctness is ascribed, must of itself sublate itself [*sich . . . von selbst aufheben*] in the further determination of the syllogism. Here, within the sphere of the concept as well as in the judgment, the *opposite* determinacy is not merely *in itself* on hand, but instead it is *posited*, and hence, for the further determination of the syllogism, it is only necessary to take up what is posited each time by it itself.

By means of the immediate inference (I – P – U), the *individual* is mediated with the universal and posited as *universal* in this *conclusion* [*Schlussatz*]. By this means, the individual as subject, thus itself as universal, is now the unity of the two extremes and the mediating factor, which results

in the *second figure* of the syllogism ((2) U – I – P). This expresses the truth of the first figure, [namely] that the mediation took place in the individuality and accordingly is something contingent.

§ 187

The second figure joins the universal with the particular (i.e. the universal that emerges from the previous conclusion is determined by the individuality, and accordingly occupies the position of the immediate subject). As a result, the *universal* is posited as particular, via the conclusion [of the second figure], thus as the factor mediating the extremes, the positions of which are now taken by the others in the *third figure* of the syllogism ((3) P – U – I).

The so-called *figures* of the syllogism (Aristotle rightly acknowledges only *three* of them; the *fourth* is a superficial, indeed fatuous, addition of the moderns) are placed next to one another in the standard treatment of them, without the slightest thought being given to showing their necessity, even less their meaning and their value. For this reason it is no wonder, if the figures have later been treated as an empty formalism. They have, however, a very basic [methodical] sense that rests upon the necessity that *each moment* as a determination of the concept becomes itself the *whole* and the *mediating ground*. – What determinations the sentences otherwise have, whether they may be universal and so forth or negative, in order to bring about a *correct* inference, this is a *mechanical* investigation that has rightly come to be forgotten on account of its concept-less mechanism and its lack of inner meaning. – One can appeal least of all to Aristotle for the importance of such an investigation and of syllogism at the level of understanding. To be sure, he described these like countless other forms of the spirit and nature, and he both investigated and presented their determinacy. But in his metaphysical *concepts* as well as in the *concepts* of the natural and the spiritual, he was far from intending to make the form of the syllogism at the level of the understanding a foundation and criterion, so far that probably not a single one of these concepts would have been able to arise or be left standing if it were supposed to be subjected to the laws of understanding. In the considerable amount of descriptive and sensible [*verständigen*] detail that Aristotle, after his fashion, brings together, the *speculative* concept is

invariably what dominates for him and he does not allow that inferring at the level of mere understanding, the inferring that he first outlined in so determinate a fashion, to enter into this sphere.

Addition. The objective sense of the figures of the syllogism is in general this, that everything rational demonstrates itself in the form of a threefold syllogism and, to be sure, in such a way that each of its members occupies equally the position of an extreme and that of the mediating middle. This is expressly the case with the three members of philosophical science, i.e. the logical idea, nature, and spirit. First, nature here is the middle member that joins the others together. Nature, this immediate totality, unfolds into the two extremes of the logical idea and spirit. The spirit, however, is spirit only by being mediated by nature. Second, then, the spirit, which we know [*wissen*] as individual and active, is the middle, and nature and the logical idea are the extremes. It is the spirit that recognizes in nature the logical idea and elevates it to its essence. Third, the logical idea is similarly the middle; it is the absolute substance of the spirit as of nature, the universal, what pervades everything. These are the members of the absolute syllogism.

§ 188

Since each moment has run through the position of the middle and the extremes, their determinate *difference* relative to one another has *sublated* itself and, in this form where there is no difference between its moments, the syllogism first has the external identity of the understanding, the *equality* [*Gleichheit*], as its relation – the *quantitative* or *mathematical* syllogism. If two things are equal to a third, then they are equal to one another.

Addition. The quantitative syllogism mentioned here surfaces familiarly in mathematics as an axiom. It is customarily said of it, as of the other axioms, that its content cannot be proven, but also that this proof is not needed since it is immediately evident. Nevertheless, these mathematical axioms are in fact nothing other than logical sentences that are to be derived, insofar as particular and determinate thoughts can be articulated in them, from universal and self-determining thinking, a derivation which has to be considered then as their proof. This is the case here with the quantitative syllogism, set up in mathematics as an axiom that demonstrates itself to be the next result of the qualitative or immediate syllogism. – The quantitative syllogism, moreover, is the completely formless inference since in it the difference between the members, a difference determined by the concept, is sublated. Which sentences here are supposed to be premises depends upon external circumstances and, for this reason, in the application of this syllogism one presupposes what already stands fast and is proven elsewhere.

§ 189

By this means, it has come about with respect to the *form* (1) that each moment received the determination and position of the *middle*, hence the whole in general, and with this it has lost the one-sidedness of its abstraction (§ 182 and § 184) *in itself*; (2) that *the mediation* (§ 185) has been completed, also only *in itself*, namely, only as a *circle* of mediations that mutually presuppose one another. In the first figure (I – P – U), the two premises, I – P and P – U, are still unmediated; the former being mediated in the third, the latter in the second figure. But each of these two figures equally presupposes the two other figures to mediate their premises.

In keeping with this, the mediating unity of the concept is no longer to be posited only as an abstract particularity, but instead as the *developed* unity of individuality and universality and, indeed, at first as the *reflected* unity of these determinations, the *individuality* determined *at the same time* as universality. This sort of middle yields the *syllogism of reflection*.

β. *Syllogism of reflection*

§ 190

The middle is in the first place (1) not alone the abstract, *particular* determinacy of the subject, but instead at the same time as *all individual concrete* subjects, to which that determinacy as only one among others accrues. As such, the middle yields the syllogism of *the set of all* [Schluß der Allheit]. The major premise (the subject of which is the particular determinacy, the *terminus medius*, as the set of all) *presupposes* the *conclusion*, of which it is supposed to be the presupposition. It thus rests upon (2) *induction*, the middle of which is the *complete* [vollständig] set of the individuals as such, *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*, and so forth. Since, however, the immediate empirical individuality is different from the universality and, for that reason, cannot ensure any completeness, the induction rests upon (3) *analogy*, the middle of which is an individual but in the sense of its essential universality, its genus or essential determinacy. – The first syllogism refers, for its mediation, to the second and the second to the third; but the latter equally demands a universality or the individuality as genus after the forms of the external relation of individuality and universality have been run through in the figures of the syllogism of reflection.

By means of the syllogism of the set of all, some improvement is made relative to the deficiency of the basic form of the inference at the level

of the understanding (pointed out in § 184). But the improvement is only such that a new deficiency arises, namely, that the major premise presupposes as an accordingly *immediate* sentence what was supposed to be the conclusion. – ‘All human beings are mortal, *therefore* Gajus is mortal’, ‘all metals are electric conductors, *therefore*, for example, copper is, too’. In order to be able to assert those major premises that are supposed to express the *set of all* of the *immediate* individuals and to be essentially *empirical* sentences, it is required that already *previously* the sentences about the individual Gajus, the *individual* copper are confirmed for themselves as correct. – Everyone rightly notices not merely the pedantry, but the vapid [*nichtssagende*] formalism of such syllogisms as ‘all humans are mortal, but now Gajus is human, and so forth’.

Addition. The syllogism with respect to the set of all refers to the syllogism of induction in which the individuals form the middle that joins together the extremes. If we say ‘all metals are electric conductors’, this is an empirical sentence that results from testing undertaken with all individual metals. By this means, we get the inference of induction, which has the following form:

P – I – U

I

I

.

.

.

Gold is metal, silver is metal; similarly, copper, lead, and so forth. This is the major premise. Then comes the minor premise ‘all these bodies are electric conductors’, and from this results the conclusion that all metals are electric conductors. Hence, here the individuality in the sense of the set of all is the binding factor. This syllogism then likewise sends us on to another syllogism in turn. It has, as its middle, the complete set of individuals. This presupposes that the observation and experience be completed in a certain domain. But because it is a matter of individualities here, this yields in turn the progression [*Progreß*] into infinity (I, I, I. . .). In an induction the individuals can never be exhausted. If one says ‘all metals’, ‘all plants’, and so forth, this only means as much as ‘all metals, all plants with which one is familiar up to now’. Each induction is, therefore, imperfect. One has, indeed, made this and that observation, one has made many observations, but not all cases, not all individuals have been observed. It is this deficiency of induction that leads to *analogy*. From the fact that things of a certain genus have a certain property, it is inferred in the syllogism of analogy that other things of the same genus have the same property. Thus, for example, it is a syllogism of analogy if it is said: this law of motion has been found previously to hold for all planets; hence, a newly discovered planet will probably move according to the same law. In empirical sciences, analogy is rightly held in high regard and very important results have been attained on this path. It is the instinct of reason that has the

presentiment that this or that empirically uncovered determination is grounded in the inner nature or the genus of an object and which is further based on this. Incidentally, analogy can be more superficial or more rigorous [*gründlich*]. Suppose, for example, it is said: 'Gaius, a human being, is a learned individual; Titus is also a human being; hence, he is also likely to be learned.' This is in any case a very bad analogy and, indeed, for this reason, that for a human being to be learned is not grounded without further ado in this, his genus. Nonetheless, the same sort of superficial analogies occur very frequently. Thus, for example, it is customarily said: 'the Earth is a heavenly body and has inhabitants; the Moon is also a heavenly body; hence, it is probably also inhabited'. This analogy is not a bit better than the previously mentioned one. That the Earth has inhabitants does not rest merely on the fact that it is a heavenly body; in addition, further conditions are also required, such as, first and foremost, the fact that it is surrounded by an atmosphere, that there is water on hand (something connected to that atmosphere), and so forth – conditions that, as far as we know, are lacking in the case of the Moon. What is called 'philosophy of nature' in the modern era consists to a great extent in a vapid play with empty, external analogies, which are nonetheless supposed to count as profound results. On account of this, philosophical consideration of nature has fallen into a deserved disrepute [*Mißkredit*].

γ. *Syllogism of necessity*

§ 191

As far as the merely abstract determinations of this syllogism are concerned, it has the *universal* as the middle term, just as the syllogism of reflection has the *individuality* as the middle term – the latter in terms of the second figure, the former in terms of the third (§ 187); the universal posited as essentially determined in itself. (1) At first, the *particular* in the sense of the determinate *genus* or *species* is the mediating determination – in the *categorical* syllogism; (2) the *individual* in the sense of immediate being that is both mediated and mediating – in the *hypothetical* syllogism; (3) the mediating *universal* is also posited as the totality of its *particularizations* and as an *individual* particular, an exclusive individuality – in the *disjunctive* syllogism; – so that one and the same universal is in these determinations as merely in forms of difference.

§ 192

The syllogism has been taken in terms of the differences contained in it and the universal result of the course [*Verlauf*] of those differences is that these differences and the concept's manner of being-outside-itself

sublate themselves [*das Sichaufheben*] in it. Indeed, (1) each of the moments themselves has demonstrated itself to be the *totality* of the moments and, hence, to be the entire syllogism; thus, they are *in themselves* identical. (2) The *negation* of their differences and their mediation constitutes the manner of *being-for-itself*, such that it is one and the same universal that is in these forms and is accordingly also posited as their identity. In this ideality of the moments, inferring acquires the determination of essentially containing the *negation* of the determinacies by means of which it runs its course and, with this, the determination of being a mediation by way of sublating the mediation and a manner of joining the subject together, not with *another*, but with the *sublated* other, *with itself*.

Addition. In ordinary logic, the first part, forming the so-called 'doctrine of elements', tends to come to a close with the treatment of the doctrine of the syllogism. Following upon this is the so-called 'doctrine of method', as the second part, in which it is supposed to be demonstrated how an entire body of scientific knowledge is to be brought about, through application of the forms of thinking, treated in the doctrine of elements, to the objects²⁷ at hand. Logic at the level of the understanding provides no further information about where these objects come from and what sort of a connection it has in general with the thought of objectivity. Thinking counts here as a merely subjective and formal activity, while what is objective, in contrast to thinking, counts as something firm and on hand for itself. This dualism, however, is not the true state of things [*das Wahre*] and it is a thoughtless procedure to take up the determinations of subjectivity and objectivity without further ado and to refrain from inquiring into their origin. Both, subjectivity as well as objectivity, are in any case thoughts and, to be sure, determinate thoughts which have to demonstrate themselves in universal and self-determining thinking. This has happened here first with respect to subjectivity. We have come to recognize this, or the subjective concept, which contains in itself the concept as such, the judgment, and the syllogism as the dialectical result of the first two major stages of the logical idea, namely, the stages of being and of essence. If it is said of the concept, 'it is subjective and only subjective', then this is completely correct insofar as it is, to be sure, subjectivity itself. But then, in addition, no less subjective than the concept as such are the judgment and the syllogism, determinations that in ordinary logic, next to the so-called 'laws of thought' (the principles of identity, difference, and sufficient reason), form the content of the so-called 'doctrine of elements'. Furthermore, this subjectivity with the determinations of it mentioned here (the concept, the judgment, and the syllogism) is not to be considered an empty framework which first has to acquire its filling from without, through objects on hand for themselves. Instead it is the

²⁷ Translators' note: 'Object' here and in the remainder of the text is always a translation of *Objekt*; when 'object' is a translation of *Gegenstand*, it is so flagged.

subjectivity itself that, as dialectical, breaks through its limitation and by means of the syllogism discloses itself to be objectivity.

§ 193

This *realization* of the concept, in which the universal is this *singular* totality that has returned into itself and whose differences are equally this totality, which has determined itself to be an *immediate* unity by sublating mediation, – this realization of the concept is the *object* [*das Objekt*].

At first glance, this transition from the subject, from the concept in general, and, more precisely, from the syllogism into the object, may seem strange, especially if one regards the syllogism only at the level of the understanding and regards inferring only as an act of consciousness. At the same time, it cannot be our task to want to make this transition plausible to representation. It is only possible to recall whether our customary representation of what is called an ‘object’ corresponds roughly to what constitutes the determination of the object here. By ‘object’, however, one tends to understand not merely an abstract entity or concretely existing thing or something in general actual, but instead something concretely and *completely* self-sufficient in itself; this completeness is the *totality of the concept*. That the *object* is also something standing opposite [*Gegenstand*] and *external* to another, this will be determined subsequently insofar as it posits itself in *opposition* to the *subjective*. Here, as that into which the concept has passed over from its mediation, it is at first only an *immediate*, neutral [*unbefangenes*] object, just as the concept is determined to be the *subjective* only in the subsequent opposition.

Furthermore, the *object* in general is also the *one* whole, in itself as yet indeterminate, the objective world in general, God, the absolute object. But the object equally has difference within it, breaking down in itself into an indeterminate manifold (as objective *world*) and each of these *individuated entities* is also an object, an existence [*Dasein*], in itself concrete, complete, self-sufficient.

As objectivity has been compared with being, concrete existence [*Existenz*], and actuality, so too the transition to concrete existence and actuality (since being is the first, completely abstract immediacy) is to be compared with the transition to objectivity.

The *ground* from which concrete existence emerges, the *relationship* of reflection that sublates [and elevates] itself to actuality [*sich zur Wirklichkeit aufhebt*], these are nothing other than the *concept*, *posited* in a still imperfect way. Or they are only abstract sides of it, the ground being the *unity* of it merely in the form of essence [*wesenhafte*], the relationship merely the relation of sides that are supposed to be *real*, *reflected only in themselves*. The concept is the unity of both and the object is not only the unity befitting an essence but the unity in itself universal, containing not only real differences but these differences as totalities in itself.

It is clear, moreover, that in all these transitions, it is a matter of more than merely showing the inseparability of the concept or thinking from being. It has been frequently noted that *being* is nothing more than the simple relation to itself and that this impoverished determination is contained, without further ado, in the concept or even in thinking. The point of these transitions is not to take up determinations only insofar as they are *contained* [in the concept] (as happens even in the ontological argument for the existence of God based upon the principle that being is *one* of the realities). The point is instead to take the concept as it is *prima facie supposed* to be determined for itself as concept, with which this distant abstraction of being or even objectivity still has nothing to do, and to see whether, in its determinacy solely as the determinacy of the *concept*, it passes over into a form which differs from the determinacy inherent in the concept and appears *within it*.

If the product of this transition, the object, is placed in relation to the concept that has disappeared in the transition in its peculiar form, then the result can be *correctly* expressed in such a way that *in itself* concept, or also, if one prefers, subjectivity, and the object are *the same*. However, it is equally *correct* that they are *diverse*. Since one is as correct as the other, then by the same token one is as incorrect as the other. Such a manner of expression is incapable of presenting their true relationship. The expression *in itself* here is an *abstractum* and even more one-sided than the concept itself, the one-sidedness of which in general sublates itself [*sich aufhebt*] in that it elevates itself [*sich aufhebt*] to the object, the opposite one-sidedness. Thus, that *in itself* must also determine itself to *being-for-itself* through the *negation* of itself. As is everywhere the case, the speculative identity is not that trivial identity that concept and object are in themselves

identical – an observation that has been repeated often enough, but could not be repeated enough, if the aim is to put an end to the shallow and completely malicious misunderstanding of this identity. Understandably, however, this is not something that can be hoped for.

Moreover, if that unity is taken quite generally, without recalling the one-sided form of its *being-in-itself*, then it is, as is familiar to many, what is *presupposed* in the *ontological proof* of God's existence and, indeed, presupposed as *what is most perfect*. The utterly remarkable thought of this proof first occurs to *Anselm* who, to be sure, begins by discussing merely whether a content is only in *our thinking*. These, in brief, are his words: 'Certe id, quo maius cogitari nequit, non potest esse in intellectu solo. Si enim vel in solo intellectu est, potest cogitari *esse et in re*: quod maius est. Si ergo id, quo maius cogitari non potest, est in solo intellectu; id ipsum, quo maius cogitari non potest, est, quo maius cogitari potest. Sed certe hoc esse non potest.' [Certainly that, of which nothing greater can be thought, cannot be in the intellect alone. For if it is in the intellect alone, it can be thought *to be in some thing as well*: which is greater. If, therefore, that of which a greater cannot be thought is in the intellect alone, then it is possible to think something greater than that of which nothing greater can be thought. But this certainly cannot be the case.] – In terms of the determinations we are standing among here, *finite* things are such that their objectivity is not in agreement with the thought of them, i.e. their universal determination, their genus, and their purpose. Descartes and Spinoza, among others, have articulated this unity more objectively, whereas the principle of immediate certainty or belief takes them more in the subjective manner of Anselm, namely, that the determination of God's being is inseparably bound up with the representation of God in *our consciousness*. If the principle of this belief also takes up [*befasst*] the representations of external, finite things into the inseparability of the consciousness of them and their being, because *in the intuition* they are bound up with the determination of concrete existence, then this is indeed correct. But it would be the greatest thoughtlessness if that were supposed to mean that in our consciousness concrete existence is bound up in the same way with the representation of finite things as with the representation of God. It would be forgotten that finite things are

mutable and transient, i.e. that concrete existence is only bound up with them in a transitory manner, that this bond is not eternal, but separable. For this reason, in the course of relegating the sort of connection [*Verknüpfung*] that obtains in the case of finite things, Anselm rightly declared that alone to be the perfect being that is not merely in a subjective but at the same time in an objective manner. None of the condescension shown towards the so-called 'ontological' proof and against this Anselmian determination of the perfect is of any help, since it lies in every innocent, common sense just as much as it returns in every philosophy, even against one's will and better judgment, as in the principle of immediate belief.

But the deficiency in Anselm's argument (a deficiency, moreover, that Descartes and Spinoza as well as the principle of immediate knowing share with it) is that this *unity*, articulated as the most perfect being or subjectively as true knowing [*Wissen*], is *presupposed*, i.e. it is only assumed as something that is *in itself*. The *diversity* of the two determinations is immediately opposed to this identity which is accordingly abstract (something that has long since been held against Anselm). That is, in fact, to say that the representation and concrete existence of the *finite* are opposed to the infinite since, as noted earlier, the finite is the sort of objectivity that is at the same time not adequate to the purpose, to its essence and concept, the sort of objectivity that differs from it – or that it is the sort of the representation, the sort of subjective entity that does not involve concrete existence. This objection and contrast is sublated only by demonstrating that the finite is something untrue, that these determinations are, *for themselves*, one-sided and vacuous and that the identity, accordingly, is one into which they themselves pass over and in which they are reconciled.

B. THE OBJECT

§ 194

The object is immediate being by virtue of the indifference towards the difference that has sublated itself in it. It is in itself the totality and, at the same time, since this identity is the identity of the moments but an identity that only is in itself [*ansichseiende*], it is just as indifferent to its immediate unity. It breaks down into differentiated [moments], each of which is itself the totality. The object is thus the absolute *contradiction* of

the complete self-sufficiency of the manifold and the equally complete lack of self-sufficiency of the differentiated [moments].

The definition 'the absolute is the object' is contained in the most determinate manner in the *Leibnizian monad* which is supposed to be an object, yet [an object] *in itself* representing [things] and, indeed, is supposed to be the totality of the representation of the world. In its simple unity, every difference is merely something ideal, something not self-sufficient. Nothing enters into the monad from the outside; it is in itself the entire concept, only differentiated by its own greater or lesser development. By the same token, this simple totality breaks down into the absolute plurality of differences such that they are self-sufficient monads. In the monad of monads and the pre-established harmony of their inner developments, these substances are just as much reduced in turn to the level of something ideal and lacking in self-sufficiency. The Leibnizian philosophy is thus the perfectly developed *contradiction*.

Addition 1. Construing the absolute (God) as the object and not moving beyond such a construal is in general the standpoint of superstition and slavish fear, as Fichte above all has rightly emphasized in recent times. To be sure, God is the object, and indeed the object without qualification, opposite which our particular (subjective) opinions and wants have no truth and no validity. But precisely as the absolute object, God does not stand like some sinister and inimical power over against subjectivity. Instead God contains subjectivity as an essential factor within himself. This point is formulated in the teachings of the Christian religion, when it is said that God wants for all human beings to be helped and wants all of them to be blessed. That human beings are helped, that they are blessed, this happens by virtue of the fact that they attain consciousness of their unity with God and God ceases to be for them a mere object and thereby just an object [*Gegenstand*] of fear and terror, as was the case for the religious consciousness of the Romans in particular. If, furthermore, in the Christian religion, God is known [*gewußt*] as love, and indeed insofar as he revealed himself to humanity in his Son, who is one with him, and did so as this individual human being, by this means redeeming humanity, this says likewise that the opposition of objectivity and subjectivity is *in itself* overcome and the basic matter for us is to participate in this redemption by letting go of our immediate subjectivity (taking off the old Adam) and becoming conscious of God as our true and essential self. – Now, just as religion and the religious culture consists in overcoming the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity, so too science, and more precisely philosophy, has no other task than to overcome this opposition through thinking. In the case of knowing, what generally needs to be done is to strip away the alienness of the objective world standing over against us, to find our way into it, as one says, which amounts to saying that we need to trace the objective [dimension] back

to the concept which is our innermost self. From the previous discussion it can be gathered how wrong it is to consider subjectivity and objectivity a rigid and abstract opposition. Both are utterly dialectical. In keeping with its own activity, without needing any external material or stuff, the concept which at first is only subjective proceeds to objectify itself, and so too the object is not something immovable and devoid of process, but instead is the process of proving itself to be at the same time the subjective [dimension] that forms the progression to the *idea*. What happens to anyone who is not familiar with the determinations of subjectivity and objectivity, preferring to hold fast to them in their abstraction, is that these abstract determinations slip through his fingers before he lays hold on them and he says precisely the opposite of what he wanted to say.

Addition 2. Objectivity contains the three forms: *mechanism*, *chemism*, and *the relation of purpose*. The *mechanically* determined object is the immediate, indifferent object. It contains difference, to be sure, but the diverse [elements] behave indifferently towards one another and the combination of them is only external to them. In *chemism*, by contrast, the object demonstrates itself to be essentially different, such that the objects are what they are only through their relation to one another and the difference constitutes their quality. The third form of objectivity, the *teleological relationship*, is the unity of mechanism and chemism. The purpose is again, like the mechanical object, a totality enclosed within itself, yet enriched by the principle of difference [*Differenz*] that emerged in chemism, and so it [the purpose] refers to the object standing over against it. It is the realization of the purpose, then, that forms the transition to the *idea*.

a. *Mechanism*

§ 195

The object, taken first in its immediacy, is (1) the concept only *in itself*; it has the concept at first as something subjective *outside it*, and every determinacy is posited as an external determinacy. As the unity of differences, it is thus something *composite*, an aggregate, and the effect on another remains an external relation: *formal mechanism*. – In this relation and lack of self-sufficiency, the objects remain equally self-sufficient, resistant, *external* to one another.

Just as pressure and impulse are mechanical relationships, so we also know [*wissen*] in a mechanical way, *by rote* [*auswendig*], insofar as the words are devoid of any sense for us and remain external to the senses, representing, thinking; they [the words] are equally external to themselves, a senseless sequence. Acting, piety, and so forth are equally *mechanical* insofar as what a person does is determined by

ceremonial laws, a counsel of conscience, and so forth, while his own spirit and will are not in his actions, such that these actions are external to him himself.

Addition. Mechanism, as the first form of objectivity, is also that very category that first presents itself to reflection in observation of the objective [*gegenständlich*] world and a category from which this observation quite frequently does not budge. Nevertheless, this is a superficial manner of observation, lacking in thought, insufficient for making do either in relation to nature or even less in relation to the spiritual world. In nature only the completely abstract relationships of matter (insofar as it remains locked up in itself) are subject to mechanism. By contrast, even the phenomena and processes of the so-called 'physical domain' in the narrower sense of the word (for example, the phenomena of light, heat, magnetism, electricity, and so forth) cannot be explained in a merely mechanical manner (i.e. through pressure, impulse, displacement of parts, etc.). Even more unsatisfactory is the application and transference of this category to the domain of organic nature, insofar as it is a matter of conceiving what is specific to it: for example, the nourishment and growth of plants or even animal sensation. In any case it must be regarded as a quite essential deficiency, indeed, the chief deficiency of modern research into nature that, even where it is a matter of completely different and higher categories than those of mere mechanism, it nevertheless stubbornly clings to the latter, contradicting what presents itself to an unprejudiced observation [*Anschauung*], and by this means blocks the path to an adequate knowledge of nature. – Next, with regard to the formations of the spiritual world, here too in the consideration of them the mechanical perspective has been unduly promoted in various ways. This is the case, for example, if it is said that a human being *consists* of body and soul. In this assertion these two count as subsisting each for themselves and as being combined with one another only externally. It also happens when the soul is regarded as a mere complex of forces and faculties, subsisting self-sufficiently next to one another. – Thus, on the one hand, the mechanical manner of observation must be rejected out of hand where it comes on the scene with the pretension of occupying the position of conceptual knowing in general and making mechanism the absolute category. Yet, on the other hand, mechanism's legitimacy and meaning as a universal, logical category must also be expressly vindicated, and accordingly by no means should it be limited merely to the domain of nature from which this category's name is taken. Thus, there is nothing to object to if attention is paid to mechanical actions (e.g. those of weight, lever, and so forth) even outside the realm of genuine mechanics, particularly in physics and in physiology. Only it should not be overlooked thereby that within these domains the laws of mechanism are no longer the decisive ones, but make their appearance only, as it were, in a subservient position. Immediately linked to this point is then the further remark that where the higher functions in nature, namely, the organic functions, suffer a disturbance or hindrance in one way or another in their normal effectiveness, the otherwise subordinate mechanism immediately emerges as dominating. Thus, for example, someone suffering from

a weak stomach has a sensation of *pressure* in the stomach after consuming a modest quantity of certain foods, while others whose digestive organs are healthy remain free of this sensation, despite having consumed the same thing. This is also the case with the general feeling of *heaviness* in the arms and legs when the body is in a sickly mood. – Even in the domain of the spiritual world, mechanism has its place, albeit a place that is likewise merely subordinate. One speaks rightly of mechanical memory and of all sorts of mechanical activities such as, for example, reading, writing, playing music, and so forth. More precisely in this connection, as far as memory is concerned, a mechanical manner of behaving is even inherent in its essence; a circumstance that has often been overlooked by modern pedagogy, to the great detriment of the education of youth, in a mistaken zeal for freedom of the intelligence. Nevertheless, someone would prove to be a bad psychologist if, in order to fathom the nature of memory, he were to take flight to mechanics and apply its laws without further ado to the soul. The mechanical dimension of memory precisely consists solely in the fact that here certain signs, sounds, and so forth are construed in their merely external combination and then reproduced in this combination, without it being necessary thereby to attend explicitly to their meaning and inner combination. In order to recognize this connection with mechanical memory, no further study of mechanics is needed, and from this study there is nothing to be gained for psychology as such.

§ 196

Only insofar as the object is self-sufficient (see the preceding section) does it have the lack of self-sufficiency in terms of which it suffers *violence*. Insofar as the object is the posited concept in itself, neither of these determinations sublates itself in its other determination; instead the object joins itself together with itself through the negation of itself, through its lack of self-sufficiency, and only then is it self-sufficient. Thus, at the same time, in the difference from externality, and in its self-sufficiency negating this externality, it [the object] is the *negative unity* with itself, *centrality*, subjectivity – in which it is itself directed and related to the external. The latter is equally centred in itself and, in that, just as much related to the other centre, having its centrality just as much in the other. [Hence, the object in the second place is] (2) a *differentiated* [*differenter*] mechanism (fall, desire, social drive, and the like).

§ 197

The development of this relationship forms the syllogistic inference that the immanent negativity as the *central* individuality of an object (the abstract

centre) relates itself to objects lacking self-sufficiency as the other extreme, relating to them through a middle [term] that unifies the objects' centrality and lack of self-sufficiency, the relative centre. [Hence, the object is] (3) *absolute mechanism*.

§ 198

The syllogism that has been given here ($I - P - U$) is a triad of syllogistic inferences. The flawed *individuality* of the objects *lacking self-sufficiency*, in which the formal mechanism is at home, is, in keeping with its lack of self-sufficiency, just as much the external *universality*. These objects are thus the *middle* also between the *absolute* and the *relative* centre (the form of the syllogism: $U - I - P$). For it is by means of this lack of self-sufficiency that those two are separated and are extremes just as they are related to one another. So, too, the *absolute centrality* as the substantial universal (the gravity that remains identical), which as the pure negativity also encapsulates in itself the individuality, is the mediating factor between the *relative centre* and the objects *lacking self-sufficiency*; ([thus amounting to] the form of the inference $P - U - I$) and, to be sure, just as essential in terms of the immanent individuality where it functions to separate, as it is in terms of the universality as the identical cohesion and as the undisturbed being-in-itself.

Like the solar system, the state, for instance, is, in the practical sphere, a system of three syllogisms. (1) The *individual* (the person) joins itself through its *particularity* (physical and spiritual needs, what becomes the civil society, once they have been further developed for themselves) with the *universal* (the society, justice, law, government). (2) The will, the activity of individuals, is the mediating factor which satisfies the needs in relation to society, the law, and so forth, just as it fulfils and realizes the society, the law, and so forth. (3) But the universal (state, government, law) is the substantial middle [term] in which the individuals and their satisfaction have and acquire their fulfilled reality, mediation, and subsistence. Since the mediation joins each of the determinations with the other extreme, each joins itself precisely in this way together with itself; it produces itself and this production is its self-preservation. – It is only through the nature of this joining-together, through this triad of syllogisms with the same *terminis*, that a whole is truly understood in its organization.

§ 199

The *immediacy* of concrete existence that objects have in absolute mechanism is *in itself* negated by the fact that their self-sufficiency is mediated by their relations to one another, hence, through their lack of self-sufficiency. Thus, the object must be posited as *differentiated* [*different*], in its *concrete existence*, opposite *its* other.

b. Chemism

§ 200

The *differentiated* [*different*] object has an immanent *determinacy* constituting its nature and in that determinacy it has concrete existence. But as the posited totality of the *concept*, it is the contradiction of this its totality and the determinacy of its concrete existence [*Existenz*]; it is thus the [process of] striving to sublimate this contradiction and make its existence [*Dasein*] equal to the concept.

Addition. Chemism is a category of objectivity that as a rule does not tend to be stressed particularly. Instead it is usually taken together with mechanism as one and, in this manner of taking them together, under the common title ‘mechanistic relationship’, it is opposed to the relationship of *purposiveness*. The motivation for this is to be sought in the fact that *mechanism* and *chemism* have, indeed, this in common: each is initially the concretely existing concept only *in itself*, whereas the *purpose*, by contrast, is to be regarded as the concept existing concretely *for itself*. Nonetheless, mechanism and chemism also differ from one another very specifically, namely, in the way that the object, in the form of mechanism, is initially only an indifferent relation to itself, whereas the chemical object, by contrast, demonstrates itself to be related straightaway to an other. Now, to be sure, even in the case of mechanism, as it develops, relations to an other are already emerging. But the relation of the mechanical objects to one another is only an external relation initially, such that the objects related to one another are left with the semblance [*Schein*] of self-sufficiency. Thus, for example, in nature the various heavenly bodies that form the solar system are connected by their movements and, by this means, demonstrate that they are related to one another. Yet motion, as the unity of space and time, is nothing but an utterly external and abstract relation and so it seems as though the heavenly bodies, related in such an external manner to one another, would be and even remain what they are without this relation that they have to one another. – In the case of chemism, by contrast, things behave otherwise. Chemically differentiated [*chemisch-differenten*] objects are explicitly what they are, only through their difference [*Differenz*], and are thus the absolute drive to integrate themselves through and with one another.

§ 201

The chemical process thus has as its product the *neutral* dimension of these strung-out extremes, a neutral dimension which these extremes are *in themselves*; by means of the differentiation of the objects (the particularization), the concept, i.e. the concrete universal, joins itself [*schließt sich . . . zusammen*] with the individuality, i.e. the product, and so merely with itself. Equally contained in this process are the other syllogisms; the individuality, as activity, is likewise the mediating factor just like the concrete universal, the essence of the strung-out extremes, which enters into existence [*Dasein*] in the product.

§ 202

Chemism, as the reflexive relationship [*Reflexionsverhältnis*] of objectivity, still presupposes, together with the differentiated [*different*] nature of the objects, the *immediate* self-sufficiency of those same objects. The process is that of passing back and forth from one form into the other, forms that at the same time still remain external. – In the neutral product, the determinate properties that the extremes had opposite one another are sublated. This is, indeed, in keeping with the concept; but the *animating* principle of differentiating does not exist concretely in it since it has sunk back into immediacy. For this reason, the neutral dimension is a separable dimension. Yet the judging principle that severs the neutral dimension into differentiated [*différente*] extremes and gives the undifferentiated [*indifferent*] objects in general their difference [*Différenz*] and animation opposite an other falls outside that first process, and so does the process as the separation that strings things out.

Addition. The chemical process is still a finite, conditioned process. The concept as such is as yet only the inner dimension of this process and does not yet come into concrete existence in its being-for-itself. In the neutral product, the process is extinguished and what stirs things up falls outside the process.

§ 203

The *externality* of these two processes, the reduction of what are differentiated [*Differenten*] to something neutral and the differentiation of the undifferentiated [*Differenzierung des Indifferenten*] or neutral, which allows them to appear as self-sufficient opposite one another, shows its finitude in passing over into products in which they are sublated. Conversely, the

process presents the presupposed immediacy of the differentiated [*differenten*] objects as a vacuous immediacy. – By means of this *negation* of externality and immediacy, into which the concept as object was immersed, it is posited *freely* and *for itself opposite* that externality and immediacy – *as purpose*.

Addition. The transition from chemism to the teleological relationship is entailed by the fact that the two forms of the chemical process reciprocally sublimate one another. In this way it comes about that the concept, initially only present *in itself* in chemism and in mechanism, becomes free, and the concept, thus existing concretely for itself, is the *purpose*.

c. Teleology

§ 204

Purpose is the concept that is *for itself* and that has entered into a free concrete existence [*Existenz*] via the *negation* of immediate objectivity. It is determined as something *subjective*, in that this negation initially is *abstract* and thus objectivity also only stands over against it [i.e. the purpose] at first. In contrast to the totality of the concept, however, this determinacy of the subjectivity is *one-sided* and, indeed, *for it* [the purpose] *itself*, since all determinacy has posited itself as sublated in it. Thus, too, for it [the purpose] the presupposed object is only an ideal, *in itself vacuous* reality. As this contradiction of its identity with itself opposite the negation and the opposition posited in it, it is itself the sublating, the *activity* of so negating the opposition that it posits it as identical with itself. This is the *process of realizing the purpose* in which, by rendering itself something other than its subjectivity and objectifying itself, it has sublated the difference of both, has joined *itself* together *only with itself* and has *preserved* itself.

The concept of purpose is, on the one hand, superfluous; on the other hand, it is rightly labelled *a concept of reason* and contrasted with the understanding's abstract-universal that relates itself to the particular (which it does not have in itself) only *by way of subsuming it*. – Furthermore, the difference of the purpose as the *final cause* from the merely *efficient cause* (i.e. what is ordinarily called the cause) is of the utmost importance. The cause pertains to the not yet uncovered, blind necessity; for this reason it appears to pass over into its other and lose its originality in it in the course of being

posited. Only in itself or for us is the cause in the effect first a cause, and does it come back *into itself*. The purpose, by contrast, is posited as *in itself* the determinacy, or what there [in efficient causality] still appears as being-other contains the effect [here], so that, in its efficacy, it does not pass over [into something else] but instead *preserves itself*. That is to say, it brings about itself alone and is, in the *end*, what it was in the *beginning*, in the original state. What is truly original is so only by means of this self-preservation. – The purpose requires a speculative construal, as the concept that itself, in its own *unity* and in the *ideality* of its determinations, contains the *judgment* or the negation, the opposition of the subjective and the objective, and is equally the sublating of them.

With regard to the purpose, one should not immediately or should not merely think of the form in which it is in consciousness, as a determination on hand in the representation. Through the concept of *inner* purposiveness, Kant re-awakened the idea in general and that of life in particular. Aristotle's determination of life already contains the inner purposiveness and thus stands infinitely far beyond the concept of modern teleology which has only the *finite*, the *external* purposiveness in view.

Need and drive are the examples of purpose lying closest at hand. They are the *felt* contradiction that takes place *within* the living subject itself and they enter into the activity of negating this negation that is still mere subjectivity. The *satisfaction* produces the peace between the subject and object, in that the objective dimension standing *over there* [*driiben*] in the still on hand contradiction (to the need) is equally sublated with respect to this, its one-sidedness, through the unification with the subjective dimension. – Those who speak so much of the solidity and invincibility of the finite have an example of the opposite in every drive. The drive is, so to speak, the *certainty* that the subjective dimension is only one-sided and has just as little truth as the objective dimension. The drive is, furthermore, the *implementation* [*Ausführung*] of this, its certainty. It manages to sublimate this opposition – that the subjective dimension would be and remain only something subjective, just as the objective dimension would equally be and remain only something objective – and [to sublimate] this finitude of them.

With regard to the activity of the purpose, attention may also be drawn to the fact that, in the *sylogism* that conjoins the purpose with

itself through the means of the realization, the *negation* of the *termini* surfaces – the just mentioned negation of immediate subjectivity that surfaces in the purpose as such, like that of the *immediate* objectivity (of the means and the presupposed objects). This is the same negation that is exercised in the elevation of the spirit to God in contrast to the finite things of the world as much as in contrast to one's own subjectivity. This is the moment which (as mentioned in the *Introduction* and in § 192) is overlooked and left aside in the form of the syllogisms at the level of the understanding, the form that is given to this elevation in the so-called proofs of God's existence.

§ 205

The teleological relation in its immediacy is initially the *external* purposiveness, and the concept is opposite the object which is something *presupposed*. The purpose is thus *finite*, partly in terms of the *content*, partly in terms of the fact that it has an external condition in an extant object as the *material* of its realization. To this extent, its self-determination is merely *formal*. The immediacy entails, more precisely, that the *particularity* (as a *determination of form*, the *subjectivity* of the purpose) appears as reflected in itself, the *content* as *distinct* from the *totality* of the form, the subjectivity *in itself*, the concept. This diversity constitutes the *finitude* of the purpose *within itself*. The content is, by this means, as limited, contingent, and given as the object is something particular and extant.

Addition. When speaking of purpose, one usually has one's eye only on external purposiveness. In this manner of considering things, they do not count as bearing their determination in themselves. Instead they count merely as *means* that are used and used up to realize some purpose lying outside them. This is in general the viewpoint of *utility*, which formerly played a great role in the sciences as well, but then deservedly came to be discredited, and recognized to be insufficient for true insight into the nature of things. To be sure, justice must be done to finite things as such inasmuch as they are to be considered to be other than ultimate and to point beyond themselves. This negativity of finite things, however, is their own dialectic and, in order to know this, one first has to get involved with their positive content. Moreover, what is at stake in the case of the teleological manner of consideration is the well-intended interest of pointing out the wisdom of God announcing itself in nature. To this extent, accordingly, it should be noted that, with this search for purposes that things serve as means, one does not get beyond the finite and easily lapses into meagre reflections, as, for example, when not only is the grapevine considered from the viewpoint of the familiar use that it affords human beings, but even the cork tree is so considered in relation to the stopper that is cut from its bark in order to seal the wine bottle. In former times, entire books have been written in this vein and it is easy to establish that neither the true

interest of religion nor that of science can be advanced in this way. The external purposiveness stands immediately before the idea, but sometimes what thus stands on the threshold is precisely more insufficient than anything else.

§ 206

The teleological relation is the syllogism in which the subjective purpose joins itself together [*sich . . . zusammenschließt*] with the objectivity external to it through a middle term [*Mitte*] that is the unity of the two, both as the *purposive activity* and as the objectivity *immediately* posited under the purpose, the *means* [*Mittel*].

Addition. The development of the purpose into the idea comes about by way of three steps: *first*, that of the subjective purpose; *second*, that of the purpose bringing itself about [*sich vollführenden*]; and *third*, that of the purpose that has brought itself about. – At the outset we have the subjective purpose and this, as the concept being for itself, is itself the totality of the conceptual moments. The first of these moments is that of the universality identical with itself: as it were, the neutral first water in which everything is contained but not yet separated out. The second is then the particularization of this universal, through which it receives a determinate content. But since this determinate content is posited by the activity of the universal, the latter then returns to itself by means of that content and *joins itself together with itself* [*schließt sich mit sich selbst zusammen*]. Accordingly, when we set a purpose in front of us, we also say that we decide [*beschließen*] on something and accordingly consider ourselves at the outset to be, as it were, open and amenable to this or that determination. Similarly then, however, it is also said that ‘one has resolved [*entschlossen*] to do something’, which expresses that the subject has emerged from his inwardness, i.e. his being only for himself, and let himself in for the objectivity standing opposite him. This then yields the progression from the merely subjective purpose to the purposive activity directed outwards.

§ 207

1. The *subjective* purpose is the syllogism in which the *universal* concept joins together with individuality by means of particularity, such that this [individuality] as the self-determination *judges*. That is to say, this individuality both particularizes that still indeterminate universal, making it a determinate *content*, and also posits the *opposition* of subjectivity and objectivity. It [this individuality] is, in itself, at the same time the return into itself since it determines the concept’s subjectivity (presupposed as something opposite the objectivity) to be deficient in relation to the totality that has joined together with itself and since at the same time it thereby turns *outward*.

§ 208

2. This *activity turned outward* is the *individuality* that, in the subjective purpose, is identical to the particularity in which, next to the content, the *external objectivity* is also included. As such, this activity relates at the outset *immediately* to the object and takes control of it as a *means*. The concept is this immediate *power* because it is the negativity identical with itself, in which the *being* of the object is thoroughly determined only as something *ideal* [*ideelles*]. – The *entire middle term* is now this inner power of the concept as *activity*, with which the *object* is immediately unified as *means* and under which it stands.

In the finite purposiveness, the middle term is this status of being *broken* [*das Gebrochene*] into two moments external to one another, the activity and the object. The relation of the purpose as *power* to this object and the latter's being conquered by it is *immediate* – it is the *first premise* of the inference – insofar as in the concept qua ideality that is for itself the object is posited as *in itself* nothing. This relation or first premise *becomes itself the middle term* which is, at the same time, the syllogism *in itself*, since by means of this relation the purpose joins together its activity, in which it remains contained and dominant, with objectivity.

Addition. The process of carrying out the purpose is the mediated manner of realizing the purpose; just as necessary, however, is the immediate realization of it. The purpose seizes the object immediately because it is the power over the object, because in it the particularity is contained and, in the latter, the objectivity is also contained. – The living entity has a body; the soul takes control of it and has immediately objectified itself in it. The human soul has a great deal to do in making its corporeal condition a means. A human being must first take possession of his body, as it were, so that it may be the instrument of his soul.

§ 209

3. The purposive activity with its means is still directed outward, since the purpose is also *not* identical with the object; thus it must first be mediated with the object. The means, as the object in this *second premise*, is *in immediate* relation with the *other* extreme of the syllogism, the objectivity as presupposed, the material. This relation is the sphere of the mechanism and chemism now *serving* the purpose that is their truth and free concept. That the subjective purpose, as the power of these processes in which the

objective dimension rubs up against itself and sublates itself, keeps itself *outside them* and is what *preserves itself* in them – this is the *cunning* of reason.

Addition. Reason is as *cunning* as it is *powerful*. The cunning consists generally in the activity of mediating, which, by letting the objects, in keeping with their own nature, act on one another and wear themselves out on one another, without meddling immediately in this process, achieves *its* purpose alone. In this sense, one can say that the divine providence, over against the world and its process, behaves as the absolute cunning. God gives free rein to human beings with their particular passions and interests and, by this means, what comes about is the accomplishment of *his* aims which are different from what was pursued by those of whom he makes use in the process.

§ 210

Thus, the realized purpose is the *posited unity* of the subjective and the objective dimensions. This unity, however, is essentially determined in such a way that the subjective and objective dimensions are neutralized and sublated only with respect to their *one-sidedness*, while the objective dimension is subjected and made to conform to the purpose as the free concept and, thereby, to the power over it. The purpose *preserves* itself against and in the objective dimension because, in addition to being the *one-sided* subjective dimension (the particular), it is also the concrete universal, the identity of both, that is in itself [*die an sich seiende Identität beider*]. This universal, that as simple is reflected in itself, is *the content* that remains *the same* through all three *termini* [terms] of the syllogism and their movement.

§ 211

In the finite purposiveness, however, the purpose carried out is also something as internally broken as was the middle term and the initial purpose. What has come about is thus only a form posited *externally* in the material found before it, a form that, on account of the restricted content of the purpose, is likewise a contingent determination. The purpose attained is thus only an object that is also in turn a means or material for other purposes and so on ad infinitum.

§ 212

What happens, however, in the process of realizing the purpose *in itself* is that *the one-sided subjectivity* and the semblance [*Schein*] of objective

self-sufficiency on hand opposite it are sublated. In seizing the means, *the concept* posits itself as the object's essence as it is *in itself*; in the mechanical and chemical process, the self-sufficiency of the object has already evaporated *in itself* and in the course it takes under the dominance of the purpose, the *semblance* of that self-sufficiency, the negative dimension *opposite the concept*, sublates itself. Yet this object is immediately already posited as vacuous in itself, as only ideal by virtue of the fact that the executed purpose is determined *only* as means and material. With this, the opposition of *content* and *form* has vanished as well. Since the purpose, by sublating [*durch Aufhebung*] the formal determinations, joins itself together with itself, the form is posited as *identical* with itself, thus as content, so that the *concept* as the *activity of the form* has only *itself* as *content*. It is thus posited through this process generally what the *concept* of the purpose was: the unity, *being in itself*, of the subjective and the objective dimensions now posited *as being for itself – the idea*.

Addition. The finitude of the purpose consists in the fact that, in the course of its realization, the material applied as means to it is only subsumed under it externally and made to conform to it. But, now, in fact the object *in itself* is the concept and because the concept, as purpose, is realized therein, this is only the manifestation of its own inner dimension. The objectivity is thus as it were only a hull under which the concept lies hidden. Within the finite, we cannot experience it or see that the purpose is truly attained. To accomplish the infinite purpose is thus merely to sublimate the illusion [*Täuschung*] that it is not yet accomplished. The good, the absolute good, brings itself to completion in the world eternally and the result is that it is already brought to completion in and for itself, without needing first to wait for us. It is this illusion in which we live and at the same time it alone is the activating principle upon which the interest of the world rests. The idea in its process fabricates that illusion for itself, positing an other opposite itself, and its action consists in sublating this illusion. Truth emerges only from this error and herein lies the reconciliation with error and with finitude. Otherness or error, as something sublated, is itself a necessary moment of the truth, the truth which only is by making itself its own result.

C. THE IDEA

§ 213

The idea is the true *in and for itself*, the absolute unity of the concept and objectivity. Its ideal content is none other than the concept in its determinations. Its real [*reeller*] content is only its exhibition [*Darstellung*], an exhibition

that it provides for itself in the form of external existence [*Dasein*] and, with this shape incorporated into the concept's ideality and in its power, the concept thus preserves itself in that exhibition.

The definition *of the absolute*, that it is the *idea*, is itself absolute. All previous definitions go back to this one. – The idea is the *truth*; for the truth is this, that objectivity corresponds to the concept, – not that external things correspond to my representations; these are only *correct* representations that *I, this person* [*Ich Dieser*], have. In the idea it is not a matter of an indexical this [*Diesen*], it is a matter neither of representations nor of external things. – But *everything* actual, insofar as it is something true, is also the idea and possesses its truth only through and in virtue of the idea. The individual being is some side or other of the idea, but for this still other actualities are needed, actualities that likewise appear as obtaining particularly for themselves; the concept is realized only in them together and in their relation. The individual taken by itself [*für sich*] does not correspond to its concept; this limitation of its existence constitutes its *finitude* and its demise.

The idea itself is no more to be taken as an idea *of something or other* than the concept is to be taken merely as a determinate concept. The absolute is the universal idea and the *one* idea that, by *judging*, particularizes itself into a *system* of determinate ideas: ideas, however, that are only this, the process of going back into the one idea, their truth. On the basis of this judgment, the idea is *at the outset* only the one, universal *substance*, but its developed, true actuality is that it is as *subject* and thus as spirit.

The idea is frequently taken for something logical in a merely formal sense, insofar as it does not have some *concrete existence* [*Existenz*] as its point of departure and support. One must leave such a view to the standpoints for which the concretely existing thing and all further determinations that have not yet penetrated to the idea still count as so-called *realities* and true *actualities*. – Equally false is the representation of the idea as though it were only *something abstract*. It is this, of course, insofar as everything *untrue* is consumed in it. However, in itself it is essentially *concrete* since it is the free concept, the concept determining itself and thereby determining itself as reality. It would be something formally abstract only if the concept that is its principle were taken as the abstract unity and not as it is, namely, as the *negative return of it into itself* and as *subjectivity*.

Addition. By truth, one understands at first that I *know* [*wisse*] how something *is*. Yet this is truth only in relation to consciousness or the formal truth, mere correctness. In contrast to this, truth in the deeper sense consists in this, that objectivity is identical with the concept. It is truth in this deeper sense that is at stake if, for example, one is speaking of a *true* state or of a *true* work of art. These objects [*Gegenstände*] are *true* if they are what they *should* be, that is to say, if their reality corresponds to their concept. So construed, the untrue is the same as what is otherwise also called 'the bad'. A bad human being is one who is not truly human, i.e. a human being who does not behave in keeping with the concept or determination of a human being. Nothing, meanwhile, can subsist utterly without the identity of the concept and reality. Even something bad and untrue *is* only insofar as its reality still behaves somehow in conformity with its concept. Something thoroughly bad or at odds with the concept is, precisely for this reason, something collapsing in itself. It is the concept alone through which things have their standing in the world; that is to say, in the language of religious representation, things are what they are only by virtue of the divine and thereby creative thought dwelling within them. – When speaking of the idea, one must not imagine something remote and other-worldly by this. The idea is instead what is thoroughly present, and so too it is to be found in every consciousness, even if muddled and stunted. – We represent the world to ourselves as an enormous totality created by God and, indeed, such that God has revealed himself to us in it. So too we regard the world as governed by divine providence and herein lies the fact that the asundered character [*Auseinander*] of the world is eternally led back to the unity out of which it went forth and, in keeping with that unity, is preserved. – From time immemorial in philosophy, it has been about nothing other than thoughtfully knowing the idea, and underlying everything that deserves the name 'philosophy' has been the consciousness of an absolute unity of what holds for the understanding only in its separation. – The proof that the idea is the truth is not something to be demanded only now; the entire foregoing elaboration and development of thinking contains this proof. The idea is the result of the course that this has taken, a course that is, nevertheless, not to be understood as if it were something *only* mediated, that is to say, mediated by something other than itself. The idea is instead its own result and, as such, just as much immediate as mediated. The stages considered so far, those of being and essence and equally of the concept and objectivity, are not something fixed and resting on themselves with regard to this difference among them. Instead they have been demonstrated to be dialectical and their truth is only that of being moments of the idea.

§ 214

The idea can be grasped as *reason* (this is the genuine philosophical meaning of *reason*), further as *subject-object*, as the *unity of the ideal and the real, of the finite and the infinite, of the soul and the body*, as the *possibility that has its actuality in itself*, as that the *nature* of which *can only be conceived as existing*,

and so forth, because in it [the idea] all relationships of the understanding are contained, but in their *infinite* return and identity in themselves.

The understanding makes easy work of pointing out that everything said of the idea is *self-contradictory*. This can be equally conceded to it or rather it is already accomplished in the idea; – a work that is the work of reason and, of course, not as easy as that of the understanding. – The understanding shows that the idea is self-contradictory because, for example, the subjective dimension is only subjective and the objective dimension, by contrast, is opposed to it; because being is something completely different from the concept and thus cannot be plucked from it; similarly, because the finite is only finite and precisely the opposite of the infinite, and consequently is not identical with it and so on for all determinations. If the understanding thus shows that the idea is self-contradictory, the [science of] logic points out the opposite instead, namely, that the subjective dimension that is supposed to be merely subjective lacks any truth, contradicts itself, and passes over into its opposite, as does the finite that is supposed to be merely finite, the infinite that is supposed to be merely infinite, and so on. By this means, the process of passing over into its opposite and the unity in which the extremes are as something sublated, as a shining [*Scheinen*] or as moments, reveals itself as their truth.

The understanding that tackles the idea suffers from a twofold misunderstanding. *In the first place*, it takes the *extremes* of the idea, however they may be expressed, insofar as *they* are *in their unity*, yet in the sense and determination proper to them insofar as they are *not* in their concrete unity but instead are still *abstractions* outside it. The understanding mistakes no less the *relation*, even if it is already posited explicitly. In this way the understanding overlooks, for example, the nature of the *copula* in a judgment, which asserts of the individual, the subject, that the individual is just as much something not individual but instead something universal. – *In the second place*, the understanding holds *its* reflection that the idea that is identical with itself contains the *negative* of itself (that it contains the contradiction) to be an *external* reflection, that does not fall to the idea itself. In fact, however, this is not a wisdom proper to the understanding. The idea is instead itself the dialectic that eternally separates and distinguishes what is identical with itself from the differentiated [*Differenten*], the subjective from the objective, the

finite from the infinite, the soul from the body and, only insofar as it does, is it eternal creation, eternally alive, and eternal spirit. Because it is thus itself the passing over or rather the transposing of itself into *abstract understanding*, it is also eternally *reason*. It [i.e. the idea] is the dialectic that takes what is understandable in this [superficial] way [*dieses Verständige*] – including the diversity of its finite nature and the false semblance [*falschen Schein*] of self-sufficiency of its productions – and renders it understandable in a recursive way [*wieder verständigt*] and leads it back to unity. Since this twofold movement is neither temporal nor separate and distinct in any way – otherwise it would be again only abstract understanding –, it is the process of eternally intuiting [*Anschauend*] itself in the other; the concept that *has* carried *itself* out in its objectivity, the object that is *inner purposiveness*, essential subjectivity.

The *diverse ways* of construing the idea, as unity of the ideal and the real, of the *finite* and *infinite*, of *identity* and *difference* [*Differenz*], and so on, are more or less *formal*, since they designate some sort of stage of the *determinate concept*. Only the concept itself is free and the truly *universal*; in the idea its *determinacy* is thus equally only itself, – an objectivity into which it, as the universal, continuously sets itself and in which it has only its own determinacy, the total determinacy. The idea is the *infinite judgment*, each of the sides of which is the self-sufficient totality and, precisely by virtue of completing itself to this end [*dazu*], has just as much passed over into the other. None of the other determinate concepts is this totality completed in its two sides, except the *concept* itself and the *objectivity*.

§ 215

The idea is essentially a *process* since its identity is that of the absolute and free concept only insofar as it is the absolute negativity and thus dialectical. It is the course [*Verlauf*] in which the concept as the universality that is individuality determines itself to be objectivity and to be the opposite of objectivity, and in which this externality that has the concept as its substance leads itself back into *subjectivity* through its immanent dialectic.

Because the idea is (a) a *process*, the expression ‘the *unity* of the finite and infinite, of thinking and being, and so on’, as an expression for

the absolute, is false, as often noted. For this unity expresses an abstract, *calmly* enduring identity. The expression is likewise false because the idea is (b) *subjectivity*, since that unity expresses the *in-itself*, the *substantial dimension* of the true unity. The infinite thus appears as only *neutralized* relative to the finite, and so too the subjective relative to the objective, thinking relative to being. But in the *negative* unity of the idea the infinite reaches over and beyond the finite, as does thinking over being, subjectivity over objectivity. The unity of the idea is subjectivity, thinking, infinity, and hence it is essentially distinct from the idea as *substance* just as this *overreaching* subjectivity (thinking, infinity) is to be distinguished from the *one-sided* subjectivity (one-sided thinking, one-sided infinity) to which it reduces itself in judging and making determinations.

Addition. The idea, as a process, runs through three stages in its development. The first form of the idea is *life*, i.e. the idea in the form of immediacy. The second form is then that of the mediation or the difference [*Differenz*], and this is the idea as *knowing* which appears in the twofold shape of the *theoretical* and the *practical* idea. The process of knowing has, as its result, the restoration of the unity, enriched by the difference, and this yields the third form of the hereby *absolute idea*, the final stage of the logical process that proves itself to be at once the truly first and the only entity that is through itself alone.

a. Life

§ 216

The *immediate* idea is *life*. The concept is realized as the soul in a *body*; the soul is the immediate, self-referring *universality* of the body's externality just as much as it is the body's *particularization*, so that the body expresses no other differences than the determination of the concept, and finally it is the *individuality* as infinite negativity – the dialectic of the body's objectivity, [the factors of which are] outside one another, an objectivity that is led back into subjectivity from the semblance of self-sufficient subsistence, so that all members are reciprocally momentary *means* as much as momentary purposes, while life, inasmuch as it is the *inceptive* particularization, *results* in itself as the *negative* unity that is *for itself* and, in the dialectic of embodiment [*Leiblichkeit*], joins itself together only with itself. – Life is thus essentially a *living entity* [*Lebendiges*] and, with regard to its immediacy, *this individual* living entity. In this sphere, finitude has

the determination that soul and body are *separable*, on account of the immediacy of the idea; this constitutes the mortality of the living. But those two sides of the idea are diverse *component parts* [*Bestandstücke*] only insofar as it is dead.

Addition. The individual members of the body are what they are only by means of their unity and in relation to it. Thus, for example, a hand that is severed from the body, is a hand only in name, but not in reality [*der Sache nach*], as *Aristotle* already noted. – From the standpoint of the understanding, life is usually regarded as a mystery and generally as *incomprehensible*. In this way, meanwhile, the understanding merely confesses its finitude and vacuousness. Life is, in fact, so little something incomprehensible that in it we are confronted with the concept itself and, more precisely, the *immediate* idea existing concretely as a concept. With this, then, the deficiency of life is also at once articulated. This deficiency consists in the fact that here concept and reality do not truly correspond to one another. The concept of life is the soul and this concept has the body for its reality. The soul is, as it were, poured into its corporality and thus the former is only *sensing and feeling* [*empfindend*] but not yet freely being-for-itself. The process of life consists then in overcoming the immediacy in which it is still caught up, and this process (which is itself in turn threefold) has as its result the idea in the form of the judgment, i.e. the idea as *knowing*.

§ 217

The living is the syllogism, whose moments are systems and syllogisms in themselves (§§ 198, 201, 207) which, however, are active syllogisms, processes, and in the subjective unity of the living, they are only *one* process. The living is thus the process of its coming to closure together with itself [*Zusammenschließens mit sich selbst*], that runs its course by means of *three processes*.

§ 218

1. The first is the process of the living *within* itself, in which it divides itself in itself and makes its corporal condition [*Leiblichkeit*] its object, its *inorganic* nature. For its part, this inorganic side, as the relatively external, enters into the difference and opposition of its moments that reciprocally surrender themselves, the one assimilating the other to itself, and preserve themselves in the process of producing themselves. This activity of the members, however, is only one activity of the subject, the activity into which its productions go back, so that through that activity only the subject is produced, i.e. it merely reproduces itself.

Addition. The process of living that is internal to it has in nature the threefold form of sensibility, irritability, and reproduction. As sensibility, the living is immediately a simple relation to itself, the soul that is everywhere present, in its body, the external juxtapositions of which have no truth for it. As irritability, the living appears divided in itself and, as reproduction, the living is constantly reproducing itself from the inner difference of its members and organs. The living *is* only as this continually self-renewing process within itself.

§ 219

2. But the *judgment* of the concept proceeds freely to release from itself the *objective dimension* as a self-sufficient totality. The negative relation of the living to itself, as *immediate* individuality, *presupposes* an inorganic nature standing over against it. Since this negative aspect of itself is just as much a moment of the concept [*Begriffsmoment*] of the living itself, it is thus in the latter (the at once concrete universality) as a *lack*. The dialectic, through which the object as something *in itself* vacuous sublates itself, is the activity of the living entity certain of itself that accordingly *preserves*, *develops*, and *objectifies* itself in *this process* *opposite* an *inorganic nature*.

Addition. The living stands over against an inorganic nature towards which it behaves as its power and which it assimilates to itself. The result of this process is not, as in the case of the chemical process, a neutral product in which the self-sufficiency of both sides standing opposite one another is sublated. Instead, the living demonstrates itself to be something that reaches over and beyond its other [*übergreifend über sein Anderes*] which is incapable of withstanding its power. The inorganic nature that is subjugated by the living endures this because it is *in itself* the same as life is *for itself*. Hence, in the other, the living is merely connecting with itself. When the soul has fled the body, the play of the elementary powers of objectivity commences. These powers are, so to speak, continually poised to initiate their process in the organic body, and life is the constant battle against them.

§ 220

3. In the initial stage of its process, the living individual behaves as a subject and concept in itself. Through its second stage, it assimilates its external objectivity to itself and thus *posits in itself* the real determinacy. As a result, it is now *in itself* the *genus*, substantial universality. The particularization of the latter is the relation of the subject to *another subject* of its genus and the judgment is the relationship of the genus to these determinate individuals standing opposite one another: *the difference of the sexes* [*Geschlechtsdifferenz*].

§ 221

The process of the *genus* brings this [genus] to the point of *being-for-itself*. Because life is still the immediate idea, the product of the process breaks down into two sides. On the *one* side, the living individual in general, at first presupposed as immediate, emerges now as something *mediated* and *produced*. On the *other* side, however, the living *individuality* that, on account of its initial *immediacy*, behaves *negatively* towards the universality, *perishes* in this [universality] as the power.

Addition. What is alive dies because it is the contradiction of being *in itself* the universal, the genus, and yet existing concretely and immediately only as individual. In death, the genus demonstrates itself to be the power over the immediately individual. – For the animal, the process of the genus is the highest point of its condition of being alive. But the animal does not manage to be for itself in its genus, succumbing instead to the latter's power. What is immediately alive mediates itself with itself in the process of the genus and thus elevates itself above its immediacy, only to sink back down to that same immediacy again and again. In this way, life runs its course at first merely into the bad infinity of the progression ad infinitum. What, meanwhile, in keeping with the concept, comes about through the process of life is the sublation and overcoming of the immediacy in which the idea as life is still ensnared.

§ 222

By this means, however, the idea of life has not only freed itself from *just any* (particular) *immediate* 'this', but from this initial immediacy altogether. In this way, it comes *to itself*, to its *truth*, entering *into concrete existence* [*Existenz*] as the *free genus for itself*. The death of the merely immediate, individual living thing [*Lebendigkeit*] is the *spirit emerging*.

b. Knowing [*Das Erkennen*]

§ 223

The idea concretely exists freely *for itself* insofar as universality is the element *in which it exists concretely* or insofar as it is objectivity itself as the concept; [that is to say,] the idea has itself for an object [*Gegenstand*]. Its subjectivity, determined as universality, is *pure differentiating within* it – intuiting that keeps itself in this identical universality. But, as a differentiating in a determinate way, it is the further *judgment* of thrusting itself as a totality away from itself and, indeed, initially *presupposing* itself as the *external*

universe. These are two judgments that are *in themselves* identical but not yet *posited* as identical.

§ 224

The relation of these two ideas that are identical *in themselves* or as life, is thus the *relative* relation that makes up the determination of *finitude* in this sphere. It is the *relationship of reflection*, since the differentiation of the idea in it [the idea] itself is only the *first* judgment, the *presupposing* is not yet *a positing*, and thus, for the subjective idea, the objective dimension is the *extant* immediate world or the idea as life in the appearance of *individual concrete existence*. At the same time, insofar as this judgment is a pure differentiating *within* it [the idea] itself (see the preceding section), the idea is *for itself* both itself and *its other*. Thus it is the *certainty* of being *in itself* the identity of this objective world with it. – Reason comes to the world with the absolute faith in its capacity to posit the identity and elevate its certainty to *truth*, and with the drive to posit as also vacuous *for it* that opposition that is *in itself* vacuous.

§ 225

In general, this process is *knowing* [*das Erkennen*]. In it, in *one* activity, the opposition, the one-sidedness of subjectivity together with the one-sidedness of objectivity, is sublated *in itself*. But this process of sublating takes place at the outset only *in itself*. The process as such is thus itself immediately beset with the finitude of this sphere and falls apart into the *twofold*, diversely posited movement of the drive. [In one respect,] it is the drive to sublate the one-sidedness of the *subjectivity* of the idea by taking up into itself the world *that is* [*seiende Welt*], taking it up into subjective representing and thinking, and to fill out the abstract certainty of itself with this objectivity as *content*, an objectivity that thus counts as true. Conversely, it is the drive to sublate the *one-sidedness* of the objective world that here accordingly, by contrast, counts as a *semblance*, a collection of contingencies and shapes vacuous in themselves, and to determine and mould it through the *inner dimension* of the subjective, that counts here as the objective, as what truly is. The former is the drive of knowledge [*Wissen*] to truth, *knowing* [*Erkennen*] as *such*, the *theoretical* [activity]; the latter is the drive of the *good* to bring itself about, *willing*, the *practical* activity of the idea.

α . *Knowing*

§ 226

The universal finitude of knowing that lies in the first judgment, the *presupposition* of the opposition (§ 224), which its very action contradicts, specifies itself more precisely in its own idea in this direction, that its moments receive the form of diversity from one another and, since those moments are in fact complete, they come to stand in the relationship of reflection, not of the concept, to one another. The assimilation of the material [*Stoffes*] as something given thus appears as a *way of taking it up* into conceptual determinations that at the same time remain *external* to it, determinations that likewise display themselves opposite one another as diverse. It is reason active as *understanding*. The truth that this knowing comes to is thus likewise only *finite*; the infinite truth of the concept is fixed as a goal that is only *in itself*, something *beyond* this knowing. But in its external action, it stands under the guidance of the concept, and conceptual determinations make up the inner thread of the progression.

Addition. The finitude of knowing lies in the presupposition of a world already found before it, and in the process the knowing subject appears as a *tabula rasa*. This representation of things has been ascribed to Aristotle, although no one is more removed from this external way of construing knowing than Aristotle. This knowing does not yet know [*weiß*] itself as the activity of the concept, something which it is only *in itself*, but not *for itself*. Its behaviour appears to it as something passive, yet it is in fact active.

§ 227

Because it presupposes *what is differentiated* as a being that is found to be already on hand, standing opposite it (the manifold *facts* of external nature or of consciousness), finite knowing has (1) the *formal identity* or the *abstraction* of universality as the form of its activity at the outset. This activity thus consists in dissolving the given concrete dimension, individuating its differences, and giving them the form of *abstract universality*; or in leaving the concrete dimension as the *ground* and, through abstraction from the particularities that seem inessential, extracting a concrete universal, the *genus* or the force and the law. Such is the *analytic method*.

Addition. It is customary to speak of *analytic* and *synthetic* method as though following the one or the other were a mere matter of our whim. Yet this is in no way the case. Instead, which of the two methods to apply – both of which result from the concept of finite knowing – depends upon the form of the objects

[*Gegenstände*] themselves that are to be known. Knowing is at the outset analytical. The object has for it the shape of an isolated individual [*Gestalt der Vereinzelung*] and the activity of analytic knowing aims at tracing the individual lying before it back to a universal. Here thinking has the meaning of abstraction or formal identity only. This is the standpoint on which *Locke* and all empiricists stand. Many say that knowing can do nothing further than analyse the given, concrete objects [*Gegenstände*] into their abstract elements and then consider the latter in isolation. It is immediately evident, meanwhile, that this is to turn things upside down and that the sort of knowing that wants to take things as they *are* thereby falls into self-contradiction. Thus, for example, the chemist brings a piece of meat to his test-tube, breaks it down in a variety of ways, and then says that he has found that it consists of nitrogen, carbon, hydrogen, and so on. However, these abstract bits of material are then no longer meat. Something similar is the case when the empirical psychologist analyses an action into the diverse sides which it presents for consideration and then clings to them in abstraction from one another. In this case, the analytically treated object [*Gegenstand*] is regarded, as it were, as an onion from which one peels one skin after the other.

§ 228

This *universality* is (2) also a *determinate* one. The activity here proceeds according to the moments of the concept that, in finite *knowing*, is not in its infinity but is the *understandable* [*verständige*], *determinate concept* instead. Taking up the object [*Gegenstand*] into the forms of the latter concept is the *synthetic method*.

Addition. The movement of the synthetic method is the inversion of the analytic method. While the latter advances by going from the individual as its starting point to the universal, in the former case the universal (as *definition*) forms the point of departure instead, and there is a progression from it through the particularization (in the *division*) to the individual (the *theorem*). With this, the synthetic method demonstrates itself to be the development of the moments of the concept in the object [*Gegenstand*].

§ 229

(aa) Knowing initially puts the object [*Gegenstand*] into the form of the determinate concept in general so that, by this means, its *genus* and its universal *determinacy* are posited. The respective object is the *definition*. Its material and justification are procured by the analytic method (§ 227). The determinacy is, nevertheless, supposed to be only a *characteristic* [*Merkmal*], that is to say, something to assist merely subjective knowing that is external to the object [*Gegenstand*].

Addition. The definition itself contains the three moments of the concept: the universal as the proximate genus (*genus proximum*), the particular as the determinacy of the genus (*qualitas specifica*), and the individual as the defined object [*Gegenstand*] itself. With respect to definition, the question immediately arises ‘where does it comes from?’ and this question is generally to be answered by noting that definitions arise on the analytic path. With this answer, however, the dispute about the correctness of the definitions put forward immediately presents itself. For it is a matter here of the perceptions that formed one’s point of departure and the kinds of viewpoint from which one looked. The richer the object [*Gegenstand*] is that is to be defined, i.e. the more diverse sides it offers for consideration, the more diverse the definitions given of it tend to be. Thus, for example, there is an entire array of definitions of life, of the state, and so forth. Geometry, by contrast, has an easy time making definitions since its object, space, is such an abstract object [*Gegenstand*]. – Further, there is generally no necessity on hand with respect to the content of the defined object [*Gegenstand*]. One is supposed to accept that there is space, that there are plants, animals, and so forth, and it is not a matter for geometry, botany, and so forth to point out the necessity of the defined objects [*Gegenstände*]. On account of this circumstance, the synthetic method is no more appropriate for philosophy than the analytic method is, since philosophy has, before anything else, to justify to itself the necessity of its objects [*Gegenstände*]. Nevertheless, the effort has been made over and over to make use of the synthetic method in philosophy. Spinoza in particular begins with definitions and says, for example, ‘Substance is the *causa sui*.’ He lays down the most speculative themes in his definitions, but in the form of assurances. The same holds for Schelling.

§ 230

(bb) The account of the second moment of the concept, the determinacy of the universal as *particularization*, is given by the *division* in terms of some sort of external aspect.

Addition. What is demanded of the division is that it be complete, and part of this requirement is a principle or ground of the division that is so constituted that the division based on it encompasses the entire scope of the domain designated by the definition in general. In the course of the division it is then necessary, in addition, that it be done in such a way that its principle has been drawn from the nature of the object [*Gegenstand*] itself that is divided up. In this way the division is made naturally and not artificially, i.e. arbitrarily. So, for example, in zoology in the division of mammals, the claws and teeth are used above all as the ground of the division, and this is sensible since mammals themselves distinguish themselves from one another through these parts of their bodies and the general type of the diverse classes of them [i.e. mammals] are to be led back to this. – In general, the true division is to be regarded as determined by the concept. To this extent it is initially threefold; but since the particularity presents itself as something

doubled, the division then progresses to something fourfold as well. Trichotomies predominate in the sphere of the spirit and it is one of Kant's accomplishments to have drawn attention to this circumstance.

§ 231

(cc) In the *concrete individuality* (such that the simple determinacy in the definition is construed as *a relationship*), the object [*Gegenstand*] is a synthetic relation of *differentiated* determinations – a *theorem*. Because they are diverse, their identity is a *mediated* identity. The process of supplying the material that constitutes the middle members is the *construction*; and the mediation itself, out of which the necessity of that relation for knowing goes forth, is the *proof*.

According to the usual accounts given of the difference between the synthetic and the analytic method, it appears on the whole arbitrary which one person might want to use. If the concrete dimension that is presented in the synthetic method as the *result* is *presupposed*, then the abstract determinations may be analysed as its *consequences* (those abstract determinations constituting *presuppositions* and *material* for the proof). The algebraic *definitions* of curved lines are *theorems* in the route taken by geometry. Similarly, analysis of the Pythagorean theorem, assumed as the definition of a right-angled triangle, would yield principles proven earlier in geometry for the sake of establishing it. The arbitrariness of the choice rests upon the fact that the one method like the other proceeds from something *externally presupposed*. As far as the nature of the concept is concerned, analysing is primary since it first has to elevate the given, empirically concrete material into the form of universal abstractions which can only then be put forward as definitions in the synthetic method.

That these methods, so essential and so splendidly successful in their distinctive fields, are not usable for knowing philosophically is self-evident, since they have presuppositions and since knowing behaves in them as understanding, proceeding in terms of formal identity. In the case of Spinoza who principally employed the geometric method and, indeed, for *speculative* concepts, the formalism of the method makes itself immediately apparent. The Wolffian philosophy that develops it to the extremes of pedantry is a metaphysics of the understanding even in terms of its content. – The abuse of the formalism of these methods in philosophy and the

sciences has been replaced in more recent times with the abuse of so-called *construction*. Kant brought into circulation the notion that mathematics *constructs* its *concepts*, which was to say nothing else than that it dealt, *not* with *concepts* but instead with abstract determinations of *sensory intuitions*. Accordingly, what has been labelled a *construction of concepts* is the process of giving an account of *sensory* determinations taken up from *perception* while circumventing the concept, and the further formalism of classifying philosophical and scientific objects [*Gegenstände*] according to a presupposed schema in the form of tables (doing so, moreover, at one's whim and discretion). Lying in the background here is probably an obscure representation of the *idea*, of the unity of the *concept and of objectivity* as well as the notion that the idea is concrete. But that play of the so-called process of construction is far removed from presenting this *unity* that only the *concept* as such is, and the sensory-concrete [content] of intuition is just as far from being a concrete [content] of reason and the idea.

Since, moreover, *geometry* has to deal with the *sensory* but *abstract intuition* of space, it can specify unrestrictedly simple determinations of the understanding in space. For this reason, it alone has the synthetic method of finite knowing in its perfection. Nevertheless, it is quite noteworthy that, following this course, geometry ultimately hits upon *incommensurabilities* and *irrationalities* where, if it wants to go further in its determinations, it is driven beyond the principle of mere understanding. As often happens elsewhere, so here, too, the terminology is inverted such that what is named *rational* is something *due to the understanding* [*Verständige*], but what is called *irrational* is much more a beginning and trace of *what is in keeping with reason* [*Vernünftigkeit*]. Other sciences, since they do not find themselves in the simple framework of space or time, come up against the limit of proceeding by merely understanding (which happens to them both necessarily and often) but they have an easy way of helping themselves out of this fix. They break up the consistency of that way of proceeding and take what they need, often the opposite of what went before, taking it in from the outside, from representation, opinion, perception, or whatever it may be. In its obliviousness to the nature of its method (and that method's relation to the content) this finite knowing is precluded from knowing that, in its progression through definitions, divisions, and so forth, it is guided by the necessity of *the conceptual determinations*. Nor does this obliviousness allow it to know either where it is at its limit or, if

it has overstepped that limit, that it finds itself in a field where the determinations of understanding no longer count, determinations that it nevertheless roguishly continues to use in that field.

§ 232

The *necessity* which finite knowing produces in a *proof* is initially an external necessity, determined only for the subjective discernment. But in the necessity as such, it has itself left behind its presupposition and point of departure, the *finding* and *givenness* of its content. The necessity as such is, in itself, the concept relating itself to itself. The subjective idea has thus, in itself, come to what is determined in and for itself, *what is not given*, and is thus *immanent* to it as the *subject*. As such, it passes over into the *idea of willing*.

Addition. The necessity that knowing attains through the proof is the opposite of what forms for it its point of departure. In its point of departure, knowing had a given and contingent content. Now, however, at the conclusion of its movement, it knows [*weiß*] the content as a necessary one and this necessity is mediated by the subjective activity. So, too, subjectivity was at first completely abstract, a mere *tabula rasa*, whereas it proves itself now, by contrast, to be determining. Herein, however, lies the transition from the idea of knowing to the idea of willing. This transition consists then, more precisely, in the fact that the universal is to be construed in its truth as subjectivity, as the self-moving, active concept, positing determinations.

β. Willing

§ 233

The subjective idea – as what is determinate in and for itself, the simple, self-same *content* – is the *good*. Its drive of realizing itself inverts the relationship that holds relative to the idea of the *true*, and is bent on determining, in terms of its *purpose*, the world that it finds. – This *willing* is, on the one hand, certain of the *vacuousness* [*Nichtigkeit*] of the presupposed object but, on the other hand, as finite, it at the same time presupposes both the purpose of the good as a merely *subjective* idea and the *independence* of the object.

§ 234

The finitude of this activity is thus the *contradiction* that, in the self-contradicting determinations of the objective world, the *purpose of the good*

is both carried out and not carried out, and that it is posited as something inessential just as much as something essential, as something actual and at the same time as merely possible. This contradiction presents itself as the *endless progression* in the actualization of the good, that is therein established merely as an *ought*. *Formally*, however, this contradiction disappears in that the activity sublates the subjectivity of the purpose and thereby the objectivity, the opposition through which both are finite, and not only the one-sidedness of *this* subjectivity but subjectivity in general; *another* such subjectivity, that is to say, a *new* generation of the opposition, is not distinct from what was supposed to be an earlier one. This return into itself is at the same time the *recollection* [*Erinnerung*] of the *content* into itself, which is the *good* and the identity in itself [*die an sich seiende Identität*] of both sides, – the recollection of the presupposition of the theoretical stance (§ 224), that the object is what is substantial in itself and true.

Addition. While what matters for intelligence is merely taking the world as it *is*, the will, by contrast, is bent on making the world what it *ought* to be. The immediate, what it finds before it, counts for the will, not as a fixed being, but instead only as a semblance [*Schein*], as something in itself vacuous. Here those contradictions come to the fore in which one stumbles around on the standpoint of morality. This in general is the standpoint of the *Kantian* and even also the *Fichtean* philosophy in a practical context [*Beziehung*]. The good is supposed to be realized; one has to work to produce it, and the will is only the good activating itself. But then, were the world as it is supposed to be, the activity of willing would fall by the wayside. Thus the will in itself requires that its purpose also not be realized. This account correctly expresses the will's finitude. But then we should not stand pat with this finitude, and it is the process of willing itself through which this finitude and the contradiction contained in it are sublated. The reconciliation consists in the fact that the will, in its result, returns to the presupposition of knowing, that is to say, it consists in the unity of the theoretical and practical idea. The will knows [*weiß*] the purpose as its own and the intelligence construes the world as the actual concept. This is the true posture of rational knowing. What is vacuous and vanishing makes up only the surface, not the genuine essence of the world. This is the concept, being in and for itself, and the world is thus itself the idea. The unsatisfied striving disappears if we know that the final purpose of the world has been brought about and to the same degree eternally brings itself about. This is generally the posture of the adult man, while the youth believes that the whole world is in a bad way and out of it a completely different world must be made. By contrast, religious consciousness regards the world as governed by Divine Providence, and thus as corresponding to what it *ought* to be. This correspondence of is and ought, meanwhile, is not a frozen and inert correspondence; for the good, the final purpose of the world, *is* only in that it produces itself again and again, and the difference between the spiritual world and the natural world then consists in the fact that while

the latter constantly only returns into itself, a progression also takes place in the former.

§ 235

The *truth* of the good is, by this means, *posited* as the unity of the theoretical and practical idea, [the notion] that the good has been attained in and for itself – that the objective world is thus in and for itself the idea precisely as it [the idea] at the same time eternally posits itself as *purpose* and through activity produces its actuality. This life, having come back to itself from the differentiation [*Differenz*] and finitude of knowing, and having become identical with the concept through the activity of the concept, is the *speculative or absolute idea*.

c. The absolute idea

§ 236

The idea as the unity of the subjective and the objective idea is the concept of the idea, for which the idea as such is the object [*Gegenstand*], for which it is the object [*Objekt*] – an object [*Objekt*] into which all determinations have gone together. This unity is accordingly the *absolute and entire truth*, the idea thinking itself, and here, indeed, *as* thinking, as the *logical idea*.

Addition. The absolute idea is first the unity of the theoretical and the practical idea and, by this means, at the same time the unity of the idea of life and the idea of knowing. In knowing [*Erkennen*], we had the idea in the form of difference [*Differenz*] and the process of knowing has presented itself to us as the overturning of this difference and as the restoration of that unity which, as such and in its immediacy, is first the idea of life. The deficiency of [the concept of] life consists in being at first only the idea insofar as it is *in itself* [*die an sich seiende Idee*]; in contrast to this, but in just as one-sided a fashion, knowing is only the idea insofar as it is *for itself*. The unity and truth of these two is the *idea* insofar as it is *in and for itself* and, thereby, *absolute*. – Up to now *we* have had for our object [*Gegenstand*] the idea in the development through its diverse stages; now, however, the idea is objective with respect to itself [*sich selbst gegenständlich*]. This is the νόησις νοήσεως; what Aristotle already designated as the highest form of the idea.

§ 237

The *absolute idea* is for itself, since in it there is no transition or presupposing and no determinacy at all that is not fluid and transparent; it is the *pure*

form of the concept that intuitively *its content* as itself. It is *content* for itself insofar as it is the ideal differentiating of itself from itself, and one side of what has been differentiated is the identity with itself, in which, however, the totality of the form is contained as the system of the determinations of the content. This content is the system of *the logical*. Nothing remains here of the idea, as *form*, but the *method* of this content – the determinate knowledge [*Wissen*] of the validity of its moments.

Addition. When one speaks of the absolute idea, one can think that here finally the substantive must come to the fore, that here everything must become clear. One can, to be sure, vacuously spout on end about the absolute idea; the true content, meanwhile, is nothing but the entire system, the development of which we have considered up to this point. It can accordingly also be said that the absolute idea is the universal, but the universal not merely as an abstract form opposite which the particular content stands as something other than it. Instead it is the absolute form, into which all determinations, the entire fullness of the content posited by it, have gone back. In this respect, the absolute idea is comparable to the old man who says the same religious sentences as the child does, but for the old man they have the meaning of his entire life. Even if the child understands the religious content, what validity that content has for him is still of the sort that lies outside his entire life and world. – The same holds then also for human life in general and the occurrences that make up the content of it. All work is only aimed at the goal, and if this is attained, then one is astonished at finding nothing else than precisely this, what one wanted. The interest lies in the entire movement. If a human being pursues his life, then the end can appear to him as quite limited, but it is the entire *decursus vitae* [course of a life] that is encompassed in it. – Thus, too, then the content of the absolute idea is the entire expanse of what we had before us up until now. The final [point] is the insight that the entire unfolding makes up the content and interest. – This is, furthermore, the philosophical view that everything that appears limited, taken for itself, acquires its worth through inhering in the whole and being a moment of the idea. Thus it is that we have had the content and what we still have is the knowledge [*Wissen*] that the content is the living development of the idea and this simple retrospective is contained in the form. Each of the stages considered up to this point is an image of the absolute, albeit in a limited manner at first, and so it drives itself on to the whole, the unfolding of which is precisely what we have designated the method.

§ 238

The moments of the speculative method are (α) the *beginning*, which is being or the immediate; for itself for the simple reason that it is the beginning. From the vantage point of the speculative idea, however, it is the speculative idea's *self-determining* which, as the absolute negativity or movement of the concept, *judges* and posits itself as the negative of itself.

Being, which from the vantage point of the beginning as such appears as abstract affirmation, is thus instead the *negation*, *positedness*, being-mediated in general and being *pre-supposed*. But as the negation of the *concept* that is simply identical with itself in its otherness and is the certainty of itself, it is the concept not yet posited as concept or, in other words, it is the concept *in itself*. – For that reason, as the still undetermined concept, i.e. the concept determined only in itself or immediately, this being is just as much the *universal*.

The beginning is taken in the sense of immediate being from intuition and perception – the beginning of the *analytic* method of finite knowing; in the sense of the universality, it is the beginning of the synthetic method of such knowing. Since, however, the logical [dimension] is immediately something universal as much as something that is [*Seiendes*], just as much something presupposed by the concept as it is immediate, its beginning is as much synthetic as it is analytic.

Addition. The philosophical method is as much analytic as it is synthetic, yet not in the sense of a mere juxtaposition or a mere oscillation of these two methods of finite knowing. It is instead such that it contains them as sublated in itself and accordingly behaves in each of its movements both analytically and synthetically at the same time. Philosophical thinking proceeds analytically insofar as it merely takes up its object [*Gegenstand*], the idea, giving the latter full play, and as it were merely looking upon its movement and development. To this extent, philosophizing is completely passive. But philosophical thinking is then equally synthetic and demonstrates itself to be the activity of the concept itself. This requires, however, the strenuous effort of holding off on one's own notions [*Einfälle*] and particular opinions which are always trying to assert themselves.

§ 239

(β) The *progression* is the posited *judgment* of the idea. The immediate universal, as the concept in itself, is the dialectic of reducing, within itself, its immediacy and universality to a moment. It is accordingly the *negative* [aspect] of the beginning or the first [moment] posited in its *determinacy*; it is *for something* [*für eines*], the *relation* of what has been differentiated, – *the moment of reflection*.

This progression is just as much *analytic* (in that the immanent dialectic only posits what is contained in the immediate concept) as *synthetic* (since in this concept this difference was not yet posited).

Addition. In the progression of the idea, the beginning demonstrates itself to be what it is in itself, namely, something posited and mediated and not what simply and immediately is [*nicht als das Seiende und Unmittelbare*]. Only for immediate consciousness is nature the beginning point [*Anfängliche*] and the immediate, and the spirit something mediated by nature. In fact, however, nature is posited by the spirit and the spirit itself makes nature its presupposition.

§ 240

The abstract form of the progression within the stage of being is [to be] an *other* and a *passing over* into an other; in the stage of the essence, it is *the shining* [*das Scheinen*] in something *opposite*; in the stage of the concept, it is the differentiated status of the *individual* from the *universality* which *continues* itself as such in what is differentiated from it and is *as an identity* with the latter.

§ 241

In the second sphere, the concept at first being in itself came to shine forth [*zum Scheinen gekommen*] and is *thus in itself* already the *idea*. – The development of this sphere becomes the return to the first, just as the development of the first sphere is a transition into the second. Only by means of this double movement is justice done to the difference, since each of the two differentiated factors, each considered in itself, completes itself so as to form the totality and, in that totality, puts itself into unity with the other. Only the fact that *both* sublate [*das Sichaufheben*] the one-sidedness *in themselves* prevents the unity from becoming one-sided.

§ 242

The second sphere develops the relation of what has been differentiated into what the relation is at first, namely a *contradiction* in the relation itself – in the *infinite progression*. This contradiction (γ) resolves itself into the *end*, where the differentiated [*das Different*e] is posited as what it is in the concept. It is the negative of the first, and, as the identity with the latter, the negativity of itself. Hence, it is the unity in which these first two, as ideal and as moments, are sublated, i.e. preserved at the same time. The concept, starting out from its *being-in-itself*, thus comes to a close with itself by means of its difference [*Differenz*] and the process of sublating that difference. This concept is the *realized* concept, i.e. the concept that

contains the *positedness* of its determinations in its *being-for-itself*— it is the *idea* for which, as the absolutely first (in the method), this end is at the same time nothing more than the process by which the *semblance* that the beginning is something immediate and it [the idea] a result *vanishes*; — in other words, this end is the knowledge that the idea is the one totality.

§ 243

In this way, the method is not an external form but the soul and concept of the content, from which it is distinguished only insofar as the moments of the *concept*, even in *themselves*, in their [respective] *determinacy*, come to appear as the totality of the concept. Insofar as this determinacy or the content, with the form, leads itself back to the idea, this idea exhibits itself as the *systematic* totality which is only *one* idea, the particular moments of which are *in themselves* this same idea to the same extent that they bring forth the simple *being-for-itself* of the idea through the dialectic of the concept. — The science concludes in this way by grasping the concept of itself as the pure idea, for which the idea is.

§ 244

The idea, which is *for itself*, *considered* in terms of this, its *unity* with itself, is *the process of intuiting* [*Anschauung*] and the idea insofar as it intuits is *nature*. As intuiting, however, the idea is posited by external reflection in a one-sided determination of immediacy or negation. Yet the absolute *freedom* of the idea is that it does not merely pass over into *life* or let life shine in itself as finite knowing, but instead, in the absolute truth of itself, *resolves to release* *freely from itself* the moment of its particularity or the first determining and otherness, the *immediate idea*, as its *reflection* [*Widerschein*], itself as *nature*.

Addition. We have now returned to the concept of the idea with which we began. This return to the beginning is at the same time a move forward [*Fortgang*]. What we began with was being, the abstract being, and now we have the *idea* as *being*; this idea insofar as it is [*diese seiende Idee*], however, is *nature*.

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Glossary of translated terms, German to English

<i>Abwechslung</i>	oscillation
<i>Allgemeinheit</i>	universality
<i>an sich</i>	in itself, as such
<i>anerkennen</i>	recognize
<i>angemessen</i>	adequate, suitable, appropriate
<i>anschauen</i>	intuit, observe, inspect, look at
<i>Anstoß</i>	check
<i>Anzahl</i>	amount
<i>Art</i>	species, type
<i>auffassen</i>	construe, apprehend
<i>Auffassung</i>	construal
<i>aufheben, Aufhebung</i>	sublate, sublation (see 'Translators' note)
<i>aufzeigen</i>	show
<i>Ausführung</i>	elaboration
<i>ausführlicher</i>	in more detail
<i>Äußere, das</i>	the outer, the outer dimension
<i>äußerlich</i>	external
<i>Band</i>	bond
<i>Bedeutung</i>	sense, meaning, significance
<i>Bedingung</i>	condition
<i>Begehren</i>	desiring
<i>Begierde</i>	desire
<i>begreifen</i>	conceive, comprehend
<i>begrenzt</i>	bounded
<i>begründen</i>	justify, ground
<i>Behauptung</i>	claim
<i>Beisichsein, das</i>	being-with-itself, being-at-home-with-itself
<i>Bekanntschaft</i>	familiarity
<i>berühmt</i>	acclaimed
<i>beschränken</i>	limit
<i>Beschränkung</i>	limitation
<i>Besondere, das</i>	the particular
<i>Bestand</i>	standing, status, the stable
<i>bestehen</i>	subsist, consist, obtain

<i>bestimmen</i>	determine, specify
<i>Bestimmung</i>	determination, vocation, function
<i>betrachten</i>	consider, regard, contemplate, view, observe
<i>bewähren</i>	prove
<i>Beweis</i>	proof
<i>beweisen</i>	prove
<i>Beziehung</i>	relation, connection, context
<i>bilden</i>	form, shape
<i>Bildung</i>	education, formation
<i>Boden</i>	basis, terrain, province
<i>Dasein</i>	existence (see Translators' note)
<i>Denkbestimmung</i>	determination of thinking, thought- determination
<i>Denkformen</i>	forms of thinking
<i>Denkgesetz</i>	principle
<i>Differente, das</i>	differentiated
<i>Differenz</i>	difference (see Translators' note)
<i>Differenzierung</i>	differentiation
<i>Einfachheit</i>	simple form
<i>Einigkeit</i>	oneness
<i>eintreten</i>	enter in
<i>Einzelne, das</i>	individual
<i>Empfindung</i>	sensation, sentiment, feeling
<i>Entgegensetzung</i>	opposition
<i>Entwicklung</i>	development
<i>Entzweiung</i>	division
<i>Erbsünde</i>	original sin
<i>Erdichtung</i>	contrivance
<i>Erfahrung</i>	experience
<i>erhalten</i>	acquire, sustain
<i>Erkennen, das</i>	knowing (see Translators' note)
<i>Erkenntnis</i>	knowledge (see Translators' note)
<i>erregen</i>	arouse
<i>Erscheinung</i>	appearance, phenomenon, manifestation
<i>erweisen</i>	demonstrate
<i>Erzeugte, das</i>	generated entities
<i>Erziehung</i>	education
<i>Existenz, Existenzen, existierend</i>	concrete existence, concretely existing entities, concretely existing (see 'Translators' note)
<i>fassen</i>	grasp
<i>Feld</i>	field, plane
<i>fest</i>	stable, firm, fixed
<i>festhalten an</i>	cling to, firmly maintain, hold fast

<i>Fortgang</i>	progression
<i>fortschreiten über</i>	advance beyond
<i>für sich</i>	for itself, on its own account
<i>Gang</i>	route, path
<i>Gebiet</i>	domain
<i>Gedankenbestimmung</i>	thought-determination
<i>Gefühl</i>	feeling
<i>Gegensatz</i>	opposition
<i>gegenseitig</i>	mutually
<i>Gegenstand</i>	object (see Translators' note)
<i>gegenständlich</i>	objective
<i>Gehalt</i>	basic content, significance (see Translators' note)
<i>gehören</i>	inhere, pertain, belong to, be inherent in, be part of
<i>geltend machen</i>	maintain and uphold
<i>Gemeinschaftlichkeit</i>	commonality
<i>gesetzt</i>	posited, supposed
<i>Gesinnung</i>	sensibility
<i>Gestalt</i>	shape, formation, configuration
<i>Gestaltung</i>	formation
<i>Glaube</i>	faith
<i>glauben</i>	believe
<i>gleichgültig</i>	indifferent
<i>Gleichheit</i>	likeness, being alike, equality
<i>Grenze</i>	boundary
<i>Grundlage</i>	foundation
<i>Güte</i>	loving kindness
<i>Historie</i>	historical record
<i>indifferent</i>	undifferentiated
<i>Inhalt</i>	content (see Translators' note)
<i>Innere, das</i>	the inner, the core, the inner dimension
<i>innerlich</i>	internal
<i>kennen</i>	be familiar, acquainted with
<i>kennenlernen</i>	become acquainted with, familiar with
<i>Kraft</i>	force, might, power
<i>Kreis</i>	sphere
<i>Leere</i>	void
<i>liegen in</i>	to lie in, to be inherent in
<i>Logische, das</i>	the logical dimension
<i>Macht</i>	power
<i>Mannigfaltigkeit</i>	multiplicity, manifoldness
<i>Material</i>	material
<i>Materie</i>	matter, sort of matter (see Translators' note)

<i>Materien</i>	sorts of matter
<i>meinen</i>	believe, mean
<i>Menge</i>	set, assortment
<i>Mensch</i>	human being, human (<i>n.</i>)
<i>Moment</i>	moment (see Translators' note)
<i>nach</i>	in keeping with, according to, in terms of
<i>Nachdenken</i>	thinking over, thinking through, meditation, deliberation
<i>neben</i>	alongside, along, next to
<i>nichtig</i>	vacuous, vapid, empty
<i>Notwendigkeit</i>	necessity
<i>Objekt</i>	object (see Translators' note)
<i>objektiv</i>	objective
<i>Objektivität</i>	objectivity
<i>Prozeß</i>	process
<i>Räsonnement</i>	rationalizing, formal reasoning, formal sort of reasoning
<i>Rechtfertigung</i>	justification
<i>Reflexion</i>	reflection
<i>Sache</i>	basic matter (see Translators' note)
<i>sachlich</i>	factual
<i>Satz vom Grund</i>	principle of the ground
<i>Scharfsinn</i>	craftiness
<i>Scheidung</i>	divorce
<i>Schein</i>	shine (<i>n.</i>), shining, semblance (see Translators' note)
<i>scheinen</i>	shine (<i>v.</i>), seem (see Translators' note)
<i>schlecht</i>	bad
<i>schließen</i>	infer, infer via syllogism (see Translators' note)
<i>Schluß</i>	syllogism, syllogistic inference (see Translators' note)
<i>Schranke</i>	barrier, limitation
<i>Seiende, das</i>	entity
<i>Sein</i>	being (<i>n.</i>)
<i>selbstständig</i>	self-sufficient, self-standing
<i>Selbstständigkeit</i>	self-sufficiency, independence
<i>selbsttätig</i>	active on its own
<i>Sinn</i>	sense, sensitivity
<i>sinnig</i>	sensible
<i>sinnlich</i>	sensory, via (by way of) the senses
<i>Sinnlichkeit</i>	sentience
<i>sinnvoll</i>	meaningful
<i>spröde</i>	austere

<i>stehen bleiben bei</i>	stand pat with, remain at a standstill, remain content with
<i>Stellung</i>	position
<i>Stoff</i>	material
<i>Substantielle, das</i>	the substantial element
<i>Sündenfall</i>	the Fall
<i>Tätigkeit</i>	activity
<i>Trennung</i>	separation
<i>Trieb</i>	urge, drive
<i>Übereinstimmung</i>	agreement
<i>Übergang</i>	transition
<i>übergehen</i>	pass over
<i>übersetzen</i>	translate, transpose, transport
<i>umschlagen</i>	turn over
<i>Unabhängigkeit</i>	independence
<i>unbefangen</i>	naïve
<i>Unbegrenzte, das</i>	unbounded
<i>Unbeschränkte, das</i>	unlimited
<i>Unförmlichkeit</i>	informality
<i>Unsagbare, das</i>	ineffable
<i>unterscheiden</i>	differentiate, distinguish
<i>Unterschied</i>	difference (see Translators' note)
<i>Unterschiedenheit</i>	distinctness
<i>unterwerfen</i>	subject
<i>Verbindung</i>	bond, combination, connection
<i>verbunden</i>	be combined with, be bound up with
<i>Vereinzelung</i>	individualization, individuated condition, instantiation
<i>Verfahren</i>	procedure, process
<i>Verhältnis</i>	relationship, relation, proportion
<i>verknüpfen</i>	attach, connect
<i>Verknüpfung</i>	combination
<i>verschieden</i>	different, diverse, various
<i>verwerfen</i>	reject
<i>vorhanden</i>	on hand, at hand, present
<i>vorkommen</i>	surface
<i>Vorsehung</i>	providence
<i>Vorwurf</i>	reproach
<i>Wechsel</i>	alternation, exchange
<i>Weg</i>	path, way
<i>Wert</i>	value
<i>Wesen</i>	essence, being (see Translators' note)
<i>Wille</i>	will
<i>Willensvermögen</i>	volition
<i>Wirken, das</i>	effecting

<i>Wirklichkeit</i>	actuality
<i>Wissen, das</i>	knowledge, knowing (see Translators' note)
<i>Wollen, das</i>	willing, wanting
<i>zerfallen</i>	break down, fall apart, collapse
<i>zerlegen</i>	analyse
<i>Ziel</i>	goal
<i>Zufall</i>	chance, (the) contingent, coincidence
<i>zufällig</i>	contingent, accidental, ad hoc
<i>Zufälligkeit</i>	contingency
<i>Zusammenhang</i>	connection
<i>zusammenschließen</i>	join together with (see Translators' note)
<i>sich mit etwas zusammenschließen</i>	joins itself (decisively, conclusively) together with (see Translators' note)
<i>Zustand</i>	status
<i>Zweck</i>	end, purpose

Glossary of translated terms, English to German

accidental	<i>zufällig</i>
acclaimed	<i>berühmt</i>
according to	<i>nach</i>
acquainted	
be acquainted with	<i>kennen</i>
become acquainted with	<i>kennenlernen</i>
acquire	<i>erhalten, erwerben</i>
active on its own	<i>selbsttätig</i>
activity	<i>Tätigkeit</i>
actuality	<i>Wirklichkeit</i>
ad hoc	<i>zufällig</i>
adequate	<i>angemessen</i>
advance beyond	<i>fortschreiten über</i>
agreement	<i>Übereinstimmung</i>
alike, in 'being alike'	<i>Gleichheit</i>
along, alongside	<i>neben</i>
alternation	<i>Wechsel</i>
amount	<i>Anzahl</i>
analyse	<i>zerlegen</i>
appearance	<i>Erscheinung</i>
apprehend	<i>auffassen</i>
appropriate	<i>angemessen</i>
arouse	<i>erregen</i>
as such	<i>an sich</i>
assortment	<i>Menge</i>
at hand	<i>vorhanden</i>
attach	<i>verknüpfen</i>
austere	<i>spröde</i>
bad	<i>schlecht</i>
barrier	<i>Schranke</i>
basic	
basic content	<i>Gehalt</i> (see Translators' note)
basic matter	<i>Sache</i> (see Translators' note)
basis	<i>Boden</i>

being (<i>n.</i>)	<i>Sein, Wesen</i> (see Translators' note)
being-at-home-with-itself	<i>das Beisichsein</i>
being-with-itself	<i>das Beisichsein</i>
belief	<i>Glaube</i>
believe	<i>glauben, meinen</i>
belong	<i>gehören</i>
bond	<i>Band, Verbindung</i>
bound up with	<i>verbinden</i>
boundary	<i>Grenze</i>
bounded	<i>begrenzen</i>
break down	<i>zerfallen</i>
chance	<i>Zufall</i>
check	<i>Anstoß</i>
claim	<i>Behauptung</i>
cling to	<i>festhalten</i>
coincidence	<i>Zufall</i>
collapse	<i>zerfallen</i>
combination	<i>Verbindung, Verknüpfung</i>
combined with	<i>verbunden</i>
commonality	<i>Gemeinschaftlichkeit</i>
comprehend	<i>begreifen</i>
conceive	<i>begreifen</i>
concrete	
concrete existence	<i>Existenz</i> (see Translators' note)
concretely existing	<i>existierend</i> (see Translators' note)
concretely existing entities	<i>Existenzen</i> (see Translators' note)
condition	
condition	<i>Bedingung</i>
individuated condition	<i>Vereinzelung</i>
configuration	<i>Gestalt</i>
connect	<i>verknüpfen</i>
connection	<i>Beziehung, Verbindung, Zusammenhang</i>
consider	<i>betrachten</i>
consist	<i>bestehen</i>
construe	<i>auffassen</i>
construal	<i>Auffassung</i>
contemplate	<i>betrachten</i>
content	
content	<i>Inhalt</i> (see Translators' note)
basic content	<i>Gehalt</i> (see Translators' note)
in 'remain content with'	<i>stehenbleiben bei</i>
context	<i>Beziehung</i>
contingency	<i>Zufälligkeit</i>
contingent, the	<i>Zufall</i>
contingent	<i>zufällig</i>

contrivance	<i>Erdichtung</i>
core	<i>das Innere</i>
craftiness	<i>Scharfsinn</i>
deliberation	<i>Nachdenken</i>
demonstrate	<i>erweisen</i>
desire	<i>Begierde</i>
desiring	<i>Begehren</i>
determination	<i>Bestimmung</i>
determinations of thinking	<i>Denkbestimmungen</i>
determine	<i>bestimmen</i>
development	<i>Entwicklung</i>
difference	<i>Differenz, Unterschied</i> (see Translators' note)
different	<i>verschieden</i>
differentiate	<i>unterscheiden</i>
differentiated, the	<i>das Differente</i>
differentiation	<i>Differenzierung</i>
dimension	
inner dimension	<i>das Innere</i>
logical dimension	<i>das Logische</i>
outer dimension	<i>das Äußere</i>
distinctness	<i>Unterschiedenheit</i>
distinguish	<i>unterscheiden</i>
diverse	<i>verschieden</i>
division	<i>Entzweiung, Einteilung</i>
divorce	<i>Scheidung</i>
domain	<i>Gebiet</i>
drive	<i>Trieb</i>
education	<i>Bildung, Erziehung</i>
effecting	<i>das Wirken</i>
elaboration	<i>Ausführung</i>
element, in 'substantial element'	<i>das Substantielle</i>
empty	<i>nichtig</i>
end	<i>Zweck</i>
enter in	<i>eintreten</i>
entity	
entity	<i>das Seiende</i>
in 'generated entities'	<i>das Erzeugte</i>
equality	<i>Gleichheit</i>
essence	<i>Wesen</i>
exchange	<i>Wechsel</i>
existence	<i>Dasein</i> (see Translators' note)
experience	<i>Erfahrung</i>
external	<i>äußerlich</i>
factual	<i>sachlich</i>

faith	<i>Glaube</i>
fall	
fall apart	<i>zerfallen</i>
the Fall	<i>Sündenfall</i>
familiar	
be familiar with	<i>kennen</i>
become familiar with	<i>kennenlernen</i>
familiarity	<i>Bekanntschaft</i>
feeling	<i>Empfindung, Gefühl</i>
field	<i>Feld</i>
firm	<i>fest</i>
firmly maintain	<i>festhalten an</i>
fixed	<i>fest</i>
for itself	<i>für sich</i>
force	<i>Kraft</i>
form	
form	<i>bilden</i>
forms of thinking	<i>Denkformen</i>
in 'simple form'	<i>Einfachheit</i>
formal reasoning,	<i>Räsonnement</i>
formal sort of reasoning	
formation	<i>Bildung, Gestalt, Gestaltung</i>
foundation	<i>Grundlage</i>
function	<i>Bestimmung</i>
generated entities	<i>das Erzeugte</i>
goal	<i>Ziel</i>
grasp	<i>fassen</i>
ground (<i>v.</i>)	<i>begründen</i>
historical record	<i>Historie</i>
hold fast	<i>festhalten</i>
human (<i>n.</i>), human being	<i>Mensch</i>
in . . .	
in itself	<i>an sich</i>
in keeping with	<i>nach</i>
in more detail	<i>ausführlicher</i>
in terms of	<i>nach</i>
independence	<i>Selbstständigkeit, Unabhängigkeit</i>
indifferent	<i>gleichgültig</i>
individual	<i>das Einzelne</i>
individualization	<i>Vereinzelung</i>
individuated condition	<i>Vereinzelung</i>
ineffable (<i>n.</i>)	<i>das Unsagbare</i>
infer, infer via syllogism	<i>schließen</i> (see Translators' note)
inference, in 'syllogistic inference'	<i>Schluß</i> (see Translators' note)
informality	<i>Unförmlichkeit</i>

inhere	<i>gehören</i>
inherent, in 'to be inherent in'	<i>gehören, liegen in</i>
inner, inner dimension	<i>das Innere</i>
inspect	<i>anschauen</i>
instantiation	<i>Vereinzelung</i>
internal	<i>innerlich</i>
intuit	<i>anschauen</i>
join	
join together with	<i>zusammenschließen</i>
join itself decisively/conclusively together with	<i>sich mit etwas zusammenschließen</i>
justification	<i>Rechtfertigung</i>
justify	<i>begründen</i>
kindness, in 'loving kindness'	<i>Güte</i>
knowing	<i>das Erkennen, das Wissen</i> (see Translators' note)
knowledge	<i>Erkenntnis, das Wissen</i> (see Translators' note)
lie in	<i>liegen in</i>
likeness	<i>Gleichheit</i>
limit	<i>beschränken</i>
limitation	<i>Beschränkung, Schranke</i>
look at	<i>anschauen</i>
loving kindness	<i>Güte</i>
maintain and uphold	<i>geltend machen</i>
maintain firmly	<i>festhalten</i>
manifestation	<i>Erscheinung</i>
manifoldness	<i>Mannigfaltigkeit</i>
material	<i>Material, Stoff</i>
matter	
matter	<i>Materie</i>
basic matter	<i>Sache</i> (see Translators' note)
in 'sort/sorts of matter'	<i>Materie, Materien</i>
mean	<i>meinen</i>
meaning	<i>Bedeutung</i>
meaningful	<i>sinnvoll</i>
meditation	<i>Nachdenken</i>
might	<i>Kraft</i>
moment	<i>Moment</i> (see Translators' note)
multiplicity	<i>Mannigfaltigkeit</i>
mutually	<i>gegenseitig</i>
naïve	<i>unbefangen</i>
necessity	<i>Notwendigkeit</i>
next to	<i>neben</i>
object	<i>Gegenstand, Objekt</i> (see Translators' note)

objective	<i>gegenständlich, objektiv</i>
objectivity	<i>Objektivität</i>
observe	<i>anschauen, betrachten</i>
obtain	<i>bestehen</i>
on hand	<i>vorhanden</i>
on its own account	<i>für sich</i>
oneness	<i>Einigkeit</i>
opposition	<i>Entgegensetzung, Gegensatz</i>
original sin	<i>Erbsünde</i>
oscillation	<i>Abwechslung</i>
part, in 'to be part of	<i>gehören</i>
particular, the	<i>das Besondere</i>
pass over	<i>übergehen</i>
path	<i>Gang, Weg</i>
pertain	<i>gehören</i>
phenomenon	<i>Erscheinung</i>
plane	<i>Feld</i>
posited	<i>gesetzt</i>
position	<i>Stellung</i>
power	<i>Kraft, Macht</i>
present	<i>vorhanden</i>
principle	<i>Denkgesetz</i>
principle of the ground	<i>Satz vom Grund</i>
procedure	<i>Verfahren</i>
process	<i>Prozeß, Verfahren</i>
progression	<i>Fortgang</i>
proof	<i>Beweis</i>
proportion	<i>Verhältnis</i>
prove	<i>bewähren, beweisen</i>
providence	<i>Vorsehung</i>
province	<i>Boden</i>
purpose	<i>Zweck</i>
rationalizing	<i>Räsonnement</i>
recognize	<i>anerkennen</i>
reflection	<i>Reflexion</i>
regard	<i>betrachten</i>
reject	<i>verwerfen</i>
relation	<i>Beziehung, Verhältnis</i>
relationship	<i>Verhältnis</i>
remain at a standstill	<i>stehen bleiben, stehenbleiben bei</i>
remain content with	<i>stehenbleiben bei</i>
reproach	<i>Vorwurf</i>
route	<i>Gang</i>
seem	<i>scheinen (see Translators' note)</i>
self-standing	<i>selbstständig</i>

self-sufficiency	<i>Selbstständigkeit</i>
self-sufficient	<i>selbstständig</i>
semblance	<i>Schein</i> (see Translators' note)
sensation	<i>Empfindung</i>
sense	<i>Bedeutung, Sinn</i>
sensibility	<i>Gesinnung, Sensibilität</i>
sensible	<i>sinnig</i>
sensitivity	<i>Sinn</i>
sensory	<i>sinnlich</i>
sentience	<i>Sinnlichkeit</i>
sentiment	<i>Empfindung</i>
separation	<i>Trennung</i>
set	<i>Menge</i>
shape (<i>n.</i>)	<i>Gestalt</i>
shape (<i>v.</i>)	<i>bilden</i>
shine (<i>n.</i>)	<i>Schein</i>
shine (<i>v.</i>)	<i>scheinen</i> (see Translators' note)
shining	<i>Schein</i> (see Translators' note)
show	<i>aufzeigen</i>
significance	<i>Bedeutung, Gehalt</i>
simple form	<i>Einfachheit</i>
sort, in 'sort/sorts of matter'	<i>Materie, Materien</i>
species	<i>Art</i>
specify	<i>bestimmen</i>
sphere	<i>Kreis</i>
stable	
stable (<i>adj.</i>)	<i>fest</i>
stable (<i>n.</i>)	<i>Bestand</i>
stand pat	<i>stehen bleiben</i>
stand pat with	<i>stehenbleiben bei</i>
standing	<i>Bestand</i>
standstill, in 'remain at a standstill'	<i>stehenbleiben, stehenbleiben bei</i>
status	<i>Bestand, Zustand</i>
stop short	<i>stehenbleiben</i>
subject (<i>v.</i>)	<i>unterwerfen</i>
sublate	<i>aufheben</i> (see Translators' note)
sublation	<i>Aufhebung</i> (see Translators' note)
subsist	<i>bestehen</i>
substantial element	<i>das Substantielle</i>
sufficiency, in 'self-sufficiency'	<i>Selbstständigkeit</i>
sufficient, in 'self-sufficient'	<i>selbstständig</i>
suitable	<i>angemessen</i>
supposed	<i>gesetzt</i>
surface (<i>v.</i>)	<i>vorkommen</i>
sustain	<i>erhalten</i>

syllogism	<i>Schluß</i>
syllogism	<i>schließen</i>
infer via syllogism	<i>Schluß</i>
syllogistic inference	<i>Boden</i>
terrain	<i>Nachdenken</i>
thinking over, through	<i>Denkbestimmungen,</i>
thought-determinations	<i>Gedankenbestimmungen</i>
transition	<i>Übergang</i>
translate	<i>übersetzen</i>
transport	<i>übersetzen</i>
transpose	<i>übersetzen</i>
turn over	<i>umschlagen</i>
type	<i>Art</i>
unbounded, the	<i>das Unbegrenzte</i>
undifferentiated	<i>indifferent</i>
universality	<i>Allgemeinheit</i>
unlimited, the	<i>das Unbeschränkte</i>
uphold, in 'maintain and uphold'	<i>geltend machen</i>
urge	<i>Trieb</i>
vacuous	<i>nichtig</i>
value	<i>Wert</i>
vapid	<i>nichtig</i>
various	<i>verschieden</i>
view	<i>betrachten</i>
vocation	<i>Bestimmung</i>
void	<i>Leere</i>
volition	<i>Willensvermögen</i>
wanting	<i>das Wollen</i>
way	<i>Weg</i>
will	<i>Wille</i>
willing	<i>das Wollen</i>

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